

Notes on What's What, and on What It Might Be Reasonable to Do about What's What:

The Culmination of Aldous Huxley's Philosophy in *Island*

By


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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		
I.	Introduction: Nothing Short of Everything	
II.	The Individual: What's What	13
III.	Spiritual Philosophy: Thou Art That	30
IV.	Relationships: Self-knowledge, Total Acceptance, The Blessed Experience of Not-Two	43
V.	Government, Economics, Law: What Might Be Reasonable	56
VI.	Education: Processes or Substantial Things	67
VII.	Conclusion: Pontifex Minimus	80
	List of Works Consulted	83

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- 1) BWR *Brave New World Revisited*, 1958
- 2) DP *The Doors of Perception*, 1954
- 3) DYW *Do What You Will*, 1929
- 4) EG *Eyeless in Gaza*, 1936
- 5) EM *Ends and Means*, 1937
- 6) HS *The Human Situation*, (1959 lectures), 1977
- 7) ISL *Island*, 1962
- 8) OM *On the Margin*, 1923
- 9) PCP *Point Counter Point*, 1928
- 10) PP *Perennial Philosophy*, 1945
- 11) PS *Proper Studies*, 1927
- 12) SLP *Science, Liberty and Peace*, 1946
- 13) TTT *Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow*, 1956
(British title, *Adonis and the Alphabet*)
- 14) W *Words and Their Meanings*, 1940

INTRODUCTION: NOTHING SHORT OF EVERYTHING

In his last novel, *Island* (1962), Aldous Huxley writes in the persona of the old Raja of Pala: “PATRIOTISM IS NOT ENOUGH, ’...Science is not enough, religion is not enough, art is not enough, politics and economics are not enough, nor is love, nor is duty, nor is action however disinterested, nor, however sublime, is contemplation” (152). Each of these unifying forces within society are “not enough” alone or in conjunction with one or more of the others to reform society into Huxley’s version of a “fully human” society. According to Huxley, all of these aspects of individual and societal life must be in alignment with the undergirding goal of reaching “full humanity” for the individuals who make up the population: “Nothing short of everything will really do” (152). The old Raja’s booklet is entitled “Notes on What’s What, and on What It Might be Reasonable to Do about What’s What” and contains Huxley’s “underlying principles” for the creation of a near-utopian society that Huxley depicts in cumulative detail in *Island* (39). Although he is limited by the novel form in both length and breadth, Huxley’s depictions in *Island* are indicative of his career-long interest in individual and societal reform.

Will Farnaby, Huxley’s protagonist in *Island*, is introduced to the Palanese program for a society that is both more sane and more humane than his own European world through his reading of the Old Raja’s writings. Characteristically, Huxley, who throughout his career had been both delineating modern social and philosophical conundrums and exploring various solutions in his novels and essays, divides the Old

Raja's approach into the theoretical and the pragmatic. "What's What" establishes the underlying philosophical assumptions about how human beings typically live in contrast to how they ought to live. "What It Might be Reasonable to Do about What's What" proposes practical solutions for restructuring individuals, and, subsequently, societies into organizations conducive to living, as Huxley terms it, in a way that is "fully human."

"What's What," or in other words, the identification of the unhealthy state of the "modern" individual and the diseased "modern" society, was the focus of Huxley's early novels. Up to 1928, Huxley's protagonists generally revealed that the relationships between an individual's ideas and beliefs were all too often irrelevant to the individual's actions. To Huxley, this situation of discontinuity is a key symptom of modern fragmentation, and in his early novels he presented varying but continuous portraits of stagnate, fragmented individuals. Theodore Gumbriel in *Crome Yellow* (1921) and Denis Stone in *Antic Hay* (1923) epitomize Huxley's early protagonists--individuals not only unable to function in their own best interests but unable even to recognize their plight. The exception to this early character type is Calamy in *Those Barren Leaves* (1925). At the end of the novel, Calamy recognizes his situation and separates himself from sexual distractions, which he has identified as the main force keeping him from transcending the illness of modern fragmentation. However, in this early novel, Huxley does not show Calamy reaching his goal of integrating actions and ideals; he just takes the initial step in the right direction.

The year 1928 marks a shift in Huxley's philosophical stance with his novel, *Point Counter Point*, and his work from 1928 onward indicates that he became dissatisfied with

only identification and portrayal of what he saw as the problems of society. *Point Counter Point* is Huxley's satiric treatment of the intellectual and scientific attitudes of the 1920s, and his readers both expected and enjoyed his cynical portrayals. Yet, *Point Counter Point* is much more than a riotous romp through intellectual meaninglessness. It is in this novel, in which Huxley positions a multitude of fragmented individuals who pursue "single principles," that is, who live mainly according to intellect, senses, or some other one-dimensional aspect of their humanity, that his interest in a didactic cure for modern fragmentation becomes apparent. In the numerous penetrating conversations between the characters in the novel, Huxley defines a new direction--a direction in which he is looking for and suggesting answers to the manifold problems of society. D.H. Lawrence recognized Huxley's accurate diagnosis of the sick modern individual and society when he said that he believed Huxley told the truth in *Point Counter Point* about "you [Huxley] and your generation," and furthermore, "if the public knew what it was reading, it would throw a hundred stones at you, to one at me [for *Lady Chatterly's Lover*]" (Bedford 199). Lawrence was referring to Huxley's portrayal of the one-dimensional characters in *Point Counter Point*, all on a quest of a "singular vision." As Keith May says,¹ each was "living by [only] one ruling principle" (Meckier 222). May exempts Mark and Mary Rampion (two main characters in PCP) from this statement because of their exemplifying the novel's ideal of "completeness." According to May, Mark Rampion preaches the Lawrentian principle of meaning within existence--"...existence rather than essence"; yet

¹In "Accepting the Universe: The 'Rampion-Hypothesis' in *Point Counter Point* and *Island*" included in Meckier's *Critical Essays on Aldous Huxley*, 220-7.

even Rampion speculates during his final confrontation with Spandrell on the possibility that he does not have the whole picture of what it means to live the fully integrated life (Meckier 220). To this probing and clarifying aspect of Mark Rampion, May links an autobiographical connection in his “Rampion -Hypothesis” to Huxley’s working through his own thoughts on the metaphysical (Meckier 225-6). Also in *Point Counter Point*, it is through Philip Quarles, who lives intellectually to the “exclusion of feeling,” that Huxley presents and examines his own penchant for one-sided intellectualism. Both Quarles and Mark Rampion are intellectually aware, like Will Farnaby, of their fragmentation. It is not, however, until Farnaby’s conversion in *Island* that Huxley’s novelistic and philosophical plan for the evolution of the modern individual (from fragmentation to “fully human”) is entirely realized. This plan, intimated in *Those Barren Leaves*, finds full expression in *Island*.

Huxley had made his early and popular reputation portraying “What’s What” in its many forms. However, one may also assume with confidence that after 1928 he became dissatisfied with depicting the current ill state of modern individuals because “What’s What” led to the kind of stagnant existence he portrayed through the lives of his characters in his satiric novels. On a societal level, Huxley feared that “What’s What” could lead to a future of possibilities like the “civilized” world he depicts in *Brave New World* (1932) or even to a truly demented society of mutated individuals in the aftermath of nuclear war such as he portrays in *Ape and Essence* (1948). By 1935, Huxley had become personally committed to pursuing practical solutions for the dilemma of modern man and modern society. Europe was moving ever closer to war, and Huxley admitted to

himself and his largely disappointed readership with the completion of *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936) that “the thing finally resolves itself into a religious problem--an uncomfortable fact which one must be prepared to face” (Letters 398). Prior to his writing *Eyeless in Gaza*, Huxley’s treatment of mysticism was only slightly less derisive than his treatment of formal religions--especially Christianity. Consequently, his fans felt betrayed by the author that newspaper headlines had proclaimed “The Man Who Hates God” as the protagonist of *Eyeless in Gaza*, Anthony Beavis, turns to pacifism and a brand of mysticism that blends the best of East and West religious yearnings (Dunaway, *Hollywood* 14). Thus, Anthony Beavis marks Huxley’s first portrayal of the individual actually moving forward in finding an answer to his own and society’s problem; but, again, if Beavis is not immobilized by doubts, he is still not certain about his choice. Furthermore, the reader does not see him complete the journey and is left with considerable uncertainty about Beavis’ fate at the end of *Eyeless in Gaza*. From *Eyeless in Gaza* on, Huxley’s popularity as a novelist suffered in the literary world as he became even better known in the counterculture of the sixties largely because of his charismatic personality and flamboyant courage, which led him to experimentation with the psychedelic drugs mescaline and lysergic acid and subsequent publication of two books about his experiences, *The Doors of Perception* (1954) and *Heaven and Hell* (1956).

In any case, popularity was not an important enough issue to dampen Huxley’s persistence to search, discover solutions as he saw them, and offer suggestions to a human civilization that was (in Huxley’s opinion) in decline. To Huxley, modern man was fragmented to an extreme on a multitude of levels as a result of both conscious and

unconscious paradoxes within the individual and society, which Huxley says is “a state of mind which fate has forced on us” (OM 31). In his essay “The Education of an Amphibian,” Huxley clarifies that the inconsistencies within human nature are natural outgrowths from several internal psychological and organic urges. He felt that the individual of the twentieth century was alarmingly unbalanced and sick because his normal internal inconsistencies were further aggravated by extreme and rapid external inconsistencies. Thus, on the individual level as well as on the societal level, Huxley saw the fragmentation as being on the threshold of shattering even further. For Huxley, the added societal burden of modern man was the inherent contradictions in the ideologies of self and country experienced during the World Wars of the twentieth century. Because of his poor eyesight, Huxley was “rejected by every recruiting office” when he tried to enlist in military service (Bedford 53). Instead, he returned to school at Oxford. Unable to enlist and “extirpate the vipers” with his peers, Huxley was thinking, writing, and developing his own personal philosophy of life. A letter in April of 1915 demonstrates Huxley’s early and already detached view of government and war that seems to remain fairly consistent throughout his life. He is just twenty-one when he writes to his father:

This hustling of aliens is rather damnable...and the government taking a repressive action on the strength of it seems to me to be the last word in lack of dignity...it betrays mere feeble-mindedness to drift on the stream of popular passion. We’re losing our heads and our senses of humor--and soon we shall be reduced to writing Hymns of Hate--then we’re lost.
(Letters 69-70)

Modern man (including Huxley) was experiencing wartime individual and societal realities of brutal and entirely inhumane proportions that cannot be understood completely unless

one experiences them. These empirical experiences of war presented hard choices for modern man to make between what was right and what was necessary for survival for those who fought in the trenches and those who were left behind--to the individual and society. The older Huxley who wrote *Ends and Means* (1937) assumed a self-appointed role as social critic and moralist to suggest possible solutions to the “damnable” situation that he recognized in 1915 as a young man at Oxford.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze and clarify the culmination in *Island* of Huxley’s lifetime consideration of the problems and possible solutions (as he saw them) inherent in human society, which may be considered “one of his major contributions to serious thought” (J. Huxley 24). Huxley’s many possible suggestions ultimately rest on the existential question that begins the first chapter of his last novel, an unnamed narrative that Huxley did not finish because of his death in November, 1963. The question asks what is a person: “Oh, what *am* I?” (L. Huxley 158). This question is the first question, according to Huxley, that man must answer in order to live a “fully human” life, and, therefore, it is the first question answered rather ambiguously in the old Raja’s booklet in *Island*, which states that one must first realize what one is not in order to define what one is (40-1). Will Farnaby ultimately finds out that he is not “the man who won’t take yes for an answer” because “yes” in *Island* is represented by the Palanese program for individual and societal health, and Farnaby comes to accept the Palanese world view (18). Unlike Huxley’s early protagonists, Farnaby is able to transition from modern fragmentation to “fully human” within the span of the novel. Thus, Farnaby is the first fragmented Huxley character who completes the individual journey from illness to well being. First, Farnaby realizes his

fragmentation; then, he deliberately moves toward well being. Furthermore, Huxley believed that since society is composed of individuals, identification of the nature of the individual is necessarily linked to the fundamental need to establish the individual's place in, and responsibility to, society. The island of Pala is Huxley's setting, and Will Farnaby's tour of the country and education about the Palanese way of life provide a forum from which Huxley explains and provides examples of his near-utopian vision of a sane and healthy society through various Palanese guides. The explanations that are presented to Farnaby set up Huxley's parameters for the collective representation of the Palanese ideas about human and spiritual life and, subsequently, the practical working structures of human relationships, government, economics, law and the most effective tool Huxley saw available in society to achieve his goals--education.

Huxley's examples in *Island* are intertwined to such a degree that one finds the holistic integration of his prescriptions, what he means by living "fully human," both tacit and explicit in the novel. Huxley's extensive integration is also indicative of his culminating maturation on the subject of improvement of humanity. As a result, all of his specifications for improvements of human society are not always distinct or fully explained to the reader. However, there are a minimum of five major areas that Huxley does outline clearly in the novel (and discusses in detail in his many essays): the underlying motivations of the individual; the pragmatic use of a mystical religion as a consistent and unifying force in Huxley's improved social structure; the rational structure of human relationships; the structure of systems of government, economics, and law that supports and maintains society; and, most importantly, the structure of a system of education that is an effective

tool for preparing individuals to live “fully human.”

For the most part, Huxley’s philosophy requires analysis of existing presuppositions and rejection or reconfiguration of those presuppositions that are not consistent with the goal of enabling individuals to live “fully human.” The smallest component of society is the individual; and as such, Huxley’s view of the individual is the foundation for his entire philosophy of life. To Huxley, it was logical that every aspect of human life grows out of human nature. Huxley looked for and found to his satisfaction that the nature of human beings existed in the complex psycho-physical individual. Huxley was unable, however, to state an empirical or scientific argument for spirituality other than to describe it as a historical human yearning that manifests itself as desire for transcendence from human foibles. He was convinced that religious constructions historically made to provide a foundation for the spiritual yearning (i.e., in Christianity) are responsible for most of the external fragmentation that modern man is experiencing. Huxley seems to maintain that the growing burden of holding up under the inconsistencies between what one should do and what one does is becoming more difficult. The inconsistencies become heavier and more obvious because they are added to and further complicated by the passage of time. In Huxley’s prescriptions in *Island*, he rewrites the various religious foundations of modern man into a workable mysticism that does not include a historical narrative or a basis other than the historically documented desire to know that there is something more (supernatural and spiritual) than the material world. Huxley’s mystical religion proceeds from internal individual desire outward, encompassing human life and the universe in a time-spatial experience--existing in a “universal

continuum.” Huxley’s idea of “universal unity and existence” that he found reasonable is much more abstract than most religious dictums, but he saw the advantage of not knowing but longing to know as unifying. He found the state of spiritual desire unifying because it is exclusive in itself of details, facts, or stories that promote division among people. Since “universal unity” and perpetual existence is so abstract, Huxley saw the use of chemical drugs as a possible help to the individual. The drugs could help by allowing the individual to reach a state of “gratuitous grace,” the apprehension or understanding of how everything and everyone is inextricably connected.

