

**Cicero's *Academica* and the Criterion of Truth**

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
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
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
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## Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of Cicero's *Academica* as it transmits the debate between the Hellenistic Academy and Stoa concerning the criterion of truth, and to evaluate Cicero's motives for the composition of the *Academica*, Cicero's sources, his interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth, and Cicero's appropriation and endorsement of Academic philosophy.

The central argument of this thesis actually contains three successive arguments in one. After an introduction which evaluates Cicero's interpretation of Academic philosophy (Chapter 1), the first phase of my argument investigates the dialectical role of the Academic/Stoic debate concerning the criterion of truth and the philosophical environment in which Cicero came to interpret the relevance of the debate within his conception of philosophy (Chapters 2 and 3). The second phase of my argument analyzes Cicero's interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth, as presented in the *Academica*, and investigates Cicero's presentation of the outcomes of Academic philosophy (Chapter 4). Finally, the third phase of my argument evaluates Cicero's transmission of sources that influenced his interpretation and appropriation of Academic philosophy and his endorsement of Academic philosophy based upon his conception of the debate on the criterion of truth (Chapter 5).

## Acknowledgments

This thesis begins, as many do, with a list of those who have helped to see this project through to completion. For those both named and unnamed, I thank you for your good humor and quick and ready advice which has kept me ever-motivated and focused on seeing this project through to the end.

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Also, I would like to recognize my colleagues of the staff and faculty of Huntingdon College for whom I have the pleasure of serving as Director of Admission, and who have reminded me that there is no such thing as a good writer, only a good re-writer. Specifically, I give a nod to the ever-helpful and knowledgeable staff of the

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Similarly, I give my thanks to Dr. Harold Thorsrud of Agnes Scott College for his insight, charity, and generosity for reading early versions of the chapters and offering suggestions both to my original thesis prospectus and to the work as it was in progress. Not only was Dr. Thorsrud's 1999 dissertation, *Cicero's Academic Skepticism*, one of the original inspirations for my thesis, but he also very generously provided me with a draft of his paper "Radical and Mitigated Skepticism in Cicero's *Academica*" from Walter J. Nicgorski's upcoming book *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, which is currently under contract to the University of Notre Dame Press for publication. While I am convinced that my thesis would have benefitted greatly from the whole of Dr. Nicgorski's book, I shall be content in letting the central arguments and conclusions of this thesis stand independently along side the current scholarship on the subject.

Finally, I give thanks to my long-suffering family for allowing me the time to complete this thesis. No doubt, the countless hours spent studying, typing, and revising while wearing ear-plugs with my children playing at my feet will be memories that I will cherish. In all respects, this thesis has truly been a *labor amoris*.

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## Abbreviations\*

<i>Acad.</i>	Cicero, <i>Academici libri (liber primus, editio secundus)</i>
† <i>Acad. Hist.</i>	Philodemus, <i>Academicorum Historia</i> (= <i>PHerc.</i> in OCD <sup>3</sup> )
<i>Adv. Col.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Adversus Colotem</i>
<i>Att.</i>	Cicero, <i>Epistulae ad Atticum</i>
August.	Augustine
<i>Brut.</i>	Cicero, <i>Brutus</i>
Cic.	Cicero (Marcus Tullius)
<i>C. acad.</i>	Augustine, <i>Contra academicos</i>
<i>Comm. not.</i>	Plutarch, <i>De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos</i>
<i>Fat.</i>	Cicero, <i>De fato</i>
<i>Fin.</i>	Cicero, <i>De finibus bonorum et malorum</i>
<i>De. or.</i>	Cicero, <i>De oratore</i>
<i>Div.</i>	Cicero, <i>De divinatione</i>
<i>Diog. Laert.</i>	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</i>
<i>Ep. Hdt.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Epistula ad Herodotum</i>
Euseb.	Eusebius
<i>Luc.</i>	Cicero, <i>Lucullus</i>
<i>Math.</i>	Sextus Empiricus, <i>Adversus mathematicos</i> (= <i>Against the Logicians</i> )

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\* All abbreviations are from the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Third Edition (OCD<sup>3</sup>) unless where otherwise noted. Other noted abbreviations (†) are from *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*.



<i>Nat. D.</i>	Cicero, <i>De natura deorum</i>
Numen.	Numenius
<i>Praep. evang.</i>	Eusebius, <i>Praeparatio evangelica</i>
<i>Pyr.</i>	Sextus Empiricus, <i>Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις</i> (= <i>Outlines of Pyrrhonism</i> )
Phld.	Philodemus
Plut.	Plutarch
Sext. Emp.	Sextus Empiricus
† <i>Stoic. Rep.</i>	Plutarch, <i>De Stoicorum repugnantiis</i>
<i>SVF</i>	H. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i>
<i>Tusc.</i>	Cicero, <i>Tusculanae disputationes</i>

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: EXAMINING CICERO'S INTERPRETATION OF ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

Cicero's interpretation of philosophy was influenced by his philosophical education and his intellectual interests, which developed his identity as a politician, philosopher, and author by his endorsement and appropriation of Academic philosophy. In the opening of book two of *Div.*, Cicero states that his work, the *Academica*, presents the justification for his endorsement of Academic philosophy, which has influenced his overall method and conception of philosophy. Cicero states:

...et, quod genus philosophandi minime arrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor *Academicis* libris ostendimus.<sup>1</sup>

...and in my *Academica*, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and refined.  
(trans. Falconer)

Recent scholarship in Ciceronian studies has reevaluated Cicero's admission of his endorsement of Academic philosophy, and the implications for his innovations as an original philosophical thinker.<sup>2</sup> However, most early scholarship on the *Academica* had been concerned only with preserving Cicero's transmission of the history of the Academy

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<sup>1</sup> Cicero, "De Divinatione," in *Cicero: De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*, trans. William Armistead Falconer. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1923. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1959), 2.1-2.

<sup>2</sup> For example: John Glucker, "Cicero's philosophical affiliations," in *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, eds. John A. Dillon and A.A. Long. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 34-69.; J.G.F. Powell, ed., *Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), John Glucker, "Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations Again," *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 17 (1992): 134-138.; and Harald C. Thorsrud, "Cicero's Academic Skepticism." (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 1999).

and its *scholarchs*, with little regard to examining the originality of his motives or his interpretation. This oversight has led, I think, to a portrayal of Cicero as merely a doxographer and has ignored his contributions as an original thinker and authentic philosopher. While Cicero's contributions to the study of philosophy have not received the recognition that, I would argue, they deserve, his philosophical writings have preserved much of our knowledge about Hellenistic philosophy through his transmission of sources and issues, and his development of a philosophical vocabulary into Latin which introduced the study of philosophy to a Roman audience. The present thesis may be considered among other works which have appeared recently arguing for Cicero's philosophical originality and for his re-establishment into the canon of ancient philosophy.<sup>3</sup> In particular, this thesis attempts to explain the connection between Cicero's interpretation of the debate concerning the criterion of truth between the Academy and the Stoa and his ultimate endorsement of Academic philosophy.

## 1.1 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Through the historiographical practice of rational reconstruction, contemporary analytic philosophy has tended to evaluate the significance of ancient philosophers according to the standards that currently we conceive of the aims, goals, and issues of

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<sup>3</sup> See: Peter L. Schmidt, "Cicero's Place in Roman Philosophy: A Study of his Prefaces," *The Classical Journal* 74, no. 2 (1978): 115-127.; Gisela Striker, "Cicero and Greek Philosophy," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 97, Greece in Rome: Influence, Integration, Resistance (1995): 53-61.; Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld, eds., *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI. (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997); and Ingo Gildenhard, *Paideia Romana: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations*. Cambridge Classical Journal. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society. Supplementary Volume 30. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

philosophy. While the practice of rational reconstruction is a helpful tool in understanding the issues and concerns of ancient philosophy by making those issues relevant *in our terms*, rational reconstruction also has come under criticism and even faced charges of anachronism by disingenuously representing the positions of ancient thinkers. It is highly unlikely, for the purpose of this thesis, that Cicero would have bracketed his philosophical works into such areas in which we divide the study of philosophy today (*scil.*, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, Philosophy of Mind). However, Cicero *did* organize his philosophical works into subjects according to their content, and it is important to analyze Cicero's understanding of the different subject areas of philosophy as he understood them and how each area affected his composite picture of philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Richard Rorty recognizes the difficulty of reconciling and synthesizing the alternative methods within the historiography of philosophy (e.g. rational reconstruction, historical reconstruction, *Geistesgeschichte*, doxography, and intellectual history) and the unique challenges that each practice presents.<sup>5</sup> For example, as Rorty argues, either we interpret the ideas of ancient philosophers into our current vocabulary and run the risk of anachronism, or we try desperately to retain the original language and context of the philosopher while running the risk of making the thought of "great dead philosophers" relevant.<sup>6</sup> Cicero's *Academica* has not been immune from this dilemma. Instead of evaluating and arguing for the relevance of the *Academica* according to the current trends of epistemology, I

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<sup>4</sup> This will be examined at length in Chapter 3.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres," in *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*, eds. Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 49-75.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 54-58.

intend to investigate Cicero's interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth between the Hellenistic Academy and Stoa and the dialectical connections within Cicero's appropriation and endorsement of Academic philosophy, its practical implications, its method, and its applications within Cicero's unique conception of philosophy.

Similarly, to understand the motives behind Cicero's endorsement and appropriation of Academic philosophy, it is important to understand Cicero's practical conception of philosophy and its applications. It is equally important to understand the connections between Cicero's conception of philosophy and its dialectical utility and functions. In the introduction to his collection, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Michael Frede presents the *modus operandi* for his study of ancient philosophy. Frede argues that we must examine the facts and historical context in order to reconstruct a line of reasoning, along with the underlying assumptions, to determine whether a philosopher had good reasons to hold a particular view. Frede proposes to study ancient philosophy, "not just by studying ancient philosophers as paradigms, nor by just trying to fit them into the history of philosophy, but by looking at all the histories in which they occur, to see by their example, what it actually means and amounts to when one does philosophy."<sup>7</sup> With Frede's method in mind, I propose to examine the reasons why Cicero chose to accept the methods and outcomes of Academic philosophy based upon his conceptions of philosophy and its practical implications. Similarly, I shall argue that Cicero had both dialectical and didactic motives for endorsing Academic philosophy. Not only did Cicero intend to provide an educational service through his philosophical literary activities by making philosophy accessible to a Latin-speaking audience, but he also intended to

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<sup>7</sup> Michael Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), xxvii.

demonstrate philosophy as a dialectical activity through the examples in his dialogues. Specifically, I propose that the Academic/Stoic debate on the criterion of truth lies at the center of Cicero's motives.

## 1.2 CICERO'S INTERPRETATION AND APPROPRIATION OF ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

The *Academica* presents Cicero's defense of Academic philosophy against the positions of Stoicism and of the Old Academy of Antiochus regarding the criterion of truth. While the *Academica* has survived as a fragmentary text, what has survived preserves Cicero's evaluation of the arguments of the Stoics and the Old Academy of Antiochus against the responses of the New Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades, as well as the position of Philo of Larissa. Within Cicero's composite philosophical *oeuvre*, his *philosophica*, he maintains that the *Academica* reflects his own personal endorsement of Academic philosophy and his appropriation of the Academic dialectical method. This admission has already been documented in the previous quote from *Div.* 2.1-2; however, in the opening of *Nat. D.*, Cicero also claims,

Qui quidem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, iis quattuor Academicis libris satis responsum videtur.<sup>8</sup>

To those again who are surprised at my choice of a system to which to give my allegiance, I think that a sufficient answer has been given in the four books of my *Academica*. (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, in *Tusc.* 2. 4, Cicero affirms:

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<sup>8</sup> Cicero, "De Natura Deorum," in *Cicero: De Natura Deorum/Academica*, trans. H. Rackham. The Loeb Classical Library, 268. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1933. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2000), 1.11.

...pro Academia autem quae dicenda essent satis accurate in Academicis quattuor libris explicare arbitramur.<sup>9</sup>

...in the four books of the *Academics* we have set out, as we think with sufficient precision, all that could be urged on behalf of the Academy. (trans. King)

If one is to view the *Academica* as Cicero's manifesto for his endorsement of Academic philosophy as his preferred dialectical method, one must demonstrate why Cicero would include a full discussion of the Academic/Stoic debate on the criterion of truth within the core subject material of the dialogue. What, after all, is the connection? One could argue that it would seem more natural for Cicero (*qua orator*) to present the justification of his preferred dialectical method in the form of a treatise which compares the different types of dialectical theories from the various schools, the strengths and weaknesses of each, and the overwhelming superiority of the Academic method. However, this scenario hardly is contained within the *Academica*. Rather, the *Academica* is a loosely fictional dialogue depicting Cicero in conversation with colleagues and friends debating the fine points of Academic and Stoic theories of knowledge. Indeed, it is a stretch to decipher what, after all, Cicero could be communicating about his preferred dialectical method within the course of the dialogue.

I propose that it is precisely the discussion regarding the criterion of truth contained within the *Academica* which outlines Cicero's justification for endorsing Academic philosophy and appropriating the Academic dialectical method. To explain this connection, it is important to examine Cicero's placement of the criterion of truth within his conception of philosophy. Furthermore, it is important to review how Cicero understood the Academic/Stoic debate regarding the criterion of truth based on his

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<sup>9</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J.E. King. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1927. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1960), 2.4.

conception of philosophy and how he projected the debate within the context of the contemporary philosophical issues of his time. For Cicero, the criterion of truth occupied a unique function within an orderly and structured three-fold system of philosophy, the *philosophandi ratio triplex*.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, it is important to understand Cicero's interpretation of the Academic/Stoic debate on the criterion of truth based upon his own philosophical education and his access to available sources. In order to understand Cicero's endorsement of Academic philosophy, it will be necessary to review his presentation and interpretation of the Academic/Stoic debate regarding the criterion of truth, which is the central issue in the *Academica*.

Throughout his *philosophica*, Cicero highlights the philosophical commitments of the New Academy, including: (1) the endorsement of unique epistemological commitments, (2) the applications of the Academic dialectical method, and (3) the practical implications of Academic philosophy. In the *Academica*, Cicero presents all three of these key features in his description and defense of Academic philosophy.

### **1.2.1 Epistemological Commitments: Discovery of Truth and Avoiding Error**

In the *Academica*, Cicero notes that the two primary epistemological commitments of the New Academy are (1) to promote the discovery of truth and (2) to avoid error.<sup>11</sup> The Academic epistemological commitments essentially represent two sides to the same coin. For if one is concerned with the discovery of truth, then one must also avoid error and be cautioned against accepting mistaken (or false) impressions. For

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<sup>10</sup> *Luc.* 142-146, *Acad.* 1.30-32, 1.40-42.

<sup>11</sup> *Luc.* 66.



example, Cicero highlights that Arcesilaus' objections to the Stoic criterion of truth were not motivated by personal or *ad hominem* intentions, but rather, by a genuine interest in discovering the truth. In *Luc.* 76-77, Cicero begins his account by noting:

Arcesilan vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnasse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur.<sup>12</sup>

But that Arcesilas did not do battle with Zeno merely for the sake of criticizing him, but really wished to discover the truth, is gathered from what follows. (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, In *Luc.* 60 and 66, Cicero outlines the motive of Academic philosophy as the discovery of truth. Cicero states:

Restat illud quod dicunt veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus.<sup>13</sup>

There remains their statement that for the discovery of truth it is necessary to argue against all things and for all things. (trans. Rackham)

Likewise, the Academic epistemological commitment of discovering the truth also entails avoiding error. In *Luc.* 65-66, Cicero admits:

...iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et ea sentire quae dicerem. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum gaudeam si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est.<sup>14</sup>

...I should swear by Jove and the gods of my household that I am fired with zeal for the discovery of the truth, and that I really hold the opinions that I am stating. For how can I fail to be eager for the discovery of truth, when I rejoice if I have discovered something that resembles truth? But just as I deem it supremely honourable to hold true views, so it is supremely disgraceful to approve falsehoods as true. (trans. Rackham)

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<sup>12</sup> *Luc.* 76-77.

<sup>13</sup> *Luc.* 60.

<sup>14</sup> *Luc.* 65-66.

The Academic commitment to avoiding error also influenced the outcome of the Academic dialectical method. Consider the following from *Acad.* 1.45:

...cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, neque hoc quidquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni adensionem approbationemque praecurrere.<sup>15</sup>

...and a man must always restrain his rashness and hold it back from every slip, as it would be glaring rashness to give assent either to a falsehood or to something not certainly known, and nothing is more disgraceful than for assent and approval to outstrip knowledge and perception. (trans. Rackham)

Furthermore, Cicero adds insight to the reputation of the Academic commitment of avoiding error by justifying the practice of withholding assent, when he states in the opening of *Nat. D.*:

...prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis adensionem cohibuisse: quid est enim temeritate turpius? aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quod non satis explore perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere?<sup>16</sup>

...and that the Academic School were well-advised in ‘withholding assent’ from beliefs that are uncertain: for what is more unbecoming than ill-considered haste? And what is so ill-considered or so unworthy of the dignity and seriousness proper to a philosopher as to hold an opinion that is not true, or to maintain with unhesitating certainty a proposition not based on adequate examination, comprehension and knowledge? (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, the motives of Academic philosophy for the discovery of truth and the avoidance of error are demonstrated by the application of the Academic method. In the following section, I shall briefly sketch Cicero’s interpretation of the key features of the Academic method, including the dialectical practices of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* and *in utramque partem disserendi*, to produce the outcome of verisimilitude.

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<sup>15</sup> *Acad.* 1.45.

<sup>16</sup> *Nat. D.* 1. 1-2.

### 1.2.2 Academic Method: *ratio contra omnia disserendi*, *in utramque partem disserendi*, and *verisimilitudo*

In explaining the epistemological commitments of the New Academy, Cicero also injects the justification for the Academic method and its dialectical motives. The Academic dialectical method includes the three following features: (1) the practice of discerning the truth by arguing against all sides of a proposition (*ratio contra omnia disserendi*), (2) the dialectical method of arguing on both sides of a position (*in utramque partem disserendi*), and (3) appropriating the Academic dialectical method to discern which position arrives most closely at resembling the truth (*veri simile*). The Academic method of arguing against all positions (*ratio contra omnia disserendi*) has already been demonstrated in the previous passage from *Luc.* 60, in which Cicero comments upon the method and its utility to discover the truth. Similarly, in *De. or.* 3.67-68 and *Acad.* 1.45, Cicero argues that the practice of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* was first used by Arcesilaus. Cicero notes:

Huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias disserens in eam plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte ad sensum sustinerentur.<sup>17</sup>

His practice was consistent with this theory - he led most of his hearers to accept it by arguing against the opinions of all men, so that when equally weighty reasons were found on opposite sides on the same subject, it was easier to withhold assent from either side. (trans. Rackham)

However the motive for employing *ratio contra omnia disserendi* was not intended to support an entirely negative or destructive dialectical practice. In fact, as the passage demonstrates, the outcome of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* is to generate reasons that are

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<sup>17</sup> *Acad.* 1.45.

equally weighted and balanced on both sides of a position, so that the justification for a position will be supported by reason, and not merely in appeal to tradition or authority. This outcome is confirmed in the statement from *Luc.* 60, examined earlier, where Cicero admits that for the discovery of the truth it is necessary to “argue against all things and for all things”.<sup>18</sup> In the same passage, Cicero depicts the Academic practice of withholding one’s personal views in the process of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* in order for those who are listening to be guided by reason, rather than by authority (*ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur*).<sup>19</sup> Similarly, in *Tusc.* 5.83, Cicero states:

Utamur igitur libertate, qua nobis solis in philosophia licet uti, quorum oratio nihil ipsa iudicat, sed habetur in omnes partes, ut ab aliis possit ipsa per sese nullius auctoritate adiuncta Iudicari.<sup>20</sup>

Let me then use the freedom allowed to my school of philosophic thought alone, which decides nothing on its own pronouncement but ranges over the whole field, in order that the question may be decided by others on its own merits, without invoking anyone’s authority. (trans. King)

As the Academy changed hands between successive *scholarchs*, so too did the dialectical method of the Academy. Cicero reports in *De. or.* 3.67-68 how the practice of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* of Arcesilaus became refined into the method of arguing *in utramque partem*, characterized by Carneades, to become, perhaps, the most recognizable key feature of Academic philosophy. Similarly Cicero notes that under the New Academy, established by Arcesilaus, that there was “much arguing both *pro* and *contra*”.<sup>21</sup> For example, Cicero describes the practice of arguing *in utramque partem*,

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<sup>18</sup> *Luc.* 60, *contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>19</sup> *Luc.* 60.

<sup>20</sup> *Tusc.* 5.83.

<sup>21</sup> *Acad.* 1.46, *in utramque partem multa disserentur* (trans. Rackham).

developed from Arcesilaus through Carneades, as the inherited method of Academic philosophy. Cicero notes:

Hinc haec recentior Academia emanavit, in qua exstitit divina quadam celeritate ingenii dicendique copia Carneades...<sup>22</sup>

From this source descended the more recent Academy of our day, in which the almost inspired intellectual acumen and rhetorical fluency of Carneades have made him the leading figure... (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, just as the practice of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* provided equal reasons by demonstrating the equally balanced opposing views on an issue, Cicero notes in *Luc.* 124 that the outcome of *in utamque partem disserendi* demonstrated how “matters contain equal reasons for contrary theories”.<sup>23</sup> Cicero also confirms that the rhetorical and dialectical advancements made by the Academy were founded on both Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. In *De. or.* 3.67, Cicero reports how Arcesilaus mined Plato’s dialogues to extract and cultivate the Socratic *elenchus* into the dialectical method of *ratio contra omnia disserendi*. Similarly, Cicero reports that while Aristotle had originated the practice of *in utamque partem disserendi*, it was the Academics who adopted and perfected the dialectical method. For example, in *De. or.* 3.80, Cicero remarks on the dialectical abilities of the perfect orator, arguing:

...sin aliquis exstiterit aliquando qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque sententiam possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes praeceptis illius cognitis explicare, aut hoc Arcesilae modo et Carneadis contra omne quod propositum sit disserat, quique ad eam rationem adiungat hunc usum exercitationemque dicendi, is sit versus, is perfectus, is solus orator.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 2 Vols. trans. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1942. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1959), 3.68.

<sup>23</sup> *Luc.* 124, *ita sunt in plerisque contrariorum rationum paria momenta* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>24</sup> *De. or.* 3.80.

...whereas if there has ever been a person who was able in Aristotelian fashion to speak on both sides about every subject and by means of knowing Aristotle's rules to reel off two speeches on opposite sides on every case, or in the manner of Arcesilas and Carneades argue against every statement put forward, and who to that method adds the experience and practice in speaking indicated, he would be the one and only true and perfect orator. (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, in *Tusc.* 2.9, Cicero describes his preference for adopting the rhetorical and dialectical theories of the Peripatos and the Academy in the discovery of truth and for their oratorical applications. Cicero notes the progression of *in utamque partem disserendi* as a Peripatetic practice later adapted by the Academy. Cicero comments:

...qua princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. Nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti, in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus.<sup>25</sup>

...Aristotle first employed this method and later those who followed him. Philo, however, as we remember, for we often heard him lecture, made a practice of teaching the rules of the rhetoricians at one time, and those of the philosophers at another. I was induced by our friends to follow this practice, and in my house at Tusculum I thus employed the time at our disposal. (trans. King)

Of course, the Academic dialectical method did have one *caveat*, the method could not be applied in order to *confirm* truth, rather, to discern what appears to be most *like* the truth (*veri simile*). By arguing on both sides of a question, employing *in utamque partem disserendi*, the position that comes out, standing in the end, is the one that is considered *veri simile*. Not truth, but verisimilitude, became the object most desired by the Academic dialectical method. Cicero describes the process and outcome of *in utamque partem disserendi* and its connection with verisimilitude in the introduction to the *Luc.*, where he explains:

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<sup>25</sup> *Tusc.* 2.9.

...neque nostrae disputationes quidquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam expriment aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat.<sup>26</sup>

...and the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth. (trans. Rackham)

Of course, as the quote explains, this is not to say that truth could not be attained. Truth was an offer which still remained on the table, but the Academics were willing to accept something a little less, verisimilitude, as a close alternative. In fact, later Academics noted that the requirements for truth were a matter of interpretation instead of an objective quality. For example, in Cicero's endorsement of Academic philosophy (seen earlier in the quote from *Luc.* 65-66), Cicero's qualifies his fired zeal for the discovery of the truth by noting that he is willing to accept the discovery of something truth-like (*veri simile*). Similarly, while Cicero values the process of the discovery of the truth, in *Luc.* 127-128, Cicero confesses:

Indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem; si vero aliquid occurrit quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus voluptate.<sup>27</sup>

There is delight in the mere investigation of matters at once of supreme magnitude and also of extreme obscurity; while if a notion comes to us that appears to bear a likeness to the truth, the mind is filled with the most humanizing kind of pleasure. (trans. Rackham)

While Cicero's interpretation of the key features of Academic philosophy reflects his motives for appropriating the dialectical methods of the Academy, I shall specifically examine Cicero's interpretation of verisimilitude as a component of Academic philosophy later in this thesis. For while Carneades and Philo progressively argued for

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<sup>26</sup> *Luc.* 7-8.

<sup>27</sup> *Luc.* 127-128.

accepting probability (*probabilitas*) as a guide for truth in response to the Stoic criterion of truth, it is not clear how Carneades or Philo actually advocated probability as a feature of Academic philosophy. However, while discussing the difference between the Stoic sage and the Academic sage in the previous passage, Cicero claims:

Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet, noster ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi secum putet si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit.<sup>28</sup>

These researches therefore will be pursued both by your wise man and by this sage of ours, but by yours with the intention of assenting, believing and affirming, by ours with the resolve to be afraid of forming rash opinions and to deem that it goes well with him if in matters of this kind he has discovered that which bears a likeness to truth. (trans. Rackham)

I shall return to all three of these key features (i.e. *ratio contra omnia disserendi*, *in utramque partem disserendi*, and verisimilitude) as I examine Cicero's interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth. In fact, as I shall argue later, Cicero's understanding of the debate between the Stoa and the Academy concerning the criterion of truth directly effected his appropriation of Academic philosophy.

### **1.2.3 Dialectic and the Practical Implications of Academic Philosophy**

The final feature of Academic philosophy that Cicero appropriates, promotes the practical implications of the Academic dialectical method for oratorical training. While I shall fully examine the dialectical implications of Academic philosophy in Chapter 2, it will suffice to say for the current introduction that Cicero was one of the first Romans to appreciate the outcomes of studying Academic philosophy for the purpose of dialectical training. In the passages quoted earlier, from *De. or.* 3.80 and *Tusc.* 2.9, Cicero

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<sup>28</sup> *Luc.* 128.



highlights the oratorical and dialectical features of Academic philosophy, combined with those of Peripatetic philosophy, to produce the ideal orator. Similarly, in *Fin.* 5.7, Cicero notes the advantages of studying Academic philosophy in order to cultivate the requisite skills for oratorical training and to lead a life of public service. Similarly, while discussing the practice of combining oratorical and philosophical studies in *De. or.* 3.71-73, Cicero comments that the preferred oratorical method includes the Academic dialectical method. Cicero argues:

...si illam praeclaram et eximiam speciem oratoris perfecti et pulchritudinem adamastis, aut vobis haec Carneadia aut illa Aristotelia vis comprehendenda est.<sup>29</sup>

...if you have grown to love that glorious and supreme ideal, that thing of beauty, the perfect orator, you are bound to accept either the modern dialectic of Carneades or the earlier method of Aristotle. (trans. Rackham)

While I shall consider additional evidence of Cicero's appropriation of Academic philosophy for the application of oratorical and dialectical training in Chapter 2, it will suffice to frame in this introduction the context in which Cicero applied his application of Academic philosophy, which included his interpretation of the epistemological commitments, dialectical method, and vocational applications of Academic philosophy.

### **1.3 CICERO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CRITERION OF TRUTH**

In both the *Acad.* and in *Luc.*, Cicero defends the position of the New Academy against that of the Stoa and the Old Academy regarding the definition of the criterion of truth. Cicero's account of the criterion of truth in the *Academica* demonstrates the concern within Hellenistic philosophy to define the method, process, and application

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<sup>29</sup> *De. or.* 3.71-72.

which evaluates truth and accounts for the ability to justify beliefs. Generally, the Hellenistic Epicureans, Stoics, and Academics called something a criterion of truth if it characterized the means for evaluating between truth and falsehood. While the Hellenistic schools agreed on what the criterion of truth ought to do (i.e. distinguish between truth and falsehood), they were typically in disagreement about what the criterion of truth actually was. According to Gisela Striker, the disagreement on the criterion of truth between the Epicureans, Stoics, and Academics “centered on the question of whether it is possible to distinguish with certainty between true and false opinions or assertions, and if so, by what means.”<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the definition of the criterion of truth varied between each Hellenistic school as they developed their own position on the criterion of truth which purported to discern truth from falsehood, and transmit knowledge. However, Striker argues, “anything which plays a role in judging truth and falsehood could, so it seems, be called a criterion of truth.”<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the problem of the criterion of truth was a two-fold problem, both internally, as each school defined their position on what distinguished truth from falsehood, and externally, as they defended their criterion of truth against the arguments and criticisms of the other schools. In *Luc.* 77-78, Cicero depicts the original Stoic definition of the criterion of truth, presented by Zeno, and the objections raised against it by Arcesilaus. While Cicero’s account in *Luc.* 77-78 is more anecdotal than historical, Cicero identifies that the development of the Stoic definition of the criterion of truth immediately came under scrutiny by the Academy (*scil.* Arcesilaus). As was seen earlier in the quote from *Luc.*

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<sup>30</sup> Gisela Striker, “Κριτήριο της ἀληθείας,” in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, ed. Gisela Striker, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 24-25.

76-77, Arcesilaus' objective in debating with Zeno over the definition of the criterion of truth was, specifically, to discover the truth.

Cicero's account of the debate regarding the criterion of truth demonstrates the progressive phases of the debate between Zeno and Arcesilaus, Chrysippus and Carneades, and between Philo and Antiochus, down to Cicero's own time. At each phase of the debate, Cicero devotes special attention to demonstrating the innovations, nuances, and countermoves that developed during the debate. However, what, exactly, was the nature of the debate between the Stoics and Academics regarding the criterion of truth and why was it a matter of such importance?

In *Luc.* 29, Cicero's chief interlocutor, Lucullus, presents a brief explanation for the significance of the criterion of truth. Lucullus reports:

...hanc enim esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti; quam rationem quoniam susciperent, docereque vellent quae visa accipi oporteret, quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium esset percipere eos debuisse; etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi...<sup>32</sup>

...for this was the measuring-rod that applied to the whole of philosophy, the test of truth and falsehood, of knowledge and ignorance; and that since they adopted this method, and desired to teach what sense-presentations ought to be accepted and what rejected, they unquestionably ought to have perceived this decision itself, the basis of every criterion of truth and falsehood; for (he said) the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the end of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetite... (trans. Rackham)

Lucullus depicts the criterion of truth as taking rank among the two leading outcomes of philosophy. However, in order to understand why the criterion of truth played such a significant role in the development of Stoic and Academic philosophy, it will be

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<sup>32</sup> *Luc.* 29.

necessary briefly to sketch the Stoic's application of the criterion of truth and the initial objections raised against the Stoic criterion by the Academy.

### 1.3.1 The Stoic Criterion of Truth

The first phase of the Academic/Stoic debate regarding the criterion of truth occurs between Zeno of Citium, founder of the Stoa, and Arcesilaus, founder of the New Academy. The Stoics present their definition of the criterion of truth in order to provide a foundation for knowledge which rests upon perception. In *Luc. 77*, Cicero records the original Stoic definition of the criterion of truth as a particular type of presentation or sense datum. Cicero depicts Zeno's definition as follows:

Visum credo. Quale igitur visum? Tum illum ita definisse, ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum.<sup>33</sup>

A presentation, was doubtless the answer. Then what sort of presentation? Hereupon no doubt Zeno defined it as follows, a presentation impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality. (trans. Rackham)

In this initial definition, Zeno identifies that a presentation must meet a certain list of criteria, namely, that the presentation be generated and transferred from a real existing object and that the presentation conform to the object. According to Zeno's original definition, he assumed that the senses are reliable and are equipped to detect the qualities and features of real objects in reality, and to decipher between presentations that are true from presentations that are false. However, Cicero claims, no sooner did Zeno present his definition of the criterion of truth than Arcesilaus presented his first series of objections against Zeno's operational definition.

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<sup>33</sup> *Luc. 77*.

### 1.3.2 Academic Objections

As Cicero continues his description of Zeno's original definition of the criterion of truth in *Luc. 77*, he notes the initial series of objections presented by Arcesilaus. In his anecdotal description, Cicero claims that Arcesilaus inquired whether the definition of the criterion of truth could be supported "even if a true presentation was of exactly the same form as a false one".<sup>34</sup> Arcesilaus' objection identified a concern with (1) the presentation's ability to be generated from a real existing object, and (2) the presentation's ability to be transferred in accordance with the identifying features of the object. Arcesilaus argued that one could also receive presentations from false sources that are neither (1) generated from a real object, nor (2) share all of the same key features of the object. Arcesilaus' objection recognized a crucial flaw within the Stoic criterion of truth. For, if Zeno's definition for the criterion of truth could not be supported, then neither could the Stoic theory of knowledge. However, according to Cicero, Zeno was willing to entertain Arcesilaus' objection, and even conceded that the definition needed to be modified in consideration of Arcesilaus' concerns. For, Cicero notes:

Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est ut eiusdem modi ab eo quod non est posset esse.<sup>35</sup>

At this I imagine Zeno was sharp enough to see that if a presentation proceeding from a real thing was of such a nature that one proceeding from a non-existent thing could be of the same form, there was no presentation that could be perceived. (trans. Rackham)

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<sup>34</sup> *Luc. 77, etiamne si eiusdem modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>35</sup> *Luc. 77.*

Therefore, Zeno made a modification to the original definition that would account for resolving any mistaken presentations. Cicero depicts Zeno's modified definition to the criterion of truth at *Luc.* 18, as:

...visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset.<sup>36</sup>

...a presentation impressed and moulded from the object from which it came in a form such as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did come from. (trans. Rackham)

However, Cicero's description does not end there. For Cicero notes that, as the debate continued, Arcesilaus actually accepted Zeno's modified definition. However, Cicero continues, it was the modified definition of the criterion of truth which perpetuated the rise of the ongoing debate between the Academics and Stoics. Cicero argues:

Recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum, neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum si esset tale quale vel falsum; incubuit autem in eas disputationes ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. Haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit.<sup>37</sup>

Arcesilas agreed that this addition to the definition was correct, for it was impossible to perceive either a false presentation or a true one if a true one had such a character as even a false one might have; but he pressed the points at issue further in order to show that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form. This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day. (trans. Rackham)

Thus, the debate between the Stoics and the Academics regarding the criterion of truth had begun.

Most contemporary interpretations of the debate regarding the criterion of truth between the Hellenistic Academy and Stoa have been influenced by Pierre Couissin's

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<sup>36</sup> *Luc.* 18.

<sup>37</sup> *Luc.* 77-78.

1929 paper *Le Stoïcisme de la Nouvelle Académie*.<sup>38</sup> In his innovative evaluation, Couissin presents the thesis that the Academic position regarding the criterion of truth was prompted by dialectical motives in response to Stoic philosophy. Previous scholarship from Edwyn Bevan, and Helfried Hartmann had argued that the Academy had responded to the Stoic position regarding the criterion of truth in order to present and advance a skeptical epistemology.<sup>39</sup> However, Couissin demonstrates the dialectical motive behind the Academic response to the Stoic definition of the criterion of truth and its function within the Academic dialectical method. Couissin's analysis reevaluates the Academic dialectical objective, namely, to present the objectionable logical outcomes to which the Stoics were committed according to their own theory about the criterion of truth. Couissin argues that the success of the Academic dialectical method rested upon the Academy's ability to argue against the Stoic position by employing Stoic arguments against themselves. Specifically, the Academics argue, if the Stoics hold that the mentally grasped presentation is the core of the criterion of truth, then their theory of knowledge would collapse under the weight of their own requirements. Similarly, while other scholarship on Cicero's *Academica*, prior to the publication of Couissin's thesis, had assumed that Cicero advocated a skeptical stance, Couissin's thesis established the focus on the dialectical features of the Academic (and thus, Cicero's) position.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Reprinted as: Pierre Couissin, "The Stoicism of the New Academy," in *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat, trans. Jennifer Barnes and Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 31-63.

<sup>39</sup> Edwyn Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913).

<sup>40</sup> T.W. Levin, *Six Lectures: Introductory to the Philosophical Writings of Cicero, with some Explanatory Notes on the Subject-Matter of the *Academica* and *de Finibus**. (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, and Co., 1871).

While I do not agree with all of the implications drawn out in Coussin's thesis, I do agree with his general conclusion that the Academic response to the Stoic criterion of truth was presented with primarily dialectical motives. Similarly, Cicero's interest in the Academic/Stoic debate provided the grounds and material for outlining his justification for accepting the dialectical method of Academic philosophy, as presented in the *Academica*. Cicero presents the origin of the debate regarding the criterion of truth as essentially a dialectical dispute over an operational definition. In what follows in the *Academica*, Cicero outlines the progressive arguments between the Academics and Stoics regarding the definition of the criterion of truth and how the outcomes of the debate between the Academy and Stoa affected Cicero's ultimate endorsement and appropriation of Academic philosophy. The specifics of the debate will be addressed at length in the following thesis.

#### **1.4 INTERPRETATION vs. TRANSMISSION: QUELLENFORSCHUNG OF CICERO'S ACADEMICA**

When speaking of Cicero's endorsement of Academic philosophy, one must specify which iteration of Academic philosophy he is following (*scil.* Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo) and which arguments he supports. Furthermore, in order to analyze and evaluate Cicero's interpretation and philosophical position, it is customary to ask what source(s) he is following. While Cicero certainly wrote the *Academica* as though he were reconstructing a conversation that had taken place between himself and his interlocutors, Cicero's goal was to transmit the arguments of the Academy and the Stoa



into an approachable format for a Roman audience exposed to this philosophical content for the first time.

While Cicero identifies his references at certain locations within the *Academica*, we are often left to wonder how much of the debate Cicero constructs from sources, versus, how much he injects his own interpretation. In a recent investigation of Cicero's interpretation and transmission of his sources, Julia Annas expertly notes, "before we start dissolving Cicero into his sources it is always a good idea to look first and see what he actually says; to reconstruct his sources from his philosophical use of them, not *vice versa*."<sup>41</sup> Annas's observation identifies one of the central problems within the *Quellenforschung* of Cicero's textual transmission: namely, determining how much originality can be attributed to Cicero within the *Academica* and how much is merely his transmission of a source. For example, if it can be determined that Cicero *is* transmitting a source, the task then becomes deciphering the identity of the source and the extent which Cicero relies upon the source and provides its citation. Similarly, if Cicero's account can be reduced to textual transmission of sources, can we confidently accept Cicero's bias and preference of source selection? While I have no evidence to suppose that Cicero was in the practice of intentionally and knowingly suppressing sources, it is reasonable to seek confirmation and verification of Cicero's account. Such an investigation of Cicero's sources requires one to proceed with caution. Further in her paper, Annas notes that she assumes that Cicero's discussion contains his own original contribution and, therefore, she will hold Cicero accountable for any mistakes or infelicitous renderings. However, Annas continues, "if he *is* slavishly copying a single

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<sup>41</sup> Julia Annas, "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property," in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 155.

source, then what I [Annas] say will transfer to his source, and apply to Cicero only in so far as he transmits that source.”<sup>42</sup>

Writing to Atticus in May of 45 B.C., Cicero responds to recent comments regarding the rapid output of his philosophical writings. In response, Cicero argues:

De lingua Latina securi es animi. Dices; “Qui talia consribis?” ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.<sup>43</sup>

Make your mind easy about the Latin language. You will say, “What, when you write on such subjects?” They are copies, and don’t give me much trouble. I only supply words, and of them I have plenty. (trans. Winstedt)

Is Cicero simply being modest in his description or is he disclosing to Atticus more than he is willing to admit in the *Academica*? If Cicero’s philosophical writings *are* only ἀπόγραφα (copies), then why does he not openly disclose his sources or the texts from which he transmits his information? There are several possibilities. Firstly, Cicero may be paraphrasing from Greek copies that he owns. Certainly, in the *Academica*, Cicero at times hints to his sources and even provides explicit citations.<sup>44</sup> However, if this is the case and if we can charge Cicero with any crime at all, it would be that of inconsistent citation and insufficient disclosure of sources. However, in the opening of *Fin.*, Cicero makes a shocking admission regarding his use of sources. The passage is rather lengthy, but it is necessary to quote it in its entirety:

Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. Sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen ne faciam

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 155.

<sup>43</sup> Cicero, *Letters to Atticus*. 3 Vols. trans. E.O. Winstedt. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1912. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1962), 12.52.3.

<sup>44</sup> e.g., *Luc.* 98-99, 102-103, 137.

interdictum puto. Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit ut id apte fieri possit...<sup>45</sup>

Yet even supposing I gave a direct translation of Plato or Aristotle, exactly as our poets have done with the plays, would it not, pray, be a patriotic service to introduce those transcendent intellects to the acquaintance of my fellow-countrymen? As a matter of fact, however, this has not been my procedure hitherto, though I do not feel I am debarred from adopting it. Indeed I expressly reserve the right of borrowing certain passages, if I think fit, and particularly from the philosophers just mentioned, when an appropriate occasion offers for so doing... (trans. Rackham)

Cicero's inconsistent contextualization of sources poses a serious problem, for at times Cicero names his source and follows with a full quotation.<sup>46</sup> Although, at other times, Cicero simply provides a vague statement of familiarity with sources from which he constructs his discussion.<sup>47</sup> However, a second alternative is also likely. That is, Cicero could be copying from lecture notes or recalling dialectical exercises from his formal education.<sup>48</sup> Cicero certainly makes use of this practice as a literary device to justify the philosophical credentials of his chief interlocutor in the *Lucullus* (*Luc.* 10-12), when he depicts Lucullus openly claiming that he is recalling his argument in favor of the Old Academy from conversations that he had had with Antiochus and from informal debates which he had overheard between Antiochus, Heraclitus, Aristus, Aristo, and Dio. Either account is certainly plausible. However, a third possibility may also prove likely, namely, that Cicero is relying both on texts and lecture notes, while injecting his own

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<sup>45</sup> Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, trans. H. Rackam. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1914. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1961), 1.7.

<sup>46</sup> e.g., *Luc.* 98-99.

<sup>47</sup> e.g., *Luc.* 12-14, 69, 102-103, 137.