In a pragmatic manner consistent with his version of the complex individual and with his cryptic but compassionate mysticism, the near-ideal society on the order of that in *Island* is pacifist and non-ambitious. The people in totality (excepting the dissociated Raja and Rani) inculcate the Huxleyan principles of “disinterested action,” which leads to “non-attachment” and “non-specialization,” two avenues which promote understanding and compassion. The state of “non-attachment” establishes the individual’s reason in control of the individual’s emotions. The “non-attached” individual directs his actions by reason even in directions that may be in conflict with the individual’s emotions. In Huxley’s society that he depicts in *Island*, the “non-attached” individuals find it easy to form societal associations in government and economics that are in alignment with each other and devoted to achieving a single goal--providing an environment that allows and promotes the ability for individuals to live “fully human.” The Huxleyan education system is structured and organized to educate the majority of individuals in a manner consistent with the underlying principles in the old Raja’s booklet. The education system also

provides the tools to identify and remediate individuals who may need additional help because of their genetic predispositions in directions that are in conflict with a pacifist and non-ambitious society.

Identification was Huxley's end in his early writings prior to 1928 and *Point Counter Point*. However, identification of the results of modern fragmentation and adumbration of ideals did not just serve him catalytically; he chose to make the improvement of humanity the focal point of his oeuvre. Additionally, he believed his ideals to be essentially linked, at best, to the betterment, and at worst, to the survival of mankind. *Point Counter Point* marks Huxley's turning point from primarily examination and identification of "What's What" to prescriptive suggestions of "What It might be reasonable to do about [it]." *Eyeless in Gaza* marks a metaphysical step for Huxley that became clearer to him in the twenty six years between 1936 and 1962 and reaches culmination in *Island*. While all of Huxley's novels can be analyzed in terms of his ideas for reforming the general conceptions about humanity, *Island* represents the fruition of his lifetime attention to "What's What, and on What It Might Be Reasonable to Do about What's What." *The Human Situation* (1977) compiled from a lecture series that Huxley was invited to give at the University of California in Santa Barbara and published posthumously is one of many other identifying marks that indicate Huxley's urgency about individual and social reform. In a lecture entitled "Integrate Education," the first of the lectures that Huxley gave in Santa Barbara in 1959, he states how he thinks he "may be of use in an institution of higher specialized learning" (HS 2). The use that he saw for himself derived from his adept ability to "bring together information" from widely diverse

fields of inquiry and to integrate the information in a way propitious to and practical for human life. Huxley saw this integration as a necessary step for health in the lives of individuals and thought that without the integration of knowledge that has the betterment of mankind as the ultimate goal, these special fields of interests such as religion, politics, and technology could be the undoing of both the individual and society. Huxley's ideas emerged from depiction of the fragmented modern man in his early role as the social cynic in *Point Counter Point*; to his self-proclaimed role of "pyrrhonic aesthete" in *Brave New World*; to his semi-autobiographical transformation of Anthony Beavis from the disconnected intellectual to a Huxley mystic in *Eyeless in Gaza*; and finally, to his mature visionary role and conversion of Will Farnaby in *Island*. As a lecturer, Huxley served as a "bridge builder" for the limited number of students who made up his audience; but as a novelist, Huxley's desire is fully realized in his inextricably intertwined depictions of a better, non-fragmented, human society in *Island*.

THE INDIVIDUAL: WHAT'S WHAT

Aldous Huxley's journey into social criticism for the sake of present and future humanity began with his practical analysis of the smallest element of society--the individual. Huxley chose the individual because out of all the possible bases on which to establish a philosophy of life, the individual human being was the only one that he could (to his satisfaction) know empirically, which he felt was preferable to assuming a thesis based on little or no knowledge whatsoever. His conclusions about the individual are analogous to his conclusions about society, and they are tightly interwoven and consistent with each other. Furthermore, in order to understand Huxley's prescriptions for the near-ideal society, one must understand his philosophy of both the individual and of society. In this respect, an understanding of Huxley's methodology is essential to an understanding of why the individual was the only and correct foundation from which to build a workable philosophy for social individuals. Characteristically, Huxley scrutinized the existing conventions already established about the individual in psychology, physiology, theology, and philosophy and adopted the ideas that were warranted, in his opinion, and fearlessly cast aside those ideas that were not. Many of the historical and erroneous foundations that Huxley cast aside resulted, according to him, from man's seemingly innate tendency toward both oversimplification and overcomplication in psychology, theology and philosophy. In *Island*, Huxley's methodology is mirrored in the old Raja's assertion: "If I only knew who in fact I am, I should cease to behave as what I think I am; and if I stopped

behaving as what I think I am, I should know who I am” (40). Huxley presents in *Island* (1962) the culmination of his life-long interest and research in improvements for humanity.

Huxley’s inclusive definition about the psychological aspect of the human being both explains why the individual’s behavior is often inconsistent with his intentions and reveals how to achieve consistency--how to be “sure of doing what one knows one ought to do” (EG 13). Huxley’s dual intention in *Island* is to present a prescriptive cure for the fragmented modern man and an ideal example of both the healthy individual and the healthy society. By design, then, Will Farnaby’s landing on the beach of Pala is Huxley’s insertion of the psychologically imprisoned, fragmented, and thus tormented modern man into the near-utopian world. Farnaby is imprisoned in an internal hell of pain and guilt-inflated memories, and he is also a victim of modern social fragmentation. As such, Farnaby demonstrates his painful recognition of his condition with his cynical description of himself to MacPhail: “I’m the man who won’t take yes for an answer” (18). Farnaby’s extreme cynicism is a defensive reaction to his recognition of his sickness and a seemingly subconscious plea for salvation from his condition. According to Huxley, part of Farnaby’s internal inconsistency between intentions, or “what one knows one ought to do,” and actions, what one does, is largely a result of the normal psychological conflicts within the individual. Huxley did not see the individual as exclusively a mental being or a physical being; according to Huxley, the individual is both. Additionally, Huxley believed that the individual is also an emotional self, a spiritual self, and a “self-centered” social self. As a mental, physical, emotional, spiritual, and social self, the individual is conscious. In his essay “The Education of an Amphibian,” Huxley defines the individual not only as a

“conscious self” but also as five unconscious “not-selves.” Consequently, the individual is predisposed to act inconsistently because of the inherent pull between the “selves” and the “not-selves.” Huxley theorizes that an individual’s acute fragmentation, resulting in feelings of unease and confusion that often lead to chronic depression, ensues from severe internal inconsistencies when the “not-selves” are incompatible with the individual’s conscious selves, whether mental, social, physical, emotional, spiritual or any combination thereof. Therefore, Huxley’s psychically and physically healthy individual understands and accepts the self, the “not-selves,” and the inherent relationships between them. By truly understanding, the individual is prepared to live consistent with his beliefs: “Self-knowledge [is] an essential preliminary to self change” (EG 10). In *Island*, Huxley pictures a people who are healthy in this integrated way.

Each of Huxley’s five “not-selves” are influenced by different aspects of human nature that are in a “majority” at different times. As Huxley says through Dr. Miller in *Eyeless in Gaza*: “...man is a democracy, where the majority rules. You’ve got to do something about that majority” (10). The “something,” according to Huxley, that the individual must do is accept the inherent inconsistency in human psychological nature and understand in a practical way how to keep the majority from pulling the individual out of the state of consistency between belief and actions. Huxley differentiates the “not-selves” as the “home-made not-self,” the “vegetative not-self,” the “inspirational not-self,” the “visionary not-self” and the “universal not-self.” The “home-made not-self” is what is commonly referred to as one’s baggage; it is the “habits” and spontaneous but still “conditioned reflexes” that one carries through life and “that region of the subconscious

with which psychiatry mainly deals” (TTT 9). In a lecture entitled “The Unconscious,” Huxley stipulates that Pavlovian conditioning--conditioning under extreme mental or physical stress in one’s past, especially during childhood--leads to neurotic behavior. As a consequence, the individual reacts inappropriately to the “events of the moment” and instead reacts from “repressed feelings and hidden memories from the past” (HS 156-7). For example in the beginning of *Island*, Farnaby is led through a psycho-analytical session by the eleven year old Mary MacPhail to rid Farnaby of his irrational and inappropriate reaction, his being “shaken by irrepressible shudderings” at the memory of his recent accident (12-15). Huxley’s “vegetative not-self” is the part of the subconscious that operates the automatic physical performance of the body; it executes the individual’s desire to walk or move and regulates the respiration, pulse, and “glandular secretions.” Huxley theorizes that psycho-somatic illnesses are the result of the “vegetative not-self” being in conflict with the other conscious and unconscious selves. The “inspiration not-self” is the part of the subconscious that makes itself conscious to the individual by means of personal “insights and inspirations.” Until the “insights and inspirations” occur, the “inspirational not-self” is unconscious, but it is ever present (TTT 9-10). The inspirational not-self is one of the positive aspects of the unconscious that Huxley says Freud failed to credit: “...inevitable...Freud, after all, was working with neurotic people in the Vienna of the late nineteenth century” (HS 152). Huxley links this area of the subconscious with the individual’s ability to experience “enhancement of wisdom,” or in other words, that part of the individual organism that is functioning when enlightenment occurs and therefore is responsible for and instigates the creative process (TTT 9-10). The anomalies of an

“inspirational not-self” produce geniuses who are of great significance to the evolution of mankind’s knowledge and the curious savants, those people who are incredibly specialized in a very limited field (HS 160-2). The “visionary not-self” is the area of the subconscious that recognizes “shared non-human facts,” for the most part an unconscious process, “what Jung has called the Archetypes” (TTT 10). According to Huxley, this area of the subconscious is the part of the individual that strives for conceivable philosophical/religious order and, thus, is responsible for the urge to create and impose an order of man-made philosophical and religious theories on questions that otherwise would remain unanswered. The “visionary not-self” is that not-self that Huxley utilizes as he creates and prescriptively imposes his own practical and mystical religion on humanity. The “universal not-self” is the subconscious part of the individual that belongs to the universal otherness of human reality, the individual, the world, and the universe. Huxley is ambivalent toward the “universal not-self” and theorizes that it is that, if it is anything, “which men have called the Holy Spirit, the Atman-Brahman, the Clear Light, and Suchness” (TTT 9-10). In *Island*, the Palanese are nearly whole human beings who live in an almost ideal social structure because the islanders strive through their daily beliefs and practices to understand and accept their many selves and not-selves. The social structure of Pala reflects the inherent health of the Palanese and is ideal in the sense of not only what it is, a functioning self-sufficient entity, but also and more importantly because of what the society is not. It is not a community with the endemic social problems common to most societies. Crimes of theft, assault, murder, and the social conditions that often lead to these crimes typically associated with poverty and extreme wealth are missing or

exceedingly diminished on Pala. Pala is a near-utopia because the individuals who compose the society are striving consistently toward a near-ideal existence within themselves--each is a near-utopian society of “collective selves” individually.

Huxley links his “not-selves” to historical theories on similar tracks in his Santa Barbara lecture, “The Problem of Human Nature” (HS 123-36). In this essay, he canvasses similar ideas from the ancient Greek, Homer, to whom Huxley gives the designation of a “kind of palaeo-empiricist,” to David Hume (1711-1776). According to Huxley, Homer’s “idea of semi-independent forces loosely bound together within the mind-body, whose symbiosis constitutes the personality” depicted in the characters who are often in psychological conflict with their own actions in Homer’s epic poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is very similar to Hume’s philosophy of human nature (HS 130-1). Huxley states that Hume “insisted that there is no observable self”; rather, the individual psyche is a “bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement”¹ (HS 131). In between Homer and Hume, Huxley speculates about the change in the ancient Greek constitution of the personality “400 years” after Homer with Plato’s writings about Socrates. Huxley credits the Greek adoption of the idea of “a unitary soul” capable of “surviv[al] after the death of the body” to the scholarship of northern “shamanistic religions” and the speculation that these religions strongly influenced the Greeks at this time (HS 131). From this point, Huxley sketches a loose connection between the “canonization” of the Plato/Socrates philosophy to the Cartesian philosophy of an incorrect, according to

¹Huxley cites, “David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, iv, 6.”

Huxley, “mind-body” dualism, “which has haunted Christian thought ever since” (HS 133). Consequently in *Island*, one of the first dictums in the old Raja’s booklet, “What’s What and on What It Might be Reasonable to Do about What’s What,” is the need to know the “blessed experience of Not-Two:” it is the need to identify the Cartesian mind-body dualism further corrupted by the perceived separation and conflict between two opposite (good-mental and evil-physical) identifiable forces. The Old Raja’s booklet stipulates that once the identification is made, then the individual can refute the seemingly authoritative framework of dualism. Huxley concludes his lecture on human nature by agreeing with Bertrand Russell that “the existence of a loosely conjoined aggregate of powers does not necessarily mean that there is no simple soul [meaning a soul that continues on after death in some other altered existence]....it merely means that it is extremely difficult, but not impossible, to contact it” (HS 136). Whether Huxley believed more that a “simple soul” (separate from the body and detachable after death) existed than that it did not, one must consider Huxley’s statement to Reid Gardner in a 1962 letter: “I remain an agnostic who aspires to be a gnostic--but a gnostic only on the mystical level, a gnostic without symbols, cosmologies or a pantheon” (Letters 935).

In addition to his cognitively multi-dimensional individual, Huxley agreed with and was influenced by many of Dr. W.H. Sheldon’s conclusions about a probable correlation between human physique and temperament among individuals. Huxley said in a 1944 letter to Grace Hubble that Sheldon’s objective works “clarified” and made possible a “measurable basis” for examining “old insights and intuitions” about personality

differences² and that Sheldon's work "constitute[d] a major contribution to a genuine science of man" (Letters 505). Huxley found Sheldon's "major contribution" consisted in supplying the social reformer with methods to identify personality types--a science that could be used both as a preventative science and as a strategic planning science. The ability to identify extreme personality types is, in Huxley's view, a tool that should be used whenever possible to steer individuals who are harmful to society into education that would help channel negative aspects of their personality into productive channels. In a more positive vein, early identification would also benefit the individual and society because those individuals who are inherently capable of being propitious to society could also be steered into education that would allow for the full development of their potential.