<sup>48</sup> Cicero, "Brutus," in *Cicero: Brutus/Orator*, trans. G.L. Hendrickson and H.M. Hubbell. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1962), 306, 315. (c.f. *Fin.* 1.16, 5.1).

commentary and original interpretation on the subject. Cicero's writing style in the *Academica* is not a straight dialogue, but rather, a suspended argumentative discourse where one interlocutor presents and defends a view in a progressive dialectical exchange, which is then refuted by another interlocutor in a similar manner. In the *Academica*, Cicero provides a considerable amount of space for the opposing interlocutor to present his central argument, develop supporting details, raise (and defend against) stated and perceived objections, and then restate the strengths of his position. Similarly, Cicero also devotes an equally generous amount of space to the support of his own views and the justification for his reasons and motives in favor of his view. It seems very likely that Cicero would have tapped into all of his sources (manuscripts, copies, papyri, lecture notes, etc.) to develop an accurate presentation of the opposing interlocutor's position. Likewise, Cicero would have maintained the same level of painstaking attention in support of his endorsed position by supplying all of the necessary sources. However, it is also reasonable to suspect that Cicero, being philosophically sophisticated and well-educated, would inject his own interpretation and contribute his own original insight into his philosophical position. No doubt, if Cicero's *Academica* or his other philosophical works were merely ἀπόγραφα, then it seems odd indeed that Cicero would have made the following statement to Atticus in June, 45 about the redacted version of his

*Academica*:

Libri quidem ita exierunt, nisi forte me communis φιλαυτία decipit, ut in tali genere ne apud Graecos quidem simile quicquam.<sup>49</sup>

Unless I am deceived like most people by egotism, the books have turned out superior to anything of the kind even in Greek. (trans. Winstedt)

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<sup>49</sup> *Att.* 13.13.1.

Cicero alludes to this third possibility, of combining source citation along with his own original interpretation, in the *Fin.* when, defending the literary and didactic contributions of his *philosophica*, he states that:

Quid si nos non interpretum fingimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus? Quid habent cur Graeca anteponant iis quae et spendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis?<sup>50</sup>

And supposing that for our part we do not fill the office of a mere translator, but, while preserving the doctrines of our chosen authorities, add thereto our own criticism and our own arrangement: what ground have these objectors for ranking the writings of Greece above compositions that are at once brilliant in style and not mere translations from Greek originals? (trans. Rackham)

In a similar study, Jill Harries comments upon recent scholarship regarding the philosophers whom Cicero had studied under, had been influenced by, and had known personally. In her evaluation of Cicero's definition of the *ius civile* in the *De legibus*, Harries notes, "whatever Cicero's philosophical sources wrote (or were understood by Cicero to have written), the line of argument put forward was by Cicero's own choice."<sup>51</sup> Similar to Annas, Harries assumes that Cicero's interpretation is unique, authentic, and well-informed. I shall follow both Annas and Harries in their project by employing the same method in my analysis of Cicero's *Academica*. Just as Annas and Harries have considered Cicero's transmission of his philosophical sources, I shall devote similar attention to preserving what Cicero actually *says* about his sources. However, in the

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<sup>50</sup> *Fin.* 1.6.

<sup>51</sup> Jill Harries, "Cicero and the Defining of the *Ius Civile*," in *Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honor of Miriam Griffin*, eds. Gillian Clark and Tessa Rajak, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 54.

absence of a descript reference to a source; I shall assume that Cicero is employing his own interpretation.<sup>52</sup>

There has been a great deal of scholarship recently published which has addressed the Academic/Stoic debate regarding the criterion of truth.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, there has been a good deal of work which evaluates Cicero's use of his sources within his philosophical works.<sup>54</sup> However, there has not been, to my knowledge, a close evaluation of Cicero's transmission of his sources regarding his interpretation of the Academic/Stoic debate regarding the criterion of truth in the *Academica*, the practical implications of his endorsement of the Academic philosophical/dialectical method, and the implications regarding Cicero's own interpretation and his appropriation of Academic philosophy to satisfy his own specific practical motives. By bringing these various approaches

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<sup>52</sup> I must apologize if, in the course of this thesis, I inadvertently duplicate the research, work, or outcomes of other scholars who have conducted investigations parallel to mine. The present thesis does not presume to offer entirely new or novel insight to Cicero's interpretation regarding the criterion of truth, nor in how Cicero appropriated Academic philosophy for his own practical ends. Indeed, other scholars (whose work is reflected here) have done a much more mature and sophisticated job of arguing these positions. Rather, this thesis modestly contains observations which support and elaborate other existing scholarly interpretations, most notably those of Robert Gorman, Gisela Striker, and Harold Thorsrud. Without question, this thesis is itself a synthesis of the continuity of scholarship on the subject which has allowed for (and has generated a need for) fruitful and ongoing interpretation.

<sup>53</sup> Myles Burnyeat, ed., *The Skeptical Tradition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); Michael Frede, "Stoics and Sceptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions," in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Michael Frede, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 151-176.; Julia Annas, "Stoic Epistemology," in *Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 184-203.; James Allen, "Academic Probabilism and Stoic Epistemology," *The Classical Quarterly* 44, no.1 (1994): 85-113.; Malcolm Schofield, "Academic Epistemology," in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. Kiempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 323-351.; Brad Inwood, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Harald Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism*, *Ancient Philosophies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2009); and Richard Bett, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>54</sup> John Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, *Hypomnemata: Untersuchungen Zur Antike und Zu Ihrem Nachleben*, Heft 56. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), see esp. 390-423; and Harald Thorsrud, "Cicero on his Academic Predecessors: the Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40, no. 1 (2002): 1-18.

together, I hope to be able to contribute to an account of Cicero's interpretation of the criterion of truth which is both coherent and securely based on other extant textual evidence.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Readers who are not as familiar with the fragmentary nature of the *Academica* (as it has survived) and its textual history, are advised to read the Excursus section first. In the Excursus, I discuss a necessary digression from the main text of my thesis regarding the composition of the *Academica*, Cicero's didactic intentions for writing the *Academica*, his motives for redacting the first version, and Cicero's justifications and reasons for thinking that the redaction accounted for an improvement over the first version.

## CHAPTER 2. CICERO'S *ACADEMICA* AND HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Cicero's *Academica* was written during a transitional period in the development of both Hellenistic and Roman philosophy. Cicero attests to this shifting climate in his letter to Atticus written from Athens in June of 51 B.C., where he states:

Valde me Athenae delectarunt urbe dumtaxat et urbis ornamento et hominum amore in te et in nos quadam benevolentia; sed multa in ea philosophia sursum deorsum, si quidem est in Aristo, apud quem eram.<sup>56</sup>

Athens pleases me greatly, that is the material city, its embellishments, your popularity, and the kind feeling shown to me: but its philosophy is topsy-turvy, that is, if it is represented by Aristo with whom I am staying. (trans. Winstedt)

This transitional period began in the mid-second century B.C., as Hellenistic Greek philosophy slowly began to be introduced into Roman society. Rome, in 45 B.C. (i.e., the date of the *Academica*'s composition), was both intellectually vibrant and stimulating, but also very suspicious of Greek learning. In the following sections, I shall briefly survey the tenuous environment in which Cicero wrote the *Academica*, and consider Cicero's own first-hand accounts of Roman attitudes toward Hellenistic philosophy.

### 2.1 EARLY ROMAN EXPOSURE TO HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

In *Luc.* 137, Cicero describes one of the earliest encounters the Romans had had with Hellenistic philosophers. In 155 B.C. an embassy, including heads of the Athenian

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<sup>56</sup> *Att.* 5.10.



Hellenistic schools of philosophy, traveled to Rome to request a repeal of a fine levied against the citizens of Athens for raiding Oropus. The three philosophers in the Athenian embassy included Diogenes the Stoic, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Carneades the Academic.<sup>57</sup> In a letter to Atticus from March of 45 B.C., Cicero discusses his research on the Athenian embassy as part of the content which he intends to include within the *Academica*. In the letter, Cicero states:

...quibus consulibus Carneades et ea legatio Romam venerit, scriptum est in tuo annali: haec nunc quaero quae causa fuerit. De Oropo, opinor, sed certum nescio.<sup>58</sup>

...you have entered in your Chronicle the date of the visit of Carneades and that famous embassy to Rome: I want to know now the cause of its coming. I think it was about Oropus: but I am not certain. (trans. Winstedt)

In *Luc.* 137, Cicero briefly comments on an informal exchange that had taken place during the Athenian embassy's stay in Rome in 155 B.C., between Carneades and the praetor Aulus Albinus regarding a point on Academic and Stoic doctrine. During the reported incident, Albinus exchanged in playful philosophical banter with Carneades regarding the differences between Academic and Stoic metaphysical theories. The inclusion of this incident, while brief, demonstrates that at least one educated Roman, in 155 B.C., had the intellectual curiosity and philosophical background to press Carneades on points of Academic and Stoic philosophy. This exchange was, no doubt, an isolated and unique incident within Roman culture at the time. Similarly, Cicero describes in *De. or.* 2.155 how the visiting philosophers of the Athenian embassy attracted large audiences while delivering lectures during their spare time in Rome. This initial exposure to Greek

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<sup>57</sup> *De. or.* 2.155.

<sup>58</sup> *Att.* 12.23.

philosophy elicited a strong first-impression among the Roman aristocracy; for later in the *De. or.*, Cicero explains how Carneades impressed the Romans with his oratorical and dialectical sagacity.

Carneadi vero vis incredibilis illa dicendi et varietas perquam esset optanda nobis, qui nullam umquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit, quam non probarit, nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit.<sup>59</sup>

As for Carneades, however, the extraordinary power and diversity of his oratory would be extremely to our liking; since, in those debates of his he supported no contention without proving it, and attacked none which he did not overthrow. (trans. Sutton)

Through the part-time lectures of the philosophical embassy (especially those of Carneades), not only were Romans able to hear eloquent orations and dialectical exercises given by erudite Greek philosophers, but the practical-minded Romans quickly understood that philosophy could have vocational applications as well. Through his lectures, Carneades demonstrated the practical implications of studying philosophy in service to cultivating oratorical and dialectical skills. Carneades' dialectical prowess proved both successful and influential to his Roman audience. Not only were the philosophers in the Athenian embassy successful in having the fines against Athens repealed, but they had also tapped into a marketable new export service, philosophical studies as dialectical training for budding Roman orators. In fact, at several points within his philosophical works, Cicero recounts his own oratorical, dialectical, and philosophical training, having studied first with tutors in Rome and then studying abroad in Athens and Rhodes.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, Cicero encourages other would-be orators to travel east to study

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<sup>59</sup> *De. or.* 2.161.

<sup>60</sup> *Fin.* 1.16, 5.1, *Brut.* 306, 315, *Nat. D.* 1.6-9.

with the Hellenistic schools.<sup>61</sup> With Cicero as the proselytizing poster-child, advocating philosophical studies within the curricula for Roman orators, he had to overcome one linchpin problem, namely, how to convince Roman aristocrats, suspicious of Greek education, that philosophical studies actually were worthwhile.

## 2.2 OVERCOMING THE ROMAN SUSPICION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

The Roman student (studying philosophy as part of his curriculum in oratory, rhetoric, and dialectic) could not seem to be too energetic about his philosophical studies over his main objective, to cultivate his oratorical and rhetorical skills. In her paper, “Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome,” Miriam Griffin records three prominent arguments that contributed to the Roman suspicion of Greek philosophy. Griffin argues, “behind this attitude of suspicion lay the belief that philosophy could actually diminish a man’s usefulness to the state.”<sup>62</sup> This sentiment is evidenced by Cicero in *De. or.* 2.156 and *Fin.* 1.1-12, where Cicero records the Roman attitude against philosophical studies and the objections raised by his contemporaries. For example, in *De. or.* 2.156, Cicero depicts the position of his interlocutor Q. Lutatius Catulus regarding philosophical studies:

...ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum et suspensionem artificii apud eos, qui res iudicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror, imminuit enim et oratoris auctoritatem et orationis fidem.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> *Acad.* 1.8, *Brut.* 119, 309, 332, *De. or.* 1.61, 3.71-73.

<sup>62</sup> Miriam Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome,” in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 20.

<sup>63</sup> *De. or.* 2.156.

I do not disapprove of such pursuits, if kept within limits, though I hold that a reputation for such pursuits, or any suggestion of artifice, is likely to prejudice an orator with the judiciary: for it weakens at once the credibility of the orator and the cogency of his oratory. (trans. Sutton)

Griffin lists three standard arguments which the Romans launched against the study of philosophy: (1) philosophy might seduce a student away from public service, (2) philosophy might “inculcate doctrines that were impractical and inappropriate to the realities of public life,” and (3) philosophy might make the student “recalcitrant to authority and subversive of government.”<sup>64</sup> Catulus’s statement in *De. or.* 2.156 demonstrates the call for moderation and restraint which Griffin’s points forewarn. As long as the student (or orator) stayed within appropriate and practical limits, his philosophical studies could be warranted. Similarly, appearing too pedantic in philosophical studies could be a detriment to one’s credibility as an orator. Cicero explains that his own philosophical writings had placed him at risk of criticism of engaging in activity “beneath the dignity of my character and position”.<sup>65</sup> While a knowledge of philosophical topics was expected, even encouraged, for fashionable and well-educated Romans in the late-Republic, one’s philosophical knowledge had to stay in check within acceptable and appropriate boundaries. In his study of Cicero’s dialectical method, Robert Gorman argues that “a segment of Roman elite apparently found it inappropriate for a Roman of Cicero’s stature to show too great an interest in the details of what was essentially a Greek science.”<sup>66</sup> Gorman’s comment reflects Cicero’s

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<sup>64</sup> Griffin, *Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome*, 20-21.

<sup>65</sup> *Fin.* 1.1, *personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>66</sup> Robert Gorman, *The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of Cicero* (Palingenesia 86. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2005), 113.

admission in *Fin.* 1.1-12 to the various objections to his study of philosophy. It will be convenient to quote a few lines:

Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. Quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et hi quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. Postremo aliquos futuros suspicor qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hos scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent.<sup>67</sup>

Certain persons, and those not without some pretension to letters, disapprove of the study of philosophy altogether. Others do not so greatly object to it provided it be followed in dilettante fashion; but they do not think it ought to engage so large an amount of one's interest and attention. A third class, learned in Greek literature and contemptuous of Latin, will say that they prefer to spend their time reading in Greek. Lastly, I suspect there will be some who will wish to divert me to other fields of authorship, asserting that this kind of composition, though a graceful recreation, is beneath the dignity of my character and position. (trans. Rackham)

A similar concern is addressed in the introduction of the *Lucullus*, where Cicero responds to the criticism that the discussion of philosophical topics is “not specially becoming for great statesmen”.<sup>68</sup> However, in response, Cicero provides examples of memorable Roman statesmen who have allegedly devoted themselves to liberal studies (*scil.* Marcus Cato and Publius Africanus).<sup>69</sup> In Cicero's following defense at *Luc.* 5-7, Cicero argues that the philosophical studies of notable Roman statesmen actually credited their distinction in service to the state. While Cicero was unsuccessful at single-handedly making philosophical studies a respectable Roman activity, he forcefully justified

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<sup>67</sup> *Fin.* 1.1.

<sup>68</sup> *Luc.* 5, *tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

philosophical studies for the didactic and practical implications of developing the method and practice necessary for oratorical, rhetorical, and dialectical skills.

### 2.3 PHILOSOPHY JUSTIFIED FOR VOCATIONAL STUDIES

While Roman students of oratory and rhetoric certainly could find adequately qualified tutors and teachers at home, the serious student, as future-statesman, was encouraged to study abroad in Greece with the schools of Athens; in particular, the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academics.<sup>70</sup> For example, Cicero's interlocutor, Varro, admits how he recommends apt pupils to study in Greece. Varro notes:

Sed meos amicos in quibus id est studium in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ex fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consecentur...<sup>71</sup>

But my friends who possess an interest in this study I send to Greece, that is, I bid them go to the Greeks, so that they may draw from the fountain-heads rather than seek out rivulets... (trans. Rackham)

In the *De. or.* and *Brut.*, Cicero presents several arguments that promote the study of philosophy and its application to developing the method and technique necessary to be a successful orator. For example, in *De. or.* 1.60-61 and 3.71-73, Cicero claims that an orator must study philosophy in order to understand oratorical technique and dialectical theories. Similarly, in *Brut.* 118-120, Cicero cites specific examples of the dialectical and oratorical outcomes of studying with Stoic, Academic, and Peripatetic masters. Of course, when advocating the study of philosophy in application to oratory, one must specify *which* school within the great *à la carte* of Hellenistic philosophy one has in

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<sup>70</sup> *Brut.* 119, 309, 332.

<sup>71</sup> *Acad.* 1.8.

mind. It comes as no surprise that Cicero advocated studying Academic philosophy as the primary method and theory for developing oratorical and dialectical skills; with Peripatetic philosophy coming in a close-second. In *Tusc.* 2.9, Cicero makes the following statement:

Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetude de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset inveniri, sed etiam quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio.<sup>72</sup>

Accordingly these considerations always led me to prefer the rule of the Peripatetics and the Academy of discussing both sides of every question, not only for the reason that in no other way did I think it possible for the probable truth to be discovered in each particular problem, but also because I found it gave the best practice in oratory. (trans. King)

Miriam Griffin affirms the powerful influence of Academic and Peripatetic philosophy and its ability to foster “the oratorical skills so necessary for political success under the Republic.”<sup>73</sup> Griffin continues, “There were two reasons for that: Peripatetics were best at rhetorical theory and each of these schools taught a form of argument useful to the orator.”<sup>74</sup> Griffin highlights the synthesis of Peripatetic oratorical theory with the Academic dialectical method that provided the winning combination for the would-be-orator. In particular, Griffin notes, the “Peripatetics gave practice in debating both sides of the question; the Academics in rebutting any argument.”<sup>75</sup> Cicero makes a similar affirmation in *Fin.* 5.10 where he states that:

Disserendique ab iisdem non dialectice solum sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita; ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi

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<sup>72</sup> *Tusc.* 2.9.

<sup>73</sup> Griffin, *Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome*, 9.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-10.

exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus quiquid ex utraque parte dici posset exprimeret.<sup>76</sup>

In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder started the practice of arguing both pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. (trans. Rackham)

Within the emerging climate of gradual acceptance of philosophical studies in the Roman Republic, the study of philosophy found its greatest and most vocal champion in Cicero. Throughout his *philosophica*, Cicero aggressively argued against the negative perceptions of Greek philosophy from his fellow Romans and encouraged them to devote themselves to philosophical studies. In fact, Cicero's first volume of his *philosophica*, the *Hortensius* (no longer extant), addressed the value of studying philosophy against the objections of his contemporaries.<sup>77</sup> Cicero's presentation of philosophical studies, while somewhat elitist and sugar-coated, appealed to those who sought a quality education which would ensure success in the Roman law courts and forum. As Griffin notes, "Philosophy provided the *θέσεις*, or abstract questions, used in rhetorical practice already before Cicero's time and continuously into the Empire."<sup>78</sup> Again, Cicero's philosophy of choice was that of the Academics and Peripatetics who offered the best oratorical training in debate, dialectical method, and rhetorical theory. Griffin continues, "The budding orator learned to debate on both sides of such questions as: Is the world governed by Providence? Did law originate naturally or by contract between men?"

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<sup>76</sup> *Fin.* 5.10.

<sup>77</sup> *Luc.* 6, 61, *Div.* 2.3-4, *Tusc.* 2.4. See also, Paul MacKendrick, *The Philosophical Books of Cicero* (London: Duckworth, 1989), 106-113; and R.M. Ogilvie, *The Library of Lactantius* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 58-61.

<sup>78</sup> Griffin, *Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome*, 15.



Should the wise man engage in politics? What is the difference between a king and a tyrant?"<sup>79</sup>

While the scope of Cicero's literary and personal influence was limited to a certain population of educated aristocratic Romans, Cicero did successfully manage to recruit members of Rome's ruling elite to engage in philosophical studies either for intellectual recreation or for continued oratorical studies. However, Griffin argues that this climate of marginal acceptance of philosophical studies also contributed to an attitude of detachment to philosophical controversy.<sup>80</sup> While select Romans studied philosophy to polish their oratorical skills, few actually considered the abstract intellectual exercises of philosophy seriously enough to engage in the doctrinal disputes between the schools. In other words, Griffin argues, few Romans who studied philosophy in Cicero's day would have genuinely been faithful to one philosophical school; calling themselves Stoic, Academic, or Epicurean. However, I argue, it is precisely this point which makes Cicero innovative by his application and endorsement of philosophical studies. Not only was Cicero interested in the study of philosophy for its vocational value, but Cicero was different from other philosophically affluent Romans *because* he was genuinely interested in the debate between the schools.

If this interpretation is correct, then one could expect to see a predominant philosophical affiliation highlighted within Cicero's *philosophica*. However, given Cicero's endorsement of Academic and Peripatetic dialectical method, it is not surprising to detect Cicero's endorsement of the *outcomes* of Academic and Peripatetic doctrines,

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 15.

but rather, the consistency of the Academic and Peripatetic *method* of discovering truth. Within his study, Robert Gorman adapts and applies Gregory Vlastos' sincerity principle of the Socratic *elenchus* to his own "say-what-you-believe-rule" which accounts for Cicero's authenticity within his dialectical method.<sup>81</sup> Gorman argues that the central component of Cicero's argumentative strategies within his philosophical dialogues provides fair and balanced analysis through the dialectical process of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* and *in utramque partem disserendi*.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, Gorman argues that Cicero considered the search for truth a valuable dialectical process and an authentic philosophical commitment.<sup>83</sup> Likewise, as was discussed previously in the introduction regarding the epistemological commitments of the Academy, Cicero testifies to the sincerity of his method and his interest in the discovery of truth during his speech at *Luc.* 65-66. During his speech, Cicero claims that he is "fired with zeal for the discovery of truth".<sup>84</sup> Not surprisingly, it is the content of the *Academica* in which Cicero preserves his genuine interest in philosophical studies and his endorsement of the dialectical method of Academic philosophy, as he transmits the debate on the criterion of truth between the New and Old Academy and the Stoics.

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<sup>81</sup> Gorman, 16-33, 91-94. See also, Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983): 27-58; and Gregory Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-37.

<sup>82</sup> Gorman, 11.

<sup>83</sup> Gorman, 17.

<sup>84</sup> *Luc.* 65-66, *ardere studio veri reperiendi* (trans. Rackham).

## 2.4 THE EMERGENCE OF ROMAN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

Philosophy in Republican Rome during the first-century B.C. had inherited the central concerns and traditions of Hellenistic philosophy. Similarly, the philosophical climate that Cicero encountered during his education reflected all of the main Hellenistic schools, including Stoic, Epicurean, Peripatetic, and Academic.<sup>85</sup> Cicero, having received one of the finest philosophical educations at the time, was incredibly sophisticated at understanding the complexities of all the doctrines of the Hellenistic schools. Cicero's first exposure to philosophy came through attending the lectures of the Epicureans: Phaedrus and Zeno.<sup>86</sup> Similarly, in *Brut.* 306, Cicero recounts his introduction to Academic philosophy through the lectures of Philo of Larissa. When Cicero was about 18 years old, Philo had fled the conflict in Athens during the first Mithradatic War, for Rome. Cicero describes the event:

Eodemque tempore, cum princeps Academiae Philo cum Atheniensium optimatibus Mithridatico bello domo profugisset Romamque venisset, totum ei me tradidi admirabili quodam ad philosophiam studio concitatus, in quo hoc etiam commorabar attentius.<sup>87</sup>

At this time Philo, then head of the Academy, along with a group of loyal Athenians, had fled from Athens because of the Mithradatic war and had come to Rome. Filled with enthusiasm for the study of philosophy I gave myself up wholly to his instruction. (trans. Hendrickson)

This encounter with Academic philosophy, no doubt, left a lasting and influential impression on the young Marcus Tullius. For Cicero later left Rome to study in Athens

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<sup>85</sup> *Nat. D.* 1.6-7.

<sup>86</sup> *Fin.* 1.16, *Nat. D.* 1.59, *Acad.* 1.46.

<sup>87</sup> *Brut.* 306.

with Philo's pupil, Antiochus of Ascalon. In *Fin.* 5.1 and *Brut.* 315., Cicero explains how, during his travels in Asia Minor, he studied with Antiochus in Athens. Cicero explains:

Cum venissem Athenas, sex mensis cum Antiocho veteris Academiae nobilissimo et prudentissimo philosopho fui stadiumque philosophiae numquam intermissum a primaque adulescentia cultum et semper auctum hoc rursus summo auctore et doctore renovavi.<sup>88</sup>

Arriving at Athens I spent six months with Antiochus, the wise and famous philosopher of the Old Academy, and with him as my guide and teacher I took up again the study of philosophy, which from my early youth I had pursued, and had made some progress in, and had never wholly let drop. (trans. Hendrickson)

However, it is important to note that Cicero also had Stoic instructors as part of his philosophical education. Not only had Cicero studied with the Stoic Posidonius, but he also had studied under the Stoic Diodotus who, in fact, lived in Cicero's house for the remainder of his life.<sup>89</sup>

Throughout his *philosophica*, Cicero claims that the *dramatis personae* in his dialogues had all enjoyed the similar benefits of a liberal education through the study of philosophy, which gave them all the credentials and abilities to carry on the depth of conversation depicted in the dialogues.<sup>90</sup> However, whether Cicero's philosophical education can be considered the paradigm for Roman aristocrats of his time, or if Cicero's education was unique, one thing is clear; Cicero had received not only one of the best philosophical educations in preparation for a life of public service to Rome, but also one of the best philosophical educations that could be expected for anyone who desired to assume the mantle of a philosopher. Similarly, Cicero's philosophical writings reflect the

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<sup>88</sup> *Brut.* 315.

<sup>89</sup> *Nat. D.* 1.6, 123, *Fin.* 1. 6, *Luc.* 115, *Brut.* 308-310.

<sup>90</sup> e.g., *Luc.* 1-4.

mind of a serious and capable thinker, along with his education in Hellenistic philosophy, which equipped him to masterfully command the difficult material of Hellenistic philosophy. Throughout his *philosophica*, Cicero addressed issues at the center of Hellenistic philosophy which he adapted into a context for a Roman audience. No doubt, Cicero's genius comes not only from his philosophical skills, but also from his ability to serve as a philosophical good-will ambassador to his fellow Romans.

Some scholars have argued that Roman philosophy was merely Hellenistic philosophy translated and transmitted into a Roman context.<sup>91</sup> While this portrayal of Roman philosophy was generally true between 155-79 B.C., Roman philosophy began to distinguish itself into new iterations as the study of philosophy was introduced into the higher education of many young Roman aristocrats, either by private tutors or, for those who traveled to Greece to pursue studies directly with the established Hellenistic schools. It is this period, after 79 B.C., which Miriam Griffin describes as the "heyday of the Greek tour."<sup>92</sup> As philosophical studies continued to be a component of the Roman higher education curriculum, serious-minded students continued their philosophical studies and interests in Rome by sponsoring philosophers as advisors or as private tutors in their

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<sup>91</sup> See, A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 2d ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 1-13, 210-237; and J.M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

<sup>92</sup> Griffin, *Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome*, 4.

homes.<sup>93</sup> In fact, as was mentioned previously, Cicero claims to have had the Stoic Diodotus live in his house until his death in 59 B.C.<sup>94</sup>

Cicero's *Academica* represents one of the earliest attempts at developing a uniquely Roman interpretation of Greek Hellenistic philosophy, with measurable success. At several instances in his *philosophica*, Cicero reports his intention to provide an educational service to Roman students by rendering and delivering the best of Greek philosophy into Latin.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, in *Nat. D.* 1.6-9 and in *Fin.* 1.1-12, Cicero develops several arguments that explain his reasons and motives for devoting his time to writing philosophical treatises. For example, in *Nat. D.* 1.7-8, Cicero considers his philosophical writings a patriotic and civic duty for the benefit of the Roman *res publica*. Likewise, at *Fin.* 1.1-12, Cicero defends the study of philosophy against critics who, either out of elitism or contempt for the Latin language, prefer to study philosophy only in Greek. In response, Cicero argues that the Latin language is both rich and fruitful for adapting and cultivating a philosophical vocabulary, richer in fact, than Greek (*locupletiores etiam esse quam Graecam*).<sup>96</sup> Further, in *Div.* 1.3-4, Cicero highlights the outcome of his philosophic and civic enterprise by outlining the catalog of his *philosophica*, reflecting his effort to make philosophical literature accessible in Latin.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Griffin, *Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome*, 3-4.; See also, Jonathan Barnes, "Antiochus of Ascalon." in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 51-96; and Elizabeth Rawson, "Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Adviser." in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 233-257.

<sup>94</sup> *Luc.* 115, *Brut.* 308-310.

<sup>95</sup> *Div.* 2.3-4, *Nat. D.* 1.6-9, *Fin.* 1.1-12.

<sup>96</sup> *Fin.* 1.10.

<sup>97</sup> *Div.* 1.4.

As philosophy began to gain momentum and popularity in Rome, students like Cicero, Varro, and Brutus began to examine the problems and concerns of Hellenistic philosophy and to provide their own interpretation and commentary.<sup>98</sup> Perhaps in an attempt at self-affirmation, in *Nat. D.* 1.8, Cicero claims the success of his call to philosophy by noting that several of his readers have been inspired not only to study philosophy, but also to become authors of philosophical treatises themselves. Similarly, in *Div.* 2.5-6, Cicero enthusiastically comments upon recent advances in philosophical studies in Latin and the tremendous output of Latin philosophical treatises, which had begun to eclipse the monopoly of philosophy as an exclusively Greek activity. These early attempts at Romanizing Hellenistic philosophy included imitations and emulations, like Lucretius' Epicurean poem *De Rerum Natura*. However, this is not to imply that Roman philosophy in Cicero's time was merely a derivative form of Hellenistic philosophy. Indeed, Cicero reports of several well-known Roman proponents of Epicurean, Stoic, and Peripatetic philosophy in the late-Republic who had made unique and original contributions to philosophy.<sup>99</sup>

Similarly, in *Tusc.* 2.4-9 Cicero presents one of his most direct calls for the study of philosophy, not for its practical and vocational implications, but for its own value. Cicero's speech in *Tusc.* 2.4-9 is forceful, almost bellicose, in nature as he calls for the study of philosophy in Latin in order to dominate the declining influence of Greek philosophy. For example, Cicero argues:

...hoc omnes, qui facere id possunt, ut huius quoque generis laudem iam languenti Graeciae eripiant et transferant in hanc urbem, sicut reliquas omnes,

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<sup>98</sup> *Acad.* 1.9-12.

<sup>99</sup> *Tusc.* 1.6, 2.7-8.

quae quidem erant expetendae, studio atque industria sua maiores nostri transtulerunt.<sup>100</sup>

...I encourage all, who have the capacity, to wrest from the now failing grasp of Greece the renown won from this field of study and transfer it to this city, just as our ancestors by their indefatigable zeal transferred here all the other really desirable avenues to renown. (trans. King)

Further, as Cicero continues his speech in praise of the output of quality Latin philosophical literature, he encourages philosophically-minded authors to redouble their literary efforts. Indeed, Cicero's call to study philosophy-for-philosophy's-sake in *Tusc.* 2. is quite different from his other vocational justifications. In fact, Cicero argues not only that well-educated Romans *ought* to engage in philosophical activities, but also that well-educated Romans *should* produce philosophical writings. Cicero continues;

Sed eos, si possumus, excitemus, qui liberaliter eruditi adhibita etiam disserendi elegantia ratione et via philosophantur.<sup>101</sup>

But let us, if we can, stimulate those who, possessing a liberal education and the power of arguing with precision, can deal orderly and methodically with philosophical questions. (trans. King)

Cicero's hortatory call to philosophy in *Tusc.* 2. injects a layer of moral obligation not seen in Cicero's other works. However, it is hard to say whether Cicero's promotion of philosophy in the *Tusc.* is merely a reflection of his own wishful thinking. While Cicero's philosophical call-to-arms reflects the contagious momentum of philosophical studies within the well-educated Roman elite, it still proved difficult to shake the climate of suspicion and distrust of Greek philosophy.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> *Tusc.* 2.5.

<sup>101</sup> *Tusc.* 2.6-7.

<sup>102</sup> *Luc.* 5-7.



Cicero's *Academica* fits within this complicated and contradictory context of late-Republican Rome. While philosophy was valued for its vocational merit for well-educated Romans, philosophy as a purely intellectual pursuit was considered inappropriate. Cicero's *Academica*, indeed his whole *philosophica*, would have received mixed reviews in this climate. However, it is precisely within this mixed audience that Cicero chose to argue for his endorsement of Academic philosophy. I think it is fair to say that few within Cicero's narrow readership would have had the philosophical background (or interest) to take Cicero's endorsement of Academic philosophy seriously. Fewer still would have been able to follow the complexities of the debate on the criterion of truth presented in the *Academica*. Indeed, Varro admits at *Acad.* 1.4-5 that he has intentionally decided not to write philosophy in Latin since he was unwilling to write "what the unlearned would not be able to understand and the learned would not take the trouble to read".<sup>103</sup> However, those having received the philosophical education to understand and appreciate the debate on the criterion of truth in the *Academica*, would have conceived the debate within the context of the threefold system of philosophy of the Hellenistic philosophical curriculum, the *philosophandi ratio triplex*.

Before proceeding directly to Cicero's account of the Academic and Stoic debate on the criterion of truth, it is important to understand how the criterion of truth factored into the *philosophandi ratio triplex* of Hellenistic philosophy and ultimately into Cicero's unique conception of philosophy, its practical implications, and its applications. I shall demonstrate that Cicero conceived the criterion of truth as means for the discovery of truth within the *philosophandi ratio triplex*.

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<sup>103</sup> *Acad.* 1.4, *itaque ea nolui scibere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent* (trans. Rackham).

### CHAPTER 3. THE *PHILOSOPHANDI RATIO TRIPLEX* AND THE CRITERION OF TRUTH IN THE *ACADEMICA*

This chapter begins, not surprisingly, in the same place as the *Academici libri* does itself. Varro's speech in *Acad.* 1.15-32 recounts the position of Antiochus and the Old Academy which begins with an outline of the threefold system of philosophy, the *philosophandi ratio triplex*: ethics, physics, and logic.<sup>104</sup> Varro begins by noting that the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, as conceived by the Academy, was a system inherited from Plato.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, in *Luc.* 114-146 Cicero presents the *philosophandi ratio triplex* while outlining the disagreements between the Old Academy and the Stoics in the subject areas of physics, ethics, and logic. Cicero's presentation of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* is consistent with other accounts which reflect the Hellenistic threefold system of philosophy as supported by the Academics, Stoics, and Peripatetics.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, it is the traditions, institutions, and central concerns of Hellenistic philosophy, as defined within the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, which came to dominate the philosophical world of late-Republican Rome. Cicero's decision to examine the implications of the *philosophandi*

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<sup>104</sup> *Acad.* 1.5-7, 1.19.

<sup>105</sup> *Acad.* 1.19, 1.33. cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*. trans. R.G. Bury. The Loeb Classical Library, 291. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7.16.

<sup>106</sup> *Tusc.* 5.68, *Fin.* 5.9-11, *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.2-23, cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. 2 Vols. trans. R.D. Hicks. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2006) 7.39.; and Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. trans. R.G. Bury. The Loeb Classical Library, 273. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1933. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1993) 2.13.

*ratio triplex* within his discussion on the criterion of truth in the *Academica* adds insight into his attempt to develop the outcomes and implications of the differences between the New Academy, the Old Academy, and the Stoa, while providing an honest interpretation of his understanding of the significance of the debate on the criterion of truth between the schools.

In what follows, I shall analyze and evaluate Cicero's conception of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* within the *Academica* as it relates to the debate on the criterion of truth. I shall argue that Cicero conceived the problem of the criterion of truth as a central philosophical issue, couched in the field of logic within the *philosophandi ratio triplex*. However, before exploring Cicero's conception of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, it is important to examine the philosophical climate in late-Republican Rome which framed Cicero's conception of philosophy.

### **3.1 THE *PHILOSOPHANDI RATIO TRIPLEX* IN THE *ACADEMICA***

Evidence that the *philosophandi ratio triplex* played a central role in affecting Cicero's conception of philosophy and the role of the criterion of truth, is supported by the extended discussions that survive in both extant editions of the *Academica*. As mentioned previously in the introduction to this chapter, the discussion of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* in *Luc.* 114-146 reveals the differences between the Old Academy and the Stoics within the subject areas of physics, ethics, and logic, while the version in *Acad.* 1.19-32 discusses the position of the Old Academy of Antiochus regarding the same three subject areas. Similarly, Varro's speech in *Acad.* 1.35-42

outlines the changes within the *philosophandi ratio triplex* between the Old Academy and the Stoa. Likewise, while the *Academica* presents Cicero's fullest discussion of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, Cicero also describes the *philosophandi ratio triplex* in *Fin.* 5.9-11 and *Tusc.* 5.68 as traditions within Peripatetic philosophy and as requisite fields of study for the wise man (*sapiens*). Cicero reports, at *Luc.* 116, that the *philosophandi ratio triplex* is, in fact, a generally well-established and agreed upon curriculum for philosophy. Similarly, Cicero provides a summary of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* at the beginning of Varro's speech in the *Acad.*, stating:

Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum, quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans esset iudicando.<sup>107</sup>

There already existed, then, a threefold scheme of philosophy inherited from Plato: one division dealt with conduct and morals, the second with the secrets of nature, the third with dialectic and with judgment of truth and falsehood, correctness and incorrectness, consistency and inconsistency, in rhetorical discourse. (trans. Rackham)

However, before examining each of the three branches of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* individually, it is important to note that the *philosophandi ratio triplex* is also confirmed by the later sources Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus. Diogenes treats the *philosophandi ratio triplex* at length in his Life of Zeno (*Diog. Laert.* 7.39-160) and discusses the developments of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* by Zeno and successive orthodox Stoics. Similarly, Sextus provides a detailed account of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* in *Math.* 7.2-23 and *Pyr.* 2.13, where he outlines the positions and ordering of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* according to the preferences of various schools of philosophy.

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<sup>107</sup> *Acad.* 1.19.

In what follows, I shall compare Cicero's interpretation of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* along with the accounts from Diogenes and Sextus.

Sextus reports that the concept of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* is a controversial topic, since, he notes, some schools considered philosophy to be focused on only one or two areas of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, while other schools who accepted the tripartite divisions of philosophy disagreed on the order and placement of each component area.<sup>108</sup> While it is beyond the scope of this study to devote a full discussion to the disagreements between the philosophical schools regarding the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, it is important to consider Sextus' comments. The passage is lengthy, but it will be necessary to quote a few lines:

Αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μὲν μονομερῆ δοκοῦσιν αὐτὴν ὑποτεθεῖσθαι οἱ δὲ διμερῆ τινὲς δὲ τριμερῆ, καὶ τῶν ἕν μέρους ὑποστησαμένων οἱ μὲν τὸ φυσικὸν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ὑπεστήσαντο, καὶ ὡσαύτως τῶν κατὰ δυάδα διαιρῶντων οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν διεῖλον, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τρία διαιρῶντες συμφώνως εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν διηρήκασιν.<sup>109</sup>

Some, then, hold that it has but one part, others that it has two, and others that it has three parts; and of those who have supposed it to consist of one part, some have supposed this to be physics, others ethics, others, logic; and so likewise of those who divide it into two, some have made the divisions physics and logic, others physics and ethics, others logic and ethics; while those who divide it into three parts are all agreed on the division into physics, logic, and ethics. (trans. Bury)

Sextus then goes on to describe how individual philosophers and various philosophical schools conceived of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, concluding that only those who divide philosophy according to the subject areas of physics, ethics, and logic employ an

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<sup>108</sup> *Math.* 7.2-23.

<sup>109</sup> *Math.* 7.2-4.

accurate interpretation of philosophy.<sup>110</sup> In the following sections, I shall give a brief account of ethics and physics, while developing a fuller description of logic, demonstrating how the criterion of truth was considered as a component of logic within the *philosophandi ratio triplex*.

### 3.1.1 Ethics

Cicero presents his discussion regarding ethics within the *philosophandi ratio triplex* in *Luc.* 129-141, and in Varro's speech at *Acad.* 1.19-23, and at *Acad.* 1.35-39. Cicero depicts the study of ethics, in the *Academica*, as including the following subjects of study: kinds of natural goods, identifying and pursuing the greatest good (*summum bonum*), virtue, promoting healthy and happy lives, discerning appropriate actions, and pursuing the ends of goods (*de finibus bonorum*). While it is probable that Cicero would have included other subject material into a fuller account of the study of ethics, it is likely that Cicero's presentation in the *Academica* was condensed due to his objective of only providing a comparative study between the Stoa and the Academy.<sup>111</sup> For example, in *Luc.* 129-141, Cicero discusses the disagreements regarding the objective of ethics according to various philosophical schools (e.g. Eleatics, Megarians, Eretrians, Cyrenaics, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Academics) along with the disagreements regarding the chief object of the good and how best to secure its end. As the discussion advances, Cicero provides a comparative study of the differences between Stoic ethical

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<sup>110</sup> *Math.* 7.16-19.

<sup>111</sup> Indeed, Cicero devotes a full examination on the discipline of ethics in the *Fin.*

theory and the objections raised by the Academy.<sup>112</sup> In Varro's speech at *Acad.* 1.19-23, Cicero provides a description of Antiochus' account of the ethics of the Old Academy and the similarities with Peripatetic ethical theory. Similarly, at *Acad.* 1.35-39, Varro continues with a discussion on Stoic ethics, arguing for a syncretism between the Stoa, Peripatos, and Antiochus' Old Academy.

In a similar account, Diogenes Laertius provides a full discussion of ethics as part of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* in his life of Zeno.<sup>113</sup> Diogenes not only describes the conception of ethics according to Zeno, but also provides comments regarding various conceptions of ethics from successive Stoics. In both accounts, Cicero and Diogenes provide a general statement of the object of the study of ethics, the disagreements from the various schools, and the interpretations of later figures.

### 3.1.2 Physics

Cicero also accounts for the study of physics within his conception of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* at *Luc.* 116-128, and (again) in Varro's speech at *Acad.* 1.24-29 and at *Acad.* 1.39. Cicero depicts physics, in the *Academica* as, generally, studies that relate to the natural and physical sciences (*de rerum natura*), including studies on: first principles, matter, the gods, the natural world, elements, and causes. Cicero's presentation of physics in both versions of the *Academica* follows a similar arrangement as his discussion on ethics. Specifically, Cicero presents the disagreement in physics between individual philosophers and philosophical schools in the account in the *Lucullus*,

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<sup>112</sup> *Luc.* 132-141.