In his lecture entitled "The Ego," Huxley outlines Sheldon's three extreme physical types, the endomorph, mesomorph, and ectomorph. According to Sheldon's theory, endomorphy is the physical type characterized by the "very big, fat, soft people with slow reactions" (HS 142). Sheldon stipulates that extreme endomorphs have "an amazing power of assimilation" and are able to "mix" with others easily (HS 142). The second category in what Huxley calls a "tri-polar frame of reference" is mesomorphy. Sheldon's mesomorphs are "'muscle people' with heavy bones and powerful muscles"; the psychological correlation in temperament manifests in the disposition of aggressiveness. The extreme mesomorphs are "indifferent to others," and Huxley calls them "aggressive go-getters" (HS 146). The ectomorph is physically characterized by a slight build.

²Huxley was referring to two books by Sheldon, *The Varieties of Human Physique* and *The Varieties of Temperament*.

Huxley calls the extreme ectomorphs introverted “cerebrotonics” (HS 147). As a result of their excessive tendencies to live cognitively, they have great difficulty with their own emotions and, consequently, in their relationships with others. According to Sheldon’s theory, few people are extreme types; most are “continuous” variations and combinations of the three types. In *Island*, Huxley’s agreement with Sheldonian theory results in all the Palanese children undergoing a thorough examination between the ages of “four and a half and five” (176). The examination includes “blood tests, psychological tests, somatotyping;...x-rays [of] their wrists and...an EEG,” and all problem children are given “appropriate” and “immediate treatment” (176). The information gathered on the rest of the Palanese children is used to channel the individual children into the most fulfilling path of personal growth.

Huxley further advocates Sheldon’s theories by explaining what Sheldon calls “dysplasia” within the individual, which is one of several possible reasons for aberrations within his somatotyping system. Dysplasia is a “disharmony between different regions in the body” (HS 143). In a dysplastic example, one part of the body may lean towards mesomorphy while simultaneously another part dictates ectomorphy. In the example Huxley gives, a heavily mesomorphic “desire” is attached to and thwarted by “ectomorphic extremities,” resulting in a body that cannot function as the desire and will commands--a “would-be athlete’s tragedy” (HS 143). Internal dysplasias can take extreme forms, and Huxley’s example of this situation is depicted in the “Peter Pan” types discussed in *Island*. The Peter Pans are not just people who do not want to grow up; instead, MacPhail describes them as people who are unable to grow up because of an

endocrine imbalance (175). Peter Pans grow “physiologically more slowly” than normal for their chronological age (ISL 174). MacPhail tells Farnaby that the “retarded maturation” of Peter Pans is very rare, but it can be symptomatically signaled “among boys who can’t read, won’t learn, [and] don’t get on with anyone” and further confirmed by physiological tests (175). On Pala, Huxley’s Peter Pans are confirmed by “an X-ray of the bones of the wrist” (175). The treatment for Peter Pans is “endocrine” adjustment through pharmacological means--“three pink capsules a day before meals” to a healthier and happier individual who is made capable through the use of modern medicine to function positively in society (ISL 176).

According to Huxley and Sheldon, dysplasias take other forms as well. External disharmony (between the individual and societal norms of behavior) occurs when “sociological pressures” dictate behavior from people that is in direct conflict with what would be normal for their personality type. Huxley says that historically the popular type (the politically correct personality type valued above others) periodically changes, but “we shouldn’t try to mold or squeeze people into...our popular conception of human virtue..., but permit them as far as possible to develop along their own temperamental lines” (HS 145-6). With this goal in mind and because Huxley states that extreme mesomorphs have always “been a great problem,” Huxley uses this type of personality to depict the kinds of methods used in a near-utopian society to harmonize extreme personality types at odds with social norms (HS 145). In *Island*, MacPhail tells Farnaby that in contrast to Peter Pans, “Muscle Men” are much more common among personality types (175). Huxley discusses the “religious orders of knighthood” in the Middle Ages as an example of a

society's poor control (by direction of the church) of the tremendous drive for domination of the extreme mesomorphs. Huxley says the Muscle Men found release for their aggressive tendencies in holy battle and control for the same tendencies in "all kinds of traditions and codes" (HS 145). In contrast to Huxley's example of the Middle Ages, the Palanese extreme mesomorphs or muscle people are not restrained by created "traditions" and creeds. Instead, Huxley's ideal social answer to the individual and particular threat that muscle people pose to society is to educate them "to be aware and sensitive" and to provide "innumerable alternatives" to exercise their inherent energy and aggression (ISL 178-9). Vijaya, an enlightened Muscle Man and Dr. MacPhail's assistant, explains to Farnaby that Muscle Men on Pala are identified early and given "all kinds of difficult tasks to perform--strenuous and violent tasks" (179). The Palanese mesomorphs typically and enthusiastically rise to the challenge and their need to dominate is exercised. Thus, they are satisfied, and the build-up of "disharmony" between muscle people and the society on Pala that values non-ambition is halted. As a result, Vijaya explains, the muscle people are harmonized with a society that does not provide familial or societal "opportunities for bullying" or for political and economic domination (*Island* 178).

Huxley's methodology often led him into disagreement with, what he considered, untenable conclusions reached by others before him. Huxley attributes the untenable conclusions in psychology, theology, and philosophy to mankind's historical tendency to oversimplify and to overcomplicate. Huxley never saw human life as a simple pattern of existence; he saw it as a very complex pattern. For example, Huxley often disagreed with Freud's "purely psychological" treatment of nervous disorders because it "omitted too

much” (Bedford 641). In the essay “The Education of an Amphibian,” Huxley says that “every human being is five or six amphibians rolled into one” (TTT 1). By enumerating “five or six...into one,” he means that human phenomenon, “which is [on] a level of immense complexity, can [n]ever have a single cause--we must always take at least half a dozen conspiring causal factors into consideration,” and Freud considered only one (Bedford 642). The amphibian nature implies that humans are, as creatures of the world, “embodied spirits” with one foot in the material world and one foot in the “universal mind”--a spiritual something that is just beyond everyday comprehension (TTT 1). Mankind’s proclivity to oversimplify acerbates a complicated process--identification and reordering of the physical and mental processes and relationships within the individual that make up the constitution of the whole individual. Huxley wrote in a 1937 letter to his brother, Julian Huxley, that the “mania for oversimplification, for wanting to explain everything in terms of one causative principle is the undoing” of advances made by researchers because the penchant for oversimplification results in neglect in other vital areas. When the “one causative principle” is given total attention, other areas are discounted or ignored to the detriment of ever achieving complete understanding. Thus, Freud’s psychological means of treatment for human disorders is not enough by itself. According to Huxley, it must be combined with relevant and causative organic aspects unveiled by findings “in the field[s] of neurology,...bio-chemistry,...human physique and the classification of human types... a total organic approach” in order to successfully treat any disorder (Bedford 641). Huxley was convinced that modern scientific research in the biological and psychological fields of human study had yielded enough information in the

twentieth century to allow for the development of positive scientific adjustments in the individual for the betterment of the individual and society. Furthermore, if all the modern scientific information about the constitution of the individual human being is not collectively considered, then the research is wasted; and in this situation, Huxley felt that the specialist, such as Freud, who was trying to help humanity was “undoing with one hand all that [he did] with the other” (Letters 415-6). Huxley maligned the tendency of “oversimplification” in every human endeavor--from organic health to education to politics.

Additionally, Huxley thought that disentangling the complex relationships within the individual is made more difficult when erroneous conclusions (across the gamut of human study) subsequently become accepted foundations. For example, if the generally accepted foundational idea is that *man cannot escape his sinful nature* (my italics), man may not even try. As a consequence, Huxley was guarded against both oversimplification and what he saw as overcomplication, which he regarded as one of the most pernicious errors to be found in religious history. He thought many brilliant philosophers of religion erred in overcomplicating the innate human yearning for spiritual knowledge by creating fictions to form a base from which to build their religions. In *Grey Eminence: A Study in Religion and Politics* (1941) and the biography of Father Joseph, a priest of the order of Capuchins in the sixteen hundreds, Huxley writes, “to over-simplify is fatal, ... [even though] it is impossible to determine fully and correctly all the practically significant causes of complex events” (14). Therefore when Huxley set out to outline a pragmatic religion that would function as a unifying force in society, he did not arbitrarily select a

“primary assumption” from which to proceed and to explain his spiritual world view. He did not set out, as he thought, for example, Christianity does, to create fictions to reconcile the contradictions in his own thoughts with the hope for an eternal bliss. Huxley describes the religious fiction-creating process in this way: “One sees that theology is mainly an obstacle race...[in] which one spends enormous ingenuity and subtlety in circumventing the obstacles...” (Letters 438). Since Huxley thought the obstacles impossible to “circumvent,” it remained imperative for him to identify in a logical and conceivable order the psycho-physical inner dynamics of the human animal in order to establish a beginning from which frameworks for the society could be developed.

Huxley’s methodology indicates that he would agree with Carl Jung’s comparison of modern and primitive “archaic” man and necessarily include himself in the comparison. Jung says that modern man and primitive man are similarly archaic “at the deeper levels of [their] psyche” because primitive tribes and adherents of dogmatic religions logically proceed from “collective representations...[those] widely current ideas whose truth is held to be self-evident,” and they sometimes reach irrational conclusions (Jung 126). Jung insists that modern man has not evolved far in terms of logical conative analysis. Instead, he says, “primitive man is no more logical or illogical than we are. His [archaic man’s] presuppositions are not the same as ours, and that is what distinguishes him from us” (127). If Huxley’s foundational assumptions were faulty, then, his logical processes would not necessarily lead him to correct conclusions. As a result, Huxley found attempts to explain what he considered unexplainable (i.e., the questions of who or what created the universe and for what purpose) superfluous and damaging because, historically, the

proposals to answer these questions and settle the innate spiritual yearning became accepted facts in the mind of mankind. The processes by which Huxley reaches his own conclusions about the individual man and society (in his opinion) are based on scientific research, observation, and empirical evidence. Refusing to consider myths, traditions, and created fictions as facts, Huxley aligns closely with the religious/philosophical conclusions of Spinoza.

Baruch De Spinoza, a seventeenth century philosopher, referred to God as an element of order and/or process of the universe rather than an omnipotent, invisible, and benevolent being (as the Christian theologians did). It is apparent from Huxley's writings that he firmly sided with Spinoza's view. Unlike Spinoza though, Huxley starts with the "here and now" rather than the beginning of existence and analyzes the spiritual nature of the individual to reach his conclusion about the "otherness" of the spiritual world. His analysis reaches practical conclusions in mysticism that are very similar to Spinoza's philosophy even though Huxley's process begins from a different starting point.

For Huxley, the logical beginning for a better society begins not with the creation of the universe, not with the good of society, and even not with the family unit, but even more minutely, with the psychological individual and even further inward to the separate "selves" of the individual. As Huxley moves inward to determine "what's what," there is always a corresponding outward examination that probes for practical means to enable societies of individuals to improve their ability to provide for the fulfillment of its individual members. As he answers these questions, Huxley becomes necessarily involved intellectually with the scientific methods that could be used to identify the "continuous"

variances in human personalities because, for him, societal reform necessarily begins on the individual level. Huxley acknowledged early, in *Proper Studies* in 1927, that he did not believe all men are *created* equal, but by the time *Ends and Means* is published in 1937, Huxley seemed to believe strongly that all men should be treated equally--given the means, if possible, to live “fully human.” In order to do this, society must deal with the inherent differences in human personalities that both pose a threat at one extreme and pose an incredible opportunity at the other. Therefore, Huxley’s culminating philosophy in *Island* is one of applied altruism, with the goal being the individual’s attainment of the underlying principles and understanding necessary to enable the person to live “fully human.”

To live “fully human” is an ideal concept and goal that Huxley thought unrealistic on the societal level but reachable on the individual level. Yet, in Huxley’s opinion, the near realization of the “fully human” individual will benefit tremendously both the individual and the society. The individual will benefit by increased internal peace with his identity and his actions because he will live more consistently. He will be stable--or at least much more stable than one-dimensional, two-dimensional, or variously deformed modern individuals. In the tradition of the utopian-genre then, Will Farnaby’s education about the Palanese provides the framework for a somewhat static plot. Huxley’s ideal island society impresses upon Farnaby new and expanding (individual to societal) philosophies that lead him to a “sane,” non-fragmented future. Furthermore, Farnaby’s conversion to Palanese principles and his decision not to betray those principles or the peaceful Palanese provide both the overriding conflict and the climax for a story that must

end in reality as Farnaby and Susila, one of the Palanese guides, witness the landing of invading “insanity” from the outside led by Colonel Dipa, the dictator of a neighboring island. Will Farnaby’s journey, which represents the journey that Huxley prescribes for modern man, begins in hopelessness; and although the end of the novel brings destruction to the island that has been the scene of Farnaby’s salvation, he is in possession of the knowledge and understanding to move forward and live “fully human.”

SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY: THOU ART THAT

In *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945), Huxley explains that instead of regarding God as being immanent in the world, it is more accurate, according to his version of religion to say that God is immanence (2-3). The experience of accepting and knowing the spirituality within the individual is equal to accepting and knowing the spiritual world external to the individual; Huxley calls the condition “expressed...in Sanskrit formula, *tat tvam asi* (‘That art thou’)” and the “Divine Ground” (1-2). Since both of the conditions of immanence exist simultaneously, then, Huxley’s “universal unity,” the concept that “everything exists in a field and is bound up (materially and spiritually) with everything else,” asserts the primary existence of spirituality in not just the human being but all things (Letters 491-2). Thus becomes apparent the philosophical significance of “Thou art that” and the old Raja’s statement: “Nobody needs to go anywhere else. We are all, if we only knew it, already there” (40). Consequently, the mynah birds of Pala are taught to repeat “Attention,” “Here and Now Boys,” and “*Karuna*” (Compassion)--all significant reminders to the Palanese to pay attention to their inward “Divine Ground” while they experience their immanent heaven and feel compassion, the natural consequence of being part of and equal in spirituality to everything else.

Initially, Huxley was as skeptical about the mystical experience as any other religious claim. To the Huxley of 1929, mysticism was a lesser evil than Christianity but an evil nonetheless. In the essay entitled “Spinoza’s Worm” in *Do What You Will* (1929),

Huxley indicates he does not believe human beings should strive to be anything more than human; the “worm” should not strive to be a “butterfly” because the strongest efforts to achieve an existence higher than that of which the worm is capable will only result in the worm’s achieving a “half-dead version [from futile exhaustion] of his old self.” Spinoza’s worm is a finite creature, but it accepts the “universal unity” of its world; it functions in connection with the entirety of the universe because it is necessarily connected to everything in the universe by virtue of its existence. Thus, it accepts and cooperates in the relationship between it and its world (the blood it lives in) even though it cannot “know how all the parts are influenced” (DYW 49-52). Spinoza was referring to the abstract concepts of the finite and the infinite and the philosopher’s attempt to clarify the philosophical significance of the infinite universe, an idea that Huxley returns to repeatedly in his essays. Huxley agrees that the human creature has great difficulty understanding infinity because the human mind, like the body, is finite. Likewise, the concept of a universal “continuum” is difficult for the average individual (one not practiced in the field of philosophy) to understand because first, as Huxley sees it, there is not a spoken vocabulary “capable of expressing...that the universe is a continuum...there is no such thing as simple location...nothing is separate and independent...everything exists in a field and is bound up with everything else” (Letters 491-2). The concept of such a continuum is further difficult to grasp because the human mind appears to be separate from the rest of the human body, the world, and the universe. Huxley’s experimentation with the psychedelic drugs mescaline and lysergic acid in the fifties led him to believe that responsible use of these drugs could induce an artificial time-spatial experience and could

allow a portion of the human population to experience firsthand the intellectual concept of “universal unity.” He called the experience “gratuitous grace” and believed that if the experience was successful the individual would be better intellectually and emotionally equipped to function positively in human societies and possibly transcend the limitations of purely human existence. In time, Huxley came to assert that some of the human population, some of “Spinoza’s worms,” could become in a mystical sense more than human, or rather more human, in a conscious relationship “continuous with the mind of the universe or whatever you like to call it” (HS 215). Huxley offered that possibility not as a way for the “worm” to become a “butterfly,” but for the individual to become fully human, to take part in a “religion of direct acquaintance with the divine” (HS 201). Further, he maintained that individuals could cultivate and develop this potentiality and become “fully human.”

It is with *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936) that a shift in Huxley’s thinking about the potential for a religious solution to human dilemmas becomes evident. Huxley admitted to difficulties during the writing of *Eyeless in Gaza* and indicated that the problems were of a spiritual and intellectual nature (Letters 398). Faced with the seemingly irreconcilable state of European political affairs just prior to World War II, Huxley was actively involved with Gerald Heard in attempting to establish a pacifist movement. Huxley never sought pacifism for its own sake but because he believed that “the end cannot justify the means” and that the methods used to achieve the end will “determine the nature” of the end (EM 10). At its core, Huxley found the question of ends and means--prompted by the impending war but also inherent in many human issues--to be a “religious problem.” The

difficulty, he saw, was that good intentions often resulted in “evil” outcomes. To resolve this conundrum in his own intellectual working out of the problem of how to achieve “good ends” by “appropriate means” (EM 10), Huxley moved toward a metaphysic of mysticism and the notion of “a spiritual reality underlying and uniting all apparently separate existents” (EM 345). In doing so, Huxley shifted away from his ridicule of mysticism in “Spinoza’s Worm” and asserted the undergirding principles for the establishment of a mystical spiritual framework that ultimately is reflected in *Island*.

Huxley never assumed that all individuals are intellectually equal, but it was not necessary, in his opinion, for all human beings, like Spinoza’s worm, “to know how all the parts are influenced” (DYW 49). In *Island*, Farnaby learns through another Palanese guide, Vijaya, that the Palanese do not expect total conformity to the island’s brand of mysticism because “given the nature of human minds,” religions, religious traditions, and superstitious behavior is inevitable. Vijaya explains this perspective because Farnaby witnesses a little girl paying homage to a Bodhisattva statue and inquires how the little girl fits into a society whose mystical orientation realizes no benefit in idol worship. Huxley/Vijaya explains that the little girl has already been instructed in the island’s school that religion is only a “set of manageable symbols” used by the human brain to make sense out of what otherwise appears to be chaos. The symbols either correspond closely to or “have almost no connection with external reality.” When the symbol system closely corresponds to the external world, Huxley/Vijaya says, the result is “science and common sense.” If the symbol system is far removed from reality, a forced fiction, then the result is “paranoia and delirium.” When the symbol system is a mixture of reality and fiction, the

result is religion. Religion is poor to bad when the balance between reality and fiction is skewed to fiction (symbol-manipulation) and fair to good when the bulk of it is skewed toward reality (empirical) (ISL 208). In Huxley's opinion, all people would not be able to make that final mystical and conscious connection with the rest of the universe; however, by cultivating the potentiality that does exist, the individual becomes more human because the potential to do so is inherent in human nature. Such inherent good potentiality--that which leads man to "greater perfection" because it is "profitable" and preservative of his own being--should be developed to transcend the current inconsistent condition of humanity (Spinoza 266). Huxley maintained that even if the individual does not reach a mystical relationship with the universe at large, the individual has learned the dicta of how to live positively. The individual acts morally but not because a religion threatens negative consequences if the individual acts poorly. Regardless of the punishment, the individual who does not know how to be consistently moral falls prey to his internal conflicts between the conscious selves and the subconscious "not-selves" and becomes spiritually ill--to the detriment of himself and society. Huxley reached this conclusion because he believed that everything in the universe was inextricably connected in a gigantic spider-like web of universal unity.

Huxley describes the mystical experience as "essentially the being aware of and, while the experience lasts, being identified with a form of pure consciousness, of unstructured transpersonal [sic] consciousness" (HS 212). In Christian terms, "universal unity" (what Huxley describes as the "pure," "unstructured," and "transpersonal consciousness") would equate with a personal relationship with God, but in Huxley's

mysticism, it is a relationship with God without “symbols, cosmologies or a pantheon” (Letters 935). Furthermore, whether one has a personal experience of universal unity or not is irrelevant; he asserts that unity is the condition (in his practical religious system of mysticism) of all existence--“Suchness.” Huxley’s explanation of universal unity is circular and does not answer the unanswerable questions in all religions--the questions of origin, design, purpose, and Designer. Although deficient in answering these primary questions, Huxley’s mysticism more than compensates in that the acceptance of universal unity is not tinged with illogical guilt or irrepressible doubt because there is little of, what Huxley calls, the natural consequences of improbable facts and untenable dichotomies of the “symbol-manipulating systems” (HS 205). The process of imposing a fiction on top of spiritual feeling, symbol-manipulating, does not result in better understanding but only complicates an already complicated spiritual situation.

Huxley’s mysticism is cryptic. Yet, Huxley believed all people could agree with the concept of universal unity “because it is empirical and does not depend on revelation or history” (Letters 482-3). Huxley’s stated purpose for writing *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945) was to show that a common mystical source is at the root of “all the religions of any degree of development” and that the source is spiritual awareness that subsequently becomes corrupted through man’s attempt to answer the unanswerable (Letters 483). Consequently, Huxley suggests that, as cognizant beings, humans should accept this internal spiritual feeling complete without fictions and integrate it into a personal way of life. The only real loss, in Huxley’s opinion, will be a large portion of the “two-thirds homemade sorrow” because this state of being will be truer to human nature

(the impetus to Huxley's "spiritual not-self") (ISL 98).

In Huxley's published Santa Barbara Lectures of 1959, he explains the major difference between the "religion of a system of beliefs" and the "religion of direct acquaintance with the divine (HS 201). The Western religions of systems of beliefs are "symbol-manipulating religions" that Huxley further divides into "the religion of myth and the religion of creed and theology" (HS 199). The symbol-manipulating systems are the result of "pure speculation based on theoretical knowledge that ends only in theoretical conclusions" (HS 211). The "religion of myth" is for the most part simple expression of spiritual feeling in story, image, picture, statue, and dance and is not meant to be taken as factual. In *Island*, Farnaby witnesses a coming of age ceremony that combines Buddhist myth with the use of the "moksha-medicine" to facilitate a more mature understanding of the Palanese mystical religion for young islanders. After the "ordeal" of climbing up a mountain precipice, which is part of the ceremony, MacPhail explains to Farnaby that the Palanese youth are given the second of two "first-hand experiences of reality, from which any reasonably intelligent boy or girl can derive a very good idea of what's what" (186). Although the young people participate wholeheartedly in paying homage to a Shiva idol, they do so knowing that the idol is only representational of their mystical beliefs. For example, a young Palanese girl recites a ritualized address to the statue: "O you the creator, you the destroyer... You Suchness and Illusion, the Void and All Things" (190). The Palanese are not hampered as Huxley is by his ambivalence to mysticism (he stated he remained agnostic); consequently, MacPhail tells Farnaby that when the Palanese children are old enough to accept the "deepest truths of religion," they are given "four hundred

milligrams of revelation” (185). Religions of myth are often profoundly accurate in describing “some generalized feeling” about the spiritual environment of peoples.

Therefore, Huxley asserts that as a group the “religion of myth” (i.e., the Great Mother myth, and in Hinduism, Kali) is “much less dangerous” than the “religion of creed” and, consequently, safer to use as a means to unify society (HS 200-6).

Religions of creed take the form of theological systems that have been historically a source of mankind’s greatest evils against one another. Huxley states that the problem created by the disciples of symbol-manipulating systems is that they make “claims ...propositions about events in the past and events in the future and the structure of the universe” to be “absolutely true” and view any belief otherwise to be a direct and personal affront to their God (HS 206). Huxley calls the symbol-manipulating religions “strife-producing” and responsible for “jihads and crusades of one religion against another” as well as virulent “internal friction within the same religion” (HS 206). In *The Perennial Philosophy*, Huxley shows, as William Sheldon claims in his *Psychology and the Promethean Will*, that all religions are founded by spiritual leaders driven by strong personal spiritual feeling. The founding religious leader is Sheldon’s “Promethean” character, but the religion that is founded quickly becomes corrupted by what Sheldon calls the “Epimethean” character in symbol-manipulating systems. The “Epimethean” personality is no less noble than the “Promethean” personality, but it is driven to maintain (“conservative”) rather than to move forward spiritually (“radical”) (Sheldon 77-82).

In Huxley’s terminology, the “religion of direct acquaintance of the divine” is mysticism, and instead of being a speculative process resulting in theoretical conclusion, it

is, as Huxley describes mysticism, “a kind of transcendental operationalism” (HS 211). Transcendental operationalism means that “it [mysticism] starts with somebody doing something [experiencing enlightenment of a spiritual nature] about the self and then, from the experience attained, going on to speculate and theorize about the significance of the experience” (HS 211). Although mysticism has always been a minor strain of the major religious beliefs in the West, Western mystics as well as the mystics of Oriental religions such as Hinduism, Taoism, and Mahayana Buddhism all agree that union with “God” cannot be achieved through the use of symbols (HS 211). Huxley paraphrases from these religions that the “truth has never been preached by the Buddha, seeing that one has to realize it within oneself, and that what is known of the teaching of Buddha is not the teaching of Buddha, which has to be an interior experience” (HS 211). Thus, the youth of Pala are first given the experience of “truth” in their mountain climbing ordeal; then, they are expected to relate their experience, what they must “realize” within themselves under the influence of the “moksha-medicine,” to their belief system.

Huxley sees the benefits of mysticism as two-fold. First of all, he says that experience of “the divine” is “self-evident[ly]” valuable, and secondly, the experience is capable of changing character in the individual in a positive way by prompting the development of a “sense of unity and solidarity with the world,” which “brings about the possibility of that kind of unjudging [sic] love and compassion which is stressed so much in the Gospel” (HS 212-3). The old Raja’s booklet makes the statement more explicit: “Knowing who in fact we are results in Good Being, and Good Being results in the most appropriate kind of good doing...,” but not necessarily the other way around (41).

Furthermore, Huxley credits the mystical experience with allowing the “overcoming of the fear of death”; because the “soul” is already a part of the solidarity of the universe, death is just another dimension of the same existence (HS 213). In *Island*, Huxley juxtaposes the death scene of MacPhail’s wife, Lakshmi, in chapter fourteen with Farnaby’s memories of his version of death, the “Essential Horror.” Farnaby remembers three “Essential Horrors” as he discusses death with Susila: the death of a childhood pet, Tiger; the death of his surrogate mother, Aunt Mary; and the death of his wife, Molly (272-6). Susila explains to Farnaby that death is not a horror, but, instead, it is an essential part of life (277). The animal world instinctively lives with death, but humans have become unable to do so. Although “ordinary people know its nature [universal life that incorporates death], [they] don’t live it and, if ever they think seriously about it, refuse to accept it” (277). The Palanese mysticism promotes enlightenment about life and death. As a result, “the enlightened person knows it, lives it, and accepts it completely. He eats, he drinks, and in due course he dies...” (277). Lakshmi’s death is quite different from the “Essential Horror” that Farnaby has come to expect from death. He witnesses Lakshmi die with “a smile of happiness intense almost to the point of elation transfigur[ing] her face” while her husband, MacPhail, encourages her to “let go of [her] poor old body” (305). Although MacPhail mourns Lakshmi’s death, he does so because she will no longer be part of his life and not because death represents an “essential horror.”

Furthermore, in Huxley’s mysticism, the process of suffering becomes acceptable because it is neither fair nor unfair, and the solidarity also accounts for the desire to “alleviate suffering in others,” or “universal compassion” (HS 212-3). The brand of

religion that Huxley envisions for the totality of mankind, then, is one that all people should be able to accept, “seeing that it is perfectly obvious that we shall never have more than a temporary truce until most men accept a common weltanschauung,” and one that Huxley sees as “intrinsically valuable” and pragmatic (Letters 501-2).

Huxley’s mystical philosophy supplants the practical purpose that religions serve to provide a reason for good and moral behavior. Like Spinoza, Huxley believed that kindly and cooperative behavior is inherent in human nature, as in all nature, and that the creation of an Almighty demanding love and kindness from humanity is not necessary. Kindly and cooperative behavior results in the betterment of the individual and society; therefore, these attributes are intrinsically part of human nature (Spinoza 266-7). Although in 1929 Huxley ridicules the notion that human beings can or should transcend their human existence, in time Huxley agrees with Spinoza’s observation. In fact, *The Perennial Philosophy* was Huxley’s proof that mysticism is at the root of all religions and constitutes the core of those religions. In *The Perennial Philosophy*, Huxley takes excerpts of what he calls, “the Highest Common Factor underlying all the great religious and metaphysical systems from Western and Oriental sources of every period [and sets these excerpts] in a connecting matrix of [his own] commentary” (Letters 501-2). The Huxley who wrote “Spinoza’s Worm” was cynically skeptical about a potentially transcendent humanity. The Huxley who wrote *Island* had faith in the latent potentialities in human nature; he even had faith in the human nature of individuals who suffer from the imposed inconsistencies of Western religions.