<sup>113</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.84-131.

while outlining the areas of study of the Old Academy and Peripatetics at *Acad.* 1.24-29, and developing the innovations of the Stoics at *Acad.* 1.39. Similar to his speech on ethics, Varro's objective in his discussion in *Acad.* 1.24-29 and *Acad.* 1.39 is to demonstrate the syncretism of the Old Academy, Peripatetics, and Stoics, however, this time regarding physics. It is more difficult to examine the extent of Cicero's conception of the study of physics within the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, since he did not devote another separate work to physics in the same way as he did to ethics in the *Fin.* However, according to Cicero's own admission at *Luc.* 128, Cicero's accepted the study of the natural and physical sciences as a component part of studying philosophy as a whole, not in order to assent, believe, and affirm, but in order to discover that which bears the closest resemblance to the truth (*veri simile*).

While Diogenes Laertius provides a more comprehensive examination of Stoic physics in *Diog. Laert.* 7.132-160; his account is surprisingly consistent with Cicero's abbreviated account at *Acad.* 1.39 (outlined previously). The Stoic account of physics from Diogenes begins:

Τὸν δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον διαιρουσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ σωμάτων τόπον καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ. καὶ οὕτω μὲν εἰδικῶς, γενικῶς δ' εἰς τρεῖς τῶν τε περὶ κόσμου καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τρίτον τὸν αἰτιολογικόν.<sup>114</sup>

Their physical doctrine they divide into sections (1) about bodies; (2) about principles; (3) about elements; (4) about the gods; (5) about bounding surfaces and space whether filled or empty. This is a division into species; but the generic division is into three parts, dealing with (i.) the universe; (ii.) the elements; (iii.) the subject of causation. (trans. Hicks)

Therefore, the accounts from Cicero and Diogenes demonstrate the consistency in the curriculum of physics as conceived as part of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*. In the

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<sup>114</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.132.



discussion that follows, I shall examine the third part of philosophy (*tertia philosophiae pars*) of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, logic, and specifically the role of the criterion of truth within its structure.

### 3.1.3 Logic

Cicero's inclusion of logic within the *philosophandi ratio triplex* requires some clarification. While Cicero does not actually use the term λογικόν (logic) in the *Academica*, he provides several alternates in Latin. For example, while describing the third part of philosophy (*tertia philosophiae pars*) at *Acad.* 1.30, Cicero uses the phrase “consisting in reason and discussion” to describe logical studies.<sup>115</sup> Similarly, in the discussion of the *philosophandi ratio triplex* at *Acad.* 1.19, Cicero describes the third part of philosophy as consisting of “dialectic and with judgment of truth and falsehood”.<sup>116</sup> Likewise, in a similar account from *Fat.* 1, Cicero makes the following statement:

...totaque est λογική, quam ‘rationem disserendi’ voco. Quod autem in aliis libris feci, qui sunt de natura deorum, itemque in eis quos de divinatione edidi, ut in utramque partem perpetua explicaretur oratio, quo facilius id a quoque probaretur quod cuique maxime probabile videretur;...<sup>117</sup>

...and the whole subject is *Logikē*, which I call ‘the theory of discourse.’ The method which I pursued in other volumes, those on the Nature of the Gods, and also in those which I have published on Divination, was that of setting out a continuous discourse both for and against, to enable each student to accept for himself the view that seems to him most probable;... (trans. Rackham)

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<sup>115</sup> *Acad.* 1.30, *erat in ratione et in disserendo* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>116</sup> *Acad.* 1.19, *de disserendo et quid verum* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>117</sup> Cicero, “De Fato,” in *Cicero: De Oratore Book III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria*. trans. H. Rackham. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1942. Reprint, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1960) 1.

According to *Fat.* 1, Cicero appears to be employing the phrase *rationem disserendi* as his version of the Greek *λογική*. However, Cicero’s translation does not seem to add up upon first inspection. Jonathan Barnes recognizes this difficulty as well. Barnes argues that “*disserere* usually represents the Greek *διαλέγεσθαι*, so that ‘*ratio disserendi*’ ought to be *διαλεκτική* rather than *λογική* as a whole.”<sup>118</sup> Barnes argues that this confusion is not unintentional, but rather Cicero’s inclination to assimilate *λογική* and *διαλεκτική*.<sup>119</sup> Taking this into consideration, Cicero’s depiction of the constituent parts of the *rationem disserendi* is consistent with other accounts of logic from Greek sources. Specifically, Cicero’s account of the *tertia philosophiae pars* in *Acad.* 1.32 includes: the criterion of truth (*iudicium veritatis*), definitions (*definitions rerum*) and etymology (*ἔτυμολογίαν*), guides for arriving at proofs (*notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum*), dialectic (*dialecticae disciplina*), and rhetoric (*vis dicendi*). Cicero’s account of the *tertia philosophiae pars* in the *Academica* is remarkably consistent with the description of logic found in the life of Zeno by Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes depicts the logical system of the Stoics as follows:

Τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὐρεῖν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τῶν φανασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνουσι. καὶ τὸ ὀρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. τὴν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὕσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσῃ καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων·

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<sup>118</sup> Jonathan Barnes, “Logic in *Academica I* and the *Lucullus*.” in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld, (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997), 141.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 140-142.

ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὀρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.<sup>120</sup>

Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false. (trans. Hicks)

Diogenes' account of logic is strikingly consistent with Cicero's division of studies in the *tertia philosophiae pars* in the *Academica*, since both include the criterion of truth, definitions, rhetoric, and dialectic as component parts of logic. I argue, therefore, based upon the consistency between Cicero's and Diogenes' accounts, that Cicero does consider the *rationem disserendi* to be cognate with *λογική*, both substantively and by definition. Furthermore, while Cicero may have been intentionally assimilating *λογική* and *διαλεκτική* as *rationem disserendi*, I am convinced that he provides an accurate and trustworthy account of the *tertia philosophiae pars* in the *Academica* as was also conceived by the Hellenistic schools.

However, if one expects to find an extended discussion regarding rhetoric, dialectic, definitions, etymology, or proofs in the *Academica*, one is likely to be disappointed. In fact, at the three locations within the *Academica* where Cicero discusses the *tertia philosophiae pars* (*Acad.* 1.30-32, 1.40-42, *Luc.* 142-146), the discussion is almost exclusively devoted to addressing the criterion of truth. In the quote from *Luc.* 29, provided in the introduction (p. 18), Cicero depicts the two greatest subjects in philosophy as the criterion of truth and the ends of goods (*iudicium veri et finem*

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<sup>120</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.42.

*bonorum*); however, the criterion of truth has implications which go beyond the study of logic or *rationem disserendi*. For example, Cicero's interlocutor Lucullus argues at *Luc.* 23, and *Luc.* 32-33 that if no criterion of truth can be established between true and false, then there similarly will be no criterion for ethical decisions between right and wrong, or for determining propositions that relate to physics, like "whether the number of stars is odd or even".<sup>121</sup> Lucullus continues:

Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum sic inter verum et falsum: si nihil interest, nulla regula est, nec potest is cui est visio veri falsique communis ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam.<sup>122</sup>

What is this canon of truth and falsehood, if we have no notion of truth and falsehood, for the reason that they are indistinguishable? For if we have a notion of them, there must be a difference between true and false, just as there is between right and wrong; if there is none, there is no canon, and the man who has a presentation of the true and the false that is common to both cannot have any criterion of any mark of truth at all. (trans. Rackham)

Thus, the criterion of truth was a matter of primary significance within Cicero's conception of philosophy. Similarly, while Barnes argues that Cicero assimilated *λογική* and *διαλεκτική* into the *rationem disserendi*, Cicero's account in the *Academica* depicts the criterion of truth (*iudicium veritatis*) as the primary subject within the *tertia philosophiae pars*, if not the entire *philosophandi ratio triplex* as well. In the following sections I shall examine Cicero's conception of the criterion of truth and its application as a means for the discovery of truth.

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<sup>121</sup> *Luc.* 32, *ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>122</sup> *Luc.* 33.

### 3.2 THE *ACADEMICA* AND THE CRITERION OF TRUTH

While Cicero presents the criterion of truth (*iudicium veritatis*) at several instances throughout the *Academica* as the means for the discovery of truth, its influence and relevance as a central issue of philosophy is depicted almost continuously throughout the work. Several of these occurrences have already been reviewed in the preceding section. However, while examining the role of the criterion of truth in the *Academica*, it will be necessary to compare Cicero's account of the criterion of truth with those of other Greek sources. Here, again, we turn to Sextus and Diogenes for their accounts. First, however, I shall review how Cicero depicts the criterion of truth.

#### 3.2.1 Cicero's Interpretation

Throughout the *Academica*, Cicero provides several renderings of the phrase "criterion of truth." Cicero most frequently employs the terms *iudicium* and *veritas* (or some variation of the two) within his depiction of the criterion of truth. For example at *Acad.* 1.30 and *Luc.* 142, Cicero refers to the *iudicium veritatis*, and uses a similar combination of *iudicium* and *veritas* at *Luc.* 20, 29, 33, 59, 91, 142, and 143. However, at other instances Cicero simply refers to the *iudicium*.<sup>123</sup> While I do not dispute Cicero's use of *veritas* within the phrase *iudicium veritatis*, Cicero's choice of *iudicium* is confusing, since *iudicium* does not traditionally translate as the term "criterion." Accepted renderings of *iudicium* have typically been applied in legal contexts, with most commonly accepted translations of *iudicium* as "trial, judgment, understanding,

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<sup>123</sup> *Luc.* 34, 84, 142.

discernment, decision, investigation” even “court-of-law” to name a few. Indeed Cicero’s choice of *iudicium* may have been influenced by his legal background; however, I shall not investigate that conjecture here. On the other hand, Cicero does use other Latin words which have a closer resemblance to the Greek designation for canon or criterion (*κανών* or *κριτήριον*). However, one should not place too much emphasis on trying to discover a precise rendering in Cicero’s Latin of the Greek *κανών* or *κριτήριον*. Within Hellenistic philosophy, widely divergent views existed on what a *κανών* or *κριτήριον* actually was and what it was intended to do. For example, in her paper “Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας,” Gisela Striker notes that several renderings existed in Hellenistic philosophy and in Late Antiquity which accounted for a canon or criterion, yet, the exact phrase *κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας* did not always apply to every source.<sup>124</sup> Even among contemporary philosophers, Striker rightly notes, the word “criterion” is hardly an unequivocal concept.<sup>125</sup> For example, at *Acad.* 1.42 Cicero uses the phrase *normam scientiae* to designate the criterion of truth. Similarly, Cicero employs the term *regula* to designate the criterion at *Luc.* 29, 32, 33 as the criterion of truth (*regula veri et falsi*).<sup>126</sup> Finally, Cicero also uses the word *nota* at several occasions (*Luc.* 58, 69, 71, 84, 110) either independently or in combination with *veritas* and *falsum* (e.g. *veri et falsi nota*) as a cognate for the criterion of truth.<sup>127</sup> While *norma* and *regula* seem to serve as

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<sup>124</sup> Striker, *Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας*, 23-26, 68-72.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>126</sup> *Luc.* 33.

<sup>127</sup> *Luc.* 58.

more consistent Latin renderings of *κανών* and *κριτήριον*, *nota* also has revealing implications. Acceptable translations of *norma* include “rule” or “standard” while *regula* translates as “ruler, pattern, model.” Both of these words seem to capture the objective quality of the criterion as being a standard by which truth is determined. On the other hand, *nota* is commonly translated as “mark, sign, character” or “distinguishing mark,” which lends to the perceptual and supervenient qualities of the criterion of truth. However, one must be cautious and judicious not to confuse Cicero’s use of *nota* as the criterion of truth as a rendering of the Greek *ἐνάργεια*, which Cicero translates as *perspicuitas*.<sup>128</sup> While *perspicuitas* and *nota* both can be applied to identify an evident or distinguishing characteristic about a quality or object, *perspicuitas* has a more specialized meaning within the Stoic criterion of truth, which will be examined later in Chapter 4. However, for the time, it will suffice to say that *nota* is not used as frequently in the context of the criterion of truth as *iudicium*; and therefore, I shall refer to *iudicium veritatis* as Cicero’s standard phrase for the criterion of truth.

It is important to remember that, regardless of the rendering applied to express the criterion of truth (e.g. *κανών*, *κριτήριον*, *iudicium*, *norma*, *regula*, *nota*), each rendering is used as a metaphor to express a process or function of discovering the truth. Therefore, it is not surprising to note the various iterations and presentations of the criterion of truth among different sources. Indeed, the varying positions on the criterion of truth account for the controversy and ongoing exchange between the Hellenistic philosophical schools. However, the Latin words which Cicero employs for the criterion of truth (*iudicium*, *norma*, *regula*, *nota*) appear to correspond to some aspect of the criterion of truth also

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<sup>128</sup> *Luc.* 17.

depicted within the Greek sources.<sup>129</sup> Within Cicero's depictions of the criterion of truth in the *Academica*, all are presented within the context of discussing the criterion of the pre-Socratics, the Hellenistic philosophy of the Epicureans, or the Academic response to the Stoic criterion. In each of these contexts, Cicero indicates that the criterion of truth is a method or quality that discerns the difference between truth and falsehood, whether through the senses (*Luc.* 20, 142), through reason (*Acad.* 1.30, 1.142), the mentally grasped presentation (*καταληπτική φαντασία*) (*Acad.* 1.42, *Luc.* 18, 33, 34, 53, 58, 59, 69, 84, 107), an individual judgment (*Luc.* 142), or by some other means (*Luc.* 33, 91, 95, 142, 143). Since the majority of the discussions of the criterion of truth in the *Academica* refer to the Stoic criterion, it comes as no surprise that Cicero references the *καταληπτική φαντασία* of the Stoics most frequently as the criterion of truth. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Academics and Stoics were essentially in agreement about what the criterion of truth was and the conditions which the criterion of truth ought to satisfy. However, while the Stoics argued that the criterion of truth rested upon the mentally grasped presentation (*καταληπτική φαντασία*), the Academics claimed that the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could not guarantee truth, nor that truth, as defined by the Stoics, could even be achieved. However, before going further, I shall examine the manner in which the criterion of truth is treated by Sextus and Diogenes.

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<sup>129</sup> *Diog. Laert.*, *Sext. Emp. Math.*, *Pyr.*



### 3.2.2 The Greek Sources: Accounts from Sextus and Diogenes

Similar to Cicero's interpretation, Sextus and Diogenes also depict the criterion of truth as a means for the discovery of truth.<sup>130</sup> For example, at *Math.* 7.24, Sextus argues that the preliminary requirements for any philosophical inquiry must begin with the appropriate principles and methods for the discernment of truth. Sextus states:

...ἐκεῖνο δέ φαμεν ὡς εἶπερ ἐν παντὶ μέρει φιλοσοφίας ζητητέον ἐστὶ τὰληθές, πρὸ παντός δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς τούτου διαγνώσεως ἔχειν πιστοὺς.<sup>131</sup>

...if truth is to be sought in every division of Philosophy, we must, before all else, possess trustworthy principles and methods for the discernment of truth. (trans. Bury)

Furthermore, in the Life of Zeno, Diogenes confirms that the Stoics perceived the criterion as a means for the discovery of truth (*Τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὐπεῖν*).<sup>132</sup> Likewise, both Sextus and Diogenes note that the process of discovering the truth is central to the logical branch of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*, since that is the field of study which promotes the study of criteria and proofs (*ὁ δέ γε λογικὸς τόπος τὴν περὶ τῶν κριτηρίων καὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων θεωρίαν περιείχεν*).<sup>133</sup> Therefore, as with Cicero's interpretation, both Sextus and Diogenes place the criterion of truth within the logical branch of the

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<sup>130</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.42, *Sext. Emp. Pyr.* 2.15-16, *Math.* 7.24-25, 33.

<sup>131</sup> *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.24.

<sup>132</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.42.

<sup>133</sup> *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.24.

*philosophandi ratio triplex*. Sextus emphasizes this point by describing the criterion of truth as the logical standard by which philosophers introduce the means for the discovery of truth.<sup>134</sup>

In her evaluations of the criterion of truth, Gisela Striker identifies the dispute over the criterion of truth as a uniquely Hellenistic epistemological issue which was intended to answer the question whether it is possible to discern between true and false opinions or assertions and, if so, by what means.<sup>135</sup> Similarly, although Striker's research reveals three isolated passages in Plato and Aristotle (*Republic* 9.582a6, *Theaetetus* 178b6, *Metaphysics* K6.1063a3) which refer to the *κριτήριον* as a term for a faculty of judgment or perception, the word *κριτήριον* or use of the phrase *κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας* is not documented prior to the Epicureans and the Stoics.<sup>136</sup> Likewise, the Hellenistic Epicureans and Stoics developed very specific requirements for what could be defined as a criterion of truth. In fact, as was seen previously, the disagreement over the definition of the criterion of truth became the initial cause of debate between the Stoics and Academics. Sextus notes that the criterion of truth has three senses in which it can be applied: the agent, the instrument, and the application.<sup>137</sup> As Sextus notes:

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<sup>134</sup> Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.33-34, *Pyr.* 2.16-17.

<sup>135</sup> Gisela Striker, "The Problem of the Criterion," in *Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 143-160; and Gisela Striker, "Κριτήριο τῆς ἀληθείας," 22.

<sup>136</sup> Striker, *Κριτήριο τῆς ἀληθείας*, 26.

<sup>137</sup> Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.35-37, *Pyr.* 2.16-79.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λέγεται ἂν τριχῶς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ  
καὶ τὸ καθ' ὅ, οἷον ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ἦτοι αἴσθησις ἢ  
διάνοια, καθ' ὅ δὲ ἡ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας...<sup>138</sup>

But the logical criterion also may be used in three senses – of the agent, or the instrument, or the “according to what”; the agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument either sense-perception or intelligence, and the “according to what” the application of the impression... (trans. Bury)

Therefore, given the inherent disagreement on what a criterion of truth actually was (i.e. an agent, an instrument, or an application), it is no wonder that the debate on the criterion of truth became a matter of controversy among the Hellenistic philosophers.<sup>139</sup> However, in order to fully appreciate Cicero’s interpretation of the criterion of truth and the debate between the Stoa and the Academy, it shall be helpful to consider the first reported account of the criterion of truth, conceived and developed by the Epicureans.

### 3.2.3 The First Criterion of Truth: αἰσθήσεις and εἶδωλα

According to Diogenes, Epicurus was the first philosopher to devote an entire volume to the question concerning the criterion of truth.<sup>140</sup> Similarly, Epicurus conceived

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<sup>138</sup> Sext. Emp. Pyr. 2.16

<sup>139</sup> Striker also refers to the Hellenistic debate regarding the criterion of truth as the “problem of the criterion.” See, Gisela Striker, “The Problem of the Criterion,” in *Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 143-160. However, I prefer not to use this phrase in order to avoid confusion with the issue in contemporary analytic philosophy of the same name, advanced by Roderick Chisholm in: Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 2d. ed (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1977), 119-133. Briefly stated, the problem of the criterion in contemporary analytic philosophy is directly related to the challenge of skepticism and addresses methodological questions concerning (1) how to identify sources of knowledge or justified belief, and (2) how to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of epistemic concepts like knowledge and justified belief. Richard Fumerton provides a good overview of the problem of the criterion and explores the connections between the metaepistemological views of internalism and externalism and the different approaches ascribed to the problem of the criterion: Particularism, Generalism/Methodism, and Reflective Equilibrium. See, Richard Fumerton, “The Problem of the Criterion.” in *The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism*, ed. John Greco (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34-52.

<sup>140</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 10.27. Diogenes includes the *Περὶ κριτηρίου ἢ Κανῶν* among Epicurus’ works.

the study of philosophy as a *philosophandi ratio triplex*, including the study of Canonics, Physics, and Ethics (*κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν*), placing the study of the criterion of truth (or the canon) as the primary area of philosophy.<sup>141</sup> Sextus confirms Epicurus' placement of the criterion within the *philosophandi ratio triplex* at *Math.* 7.22 where he states:

οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν εἰσβάλλουσιν· τὰ γὰρ κανονικὰ πρῶτον ἐπιθεωροῦσιν, περὶ τε ἐναργῶν καὶ ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀκολουθῶν ποιοῦται τὴν ὑφήγησιν.<sup>142</sup>

The Epicureans start off with Logic, for they expound “Canonics” first, treating of things evident and non-evident and allied matters. (trans. Bury)

Epicurus' volume titled “On the Criterion or the Canon” (*Περὶ κριτηρίου ἢ Κανῶν*) argued that the criteria of truth are: (1) sense-impressions (*αἴσθησεις*), (2) preconceptions (*προλήψεις*), and (3) feelings (*πάθη*).<sup>143</sup> Cicero confirms Epicurus' threefold criteria at *Luc.* 142, where he states that Epicurus had placed the criterion of truth in the senses, in the notions of objects, and in pleasure (*aliud Epicuri qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit*).<sup>144</sup> Therefore, according to the accounts in Diogenes and Cicero, the Epicurean criterion appears to involve a synthesis of three processes into one system to distinguish between truth and falsity. Diogenes provides descriptions of each of these three processes individually

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<sup>141</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 10.29-30. Similarly, I shall like to highlight the interesting feature of Epicurus' depiction of the *tertia philosophiae pars* by reducing *λογικὴ* to *κανονικὸν*, much in the same way that Cicero depicts the *tertia philosophiae pars* as *rationem disserendi* by assimilating *λογικὴ* and *διαλεκτικὴ*. In Epicurus' estimation, Canonics provided the basis for discerning between truth and falsehood.