Huxley’s religion of mysticism is much more abstract than the literal stories of

other religions. Consequently, Huxley advocated the sanctioned use of hallucinogenic drugs to help people understand “universal unity.” It was Huxley’s stated desire in *The Doors of Perception* (1954) to be able through the use of drugs to know “what the visionary, the medium, even the mystic” experienced in their transcendent states (14). He never claimed an actual mystical experience for himself or “that the drug experience is...identical to the mystical experience in the enlightenment it affords,” but he called his experience a “gratuitous grace” that helped him to understand universal unity and separation from the egotistical self (Nance 16). The use of insight-inducing chemicals could and should be used by a populace who would benefit individually as well as collectively from experiencing enlightenment to, what Huxley ultimately considered to be, reality. In *Island* then, the Palanese have their first state-sponsored “reality revealing” experience at the age of fourteen to “catch a glimpse of the world as it looks to someone who has been liberated from his bondage to the ego” (158). At the very least, Huxley says, the beneficiary “might lose a little of the confident insolence sprouting from systematic reasoning and the consciousness of having read all the books” (DP 78).

As Huxley recounts the episode of his mescaline experience in *The Doors of Perception*, he begins by summarizing how each individual--and by human association each human society--is “doomed to suffer and enjoy in solitude” (DP 12). Huxley’s drug-altered perception saw beyond what, before the experience, he called “obvious solitude” to a firsthand experience of the “solidarity” his mysticism claimed conceptually. Thus, he experienced the “universal unity” that he had only been able to accept and understand intellectually. Huxley felt a unity so profound with objects in his vicinity that he came to

agree with the theory that the “function of the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the main *eliminative* [sic]” (22). That is, the brain and central nervous system narrows the amount of sensations and limits the perceptions to a degree that the brain can accept (DP 22). In addition to a spatial unity with objects, Huxley perceived a time continuity extending to the infinite; he had an overwhelming impression of infinite and inextricably unified existence (23). Gazing at a vase of flowers in his altered state, Huxley felt he actually saw life, “flowers shining with their own inner light and all but quivering under the pressure of the significance with which they were charged” (17-8). Granted the experience as described is to the uninitiated surreal; yet, Huxley found it profoundly beneficial to him and thought it could be as well for others by allowing the knowledge that “the mind was primarily concerned...with being and meaning” (20).

In the last chapter of *Island*, Will Farnaby takes the “moksha medicine” under the guidance of Susila to experience the Palanese perception of the world. Huxley uses his own experiences to explain what Farnaby perceives during the episode. The experience is after, and this is very important to Huxley, Farnaby has been thoroughly familiarized with the belief system as well as the education system in regards to the use of the drug. Farnaby has been prepared to experience the benefits of a wider perception of reality, and he does. However, Farnaby also has an experience of “Nirvana,” that “Is-ness” that Farnaby describes as a “blazing uprush of bliss and understanding” that could very well be an acceptable private end in itself to the unprepared individual but would not ultimately be of public benefit to society (ISL 311).

RELATIONSHIPS: SELF-KNOWLEDGE, TOTAL ACCEPTANCE,
THE BLESSED EXPERIENCE OF NOT-TWO

Huxley believed the only valuable purpose for society is the fulfillment of the individual members of society, but “man’s psychological...[and] spiritual needs cannot be fulfilled unless, first he has a fair measure of personal independence and personal responsibility within and toward a self-governing group, unless, secondly, his work possesses certain aesthetic value and human significance, and unless, in the third place, he is related to his natural environment in some organic, rooted and symbiotic way” (SLP 27). The old Raja of Pala in *Island* says that the three Buddha blessings are “self-knowledge, total acceptance, [and] the blessed experience of Not-Two,” which are the symbolic framework for achieving the goals that Huxley thought necessary for societal man’s fulfillment (41). Huxley’s principles of “disinterested action,” “non-specialization,” and practical “skepticism” are essential concepts that fortify and fill in the gaps between each of the three blessings of Buddha found in “Notes on What’s What, and on What It Might be Reasonable to do about What’s What.” The practice of “disinterested action,” which is the emancipation from accepted habits of thought, emotion, and action, leads to “non-attachment”--the ability to direct one’s actions despite conflicts with one’s feeling--and requires and sustains an individual’s “self-knowledge.” “Non specialization” is an individual and socially sanctioned practice of habitually not specializing in any one occupation or recreation, which fulfills the same purpose as “disinterested action” for the

individual but on a broader societal level. All of these practices support the vital component, “skepticism,” in evaluating the ideas communicated by language. “Not-two” is a two-part implied understanding; the first echoes Huxley’s notion of “Thou art That,” a total connectivity with the universe; the second refers to the integrated individual’s psychological non-division between mind and body and, also, propels one back in a Huxleyan loop to “self-knowledge.”

“Disinterested action” and “non-attachment” do not equate to absence of emotion, and, in *Island*, Huxley’s islanders are not exempted from feeling even sorrow. The Palanese experience “realistic” sorrow as the island society falls in the last chapter of the novel. Pala, Huxley’s utopia, is overwhelmed by exterior forces. The dictator, Colonel Dipa, from the neighboring island, Rendang, invades and is in the process of annihilating Palanese leaders as the novel concludes. Pala’s demise indicates that Huxley did not believe his prescriptions for the near-ideal human society were feasible in the midst of the present world environment (for him the 1960s). The Ambassador to Rendang speaks with Huxleyan realism: “So long as it remains out of touch with the rest of the world, an ideal society can be a viable society” (ISL 64). Hence, the novel begins with Will Farnaby’s trying to gain access to a “forbidden island.” It is forbidden because the governing leaders rightly recognize that contact with the outside world represents danger to the serene Palanese way of life. Although their near-perfect way of life on Pala is certainly destroyed by Colonel Dipa’s militaristic take-over, the individual islanders are not defeated because they have practiced Huxley’s prescriptions of “disinterested action,” “non-attachment,” “non-specialization” and healthy “skepticism” for a century. The islanders

accept the Buddha's blessing and Huxley's prescriptions and can choose to continue to do so on the individual level even while residing among the overwhelming influence "of so much misery" from the rest of the world (ISL 65). The islanders are raised and educated to inculcate Huxley concepts essential to the establishment and maintenance of a society that can legitimately claim what Huxley presents satirically in *Brave New World* (1932)-- "community, identity and stability" (1). In the Brave New World society, "community" and "stability" necessarily negate the individual's "identity." On Pala, "community, identity and stability" are achieved without sacrificing the identity and freedom of the individual and are consistent and viable largely because of the islander's Huxleyan philosophy. As such, and because of Huxley's philosophy of "disinterested action," it is normal for the Palanese to be more logical in their reasoning and, because of the practice of "non-specialization," more understanding of others who are different from themselves. Therefore, the islanders' practice of "disinterested action" and "non-specialization" provides a foundation for the development of satisfaction for the individual in society. Since these concepts are inextricably integrated in the Palanese way of life, the initiation to disinterested action and non-specialization must begin in childhood. If these practices are not integrated into the individual's way of life, then the individual is not prepared later to withstand another insidious danger that Huxley saw inherent in human society--the irresponsible, incorrect and potentially catastrophic (to humanity) use of language. Huxley repeatedly stressed that language, as "a source of ontological postulates, a conditioner of thought and...perception, a molder of sentiments, [and] a creator of behavior patterns," makes possible the objectification of psychological ideologies such as nationalism and

patriotism that thrusts societies toward mutual destruction (TTT 195).

The concepts of “disinterested action” and “non-attachment” seemed to be new to Huxley in *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936), but he definitively establishes them in *Ends and Means* (1937). The appearance of these behaviors coincides with the shift in Huxley’s thinking about a potential for a religious solution to human dilemmas. In *Eyeless in Gaza*, Huxley explores the process of change in a character from intellectual one-sidedness to disinterested action through Anthony Beavis. The “disinterested action” first explored in *Eyeless in Gaza*, explained in *Ends and Means* (1937), and presented in *Island* (1962) is “liberation from prevailing conventions of thought, feeling and behaviour [sic],” which leads to “non-attachment” (EM 3). By “disinterested action,” Huxley does not mean disconnectedness from others or, even, disconnectedness to one’s emotions. Huxley’s early protagonists (1921-1928) are often one-sided disconnected intellectuals like Denis Stone in *Crome Yellow* and Philip Quarles in *Point Counter Point*. Although both of these characters are intellectually aware of modifications that they should make in their interpersonal relationships, each is unable to change. Denis Stone and Philip Quarles are fragmented but one-dimensional cerebral characters. In *Island*, the conversion of Will Farnaby represents a fragmented multi-dimensional intellectual who is searching for consistency and reason (even though he initially denies it). However, he is educable and able to modify his interior world view of thoughts and emotions, and he is also (unlike Stone and Quarles) able to modify his external actions. Farnaby’s conversion results in an integration of thought (he knows he is wrong in betraying the Palanese to the Rani), emotion (he stops attempting to rationalize his bad behavior), and behavior (he adjusts his

behavior to what he “ought to do” and confesses his past mistakes).

Once disinterested action is practiced by the individual, he can function to his best overall benefit because the emotions are not in control of the intellect. In this notion of the individual’s influence over his emotions, Huxley does not mean that the individual is alienated from his emotions. He means, as does Spinoza in his philosophy of emotions, that one should continue to feel but to recognize intellectually the emotional motivations of actions. Once the emotional motivations are identified, the individual will be better prepared to put aside emotional actions that are not in his best interest. The individual still feels the emotions, but the emotions can be separated from subsequent actions. Thus, the individual is able to act so that the act may be directly attributed to intellect rather than to “bondage” to often chaotic feeling (Spinoza 251). Huxley states that the individual who “aspires” to “perfect non-attachment” must be not only compassionate and charitable but also intelligent enough to “perceive the general implications of particular acts,...see the individual being within the social and cosmic relations of which he is but a part” (EM 241).

On Pala, disinterested action is a developed habit for the Palanese (excepting the disaffected Raja and Rani, both of whom continuously act under “bondage” to their emotions). Farnaby first questions the seemingly insurmountable task of controlling the emotions of interpersonal relationships in a discussion with the young nurse, Radha, and her boyfriend and lover, Ranga (ISL 82). Not surprising, interpersonal relationships on Pala are not without mistakes caused by human desires and foibles. Furthermore, pre-marital sexual relationships as well as sexual relationships of the same sex are not taboo to

the Palanese. When mistakes are made by one partner, it is not necessary to beg for forgiveness because what is an acknowledged sin in Western culture is a natural, even if painful, component in the Palanese relationship. For example because of his ability to control his emotions, Ranga was “the same as ever, waiting for [Radha]” after she realized her error in desiring the teenage Raja sexually (80-1). Additionally, both young people reveal to Farnaby that they are very aware that Ranga’s two year trip to study at the University of Manchester will thrust their relationship into contact with other attractive people during their absence from each other. Although Radha’s reply to Farnaby’s question of how she will feel if Ranga cannot “resist” other girls is unequivocal and good natured acceptance, Ranga’s response to the same question is more understandable for newcomers to the concept of disinterested action: “I’d like to be [glad for Radha]...but whether I actually shall be glad--that’s another question.” Nevertheless, it is apparent in Ranga’s declaration that Radha is “her own girl,” not his, that whether he is glad for Radha or not, he is prepared to accept the consequences, accept Radha, and control his emotions as well as his actions (ISL 82-3).

The enthusiastic practice of maithuna, the yoga of love, by the Palanese (both younger and older) is the perfect example of the physical practice of disinterested action. Ranga explains to Farnaby that maithuna was otherwise called “male continence” in the nineteenth-century “Oneida Community” and is referred to as “*coitus reservatus*” by Roman Catholics (86). Because of the male partner’s developed control over emotions and his physical body, he does not complete the sex act by ejaculation. Radha and Ranga agree with and quote a phrase that they attribute to Spinoza from a Palanese applied

philosophy book: “Make the body capable of doing many things...this will help you to perfect the mind and so to come to the intellectual love of God” (ISL 87). While Huxley’s explanation of this shift from a physical to a spiritual experience is more suggestive than explicit, maithuna seems equally popular with Radha and Ranga. Thus, Huxley implies that maithuna is not just sex but good sex for both males and females and that the practice is a possible psycho-physical means to spiritual transcendence.

The Palanese associations of “Mutual Adoption Clubs” is another example of disinterested action in operation. MACs are also an example of a modification in society that could not be implemented or succeed without the prior acceptance and widespread practice of disinterested action. The Mutual Adoption Club is an association of “fifteen to twenty-five assorted couples” all dedicated to raising the association’s collective children in an intellectually and emotionally healthy cooperative. Membership is not limited to couples entering parenthood at the same time, but, instead, it includes “newly elected brides and bridegrooms, old-timers with growing children, grandparents and great-grandparents” (ISL 102). The inclusiveness of the MACs is intended (and succeeds on Huxley’s island) to provide wisdom and understanding for the deputy children from all ages of maturation. MACs are a super-extended family of “deputy” relatives whose function is to support one another in a shared unity that is not, in Western cultures, usually available except from biological relatives.

Mutual Adoption Clubs support deputy relatives with intimate, interpersonal relationships. In addition to providing a well-spring of advice and emotional support, MACs also provide alternative physical “escapes” and freedom to offsprings when the

pressures in the immediate home become overwhelming. In the event that the home atmosphere becomes unbearable, for example in “the case of an only child of two people who [cannot] understand one another and [are] always at cross-purposes or actually quarreling,” the child may escape to one of many families where the atmosphere is saner, and where the child may receive emotional support to help with the mental reconciliation of the situation at home (ISL 102). The use of Mutual Adoption Clubs is a solution, in Huxley’s opinion, to the unavoidable conflicts in interpersonal relationships even in near-ideal societies. Clearly, however, MACs are not feasible in a culture that does not accept and promulgate the practice of disinterested action. Without objectiveness in thought and control over the power that the emotions have on the individual’s actions, Mutual Adoption Clubs cannot be conceived of much less be operationally feasible. In Western culture, which is on the whole devoid of the practice of disinterested action, parents are not capable of relinquishing control or responsibility over their offspring to an extended family on a daily basis; the emotions of fear and guilt (and several others) in the parents will not allow their children’s escape and freedom. In his satire of the emotion-ridden, largely Western dysfunctional family in *Island*, Huxley offers this prescription: “take one sexually inept wage slave,...one dissatisfied female, two or (if preferred) three small television addicts; marinate in a mixture of Freudism and dilute Christianity, then bottle up tightly in a four-room flat and stew fifteen years in their own juice” (ISL 102-3). Out of such a family, Huxley thought, the propagation of fragmented individuals was the norm, and saner, mentally and emotionally balanced individuals was the exception.

Well-balanced emotional and intellectual individuals are a vital component in

Huxley's "symbiotic" society. The development of well-balanced individuals is further advanced through the practice of "non-specialization," which is the practice of avoiding expertise in all areas of activities--from the recreational to the professional--and which can be practiced individually in a society of non-attached people (EM 3-4). "Non-specialization" is imperative, according to Huxley, because "in relation to his chosen speciality, a man may be completely mature" while spiritually and ethically the same man "may be hardly more than a foetus" (PP 299). With regard to the individual's responsibility to the island society, Huxley's Palanese begin the practice of non-specialization at the age of fourteen. At fourteen (Huxley's general age for the beginning of adulthood), Palanese youth begin working "ninety minutes a day at some kind of manual labor" to prevent the inappropriate attitude of disdain for physical labor among those individuals who are naturally predisposed to non-physical excellence. "Domesticated sitting-addicts" are to be avoided as much as acts of "delinquency," another possible consequence of idleness among youth (ISL 166).

Many adult Palanese continue practicing "non-specialization" professionally throughout their lives by performing a variety of jobs in order to prevent boredom and stagnation and to provide for their personal growth in knowledge and understanding "about things and skills and organizations, about all kinds of people and their ways of thinking" (ISL 172). A frequently changing workforce in a society necessarily hampers the efficiency of the industries because new people are constantly needing to be trained, and those who have become quick and efficient are leaving for new and stimulating professions. Huxley believed, however, that "if it's a choice between mechanical

efficiency and human satisfaction,” the leaders of society and industry should choose the fulfillment of the individual members and workers for the benefit of all (ISL 171-2).

Consistent with Huxley’s determination that all people are not equal in human potential, some of the Palanese do gravitate to one primary vocation, but only after exploring other and very different alternatives during their own personal development. Dr. Robert MacPhail, a key leader of Pala, for example, tells Farnaby that he had worked at copper smelting and in the fishing industry two decades ago during his education/development (ISL 172).

The Palanese cultivate the philosophy of disinterested action by teaching each generation a form of skepticism. MacPhail tells Farnaby that the Palanese children are “discouraged” early on “from taking words too seriously”; they are taught “to *analyze whatever* [my italics] they hear or read” (ISL 170). Logically, one must be able to set aside emotions in order to consider and evaluate ideas and concepts effectively. Huxley felt people needed to be educated and practiced in skepticism in order to avoid the pitfalls of dangerous philosophies (i.e., in religion and politics) that seem to develop naturally from the organized use of words. He says in the essay “Adonis and the Alphabet” that “as the begetter of civilization and even of our [concept of] humanity, language must be taken very seriously,” but he warns of the existence of an insidious danger in using a process (language) that contains *within* it the seeds of ideologies in forms destructive to human societies (TTT 194-5). Huxley repeatedly stresses that for all the good in human existence as well as the evil therein, “words and the meaning of words...are matters of the profoundest ethical significance to every human being” (W 28).

Characteristically, Huxley explains language's integral influence on philosophical concepts by historically comparing the origins of early Western philosophy with early Chinese philosophy. Huxley believed that Western philosophers were under a somewhat unconscious compulsion to explain life in a pattern that structures itself in the form of Western language--sentences "containing subjects and predicates" (TTT 196). Consequently, early Western philosophers were concerned with "substance" and "essence," both ideas naturally derived from the verb "to be" (TTT 196). In contrast, the Chinese language has "no fixed parts of speech and no word for 'to be,'" therefore, the Chinese preoccupation with the "relationships between things, not with their 'essences'" is partially explained by the structure of their written and spoken language (TTT 196-8).

While using language, then, man is subversively hampered by the structure and the natural outgrowths in meaning and emphasis; and therefore, ultimate conclusions (truths about human nature and society) are difficult enough to formulate. When language is used knowingly to manipulate meaning and cause trigger responses among the populace, evil occurs, and the society is in danger of destruction. In *Island*, Murugan, the Raja, has succumbed to the ideologies of industrialization and the emotional fervor and self-gratification (as future head of state) of nationalism. MacPhail responds to Murugan's disdain of Pala's lack of modernity: "...we make and import only what we can afford. And what we can afford is limited not merely by our supply of pounds and marks and dollars, but also primarily--*primarily*,...by our wish to be happy, our ambition to become fully human" (ISL 163). Further, to the ideology of unified nationalism, MacPhail says, "I admire them [energy, devotion and self-sacrifice] too...in the same way as I admire a

typhoon. Unfortunately that kind of energy and devotion and self-sacrifice happens to be incompatible with liberty, not to mention reason and human decency” (ISL 170). On the surface, Huxley points out, the rise of modern nationalism beginning with the French Revolution seems to have been an admirable development. However, language-created nationalism, “the rise of the self-conscious nation-state” is the ideology that aided Napoleon’s expansion; it was also, ironically, by virtue of its rise in Germany, Austria, and Russia, “turned against him and [that which] finally destroyed him” (HS 79). Furthermore, Huxley agrees with and summarizes Lord Acton’s opinion of nationalism from Acton’s essay reprinted in *The History of Freedom and Other Essays*, 1907: “...it does not aim at liberty or prosperity; it aims solely at making a nation, which is a kind of *abstract idea* [my italics],” and results in “not merely material but also moral ruin” (HS 80).

On one level then, Huxley is an optimist “profoundly optimistic about individuals and [small] groups of individuals existing upon the margins of society” (Letters 462). The vision of Huxley’s fictitious island continues with the possibility of the advancement of Palanese principles by the islanders and Will Farnaby. Yet, on the larger issue of sustained societal reform, Huxley is a “profoundly pessimistic” realist. The necessary scope of modification on the societal level is so grand (involving the cooperation of multitudes) that rapid, or even slow but complete and lasting, change seems improbable. In Huxley’s world view then, the society is analogous to the complexity of the individual, and modern society (though so much larger), like modern man, is fragmented to the extreme. Individuals and societies are complex entities requiring complex cures. In *Island*, while

recovering from an injury sustained after landing on Pala, Farnaby learns from Nurse Radha that Western medical care is “fifty per cent terrific and fifty per cent nonexistent” (75). She explains that the procedural and technological advances made in areas such as surgery and antibiotics are marvelous, but little or “nothing” is done preventively by “teaching people the way of going through life” in order to not need the advances (75). And in regards to a cure for an already ill individual (and, Huxley would say, a society), Nurse Radha explains that the Palanese look for “chemical answers, psychological answers, answers in terms of what you eat, how you make love, what you see and hear, [and] how you feel about being who you are” (75-6). She quotes for Will a poem learned by Palanese nursing students:

“I am a crowd, obeying as many laws
As it has members. Chemically impure
Are all ‘my’ beings. There’s no single cure
For what can never have a single cause.” (76)

Cures, according to Huxley then, require immediate and complicated modifications on “all the fronts” to save both society and the individual from self-destruction even if the successes can only be expected in infinitesimal degrees (ISL 173). The fate of Huxley’s near-utopian society represents reality, but Huxley’s hope for a better future is represented by the Palanese individuals and the recent convert, Will Farnaby; “and there is good reason to believe that their existence there [on the margin of disaster and perhaps in the real world of the Huxley readers as well] does something to mitigate the horrors which the society forever prepares for itself” (Letters 462).

GOVERNMENT, ECONOMICS, LAW: WHAT MIGHT BE REASONABLE

In 1927, Huxley was convinced that a growing trend of political apathy existed among the general population; consequently, his essays in *Proper Studies* (1927), target areas of societal leadership and organization with abstract terms like “intelligent government” and “logical economics” (PS 153-5). In Huxley’s opinion, the reality of the Western governments of the twentieth century revealed both descriptive terms--intelligent government and logical economics--to be an oxymoron. In fact, Huxley describes the European governments of 1923 with these words: “something monstrous and irresponsible and idiotic” (OM 101). However, it is interesting that the title, “Proper Studies,” and the poem (taken from the second epistle of the philosophical poem, “An Essay on Man,” by Alexander Pope) from which Huxley takes the title and the epigram for *Proper Studies* adumbrate the direction Huxley would take later in formulating his prescriptive ideas for improvement of human societies. Ironically, the title, poem, and epigram indirectly contradict Huxley’s 1927 focus in *Proper Studies* for societal improvements (i.e., “intelligent government” and “logical economics”). Indeed in 1927, Huxley’s ideal governing body was a “ruling aristocracy” kept under control by laws and chosen by “examination” to determine proven excellence of mind (PS 155-166). Huxley later came to believe that centralized power even in a small governing body could not help but lead society to a greater concentration of power in government and, necessarily, less liberty for the individual (EM 74). Furthermore, he became convinced that favorable changes in

societies will not occur without positive and “preliminary modification of the individual members of society (EM 146). Then and only then can “individuals in association” begin the more difficult task of “mak[ing] practical applications of what were merely theories, to construct here and now small working-models of the better society...; to educate themselves here and now into specimens of those ideal individuals described by the founders of religions” (EM 147).

Consequently, Huxley maintains from *Ends and Means* (1937) onward to his depiction of the Palanese government in *Island* his conviction that the key to individual fulfillment in society is only to be found in decentralized communities of “peaceful co-operation, between non-attached, yet active and responsible individuals” (EM 69). Huxley’s idea of the ideal government is depicted in *Island* in the governing body on Pala. The government consists of a “cabinet,” a “House of Representatives,” and representing the monarchial figure-head (Murugan who has not come of age), the “Privy Council.” The primary and ultimate goal of this small governing body is to support and maintain the “voluntary associations of men and women on the road to full humanity” (ISL 200). In addition, the small government represents the Palanese society when the need arises by “acting in the name of the society as a whole” (EM 78). These men and women who make up the governing body support rather than direct Pala’s self-governing industry, finance, and the decentralized judicial system; in short, they are part of and not separate from the general cooperating population.

Huxley’s ideal society outlined in *Island* is consistent with his answer to the question: What is the purpose of a society? The purpose of Huxley’s society is to

promote and maintain “liberty,” “reason,” and “human decency.” Farnaby is told that the Palanese society is neither capitalistic nor socialistic; it is something new and different and something that Huxley thought might work. In the essay “Centralization and Decentralization,” Huxley asserts that under capitalism, the state guarantees the bourgeoisie’s “right to rule and to be rich,” and under state socialism, the state “defends the position to which it [“the ruling bureaucracy”] has climbed” (EM 70). Huxley calls the political system of Pala a “co-operative” (ISL 169-70). MacPhail tells Farnaby, “Pala’s [political system is] a federation of self-governing units, geographical units, professional units, [and] economic units,” but not militaristic units because pacifism is crucial to the success of Pala’s political and economic systems (ISL 169).

The practice of pacifism is an essential element in Huxley’s political philosophy and in the personal philosophy of each and every “non-attached” individual. War is evil even if it has a long-standing place in human history (EM 74-5). Furthermore, as part of a society consisting of reasonable and decent human beings, “there is no reason why, if we so desire and set to work in the right way, we should not rid ourselves of war” (EM 105). In 1937 (and in the midst of trying to establish a pacifist movement with Gerald Heard), Huxley believed war, the militaristic attempt of one society to kill another for whatever reason, to be an “unnatural” phenomenon willed into existence for a specific purpose and developed into a mistakenly perceived “socially correct” and “inevitable..manifestation of unchanging ‘human nature’” (EM 105). Modern research in animal behavior reached conclusions that influenced Huxley later to reverse his opinion about mankind’s warring inclinations. By the time he was writing *Island* (1962), Huxley believed that although “the

superstructures of nationalism, social climbing and hierarchical order are obviously conventional and strictly home-made,” there are “instinctive and inherited” biological tendencies toward the making of war (Letters 923-4). In much the same way as he had described religions to be founded on natural spiritual motivations and then subsequently corrupted through man’s attempt to structure and maintain the status quo, Huxley thought man’s inherent warring tendencies for territory became subsequently corrupted through political attempts to protect nationalistic identities and intentions. Religion became something more (and exceedingly less valuable in Huxley’s opinion) than spiritual yearning, and war became something more than human survival (and irretrievably evil). Huxley thought of early mankind’s instinctive survival wars as understandable, but he also believed the natural progression of mankind’s evolution had passed the point in time when war was an understandable method of survival. He believed that war had no place in twentieth century societies.

Whether human societies will ever rid themselves of the practice of war or not Huxley found irrelevant to the fact that war made the establishment and maintenance of a near-ideal society virtually impossible. Huxley was certain that the “country which proposes to make use of modern war as an instrument of policy [for aggression or defense] must possess a highly centralized, all-powerful executive” (EM 71). At the same time, the existence of a centralized government naturally predisposes a country to war (EM 71). Thus, even though Huxley had little confidence that decentralized, or even warless, societies would become the norm, pacifism and decentralization are essential political elements to the establishment and maintenance of a near-ideal society in his view.

The practice of using military force in Western societies crosses from politics and national security into economics by influencing how society defines the “efficiency” of the economic system in terms of military effectiveness. In the essay “Decentralization and Self-Government,” Huxley explains that his economic philosophy, which is consistent with a decentralized self-government, increases the felt-responsibility of each worker and does not produce an attitude of “passive obedience.” Although “passive obedience” is not to be valued for innovative thinking, it, nevertheless, is an important asset to the military strategist (EM 94-5). In a centralized setting, the worker does not necessarily feel a responsibility because he is not part of the governing process. The passive worker is habituated to following orders; Huxley quotes: “Theirs not to reason why; theirs but to do and die” (EM 95). In contrast, “a society composed of men and women habituated to working in self-governing groups...may think and have wills of their own” (EM 95). Their wills are likely to question ends and means, and they might refuse to comply because of misunderstanding of or disagreement with military strategists. Furthermore, a society that is structured under a hierarchy of “military” efficiency will value swift mobilization, another trait not engendered by decentralization because even “a society composed of coordinated but self-governing parts...cannot be manipulated” as “swiftly” (EM 95). To Huxley’s near-utopian society, efficiency means something very different; it means the production of products by means that generate the greatest satisfaction for individuals living in association and developing their full human potentials (ISL 171-2). Additionally, the economic system is not hampered by the physical costs of waging war; for example, the Palanese do not need to prepare for wars, and naturally, then, there is “no need for

conscription, or military hierarchies, or a unified command” (ISL 169).