<sup>142</sup> *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.22.

<sup>143</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 10.31.

<sup>144</sup> *Luc.* 142.

(αἴσθησις = *Diog. Laert.* 10.31-32, προλήψεις = *Diog. Laert.* 10.33-34, and πάθη = *Diog. Laert.* 34). Likewise, to describe how all of these processes are intended to be assimilated, it is helpful if one considers that Epicurean physics is based upon Democritean atomic theory. Specifically, Epicureans adopted the atomic theory of Democritus which conceived the world as composed of microscopic atoms (ἄτομους) which constantly impact the senses, thus, triggering sensations.<sup>145</sup> Therefore, the Epicurean criterion of truth explains a physical event or process as atoms generating perceptual phenomena (e.g. sights, sounds, smells, noises, feelings of pleasure or pain, etc.). That is, according to the Epicurean criterion, sensations, perceptions, feelings, and memories (or preconceptions of sensations and feelings) are nothing more than the stimuli caused by the impact of atoms. In his study of the Epicurean criterion, C.C.W. Taylor argues that by combining the epistemological requirements of the criterion of truth with the Democritean physical (atomic) theory, Epicurus conflated αἴσθησις to include being both real/true (ἀληθές) representations and non-rational (αλόγος) qualities, which report reality.<sup>146</sup> In other words, the process of receiving sense-impressions by the impact of atoms removes a cognitive process. Specifically, one does not have to think about (or mentally assent to) the reality of sense-impressions: they are true simply because they exist.<sup>147</sup> That is, every received perception is true, in virtue that it is caused

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<sup>145</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 10.54-64.

<sup>146</sup> C.C.W. Taylor, "All Perceptions are True," in *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, eds. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 105-124.

<sup>147</sup> As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the Epicurean process is quite different from the way in which the Stoics conceived of the functions of receiving sense-impressions; which does involve a mental process of συγκατάθεσις, or mental assent, to the sense-impressions.

by a real event or object (i.e., the impact of atoms). Therefore, according to the Epicureans, the act of simply having a perception, or feeling, or preconception, verifies the truth of the phenomena. This depiction would seem to explain Cicero's statement at *Luc.* 79-80, where he notes:

eo enim rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam esse credendum.<sup>148</sup>

For Epicurus brings the issue to this point, that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed. (trans. Rackham)

In other words, the senses detect the veracity of a real existing object or event; for if an object or event were not true or real, then the senses would not receive stimuli from the impact of atoms, caused by an object or event. Epicurus is depicted as reporting these "stimuli" or "images" as "εἶδωλα," which are the represented objects of perception, rather than the actual objects in reality.<sup>149</sup> Stephen Everson argues that Epicurus placed the εἶδωλα at the center of his epistemology as the objects of perception rather than the solid objects in reality.<sup>150</sup> The εἶδωλα, Everson notes, are produced in exact accordance with objects in reality.<sup>151</sup> Furthermore, this description of the εἶδωλα helps to explain one statement allegedly attributed to Epicurus, that "all sense-impressions are true" (Ἐπικουρείῳ δόγματι κέχρηται τῷ πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι' αἰσθήσεως φαντασίας

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<sup>148</sup> *Luc.* 79-80.

<sup>149</sup> Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.63, *Diog. Laert.* 10.50, *Ep. Hdt.* 46-49 = *Diog. Laert.* 10.46-49.

<sup>150</sup> Stephen Everson, "Epicurus on the Truth of the Senses," in *Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.), 161-183.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 176-179.

ἀληθείς.).<sup>152</sup> Everson argues that the Epicurean thesis that all sense-impressions are true actually refers to the pre-cognitive status of the motion of collective atoms as εἶδωλα upon the senses. Sextus Empiricus helps to clarify the Epicurean criterion by explaining:

εἰ γὰρ ἀληθῆς λέγεται φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται, πᾶσα δὲ φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φανταστοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φανταστὸν συνίσταται, πᾶσα κατ' ἀνάγκην φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς.<sup>153</sup>

The presentations, then, which occur are all true. And reasonably so; for, say the Epicureans, if a presentation is termed “true” whenever it arises from a real object and in accord with that real object, and every presentation arises from a real presented object and in accord with that object, then every presentation is necessarily true. (trans. Bury)

Therefore, Epicureans promoted the sense-impressions (αἰσθήσεις) as the criterion of truth which account for the process in which images (εἶδωλα) qualify the reality and truth of an object or event.<sup>154</sup> That is, truth relies on the receipt of sense-impressions (αἰσθήσεις) by the perceiver. Thus, the Epicurean criterion was based upon a process of arriving at truth, according to way in which sense-impressions are formed, transmitted, and received.

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<sup>152</sup> Plutarch, “Reply to Colotes in Defence of the Other Philosophers (*Adversus Colotem*),” in *Plutarch's Moralia*. In Seventeen Volumes, Volume XIV. trans. Benedict Einarson and Phillip H. De Lacy. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 1109 a-b. (c.f. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.203-205, 210, and *Math.* 8.9).

<sup>153</sup> *Math.* 7.204-205.

<sup>154</sup> For a full description on the Epicurean αἰσθήσεις as the criterion of truth, see: Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean Epistemology,” in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. Kiempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 260-294; and Gisela Striker “Epicurus on the truth of sense impressions,” in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, ed. Gisela Striker, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 77-91.

However, Cicero sharply criticizes and dismisses the Epicurean criterion as naïve and gullible.<sup>155</sup> Cicero presents several arguments in *Luc.* 79-90 which demonstrate that the senses are not always reliable and indeed deceive and mislead the perceiver. Likewise, Cicero argues that these arguments are categorized into one of four types: (1) there are such things as false sense-impressions, (2) false sense-impressions cannot be perceived, (3) multiple indistinguishable sense-impressions exist in which a difference between them cannot be discerned, and (4) there does not exist a true sense-impression in which another one precisely corresponds to it and that cannot be perceived.<sup>156</sup> Cicero admits that the controversy between the Stoa and the Academy relates to the fourth category of perceptual arguments. Likewise, most other schools are willing to concede the arguments in categories one through three. However, while the Epicureans are willing to concede categories two and three, Cicero reports, they are not willing to concede the arguments in category one; which, according to Cicero is an obvious error on the part of the Epicureans. While Cicero certainly held a negative (even hostile) attitude against Epicurean philosophy (consider Cicero's attack on Epicureanism at *Nat. D.* 1.57-124 and *Fin.* 1.13-26), Cicero does not develop a full response to the Epicurean criterion of truth in the *Academica*. In fact, with dismissive criticism, Cicero abruptly ends the discussion on the Epicurean criterion by saying "let us quit this gullible person, who thinks that the senses never lie..."<sup>157</sup> In fact, as mentioned previously, Cicero devotes the

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<sup>155</sup> *Luc.* 82.

<sup>156</sup> *Luc.* 83.

<sup>157</sup> *Luc.* 82, *Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri putat, discedamus....* (trans. Rackham).



discussion on the criterion of truth in the *Academica* almost exclusively to the Stoic criterion and the objections which surfaced against it by the Academy.

### **3.2.4 The Criterion of Truth: Truth, Coherence, and Natural Properties**

In the previous sections, I considered how the concept of the criterion of truth was interpreted by Cicero and the Greek sources: Diogenes and Sextus. Similarly, I provided a brief depiction of the first reported criterion of truth developed by the Epicureans. In the accounts of the criterion of truth reviewed thus far, two predominant features stand out which highlight the requisite outcomes of the criterion of truth. First, the criterion of truth provided a means for the discovery of truth. This theme has emerged consistently while examining the different interpretations of Cicero, Sextus, and Diogenes.<sup>158</sup> Secondly, the criterion of truth provided the basis for coherence within a philosophical system. Cicero presents the coherence claim at several locations within the *Academica*; however, the passages quoted earlier from *Luc.* 32-33 (page 59) depict Cicero's fullest expression of the coherence claim. Stated briefly, the coherence claim addresses the implications of the criterion of truth as the philosophical glue which holds together a network of other beliefs. On the other hand, if the criterion of truth fails, then so does the rest of the philosophical system. This scenario forms the basis for the passage from *Luc.* 32-33. The coherence requirement of the criterion of truth especially was important for the Stoics, almost to the point of obsession. As Robert Gorman reports, "The Stoics showed great pride in what they considered one of their great achievements as philosophers, the inner-consistency and coherence of Stoic philosophy - - the Stoic

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<sup>158</sup> *Luc.* 29, *Diog. Laert.* 7.42, 10.42, *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.24.

system - - even to the level of minutiae.”<sup>159</sup> For example, at *Fin.* 3.74, Cicero’s interlocutor Cato, presents his fascination with the complexities of the logical coherence of Stoic philosophy. Of course, the pride that the Stoics vested in the logical consistency of their philosophical system made it an easy target for those who attempted to (as Gorman says) go “probing for inconsistency” to uncover flaws within the Stoic system.<sup>160</sup>

The third feature of the criterion of truth that I would like to offer for consideration is that the criterion of truth as presented by the Epicureans and Stoics intended to depict truth as a real objective feature or quality of the physical world. The concept of truth as a natural property certainly contributed to the Epicurean criterion of truth, and the natural property concept had similar implications for the Stoic criterion of truth. For example, in his recent work on ancient epistemology, Lloyd Gerson argues that the view of knowledge accepted amongst the pre-Socratics through the philosophers of Late-Antiquity presented knowledge as a non-propositional and naturalistic account (in contrast with contemporary views of knowledge as propositional and criteriological) which represents a distinct, real nature of truth as a property of reality itself.<sup>161</sup> Likewise, Gerson argues, two prevailing views among ancient philosophers dominated the conception of truth as a natural property of reality. First, Gerson notes, truth could be qualified as a property of reality by the primary objects of perception as the immediate objects of the five senses (sight, sound, taste, touch, or smell); or, secondly, truth could be qualified by the primary objects of thinking or the intelligibles (*ιδέας*) as the *ne plus*

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<sup>159</sup> Gorman, 169.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>161</sup> Lloyd Gerson, *Ancient Epistemology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7-13.

*ultra* of cognition. Therefore, truth, as a natural property, could be apprehended either through perception or through thought.

According to Gerson's analysis, the Stoics and Epicureans certainly fell into the first category of those who considered knowledge as a real feature of the truth of a property of reality through the process of perception. While the Epicureans believed that truth and knowledge depended upon the veracity of the senses through *αἰσθήσεις* and *εἶδωλα* to accurately represent reality, the Stoics believed that truth relied on the qualified *καταληπτική φαντασία* to reveal the truth about reality. Similarly, Gerson focuses on the epistemological common ground shared between Epicureans and Stoics regarding the type of naturalism in epistemology which is also materialist, connecting epistemology with metaphysics and claiming that knowledge is a natural process or event.<sup>162</sup> The epistemological/metaphysical connection of truth was depicted earlier in the discussion of the Epicurean criterion by the application of the *εἶδωλα* which represent the activity of atoms impacting the senses, thus producing *αἰσθήσεις*. Similarly, Gerson argues, both the Epicureans and the Stoics paid close attention to the development of rules and practices for identifying and removing false beliefs from true beliefs. If Gerson is correct, then the criterion of truth is the standard rule by which the Epicureans and Stoics made the distinction between truth and falsity.

Gerson's thesis helps to explain why the Epicureans and Stoics invested so much attention to developing a criterion of truth which relied on perception. Perception provided the vehicle by which the objective features of truth could be accessed. Thus, the Epicureans and Stoics each developed a criterion of truth that relied on accessing the

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 90-111.

perceptual qualities of truth. Both the Epicurean and Stoic criterion of truth were positioned to guarantee the process for the discovery of truth. Similarly, the criterion of truth satisfied the logical requirements for consistency within the Epicurean and Stoic systems by connecting the epistemological and physical/metaphysical features of their system. For the Epicureans, this meant combining *αἰσθήσεις* and *εἶδωλα* with the *ἀτόμους*. Similarly, for the Stoics, this meant combining the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* with their theories of physics and psychology. Cicero certainly understood the implications of the criterion of truth for both Epicurean and Stoic philosophy. As a follower of the Academy, Cicero knew that if arguments could be presented against the Stoic criterion of truth, then their elaborately coherent system would be shown to be flawed. Luckily, for Cicero, the Academy had already established a hefty arsenal of arguments against the Stoic criterion of truth through the ongoing debates with the Stoa.

In this chapter, I have argued that Cicero conceived of the criterion of truth as a central issue within the commonly accepted curriculum of Hellenistic philosophy, the *philosophandi ratio triplex*. Similarly, Cicero understood the significance of the criterion of truth for the Epicurean and Stoic schools as providing (1) the method for the discovery of truth, (2) the basis for establishing the coherence of their philosophical system, and (3) the means of accessing the observable features of truth as a natural property of reality. Thus, this explains why the debate on the criterion of truth factored as a central topic in the *Academica*. In the next chapter, I shall examine Cicero's presentation and interpretation of the debate between the Academy and the Stoa regarding the criterion of truth and how the debate influenced Cicero's appropriation of Academic philosophy.

## CHAPTER 4. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH: CICERO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE STOA AND THE ACADEMY

Cicero reports at *Luc.* 68 that the pivotal issue in the debate on the criterion of truth between the Stoa and the Academy concerned the role of perception. Cicero argues, “Let us therefore stress the point that nothing can be perceived, for it is on that that all the controversy turns”.<sup>163</sup> Cicero’s account of the debate on the criterion of truth in the *Academica* reports the progressive development of the Stoic criterion of truth and its revisions through dialectical exchange with the Academy. Initially, the debate on the criterion of truth between Zeno and Arcesilaus was concerned with articulating the definition of Stoic criterion of truth, the mentally grasped presentation (*καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*). However, as successive generations of Stoics and Academics became accustomed to the stock arguments and standard replies, the debate on the criterion of truth took a different dialectical turn, focusing instead on the outcomes and implications of the Academic and Stoic arguments. In this chapter, I shall evaluate Cicero’s interpretation of the debate of the criterion of truth in the *Academica*, arguing that Cicero emphasized the dialectical features of the debate and its outcomes which influenced his endorsement and appropriation of Academic philosophy. The first step in this evaluation, however, will be to identify the role of the theory of perception within the Stoic criterion of truth.

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<sup>163</sup> *Luc.* 68, *Nitamur igitur nihil posse percipi; etenim de eo omnis est controversia* (trans. Rackham).

#### 4.1 STOIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION AND THE CRITERION OF TRUTH

Similar to the Epicureans, the Stoics based their criterion of truth upon the senses. Cicero reports at *Acad.* 1.42 that Zeno affirmed that the senses were reliable (*sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat*) which subsequently formed the basis for the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>164</sup> Similarly, Diogenes Laertius reports that:

Ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ὃ ἢ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστὶ, καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος, προάγων τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται.<sup>165</sup>

The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. (trans. Hicks)

Likewise, Augustine depicts Zeno's affirmation of the truth of the senses at *C. acad.* 3.18 where he states:

Sed videamus quid ait Zeno: tale scilicet visum comprehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet signa communia.<sup>166</sup>

But let us examine what Zeno says: according to him that object of sense can be comprehended and perceived, which manifests itself by signs that cannot belong to what is not true. (trans. O'Meara)

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<sup>164</sup> *Acad.* 1.42. = H. Von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols. Editio Stereotypa Editionis Prioris, (Leipzig: Teubner, (MCMIII) 1903-24. Reprint, Stuttgart: Stuttgartiae in Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, (MCMLXIV) 1964), 1.60.

<sup>165</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.49. = *SVF* 2.52.

<sup>166</sup> Augustine, "Contra Academicos," in *Sancti Aurelii Augustini: Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine, De Magistro, De Libero Arbitrio*. Cura et Studio W.M. Green. Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, XXIX. Aurelii Augustini Opera, Pars II, 2. (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, (MCMLXX) 1970), 3.18; and Augustine, *Against the Academics: Contra Academicos*. trans. John J. O'Meara. Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation, eds. Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe, no.12. (New York and Ramsey, NJ: Newman Press, 1951), 3.18. = *SVF* 1.59.

Whether Zeno developed the Stoic criterion of truth in direct response to that of Epicurus is not known; however, it is apparent that Zeno developed the Stoic criterion of truth within a philosophical environment in which the Epicurean criterion had already been established.

#### 4.1.1 φαντασία, ἐνάργεια, συγκατάθεσις and κατάληψις

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Epicurean criterion emphasized the non-cognitive features of the sense-impressions (*αἰσθήσεις*) as the criterion of truth which account for the process in which images (*εἶδωλα*) of atoms qualify the reality and truth of an object or event. However, Cicero reports at *Acad.* 1.40, that Zeno made a number of changes within the third part of philosophy (*Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit*).<sup>167</sup> Specifically, Cicero notes, Zeno developed a new criterion of truth in which sense-impressions did not stand independently as the criterion, but rather, were qualified by an act of mental assent. Cicero states:

Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit: in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus (quam ille *φαντασίαν*, nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc quidem verbum, erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius), - sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus adsensionem adiungit animorum quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Visis non omnibus adiunebat fidem sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile – feretis haec? “Nos vero,” inquit; “quonam enim alio modo *καταληπτόν* diceres?”<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> *Acad.* 1.40. = *SVF* 1.55.

<sup>168</sup> *Acad.* 1.40-41.

In the third department of philosophy he made a number of changes. Here first of all he made some new pronouncements about the sensation itself, which he held to be a combination of a sort of impact offered from outside (which he called a *phantasia* and we may call a presentation, and let us retain this term at all events, for we shall have to employ it several times in the remainder of my discourse), - well, to these presentations received by the senses he joins the act of mental assent which he makes out to reside within us and to be a voluntary act. He held that not all presentations are trustworthy but only those that have a ‘manifestation’ peculiar to themselves, of the objects presented; and a trustworthy presentation, being perceived as such by its own intrinsic nature, he termed ‘graspable’ – will you endure these coinages? “Indeed we will,” said Atticus, “for how else could you express ‘*catalēpton*’?” (trans. Rackham)

Therefore, Cicero notes that Zeno’s innovation, while preserving sense-impressions as the vehicle of knowledge, accounted for the observation that sense-impressions are not always trustworthy or accurate. Thus, in the initial formulation, Zeno’s criterion verged from that of Epicurus by rejecting the notion that all sense-impressions are true. While Epicurus maintained the veracity of all sense-impressions (*αἰσθήσεις*), Zeno admitted that sense-impressions are not always trustworthy. While Zeno differed with Epicurus on the intrinsic truth of all sense-impressions, both philosophers consistently affirmed that sense-impressions formed the basis for the criterion of truth. For example, according to Gerson’s thesis (considered in chapter 3) both Epicurean and Stoic epistemology conceived truth as a property of reality which was qualified by the primary objects of perception as the immediate objects of the five senses. However, as previously argued, while the Epicureans believed *αἰσθήσεις* alone qualified the truth of perception, Zeno and the Stoics were more discretionary about the type of sense-impressions which could count towards qualifying truth. Furthermore, Cicero notes a change in the terminology between Epicurus and Zeno regarding the immediate objects of the senses. While Epicurus employed the term *αἰσθήσεις* to refer to the sense-impression as it is received



by the senses, Zeno employed the term *φαντασία* as a presentation or appearance (*visum*) received from an object in reality.<sup>169</sup> While the Epicureans had relied on Democritean atomic theory to explain the veracity of *αἰσθήσεις*, the Stoics claimed no atomic theory. Instead, the Stoics devised an empirical theory of knowledge which considered the mind as a blank slate upon which presentations, impressions, and sensations affected and adapted our interactions with reality.<sup>170</sup> Sextus Empiricus reports at *Math.* 7.259 that the Stoic perceptual theory relied upon a mutual correspondence between reality and the senses which accounted for the way in which the senses present and transmit accurate features of reality:

...βεβαιοῦν τὸ φαντασίαν εἶναι κριτήριον, τῆς φύσεως οἷον εἰ φέγγος ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν ἀναδούσης καὶ τὴν δι' αὐτῆς γινομένην φαντασίαν.<sup>171</sup>

...thereby of necessity confirms that fact that presentation is the criterion, - nature having kindled as it were a light for us, to aid in the discernment of truth, in the faculty of sense and the presentation which takes place by means thereof. (trans. Bury)

Similarly, at *Diog. Laert.* 7.45, Diogenes Laertius illustrates the notion that the presentation (*φαντασία*) impacts the mind and forms an impression upon the mind in much the same way that a seal makes an impression in wax. Diogenes depicts the process as follows:

Τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων <τῶν> ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένων.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> *Acad.* 1.40.

<sup>170</sup> *Luc.* 30-31.

<sup>171</sup> *Math.* 7.259.

<sup>172</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.45. = *SVF* 2.53.

A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon wax. (trans. Hicks)

Thus, over time, as the mind develops - it begins to synchronize its concepts and expectations of reality in accordance with the stock of presentations it has received (stamped and molded) from reality. Therefore, Cicero continues, Zeno qualified only those presentations (*φαντασία*), which had a distinguishing quality or feature to warrant an act of mental assent, as reliable. At *Luc. 17*, Cicero reports the distinguishing quality which a *φαντασία* needed in order to qualify as true, as *ἐνάργεια* (*perspicuitas*); which translates as “perspicuity” or “clearness.”<sup>173</sup> However, this self-evident feature of a *φαντασία*, *ἐνάργεια*, was not something which was easily definable. In fact, as Cicero continues at *Luc. 17*:

...sed tamen orationem nullam putabant inlustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse, nec ae quae tam clara essent definienda censebant.<sup>174</sup>

...they thought that no argument could be discovered that was clearer than evidentness itself, and they deemed that truths so manifest did not need defining. (trans. Rackham)

Therefore, *ἐνάργεια* was conceived as an immediate inference, a type of self-evident quality whose truth does not rely on definition or argument. Further, as Cicero notes, according to Zeno when a presentation (*φαντασία*) strikes the senses as clear and self-evident (*ἐνάργεια*), our mind processes the presentation as being true and confirms the truth of the presentation by the act of voluntary mental assent. Cicero describes the

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<sup>173</sup> See also: *Luc. 45-46*.

<sup>174</sup> *Luc. 17*.

quality of assent in *Luc.* 37-39 as *συγκατάθεσις* (*adsensio*), assent, as a process in which the mind necessarily yields to clear presentations (*sic animum perspicuis cedere*).<sup>175</sup> Cicero argues that the process of assent is a derivative of the *ἐνάργεια*, while the mind must consciously be aware of the self-evident quality of the presentation, the mind is helpless to resist from giving assent to a clear presentation (*sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non adprobare*).<sup>176</sup>

Once the mind has given assent (*συγκατάθεσις*, *adsensio*) to the presentation (*φαντασία*, *visum*), Cicero continues, Zeno then described the following stage in the process as *κατάληψις* (*comprehensio*), or a mental “grasp” of the presentation.<sup>177</sup>

Cicero continues at *Acad.* 1.41:

Sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus quae manu prenderentur – ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est.<sup>178</sup>

But after it had been received and accepted as true, he termed it a ‘grasp,’ resembling objects gripped in the hand – and in fact he had derived the actual term from manual prehension, nobody before having used the word in such a sense, and he also used a number of new terms (for his doctrines were new). (trans. Rackham)

The process of mentally grasping the presentation, once the mind has given assent, formed the basis for the truth of the senses as the Stoic criterion of truth. Since Zeno had affirmed that the senses are not always trustworthy, the process of *φαντασία*,

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<sup>175</sup> *Luc.* 38.

<sup>176</sup> *Luc.* 38.

<sup>177</sup> *Acad.* 1.41, *Luc.* 31.

<sup>178</sup> *Acad.* 1.41.

συγκατάθεσις, and κατάληψις, served as a quality-control check for the senses.

Cicero describes the outcome of κατάληψις at *Acad.* 1.42 where he states:

...comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae aperirentur.<sup>179</sup>

...he held that a grasp achieved by the senses was both true and trustworthy, not because it grasped all the properties of the thing, but because it let go nothing that was capable of being its object, and because nature had bestowed as it were a ‘measuring rod’ of knowledge and a first principle of itself from which subsequently notions of things could be impressed upon the mind, out of which not first principles only but certain broader roads to the discovery of reasoned truth were opened up. (trans. Rackham)

Therefore, the process of κατάληψις describes the interaction in which presentations are generated and transmitted, and the way in which the senses receive perceptions. In Cicero’s depiction at *Acad.* 1.42, he highlights a unique feature of Stoic epistemology, namely, that the senses are attuned to interpret the truth qualities of reality. Essentially, the Stoics endorsed an early version of foundationalist empiricism in their criterion of truth to account for the way in which our perceptions accurately represent true features of reality as a basis for knowledge. As Cicero presents the Stoic position, quoted previously, he mentions that “nature had bestowed as it were a ‘measuring rod’ of knowledge and a first principle of itself from which subsequently notions of things could be impressed upon the mind”.<sup>180</sup> Thus, Cicero continues, after the mind has accepted the

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<sup>179</sup> *Acad.* 1.42.

<sup>180</sup> *Acad.* 1.42, *natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur* (trans. Rackham).

grasped presentation, the resulting presentation counts as knowledge. Cicero describes the process at *Acad.* 1.41 where he states:

Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam...<sup>181</sup>

Well, a thing grasped by sensation he called itself a sensation, and a sensation so firmly grasped as to be irremovable by reasoning he termed knowledge... (trans. Rackham)

Diogenes confirms Cicero's interpretation of the Stoic's concept of knowledge as an outcome of the firmly grasped presentation that cannot be refuted by reasoning or argument. Diogenes states:

αὐτὴν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξις ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου.<sup>182</sup>

Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension of as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. (trans. Hicks)

Thus, the Stoic criterion of truth relied upon the successive process of the presentation being transmitted, received, approved (by assent), and grasped in order to qualify as knowledge. In other words, knowledge depended upon the confirmation of a presentation being assented and grasped by the mind. Therefore, the mentally grasped presentation or the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* served as the foundation for the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> *Acad.* 1.41. = *SVF* 1.62.

<sup>182</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.47.

<sup>183</sup> The Greek phrase *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*, has been represented by a variety of translations within the scholarship of the Stoic criterion of truth. For example, Bury translates the phrase as “apprehensive presentation” while Hicks translates it as “apprehending presentation.” Similarly, Rist translates the phrase as “recognizable presentation,” while Long and Schofield both refer to the “cognitive impression.” Likewise, Hankinson offers the translation “cataleptic impression” while Annas uses the phrases “apprehensive appearance” and “apprehensible presentation” at different locations. Indeed there is no consistently and uniformly accepted translation of *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* adopted within the scholarship on the criterion of truth. In consideration of brevity and order to reduce confusion, I shall simply employ the Greek *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* in reference to the Stoic criterion of truth; however, I also use the phrase “mentally grasped presentation” where necessary.

#### 4.1.2 The καταληπτική φαντασία

Diogenes Laertius confirms the καταληπτική φαντασία as the Stoic criterion of truth at *Diog. Laert.* 7.54 where he states that “the criterion of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, *i.e.* that which comes from a real object...”<sup>184</sup> Cicero provides an amusing illustration at *Luc.* 144-145 of the way in which Zeno conceived the process of the καταληπτική φαντασία as the criterion of truth. Cicero states:

...et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat: nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, ‘visum’ inquebat ‘huius modi est’: dein cum paulum digitos contraxerat, ‘adsensus huius modi’; tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat (qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit); cum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat...<sup>185</sup>

...and this Zeno used to demonstrate by gesture: for he would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and say ‘A visual appearance is like this’; next he closed his fingers a little and said, ‘An act of assent is like this’; then he presses his fingers closely together and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension (and from this illustration he gave to that process the actual name of *catalēpsis*, which it had not had before); but then he used to apply his left hand to his right fist and squeeze it tightly and forcibly, and then say that such was knowledge... (trans. Rackham)

The Stoic criterion of truth developed from Zeno’s graduated perceptual theory of knowledge. As introduced in chapter 1, Zeno’s original definition of the criterion of truth (reported at *Luc.* 77) included the features of the perceptual theory and accounted for the process of φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, and κατάληψις, in order to confirm the reliability of the senses as the foundation for knowledge. Specifically, Zeno’s original

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<sup>184</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.54, Κριτήριον δε τῆς ἀληθείας φάσι τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπαρχοντος... (trans. Hicks). = *SVF* 2.105.

<sup>185</sup> *Luc.* 144-145. = *SVF* 1.66.

definition of the criterion of truth maintained that the presentation must be “impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality”.<sup>186</sup> However, in the next section, I shall resume the discussion presented in chapter 1 (pages 20-21) which outlines the initial objections raised by Arcesilaus regarding Zeno’s original definition of the criterion of truth, and the subsequent issues which surfaced in the debate between the Stoa and the Academy.

#### 4.2 DEFINING THE CRITERION: ZENO AND ARCESILAUS

Both Julia Annas and Michael Frede argue that the Stoic criterion of truth developed situationally and collaboratively in debate between the Stoa and Academy regarding the definition of the *καταληπτική φαντασία*.<sup>187</sup> Cicero depicts the exchange between Zeno and Arcesilaus regarding the Stoic definition of the criterion of truth at *Luc.* 18 and *Luc.* 76-78.<sup>188</sup> Briefly restated from the introduction, Zeno’s original definition of the criterion of truth (the *καταληπτική φαντασία*) included the following: “a presentation impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality.”<sup>189</sup> Therefore, the original conception of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* included the following three conditions: (1) it derives from an existent object or event, (2)

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<sup>186</sup> *Luc.* 77, *ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>187</sup> Julia Annas, “Stoic Epistemology,” in *Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 184-203; and Michael Frede, “Stoic Epistemology,” in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. Kiempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 295-322.

<sup>188</sup> Sextus Empiricus provides an account of Arcesilaus’ debate regarding the Stoic criterion of truth at *Math.* 7.150-158.

<sup>189</sup> *Luc.* 77, *ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum* (trans. Rackham).

it accurately represents the object or event, and (3) it is stamped and molded on the mind according to the object or event.<sup>190</sup> Therefore, Zeno’s original definition of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth accounts for the process of *φαντασία*, *συγκατάθεσις*, and *κατάληψις* outlined in the previous section. However, Cicero reports that Arcesilaus objected to Zeno’s definition and inquired whether the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could be supported “even if a true presentation was of exactly the same form as a false one”.<sup>191</sup> Arcesilaus’ objection may seem harmless upon initial inspection; however Arcesilaus actually was attacking central components of the Stoic physical theory, *ἐνάργεια* and the theory of the identity of indistinguishables.<sup>192</sup>

#### 4.2.1 The Problems of *ἐνάργεια* and *ιδιώματα*

Apparently, Arcesilaus understood the implications of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* and the process involved with *φαντασία*, *συγκατάθεσις*, and *κατάληψις*, and chose to address his attention on Zeno’s notion of the *ἐνάργεια*, as a clear and self-evident feature of an object which had previously been argued as an indefinable concept. In his evaluation of the Stoic conception of clear and distinct impressions, Michael Frede examines the role and significance of clear and distinct impressions in the development

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<sup>190</sup> See: R. James. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. Brad Inwood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 61. Hankinson argues that the *καταληπτική φαντασία* serves as the central doctrine and process of Stoic epistemology.

<sup>191</sup> *Luc. 77, etiamne si eiusdem modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>192</sup> Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.248-252.



of Stoic epistemology.<sup>193</sup> Frede confirms that clear and distinct impressions factored in primarily in the Stoic definition of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth, the Stoic theory of the identity of indistinguishables, and the process in which a presentation (*φαντασία*) exhibits a unique distinguishing mark (*ἐνάργεια*) that is causally and relationally correspondent with an object in reality, and hold unique particular properties themselves which differentiate them from non-cognitive impressions.<sup>194</sup> Thus, Frede argues, the Stoics elaborate criterion of truth relied heavily upon the self-evident, clear, and distinct features (*ἐνάργεια*) of the *καταληπτική φαντασία*. In other words, according to the theory of the identity of indistinguishables, no two objects could be exactly identical, and some identifying feature (*ἐνάργεια*) would always account for an objects' unique identity.

While the Epicureans based the truth of all sense impressions upon Democritean atomic theory, the Stoics relied upon the clear and distinct *ἐνάργεια* to account for the identity of indistinguishables and the *καταληπτική φαντασία*. Arcesilaus, being motivated by intellectual curiosity and considering his role of *scholarch* of the Academy as the inheritor and reformer of the Socratic *elenchus*, chose to engage Zeno dialectically

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<sup>193</sup> Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions," in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Michael Frede (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 151-176.

<sup>194</sup> See: Julia Annas, "Truth and Knowledge," in *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, eds. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 84-104. Annas discusses two interpretations of coherence and correspondence in the definition of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the Stoic criterion of truth within the context as the Stoic's central epistemological doctrine. She further discusses two senses in which the Stoics referred to Truth and The True and connects these senses to the coherence and correspondence interpretations in order to explain why the Stoics define the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth.

on this point.<sup>195</sup> Arcesilaus' objection, whether the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could be supported "even if a true presentation was of exactly the same form as a false one" demonstrates that he did not buy in to Zeno's *ἐνάργεια* theory.<sup>196</sup> Perhaps *ἐνάργεια* was an easy dialectical target for Arcesilaus, since it was the one concept left unsupported and indefinable within the Stoic's elaborate criterion of truth. Similarly, as a good dialectician, Arcesilaus sized-up his competition and understood the Stoic obsession with coherence.<sup>197</sup> Certainly, an unsupported concept within such an elaborate system would not do. In either case, Cicero insists, Arcesilaus was motivated by a sincere and genuine desire for the discovery of truth, and not just for the pursuit of dialectical glory.<sup>198</sup> While Zeno probably was not overwhelmed by Arcesilaus' dialectical objections (indeed Zeno being Arcesilaus' elder by ten years and both having shared the same dialectical instructor, the Platonist - Polemo) it is not unreasonable to suspect that Zeno would have received Arcesilaus' objections as a gesture to articulate (*via* dialectical exchange) the Stoic criterion of truth as the *καταληπτική φαντασία*.<sup>199</sup> Indeed, Arcesilaus' criticism surfaced a genuine concern within the stoic criterion of truth that pressed for articulation of what, exactly, could count as *ἐνάργεια*. What, after all, is

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<sup>195</sup> Cicero reviews Arcesilaus' revival of the Socratic *elenchus* at *Fin.* 2.1-3. Also, see the following depictions of Arcesilaus' Socratic reforms at: John Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy, 347-274 BC.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) 234-238; J. Cooper, "Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic," in *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy*, J. Cooper (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004) 81-103; Robert Gorman, *The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of Cicero*, 14-33; and Harold Thorsud, *Ancient Scepticism*, 36-58.

<sup>196</sup> *Luc.* 77.

<sup>197</sup> Consider my previous argument regarding the second condition of the criterion of truth in Chapter 3, p. 71-72, and the Stoic's exacting attention to developing coherent theories.

<sup>198</sup> *Luc.* 76-77.

<sup>199</sup> *Acad.* 1.35.

so distinct about a presentation (*φαντασία*) that instantly lends to the truth of the presentation? Could it not also be the case that one could receive a presentation (*φαντασία*) from an object that turns out to be false or non-existent?<sup>200</sup>

Cicero supports this conjecture as well, for at *Luc. 77* Cicero reports Zeno's reply. Zeno conceded to Arcesilaus' objection and agreed that the definition of the criterion of truth needed to include a disclaimer that accounted for the veracity of the *καταληπτική φαντασία*. In order for the *καταληπτική φαντασία* to qualify as a criterion of truth, it had to provide certainty and account for the truth (or falsehood) of the presentation (*φαντασία*) in every instance of perception. Thus, if the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could not deliver on these conditions, then there could be no guarantee that any perception could qualify as being trustworthy.<sup>201</sup> In other words, anything less than one-hundred percent accuracy would not do. Therefore, Zeno offered to adjust the original definition of the criterion of truth by adding another condition to the original definition. Cicero presents Zeno's modified definition of the criterion of truth at *Luc. 18* as:

...visum igitur impressum effectumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset.<sup>202</sup>

...a presentation impressed and moulded from the object from which it came in a form such as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did come from. (trans. Rackham)

Thus, the upgraded definition retained all of the features of the original definition (i.e., "a presentation impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its

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<sup>200</sup> Consider cases of hallucination.

<sup>201</sup> *Luc. 77*.

<sup>202</sup> *Luc. 18*.

reality”); however, with the additional qualifier that it is to come in a form “such as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did come from.” Therefore, Zeno’s reformulation of the definition reaffirmed the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth and the process of *φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις,* and *κατάληψις*. Also retained was the status of *ἐνάργεια*, making its debut as an official part of the definition of the criterion of truth. Sextus also accounts for Zeno’s reformulated version of the definition of the criterion of truth at *Math.* 7.248. Sextus reports:

καταληπτικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος· ἄκρως γὰρ ποιούμενοι ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τήνδε τὴν φαντασίαν, καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς ἰδιώματα ἀναμεμαγμένην, ἕκαστον τούτων φασὶν ἔχειν συμβεβηκός.<sup>203</sup>

An apprehensive presentation is one caused by an existing object and imagined and stamped in the subject in accordance with that existing object, of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object. For as they [Stoics] deem that this presentation is eminently perceptive of real objects and reproduces with artistic precision all their characteristics, they declare that it possesses each one of these as an attribute. (trans. Bury)

Sextus’ depiction is strikingly consistent with that of Cicero; however, Sextus provides additional insight to the notion of *ἐνάργεια*. While conspicuously absent from Sextus’ account is the actual word *ἐνάργεια*, Sextus provides the word *ἰδιώματα* to represent the Stoic’s notion of the precise distinguishing characteristics which qualify the truth of the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*. Similarly, according to Sextus, only true presentations possess a particular *ἰδιώμα* that distinguish them from false presentations. In both

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<sup>203</sup> *Math.* 7.248.

accounts from Cicero and Sextus, Zeno's new definition notes the distinction between presentations that occur from real existing objects, from presentations that come from non-existing objects, and qualifies only those presentations that come from existing objects as true (e.g., to prevent against cases of hallucination). However, Cicero's interpretation of Zeno's upgraded definition is more inclusive, since it accounts for distinguishing between both incidents of hallucination and incidents of mistaken identity. Specifically, Cicero's account reports that the *καταληπτική φαντασία* must be causally produced from the intended object. Cicero's phrase, "in a form such as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did come from" can include numerous instances of misperception (e.g., cases of mistaken identity (twins), mistaken perceptions (observing a coil of rope and mistaking it for a snake), and hallucinations).<sup>204</sup> Thus, in Cicero's account, Zeno's addition specifies that the perception must come from a *real* existing object and that the perception be causally produced from the *right* object. However, Sextus' account is not as specific. Sextus only specifies that the perception must come from a *real existing object* and mentions nothing about other possibilities of mistaken perception.<sup>205</sup> Therefore, in either case, Zeno specified that the *καταληπτική φαντασία* must be causally produced from a real existing object and that real existing objects possess particular characteristics (*ιδιώματα*) which distinguish them from non-existing objects.

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<sup>204</sup> *Luc. 18, ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset* (trans. Rackham). The example of the coil of rope is illustrated at *Sext. Emp. Math. 7.187-188*.

<sup>205</sup> *Math. 7.248*.

Furthermore, Cicero represents Arcesilaus' response to Zeno's upgraded definition. At *Luc.* 77-78, Cicero reports the following:

Recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum, neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum si esset tale quale vel falsum; incubuit autem in eas disputationes ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. Haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit.<sup>206</sup>

Arcesilas agreed that this addition to the definition was correct, for it was impossible to perceive either a false presentation or a true one if a true one had such a character as even a false one might have; but he pressed the points at issue further in order to show that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form. This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day. (trans. Rackham)

Therefore, Arcesilaus agreed with Zeno (theoretically) that true presentations *should* characteristically be distinct from false presentations. Indeed, Cicero reports at *Luc.* 66 that Arcesilaus' agreement with Zeno also safeguarded against the possibility of accidentally assenting to mistaken presentations. Cicero reports:

...sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre – nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione quam habeamus de gravitate sapientis errore, levitate, temeritate diiunctus.<sup>207</sup>

...the strongest point of the wise man, in the opinion of Arcesilaus, agreeing with Zeno, lies in avoiding being taken in and in seeing that he is not deceived – for nothing is more removed from the conception that we have of the dignity of the wise man than error, frivolity or rashness. (trans. Rackham)

However, at this point the argument took a completely different turn. Arcesilaus, although having agreed with Zeno that the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* should (theoretically) possess distinguishing characteristics (*ιδιώματα*) that guarantee truth, attacked the practical notion that true presentations *actually* possess any distinguishing

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<sup>206</sup> *Luc.* 77-78.

<sup>207</sup> *Luc.* 66.

characteristics (*ιδιώματα*) that trigger their assent as a true presentation. In other words, Arcesilaus agreed with Zeno that, in order for his elaborate criterion of truth to work, the *καταληπτική φαντασία* must possess *ἐνάργεια* and *ιδιώματα* to qualify the truth of the presentation. However, Arcesilaus continued, no such *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα* exist.<sup>208</sup> Sextus Empiricus reports this line of argument at *Math.* 7.250-252 as follows:

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεςφραγισμένην τυγχάνειν, ἵνα πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ ιδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν ἀναμάττηται. ὡς γὰρ οἱ γλυγεῖς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι συμβάλλουσι τῶν τελουμένων, καὶ ὄν τρόπον αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγίδες αἰεὶ πάντας ἐπ' ἀκριβῆς τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐναπομάττονται τῷ κηρῷ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ κατάληψιν ποιούμενοι τῶν ὑποκειμένων πᾶσιν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς ιδιώμασιν αὐτῶν ἐπιβάλλειν. τὸ δὲ “οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος” προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασιν κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα εὐρεθήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ φασιν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπόψει τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορᾶ, ἐπεὶπερ καὶ εἶχέ τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἢ τοιαύτη φαντασία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας φαντασίας καθάπερ οἱ κεράσται παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τὸναντίον φασὶ δύνασθαι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀπαράλλακτον εὐρεθήσεσθαι ψεῦδος.<sup>209</sup>

Moreover, it must also be imaged and stamped in the subject, in order that all the characteristics of the presented objects may be reproduced with artistic exactitude. For just as carvers set their hands to all the parts of the works they are completing, and as the seals on rings always imprint all their markings exactly on the wax, so likewise those who experience apprehension of real objects ought to perceive all their characteristics. And they [the Stoics] added the clause “of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object” because the Academics did not, like the Stoics, suppose it to be impossible that a presentation exactly similar in all respects should be found. For the Stoics assert that he who has the apprehensive presentation discerns with artistic exactitude the difference subsisting in the objects, since a presentation of that kind is compared with all other presentations has a special characteristic of its own, like the horned serpents as compared with all other serpents; but the Academics assert on the contrary that

<sup>208</sup> *Luc.* 36, 71, 84, 101, 103, 107, 108, 111.