In addition to pacifism on the societal level, there are two other components that Huxley believed are prior and ongoing necessary components to a functioning decentralized and self-governing economic system. The first is population control. Huxley maintains that allowing millions of men, women, and children to starve while building up military or economic might is a horrendous affront to human decency. It is not understandable on the individual level or on the societal level. Huxley believed that most people develop a kind of immunity to and ability to ignore this evil with varying degrees of success because a solution seems impossible (Letters 822). In addition to what he saw as an immediate hunger problem, Huxley asserts that over-population is inextricably linked to the development of “totalitarianism” because when a problem such as starving masses becomes too big, the system of democratic societies will “break down” (BWR 15-6). Huxley agrees that a solution *seems* impossible, but he asserts that there is a solution only if individuals and societies are able to become more human and more humane--essentially like his society outlined in *Island*. Advances in knowledge across the spectrum of science and technology, but specifically in birth control, should be utilized world-wide at whatever cost to put an end to human starvation and the onset of the kind of nightmare world depicted in *Ape and Essence* (Letters 580). MacPhail explains to Farnaby that the Palanese “never allowed [them]selves to produce more children than [they] could feed, clothe, house, and educate into something like full humanity” (168). Population control is an accepted policy among the entire Palanese population, and maithuna, the yoga of love, is taught at school “about the same time as trigonometry and advanced biology...between

fifteen and fifteen and a half" (89). When the Palanese do not wish to practice the "yoga of love," they rely on government provided contraceptives delivered by the postman "at the beginning of each month" (90). Of the offspring the islanders do choose to produce, one-third to one-half is of genetically superior stock that result through the reasonable and moral use of artificial insemination (218-9). Huxley's spokesman in *Island* grants that proving the practice to be a moral good will take time, but Farnaby is told that "...now that the advantages of AI [artificial insemination] have been so clearly demonstrated, most married couples feel that it's more moral to take a shot at having a child of superior quality than to run the risk of slavishly reproducing whatever quirks and defects may happen to run in the husband's family" (220). In addition to the human "defective" traits that might be passed along from parents to offspring, Huxley predicted and feared that the quality of humankind would suffer from technological advances in medicine. In the essay "Quantity, Quality, Morality," Huxley theorizes about and agrees with Dr. W. H. Sheldon's conclusion that the genetic traits in physical and intellectual quality in the general population is declining because of "new wonder drugs and better treatment" and a social desire to save the unfit (BWR 19-21).

On Pala, overpopulation and physical and intellectual down trends are thwarted; Farnaby is told that Pala's "population is increasing at less than a third of one per cent per annum" compared to militaristic Rendang's burgeoning "almost three per cent" (90). Militaristic societies need excess humanity to use during military conflicts--an unfortunate fact that is in direct conflict with Huxley's adamant and repeated reminder to his readers that society is for people, technology is for people, and democracy is for people not vice

versa. Of the three evils of “ignorance, militarism and breeding” Huxley maintains that the “greatest of these is breeding” (ISL 169). MacPhail tells Farnaby of the relationship between population and tyranny: “As population rushes up, prosperity goes down...as prosperity goes down, discontent and rebellion, political ruthlessness and one-party rule, nationalism and bellicosity begin to rise” (169). Even in societies “doomed to a continual process of self-frustration,” Huxley repeatedly called birth control an urgent necessity in order to reduce needless suffering (Letters 445).

Again, economics is for people--not people for economics. Huxley contends that this area is one in which there is a great temptation--and that the temptation is for acquisition. He stresses that this temptation is one that must be averted. In *Island*, Huxley repeats this warning several times, showing, for example, how Murugan drools over “Italian Style Motor Scooter[s]” in a Sears Roebuck catalog given to him by Colonel Dipa. In *Island*, however, the suppression of Murugan’s desire to convert Pala into a consuming society is not successful, and indeed Murugan’s acquisitive nature has been used against Pala politically. Farnaby thinks of an analogy between Colonel Dipa’s temptation of Murugan and another famous and successful one: “The tree in the midst of the garden was called the Tree of Consumer Goods, and to the inhabitants of every under-developed Eden the tiniest taste of its fruit, and even the sight of its thirteen hundred and fifty-eight leaves, had power to bring the shameful knowledge that, industrially speaking, they were stark-naked” (155). In a letter to Ian Parsons, Huxley writes that “Roosevelt is said to have advocated free distributions of S-R [sic, Sears Roebuck] catalogues in Communist countries, to convert the inhabitants, not to Christianity but Consumerism”

(Letters 928). This ploy, however, would only work in Pala on the disaffected Murugan because all the Palanese who were educated on the island (Murugan was educated in the West) are immune to the temptation of consumerism. Ranga tells Farnaby that Murugan could not convert the Palanese to acquisitiveness because they would not want

to exchange something rich and good and endlessly interesting for something bad and thin and boring...[they do not want or] need...your speedboats or your television, your wars and revolutions, your revivals, your political slogans, your metaphysical nonsense from Rome and Moscow. (84)

Furthermore, since the Palanese economic system is cooperative rather than competitive and the Palanese “resist the temptation to over consume,” they only produce enough for everyone to have “plenty” (168). The Palanese practice of cooperation extinguishes the impetus of developing industrial “petty dictators” (EM 96). For example, on Pala there is only one newspaper, and it prints every side of a debate to allow the reader to “compare their arguments and make up his own mind” rather than make “a systematic effort to install conditioned reflexes in the minds of the voters” and scandalous distraction, “anything to prevent them [the readers] from thinking” (171). The population does not burgeon, and the Palanese only import and export when necessary; for example, they import only such essentials as “electrical equipment” (166-7). Thus, the economic system does not allow for “anybody to become more than four or five times as rich as average” (ISL 168). Decentralization and the practice of self-government in industry also generates responsibility and participation, both qualities that add to the spiritual/world view that does not include “abstract materialism,” the pseudo-want, as a goal. MacPhail explains that the Palanese are “concrete” versus “abstract” materialists who derive “wordless levels

[of meaning by] seeing and touching and smelling, [with] tensed muscles and dirty hands...sampling different kinds of work in concrete materialism is the first, indispensable step in our education for concrete spirituality” (172). The pseudo-want of the Western cultures, in contrast, never benefits the individual except with the false satisfaction of obtaining goods--a satisfaction that quickly fades because it is false and actually harms the individual by clouding his perception of “immediate spiritual experience” (ISL 172).

Because the Palanese are pacifists, violence is non-existent. Because the Palanese have developed an inculcated indifference to superficial materialism, theft should not occur. Consequently, in Huxley’s near-ideal society, the Palanese have little need for a judicial system or for a legal system to administer punishment. In Huxley’s decentralized, self-governing society, a child is raised with “plenty” of food and attention from his immediate family as well as his Mutual Adoption Club. Additionally the child is educated extensively with what MacPhail refers to (in terms of criminal behavior) as “preventative education” and “preventative medicine” (180). As a consequence, Palanese children with an identifiable tendency to become a problem for society are singled out and treated at a very early age, so they never develop into a societal problem. The child is also educated to the religion of immediate experience and universal unity to appreciate the external “jewels” of the everyday world. “Thou art That” teaches the Palanese to appreciate the natural world, themselves, and their part in what Huxley describes as a fulfilling and sustaining existence--capable of prompting the development of a “sense of unity and solidarity...love and compassion” (HS 212-3). Additionally, Huxley’s near-ideal society has neither poverty nor extreme wealth, two sociological conditions that contribute to the

development of crime. In this kind of psychological, sociological, and spiritually balanced society, Huxley expects few crimes. However, he admits that there will probably be exceptions. In the case where crime occurs, as MacPhail explains to Farnaby, judges are utilized in a humane and decentralized manner: "The judge listens to the evidence, decides...innocen[ce] or guilt, and if he is guilty, remands him to his MAC and, where it seems advisable, to the local panel of medical and mycomystical experts" (180). When the guilty party is deemed cured, "when the reports are satisfactory, the case is closed" (180).

Huxley's near-ideal society exists for the individual members of the society. All of the functions of and between government, economics, and law are consistently aimed at providing a society conducive to "liberty," "reason," and "human decency" in order for the individual to go as far on the path to becoming "fully human" as possible. The undergirding of religious mysticism provides a focus (again consistent in every categorical possibility--government, industry, law, art, education) and a goal that is not dependent upon the chance circumstances of a life bound up in emotional and/or political bondage. Furthermore in Huxley's opinion, his near-ideal society is not just wishful thinking; he provides "detailed and (conceivably) practical instructions for making...this world a place fit for human beings to live in" (Letters 944).

EDUCATION: PROCESSES OR SUBSTANTIAL THINGS

In the Old Raja of Pala's booklet, "Notes on What's What, and on What It Might be Reasonable to Do about What's What," Farnaby reads, "Tunes or Pebbles, processes or substantial things?" In regards to education, Huxley affirms "tunes" (ISL 200). He views education as "processes" designed to harmonize the various elements within the individual and the diverse fields of inquiry without. Thus, the "processes" of Huxley's near-ideal system of education are consistent philosophically with respect to Huxley's ideas of the complex individual, to his mystical and pragmatic "existential religion of mysticism,"¹ and to his prescriptions for the relationships within societal organizations. Further, all of these "processes" are geared toward inculcating the idea of "non-attachment," which leads one in a Huxleyan loop back to "self-knowledge" and "total acceptance." Huxley's foremost tool to educate and prepare individuals so that they will be able to become "fully human" remained throughout his lifetime to be a truly "integrated liberal education" (HS 2). The lecture entitled "Integrate Education," which is significantly not called "The Integrated Education" or "How to Integrate Education," indicates the stage of Huxley's hypothetical analysis of the kind of education that would promote the development of "fully human" individuals. Huxley's prescriptive use of the imperative form for his title is noteworthy because in 1959 he was considering and calling for the integrating "processes" of

¹Huxley's description of his working religion in his last essay, "Shakespeare and Religion" in J. Huxley, *Aldous Huxley: 1894-1963 A Memorial Volume*, 175.

education that would result in successful liberal education. By 1962, Huxley had developed some educational methods into “working hypotheses,” depicted in *Island*, that he thought might reach his goals.

In the same lecture, Huxley differentiates between the successful integration of scientific methods into processes that would most likely result in an understanding of the immediate world of “direct experience” because (as again he characteristically examined historical endeavors to determine the flaws in the processes) he did not agree with the conclusions of thinkers that came before him. By “direct experience” Huxley means the “reality” that exists between “the world of abstractions and concepts,” “the world of immediate experience,” and “the world of spiritual insight” (HS 4-5). These three “worlds” must “be brought together” in integrated education. In regards to education, Huxley thought the conundrum of previous thinkers was caused by two mitigating problems. The first problem was their “reluctance to accept preconceived notions” and instead “to turn [their] opinion[s] into a thesis rather than...working hypothe[sis]” (HS 9). Therefore, incorrect conclusions were propagated from the beginning because the theories concerning “human problems in general” were instigated arbitrarily (HS 1). Huxley felt that the answer to this problem primarily resided in, again, seeking answers to the questions: “Who are we? What is the nature of human nature? How should we be related to the planet on which we live? How are we to live together satisfactorily? How are we to develop our individual potentialities? What is the relationship between nature and nurture?” (HS 2). Huxley thought that if these questions could be kept at the center of inquiry, the answers could then be integrated from many different “specialized” and

“completely isolated disciplines” into an “integrated form of education” (HS 2).

According to Huxley, the second problem was the natural evolution of education into the “specialized” disciplines, which subsequently can benefit education if the results of these specialized disciplines can be integrated successfully into an education of “direct experience.” However, the process of specialization in education that brought about great and accelerating technological progress for mankind has also indirectly made it more difficult to communicate the results of specialized fields in forms advantageous to an education of “direct experience.” With specialization came the need to create special, esoteric languages (i.e., physics, botany, chemistry, mineralogy) that are insufficient languages in an educational system of “generalities”--the kind of system that addresses “direct experience.” Therefore, Huxley thought that a truly integrated education had to use “processes” that would result in the communication of “direct experience” simultaneously with the knowledge of specialized disciplines.

Additionally, Huxley stresses that education like every other human endeavor--society, industry, politics, and religion--is a complicated issue that should, first of all, insure that the desired goal is consistent with the methods used to achieve that goal: “Good ends cannot be achieved by inappropriate means” (EM 213). In his essay on education in *Ends and Means* (1937), Huxley identified a dichotomy in the Western education system that he saw as fatal to the development of the non-attached near-ideal individual. Huxley states that educationists aim for the development of “freedom, intelligence, responsibility and voluntary co-operation” in the education of the young elementary school child (EM 205). Unfortunately, during secondary and higher education,

the educational purpose contradicts the earlier aim and stresses the development of “passive acceptance of tradition ... for either dominance or subordination” (EM 205).

This happens, according to Huxley, because the older child is closer to becoming an adult who must be able to function in a modern Western democracy still under “old patriarchal tradition[s],” and educators “take fright” that the child will not be able to succeed in the “hierarchical,” and still...authoritarian” society (EM 205) .

The dilemma of an educational system whose infrastructure consists of two mutually exclusive goals is further exacerbated by the unmitigated external stress from a political/societal system that contradicts those goals. Huxley explains that even if educational systems managed to educate the adolescent for self-government and co-operation and managed to exclude “dominance and subordination” in that education, in most cases, the patriarchal conditions of the modern democratic society would nevertheless insure ultimate failure (EM 207). Once the young adult is “turn[ed]...loose into a hierarchical, competitive, success worshipping society,” he will “most likely” suffer a “period of bewilderment and distress,” but then he will “re-adjust” to the reality of the society in which he lives (EM 207). Therefore, even if successful methods are fitted to a consistent purpose in education, the results will never be completely satisfactory until the entire society is focused on one purpose--and one purpose only. Although Huxley admits it is unlikely that society will break “out of [the] vicious circle” in the educational system and the socio-political system and build “up a virtuous one in its place,” he optimistically outlines what he envisioned the shape that the necessary changes would assume in *Island* (EM 207). In *Island*, Farnaby says that boys and girls are for “mass consumption” in the

West and “for strengthening the national state...cannon fodder, industry fodder, agriculture fodder, road-building fodder” in dictatorial countries (235-6). Mr. Menon, “Pala’s Under-Secretary of Education, acknowledges to Farnaby that “the state has to exist...and there has to be enough [sustenance] for everybody” before the ideal educational methods and goals that Huxley outlines here can be realized (236). Nevertheless, Huxley analyzes his methods in *Ends and Means* and describes and gives examples in *Island* of what he believes are the major educational processes of a society whose sole purpose is to help boys and girls become “full-blown human beings” (ISL 236).

In his examination of the problems inherent in Western secondary and higher education, Huxley also stipulates his conclusion that although people are not “equal” in intellectual abilities, their inequality does not create a requirement for different educational purposes. Both the student who has the ability to become a true academic intellectual as well as the student who aspires to become a technician in a limited field need an education that will “provide [them] with a principle of integration” with their world that is “cognitive,” “affective,” and “conative” (EM 228). The differences in the students’ intellectual ability or “type” and the physical manifestation of personality, i.e., the “cerebrotonic...the viscerotonic...and the somatotonic,” necessitate the adaptation of the educational process to the type (EM 223). The purpose of the educational process is the same regardless of the type of student. That purpose is to develop skills of integration “from the power of logical analysis to that of aesthetic appreciation” and to provide “a framework of historical, logical and physico-chemico-biological relationships” (EM 221). The student will use the “framework” throughout his life to sort new information to its

“proper and significant place” (EM 221). Huxley emphasizes that the framework provides a “proper and significant place” in relation to the “non-attached,” near-ideal individual in a society consistent with and fostering the “fully human” individuals of which it consists--“a virtuous circle” (EM 207).

The necessary adaptations as far as Huxley examines them in “academic (or liberal) education” and “technical education” entail changes so “that technical education shall become more liberal, and academic education, a more adequate preparation for everyday life in a society which is to be changed for the better” (EM 225). Academic or liberal education, as Huxley viewed its status in 1937 and 1959, produces

either...parrots, gabbling remembered formulas which they do not really understand; or, if they do understand, as specialists, knowing everything about one subject and taking no interest in anything else; or, finally, as intellectuals, theoretically knowledgeable about everything, but hopelessly inept in the affairs of ordinary life. (EM 222)

According to Huxley, the technical education of his day produced similar results: “They come out into the world, highly expert in their particular job, but knowing very little about anything else and having no integrating principle in terms of which they can arrange and give significance to such knowledge as they may subsequently acquire” (EM 222-3). The answer for Huxley was a matter of applying consistent (with character/personality type) and appropriate amendments in the “principle of integration” for both the intellectual and the technical students that they will be “congenitally capable of using” (EM 229). Huxley describes this principle of integration as “psychological and ethical,” and since the goal is the ethical development of fully-human individuals, it should coordinate “knowledge and experience...in human terms;” thus, the framework of relationships is “not material, but

psychological, not indifferent to values, but moral, not merely cognitive, but also affective and conative” (EM 230). Huxley thought that as a consequence of such an integrated educational approach the current “inept in everyday life” intellectual would learn to integrate life by studying both the human world and the abstract “non-human, material universe” (EM 230). The technician, because he is not pre-positioned by type to the same kind of understanding as the intellectual, would integrate his experience and special knowledge in human terms only--of how his particular area of knowledge “has affected and is likely to affect” the individual and society (EM 231-2). Thus, the technician would have a fully integrated world-view, and the intellectual would learn to understand how the immediate emotional-material world relates to abstract-historical concepts.

Huxley thought that the identification of types was an important step in the educational process. He was greatly influenced by and repeatedly expounded the conclusions of Dr. W. H. Sheldon’s theories on the possible correlation between human physical types and human temperament. Furthermore, Huxley believed that enough in-depth information in the sciences of the individual (psychological and physical) was available to identify types. His process of identification, as seen in *Island*, is not used to determine whether the individual is a preferred type; it is used to determine the future direction of emphasis in education. Menon explains to Farnaby that the education system tries to identify as accurately as possible “precisely who or what, anatomically, biochemically and psychologically” is the student:

In the organic hierarchy, which takes precedence--his gut, his muscles, or his nervous system? How near does he stand to the three polar extremes [i.e., cerebrotonic, viscerotonic, somatotonic]? How harmonious or how

disharmonious is the mixture of his component elements, physical and mental? How great is his inborn wish to dominate, or to be sociable, or to retreat into his inner world? And how does he do his thinking and perceiving and remembering? Is he a visualizer or a nonvisualizer? Does his mind work with images or with words, with both at once, or with neither? How close to the surface is his storytelling faculty?...And finally how suggestible is he going to be when he grows up? (ISL 237)

Once identification of probable type is completed, then education can be shaped accordingly to the varieties that correlate with each type (i.e., congenial, aggressive, reclusive). Regardless of the type of student, the purpose of education remains the same--to produce "free," "intelligent," "responsible," and "voluntary and co-operative" individuals.

Yet, some character and personality types can be dangerous to the society as well as to themselves if they do not receive the appropriate "adapted" education (i.e., Peter Pans and extreme Muscle Men). Huxley explains through the mouthpiece of Mr. Menon that the individual who "can be hypnotized easily and to the limit [the somnambulist] is the most dangerous element" in a society because he is both the "propagandist's predestined victim" and the propagandist's source of success (238). However, the somnambulist can also be an asset to society. Huxley/Menon explains that if properly educated, the "twenty per cent of potential somnambulists" can use their unique characteristic to "distort time" and thereby enhance their own learning potential--that is, by learning in the span of a few minutes what normally takes much longer (ISL 238-40). By extending their intellectual gift and "exploiting it, among other things, for educational purposes," they can if they choose (and they will choose to because of their combined societal/educational development) help improve society (ISL 239-40). One may surmise that Huxley hoped,

however unlikely it might be, that the adoption of his educational techniques might instigate a slow improvement within current society. The alternative to slow change is radical change, and for Huxley radical change is not desirable because fast and complete change would require methods not consistent with the goal.

On Will Farnaby's extensive tour of Pala's educational system, Mr. Menon and Mrs. Narayan, the Principal, explain the significance of early "training of the whole mind-body" to "disinterested action" and education in general through games with titles like "Evolutionary Snakes and Ladders," "Mendelian Happy Families," and "Psychological Bridge" (241-7). The early training teaches the children by immediate experience that "people with a different kind of hereditary makeup [shy, tense, over responsive, and introverted] have [just] as good a right to exist as they do" (ISL 241). The children are taught the same lesson of acceptance rather than tolerance in "terms of analogies" and "animal parables" (ISL 241-2). Furthermore, the children are taught "breathing games," "traditional phantasies," and dance to take the energy of negative emotions such as "fear or envy or too much noradrenalin" and redirect it into "something useful, or if not useful, at least harmless" (ISL 242). As a result, education is used pragmatically to teach children some useful exercises that they may use in their everyday trials and stressful situations that Mrs. Narayan explains to Farnaby are both "fun and education" and a lesson in "applied ethics." For example, the Palanese children are taught a dance called "the Rakshasi Hornpipe" in which they are imagining as they shout, "Stamp it out!" that they are controlling "dangerous heads of steam raised by [the emotions] of anger and frustration" (259). In another example, fourth grade children are taught a lesson in "elementary

practical psychology” to disassociate pain from injury. While the fourth graders are reminded that pain is an indication that something is wrong, they are instructed to learn to control pain intellectually because “nobody *has* to feel” it (261). Additionally, children are capable of learning, according to Huxley, “elementary applied philosophy” as early as the fifth grade and can understand concepts such as the differentiation between “symbol systems” and reality. It is possible for children to understand that each person’s personal experience is private while language is a public “symbol system” and that if language is not used carefully and responsibly as well as received skeptically, it can, because of this differentiation (between public and private), do a great deal of harm to society at large (not to mention to interpersonal relationships) (ISL 251). Palanese fifth graders learn this lesson in principle by a discussion of different languages as “public” systems of communication. Then, the teacher has the students say the word “pinch” in unison and points out the word’s public significance. The students are next instructed to “pinch [them]selves...Hard! [and] Harder!”--an exercise which is followed by a discussion differentiating the private “twenty-three distinct and separate pains” from the public word, “pinch” (251).

Furthermore, the Palanese children are able to accept Huxley’s religious/mystical philosophy because since there are no conflicts with opposing religions as in the West (necessitating the separation of public school and religion), it is successfully taught at school. Huxley thought his religious philosophy could be acceptable to everyone because it was complete and, also, because it was the spiritual motivation that instigated the founding religious thinkers of all major religions both East and West. Huxley designed

and believed his mysticism to have the added advantage of excluding the forced fictions and inconsistencies caused by the manipulations of “symbol systems” (Letters 482-3).

Huxley believed that his philosophical/religious concepts could be taught through empirical lessons that enable further expansion of theoretical and religious traditions practiced at home. For example, in the “Mahakasyapa story” the children accept that Buddha and his disciple, “Mahakasyapa,” do not speak about profound-sounding concepts/feelings like “Suchness” and “Universal Unity” in the context of a flower because language is insufficient to explain what Huxley calls “Is-ness”--the experience of life. The Buddha and Mahakasyapa just smiled at each other instead. The “Mahakasyapa story” is an educational lesson that the children experience in their everyday lives. For example, when Farnaby has dinner with Vijaya’s family, he experiences “grace” in one of the traditional ways the Palanese live their philosophical/mystical world view. The family “chews” grace: “Grace is the first mouthful of each course--chewed and chewed until there’s nothing left...you pay attention to the flavor of the food, to its consistency and temperature, to the pressures on your teeth and the feel of the muscles in your jaws” (231). In this instance, the children are learning while the family is practicing the concept of “universal unity” in eating.

Huxley believed that once children theoretically understand the philosophical concepts, then education should attempt to provide “bridge-building” exercises that encourage them to “relate everything they’ve learned in...art, language, religion, [and] self-knowledge” (ISL 254). During “bridge-building” for example, as Mrs. Narayan explains to Farnaby, the children first study in books about botany to learn what a flower

is “in the world of abstractions and concepts” (HS 5). Then they are given a flower, preferably one with a scent, and are asked to explain “scientifically” in written and artistic (by drawing) form what a flower is. Then, they hear the “Mahakasyapa story” again and are asked to relate their previous answer in the context of being incapable of explaining through language or any kind of symbol system exactly what a flower is “in the world of immediate experience” (HS 5). They are thus instructed in “receptivity,” to look and think disinterestedly: “Look at it alertly but passively, receptively, without labeling or judging or comparing” (ISL 255). The development in receptivity was both Huxley’s “complement and antidote” to the human tendency to go too far in “analysis and symbol manipulation” (ISL 255). The children are asked to explain in words what they cannot, and they are confirmed in their inability to succeed (ISL 256). After this unsuccessful attempt at writing, Mrs. Narayan directs the children to “look at the flower again...shut your eyes for a minute or two...Then draw what came to you when your eyes were closed. Draw whatever it may have been--something vague or vivid...Draw what you saw or even what you didn’t see...compare the scientific description of the flower with what you wrote about it when you weren’t analyzing ...Then compare your drawings and writings with the other boys and girls in the class” (257). This part of the education encourages the students to acknowledge the “world of spiritual insight” (HS 5). Finally, the students are asked to make a connection between all the different “is-nesses” of the flower to “what [they] have learned in school” and in their daily lives at home, in the jungle, [and] in the temple” (257). Huxley also maintains through the mouthpiece of Mr. Menon that total mind-body training is beneficial to the learning process: “A trained mind-body learns more

quickly and more thoroughly than an untrained one. It's also more capable of relating facts to ideas, and both of them to its own ongoing life" (244).

Through myth, story, and experience in lessons and play, the children are able to learn that language cannot adequately convey what can only be intuitively felt and procedurally encouraged (ISL 252-3). According to Huxley, any attempt to use language to delineate a framework of integrated direct experience risks corrupting a spiritual feeling that through unity promotes compassion and understanding; and, "when there is understanding, there is an experienced fusion of the Ends with the Means," resulting in "Love" (TTT 68). This Huxleyan type of education, of course, all hinges on societal purposes being consistent with a peaceful people more interested in living fully than living as material consumers or fearful militaristic proponents of national defense. In education, as in all human endeavors, Huxley's emphasis in *Island* is a consistency of ends and means.

CONCLUSION: PONTIFEX MINIMUS

In 1959, Huxley defined what he saw as his particular role as a “literary man” in the university setting. He saw his value to the students who would inherit the responsibility of humanity’s future to be in his ability to bring together knowledge from diverse fields of inquiry--science, religion, economics--and to show “the relationships between them” (HS 2). In the first of a series of lectures that Huxley delivered to students at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Huxley gave his self-assigned role the title of “pontifex minimus,” the “bridge builder,” and outlined his aim to be that of providing connection between those diverse fields of study in a meaningful way that would be beneficial to the individual and society. He thought that for the connections to be meaningful they should relate directly to what he called the “direct and immediate experience” of everyday life. Huxley believed in the enlightening and beneficial fruits of scientific research but feared that the information was not incorporated into the human world of “direct experience.” He thought that the educational trend toward specialization naturally set people on lifetime paths that are, if not totally one-track, nevertheless extremely narrow. Further, he believed that in order to make valuable progress in terms of human growth and satisfaction, individuals and societies needed to develop broader, more inclusive, outlooks toward all aspects of human life--a perspective much like his own world view. In the Santa Barbara lectures, Huxley set out to accomplish what he later fully realizes in *Island* (1962), his utopian and last completed novel.

In *Island*, Huxley builds bridges of knowledge and understanding between diverse fields of inquiry in psychology, physiology, theology, and philosophy in the novelistic form. His bridges explain the substance of his consistent and integrated philosophies of life that begin from an inclusive definition of the individual and expand outward to include all areas of human social life. Huxley's protagonist in *Island*, Will Farnaby, examines Huxley's bridges through his education of the Palanese world view and his tour of the island, and in utopian fashion, then, the reader is educated to Huxley's world view and tours Huxley's "working hypotheses" in *Island*. Farnaby's numerous conversations with the Palanese provide the avenue by which Huxley explains what he thinks mankind should do about the modern unhealthy individual and society. Huxley was limited by the conventions of the novel in the extent of his explanations and suggestions; therefore, his Santa Barbara lectures in *The Human Situation* (1977) are more extensive than Will Farnaby's conversations with the Palanese in *Island*. The limitations imposed on Huxley by the length of the novel, however, perhaps aided him in defining those aspects of the individual and society that are the most critical, in his opinion, to presenting workable solutions for the modern individual and the modern society--both, according to Huxley, in decline. As a result, there are five major areas that Huxley outlines clearly in *Island*: the underlying motivations and make-up of the individual; the pragmatic use of a mystical religion as a consistent and unifying force in Huxley's improved social structure; the rational structure of human relationships; the structure of systems of government, economics, and law that supports and maintains society; and, the educational system that is an effective tool for preparing individuals to live "fully human." Huxley viewed the

motivations of the individual as relationships of “collective selves.” Therefore, he details a world view in *Island* that promotes consistency in those internal relationships. Huxley viewed societies in the same way he viewed the individual. The “collective selves” of the individual are analogous to the associations of individuals in society. The near-ideal society on Pala is composed of near-ideal individuals; therefore, the Palanese associations of individuals--government, economics, law, and education--are also consistent with each other and the common goal of promoting the individual’s ability to live “fully human.”

Farnaby learns how to live “fully human” on his tour of Huxley’s island of extensive “working hypotheses” for the betterment of the individual and society. Huxley’s design in *Island* is two-fold; his working hypotheses cultivate a cure for the fragmented individual, represented by Farnaby, and provide an example of a near-ideal human society, represented by Pala. However, in the final analysis of *Island* and regardless of Huxley’s optimistic lifetime pursuit of the means to improve humanity for the sake of future generations, it is apparent that at his core the “pontifex minimus” is realistic rather than idealistic. His depiction of the overthrow of Pala by outside militaristic forces, aided by western technology, indicates a realistic assessment of the difficulties of maintaining a sane society in a world where “full humanity” has yet to be embraced as a discernable “end.” The novel’s realistic conclusion may also serve as Huxley’s ongoing challenge.

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