<sup>209</sup> *Math.* 7.250-252.

a false one exactly similar to the apprehensive presentation can be found. (trans. Bury)

Thus, Arcesilaus' objection (and indeed all successive Academic objections) primarily addressed the role of *ἐνάργεια* and *ιδιώματα*, maintaining that there was no such mark to distinguish a true presentation from a false one.<sup>210</sup> While the Stoics maintained that the *καταληπτική φαντασία* contained particular *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα* which set them apart from non-existent presentations, the Academics maintained (through thought experiment) that in each case presented by the Stoics of a unique, clear, and distinct presentation (presumably with *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα*) that an equally convincing presentation of the same kind from a non-existent or mistaken object could be perceived as well.<sup>211</sup> Likewise, Eusebius reports (according to Numenius), that Arcesilaus argued against Zeno's formulation of the *καταληπτική φαντασία*, as the primary concern of the criterion of truth. Eusebius reports:

τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο αὐτοῦ πρώτου εὐρομένου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα βλέπων εὐδοκιμοῦν ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις, τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, πάση μηχανῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐπ' αὐτήν.<sup>212</sup>

Zeno was the first inventor of the following doctrine, and as he, Arcesilaus, saw that both itself and its name were famous at Athens, I mean the *conceptual presentation*, he employed every device against it. (trans. Gifford)

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<sup>210</sup> *Luc.* 84,103.

<sup>211</sup> I shall not, in this thesis, provide a full examination of all of the Academic arguments which present cases of mistaken presentations. Indeed, to do so is beyond the scope of this thesis. However Cicero reports all of the cases at *Luc.* 40-60. Since I am taking a problems approach to the nature of the debate regarding the criterion of truth, I shall examine the outcomes of the Academic objections and their implications in the debate.

<sup>212</sup> Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel*. trans. Edwin Hamilton Gifford. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1903. Reprint, Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1981), 14.6.12-13. = Numenius, *Fragments*. Texte Etabli et Traduit par Edouard Des Places. Collection Des Universites De France publiee sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Bude. (Paris: Societe d'Edition Les Belles Lettres, 1973), fr. 25.137-140.



Thus, the Academics argue, since there is no way to distinguish between a true presentation and a false one (according to the Stoics), the *καταληπτική φαντασία* cannot serve as the criterion of truth. However, the Stoics maintained that the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could work as a criterion of truth as long as the perceiver could reasonably justify the presentation as being caused in the right way and as long as the perceiver of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could identify it as such.<sup>213</sup> Thus, in response to Academic objections, the Stoics later added another revision to the criterion of truth. While the Stoics agreed that, on occasion, obstacles could interfere with assenting to the *ἐνάργεια* and *ιδιώματα* of a perception, this does not eliminate the overall applicability of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth.<sup>214</sup> As long as a presentation did not have an obstacle (*ἔνσθημα*) that interfered with the presentation being transmitted and assented, then the *καταληπτική φαντασία* could still serve as a reliable criterion.<sup>215</sup> Sextus reports the addition of the no “obstacle” (*ἔνσθημα*) revision at *Math.* 7.253-257, noting that the later stoics (i.e., the generation of Stoics immediately following Zeno) did not consider the *καταληπτική φαντασία* alone adequate to serve as the criterion of truth, but rather, only when the *καταληπτική φαντασία* was present with no *ἔνσθημα*. Sextus notes:

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<sup>213</sup> Annas, *Stoic Epistemology*, 200-202.

<sup>214</sup> R. James Hankinson, “Natural Criteria and the Transparency of Judgement: Antiochus, Philo and Galen on Epistemological Justification,” in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 169.

<sup>215</sup> Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 128-129.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν στωικῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα.<sup>216</sup>

But whereas the older Stoics declare that this apprehensive presentation is the criterion of truth, the later Stoics added the clause “provided that is has no obstacle.” (trans. Bury)

Therefore, the later Stoics claim, if one could demonstrate and justify that he were correctly perceiving a presentation without an obstacle (ἔνστημα) or interference with the proper transmission of the clear and distinct ἐνάργεια and ιδιώματα of a presentation, then the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία could still be reliable as a criterion of truth. Thus, the later Stoics maintained that the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία still qualified as the criterion of truth as long as it had no ἔνστημα (ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνστημα).<sup>217</sup> However, this last attempt to regain the ἐνάργεια and ιδιώματα of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία as the criterion of truth, again, proved to be problematic for the Stoics. In response to the no ἔνστημα addition of the criterion of truth, the Academy prepared a fully-articulated argument against the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία. In the following section, I shall review Cicero's depiction of the Academic core argument against the Stoic criterion of truth (as presented in the *Academica*) and the problem of the role of assent (συγκατάθεσις).

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<sup>216</sup> *Math.* 7.253. cf. Plutarch, “On Stoic Self-Contradictions (*De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*),” in *Plutarch's Moralia*. In Seventeen Volumes, Volume XIII, Part II. trans. Harold Cherniss. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1056 e-f.

<sup>217</sup> *Math.* 7.256.

### 4.3 THE ACADEMIC ARGUMENT AND THE ROLE OF ASSENT

Cicero presents the Academic core argument as part of Lucullus' speech at *Luc.*

40-42. The passage in which Cicero reports the Academic core argument is rather lengthy; however, since it will be necessary to argue about the details of Cicero's interpretation, it is necessary to quote the passage in its entirety. Cicero states:

Componunt igitur primum artem quandam de iis quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt, in his quale sit id quod percipi et comprehendere possit, totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo quae quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non percipi; nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positus unius argumenti conclusione tota ab iis causa comprehenditur; composita autem ea conclusio sic est: 'Eorum quae videntur alia vera sunt, alia falsa; et quod falsum est id percipi non potest. Quod autem verum visum est omne tale est ut eiusdem modi falsum etiam possit videri; et quae visa sunt eius modi ut in iis nihil intersit, non potest accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae autem sumunt ut concludant id quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant concedi, neque enim quisquam repugnat: ea sunt haec, quae visa falsa sint, ea percipi non posse, et alterum, inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis non posse alia talia esse ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint. Reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum, quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa, alterum, omne visum quod sit a vero tale esse quale etiam a falso possit esse. Haec duo proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant ut non mediocrem curam adhibeant et diligentiam; dividunt enim in partes, et eas quidem magnas, primum in sensus, deinde in ea quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt, tum perveniunt ad eam partem ut ne ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa concidunt etiam minutius; ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis, item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt, volunt efficere iis omnibus quae visa sint veris adiuncta esse falsa quae a veris nihil differant; ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendere.<sup>218</sup>

Well, they begin by constructing a 'science of presentations' (as we render the term), and define their nature and classes, and in particular the nature of that which can be perceived and grasped, at as great a length as do the Stoics. Then they set out the two propositions that 'hold together' the whole of this investigation, (1) when certain objects present an appearance of such a kind that

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<sup>218</sup> *Luc.* 40-42. For a further account of the Academic "science of the senses," see: Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.174-189.

other objects also could present the same appearance without there being any difference between these presentations, it is impossible that the one set of objects should be capable of being perceived and the other set not capable; but (2), not only in a case in which they are alike in every particular is there no difference between them, but also in a case in which they cannot be distinguished apart. Having set out these propositions, they include the whole issue within a single syllogistic argument; this argument is constructed as follows: ‘Some presentations are true, others false; and what is false cannot be perceived. But a true presentation is invariably of such a sort that a false presentation also could be of exactly the same sort; and among presentations of such a sort that there is no difference between them, it cannot occur that some are capable of being perceived and others are not. Therefore there is no presentation that is capable of being perceived.’ Now of the propositions that they take as premisses from which to infer the desired conclusion, two they assume to be granted, and indeed nobody disputes them: these are, that false presentations cannot be perceived, and the second, that of presentations that have no difference between them it is impossible that some should be such as to be capable of being perceived and others such as to be incapable. But the remaining premisses they defend with a long and varied discourse, these also being two, one, that of the objects of presentations some are true, others false, and the other, that every presentation arising from a true object is of such a nature that it could also arise from a false object. These two propositions they do not skim over, but develop with a considerable application of care and industry; they divide them into sections, and those of wide extent: first, sensations; next, inferences from sensations and from general experience, which they deem to lack clarity; then they come to the section providing the impossibility of perceiving anything even by means of reasoning and inference. These general propositions they cut up into still smaller divisions, employing the same method with all the other topics as you saw in yesterday’s discourse that they do with sensation, and aiming at proving in the case of each subject, minutely subdivided, that all true presentations are coupled with false ones in no way differing from the true, and that this being the nature of sense-presentations, to comprehend them is impossible. (trans. Rackham)

Cicero is, no doubt, condensing a lot of information in this passage. However, his analysis concisely presents the Academic position against the Stoic criterion of truth. In the opening of this passage, Cicero notes that the Academics have developed a method of examining cases of perception.<sup>219</sup> Likewise, through their examination of problematic cases of perception, the Academics present two propositions that address problems

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<sup>219</sup> See also: Plutarch, “Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions (De Communibus Notitiis Adversus Stoicos),” in *Plutarch’s Moralia*. In Seventeen Volumes, Volume XIII, Part II. trans. Harold Cherniss. The Loeb Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1059 b-c.

discerning between true and false presentations. The first proposition (*Prop<sup>1</sup>*) concerns instances of identical presentations; namely, in the instance of two identical presentations in which there is no way to distinguish between one being perceived and the other one not. That is, since it is likely to mistake one identical presentation for the other, one cannot discern one from the other. Likewise, the second proposition (*Prop<sup>2</sup>*) concerns instances of indistinguishable presentations and concludes that in such cases there is also no way to discern the presentation.

Next, Cicero launches into the Academic argument. The argument begins by noting that some presentations are true, while other presentations are false. Then, Cicero reports the next premise that false presentations cannot be perceived. However, as Cicero presents, true presentations cannot be distinguished from false ones (consider *Prop<sup>1</sup>* and *Prop<sup>2</sup>* stated previously). Therefore, the Academics conclude, there is no presentation that is capable of being perceived. Schematically, the Academic argument can be presented by the following categorical syllogism:

- (P1) Some presentations are true, while some presentations are false.
- (P2) False presentations cannot be perceived.
- But* (P3) True presentations could be exactly the same as false ones,
- And* (P4) In cases of indistinguishable perceptions, it cannot occur that some perceptions are capable of being perceived while some are not.

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Therefore: There is no presentation that is capable of being perceived.

Cicero then unpacks the argument by evaluating two sets of additional propositions which are assumed in the argument. In his interpretation, Cicero claims that first set of two propositions is non-controversial, while the second set is contested. The first non-controversial proposition (*NC<sup>1</sup>*) maintains that false presentations cannot be perceived.

Indeed, this proposition is explicitly stated in premise two (P2) of the argument. The second non-controversial proposition (*NC*<sup>2</sup>) maintains that, in the case of indistinguishable presentations that have no differences between them, there is no way to distinguish between those which should be perceived and others which should not be perceived. Specifically, this proposition is stated in premise four (P4) of the Academic argument. However, Cicero notes, two other propositions are held by the Academy which are contested. Cicero reports that, according to the first contested proposition (*Cont*<sup>1</sup>), the objects of presentations can be either true or false; while, according to the second contested proposition (*Cont*<sup>2</sup>), presentations caused by a true object could also be caused by a false object. While first set of non-controversial propositions (*NC*<sup>1</sup> and *NC*<sup>2</sup>) relate to presentations, the second set (*Cont*<sup>1</sup> and *Cont*<sup>2</sup>) concerns the objects of the presentations themselves. That is, the second set of propositions makes claims about reality, what is *really out there*. Therefore, according to Cicero's depiction, the controversial move in the Academic argument concerned the objective quality of the presentation which led to the Academic conclusion that nothing can be perceived. Cicero revisits this line of reasoning at *Luc.* 83, where he presents the core Academic argument as follows:

Quattor sunt capita quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci percipi comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est: e quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium inter quae visa nihil intersit fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu profectum cui non adpositum sit visum aliud quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit.<sup>220</sup>

There are four heads of argument intended to prove that there is nothing that can be known, perceived or comprehended, which is the subject of all this debate: the first of these arguments is that there is such a thing as a false presentation; the

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<sup>220</sup> *Luc.* 83.

second, that a false presentation cannot be perceived; the third, that of presentations between which there is no difference it is impossible for some to be able to be perceived and others not; the fourth, that there is no true presentation originating from sensation with which there is not ranged another presentation that precisely corresponds to it and that cannot be perceived. (trans. Rackham)

This passage needs a little clarification. Since, according to Cicero's account, the Academics claim that true presentations are non-distinguishable from false ones (i.e. no *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα* which set them apart), then it is not possible to comprehend them (i.e. no process of *συγκατάθεσις* (*adsensio*) – assent). That is, according to the Stoic theory of perception, the distinguishing mark of a perception (the *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα*) triggers the mind to assent (*συγκατάθεσις*) to the perception. However, the Academics argue, since there is no *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα*, then likewise there is no *συγκατάθεσις*. Therefore, the Academic argument removes the cognitive component from the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>221</sup> Likewise, since presentations cannot be assented by the mind, they also cannot be grasped by the mind (*κατάληψις* (*comprehensio*)). Thus, without a mentally grasped presentation (*καταληπτική φαντασία*), the Stoic criterion of truth fails. Sextus Empiricus confirms Arcesilaus' argument at *Math.* 154-156 as follows:

εἶπερ τε ἡ κατάληψις καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις ἐστίν, ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἡ συγκατάθεσις οὐ πρὸς φαντασίαν γίνεται ἀλλὰ πρὸς λόγον (τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωματῶν εἰσὶν αἱ συγκαταθέσεις), δεύτερον ὅτι οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθῆς φαντασία εὗρίσκεται οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς, ὡς διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων παρίσταται. μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις

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<sup>221</sup> See: Malcolm Schofield, "Academic Epistemology," in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. Kiempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 323-351.

γενήσεται ἢν γὰρ κατακηπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις. μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντ' ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα. πάντων δὲ ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων ἀκολουθήσει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς ἐπέχειν τὸν σοφόν.<sup>222</sup>

And if apprehension is in fact assent to an apprehensive presentation, it is non-existent – firstly, because assent is not relative to presentation but to reason (for assents are given to judgements), and secondly, because no true presentation is found to be of such a kind as to be incapable of proving false, as is shown by many and various instances. But if the apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither will apprehension come into existence, for it was assent to an apprehensive presentation. And if apprehension does not exist, all things will be non-apprehensible. And if all things are non-apprehensible, it will follow, even according to the Stoics, that the wise man suspends judgement. (trans. Bury)

Therefore, in response to this line of reasoning, the Academics claim that while presentations cannot be assented or grasped by the mind, the logical outcome is to withhold assent (*ἐποχή*) of all presentations.<sup>223</sup> Indeed, since the Academics were in the business of avoiding error (Chapter 1), giving assent to false impressions would present a gross negligence of discernment. At *Luc.* 68, Cicero warns of the dangers of assent:

...quam ob rem, cum tam vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet si temere processerit...<sup>224</sup>

...to give assent to anything that is either false or unknown is so serious a fault, preferably all assent is to be withheld, to avoid having a serious fall if one goes forward rashly... (trans. Rackham)

Both Cicero and Sextus depict the Academy as framing *ἐποχή* within the context of the logical outcomes of the Stoic criterion of truth. However, what is not precisely clear is how *ἐποχή* was to be considered amongst the members of the Academy. For example,

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<sup>222</sup> *Math.* 7.154-156.

<sup>223</sup> *Luc.* 59, 68. *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.154-156.

<sup>224</sup> *Luc.* 68.



was ἐποχή the official position of the Academy, or was it a dialectical outcome that the Academy presented to the Stoa, thus, demonstrating the objectionable outcomes of their criterion of truth? As it turns out, contradictory interpretations emerge from both accounts. At *Acad.* 1.44-46, Cicero claims that Arcesilaus engaged in debate with Zeno because he was motivated by a predisposition to ἀκαταληψία, namely the notion that nothing was graspable. Cicero elaborates how Arcesilaus had been influenced by the arguments of Socrates and the pre-Socratics (scil. Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles) who maintained that truth was an elusive object of pursuit and that the senses are an inadequate aid for the discovery of truth. In fact, Cicero reports that Arcesilaus, as a Socratic revivalist, went one step beyond Socrates' admission of ignorance, noting:

Itaque arcesilaus negebat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset...<sup>225</sup>

Accordingly Arcesilaus said that there is nothing that can be known, not even that residuum of knowledge that Socrates had left himself... (trans. Rackham)

In other words, while Socrates claimed that the only thing that he knew was that he knew nothing, Arcesilaus was willing to state that he himself did not even know that. Indeed, Cicero's account at *Acad.* 1.44-46 depicts a very bleak and dismal portrayal of Arcesilaus' motivations; concluding that knowledge lays hidden in obscurity. Thus, Cicero claims, the outcome of Arcesilaus' dialectical method of *ratio contra omnia disserendi* presented equally weighty reasons on both side of an issue, not to provide honest and equally balanced accounts to promote the discovery of truth, but to achieve the outcome of ἐποχή.<sup>226</sup> Indeed Cicero's depiction of Arcesilaus' motivation in the

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<sup>225</sup> *Acad.* 1.45.

<sup>226</sup> See also: Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1120 c. cf. Euseb. *Praep evang.* 14.4.

*Acad.* is considerably different than the account in the *Luc.*, which presents Arcesilaus engaging in dialectical exchange with Zeno in order to promote the discovery of truth.<sup>227</sup> Likewise, reconsider Cicero's own admission in *Luc.* 66, swearing an oath to Jove and his household gods, that he is personally motivated by the discovery of truth. No doubt, Cicero's account at *Acad.* 1.44-46 is very puzzling indeed, since it appears to be inconsistent with his own account in the *Luc.*, and inconsistent with his own personal interpretation of Academic philosophy.

Likewise, Sextus Empiricus presents a widely different picture of Arcesilaus' motivations at *Math.* 7.157-158. Instead of depicting ἐποχή as the final Academic outcome against the Stoic criterion of truth, Sextus argues that Arcesilaus offered a counter-criterion to the Stoic καταληπτική φαντασία. While arriving at the same conclusion as Cicero's interpretation (i.e., that one must withhold assent - ἐποχή), Sextus reports that Arcesilaus continued that one must still operate according to a practical criterion of "the reasonable" (το εὔλογον). Sextus provides the following account:

τὸ δὲ ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐπέχειν· ἐφέξει ἄρα περὶ πάντων ὁ σοφός. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν, ἥτις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαί, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρτημένην ἔκει τὴν πίσιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κείσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατορθῶμα εἶναι ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> *Luc.* 60, 76-77.

<sup>228</sup> *Math.* 157-158.

But to refuse assent is nothing else than to suspend judgment; therefore the wise man will in all cases suspend judgment. But inasmuch as it was necessary, in the next place, to investigate also the conduct of life, which cannot naturally, be directed without a criterion, upon which happiness – that is, the end of life – depends for its assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgement about everything will regulate his inclinations and aversions and his actions in general by the rule of “the reasonable,” and by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom consists in right actions, and the right action is that which, when performed, possesses a reasonable justification. He, therefore, who attends to “the reasonable” will act rightly and be happy. (trans. Bury)

Therefore, Arcesilaus concedes that withholding assent (*ἐποχή*) is not a position of the Academy, but rather, demonstrates dialectically the unpalatable outcome of the exacting requirements of the Stoic criterion of truth. However, Arcesilaus presents the rule of the reasonable (*το εὔλογον*) as a disclaimer that one must still live his life in accordance with what appears to be reasonable. Recently, historians of philosophy have criticized both Arcesilaus and Cicero for inconsistency. For example, Casey Perin examines whether, and how, Arcesilaus can claim that one ought not to believe anything without thereby doing just what he is claiming one ought not to do, namely, believing something.<sup>229</sup> Perin argues that if Arcesilaus is committed to endorsing *ἐποχή* and *ἀκαταληψία*, as presented at *Acad.* 1.44-46, then he is disingenuously in the position of assenting to, and believing a principle in which he violates by assenting to and thus believing.<sup>230</sup> Similarly, J. Cooper raises the question regarding Cicero’s interpretation and presentation of Arcesilaus’ account.<sup>231</sup> While Cicero provides the most extensive

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<sup>229</sup> Casey Perin, “Scepticism and Belief,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 145-164.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

account of Arcesilaus' philosophy, it is also difficult to reconcile the two versions of Arcesilaus presented at *Acad.* 1.44-46 and in the *Luc.* Cooper argues that Cicero's account in *Acad.* 1.44-46 inflates the emphasis placed on Arcesilaus' reference to Socratic and pre-Socratic antecedents in his epistemological positions. Similarly, Cooper argues that Cicero's account in the *Luc.* 72-78 is a rebuttal regarding Lucullus' accusation that Arcesilaus misinterpreted the positions of ἀκαταληψία of the pre-Socratics.<sup>232</sup>

Cooper concludes that it is reasonable to doubt the accuracy of Cicero's account, arguing that Cicero is guilty of back-reading and that his account of the history of the Academy in the *Academica* is based on Philo's faulty interpretation of his sources.<sup>233</sup> Also, Cooper accuses Cicero's account of being a fabrication (either intentionally by Philo or unintentionally transmitted by Cicero) and having no evidentiary value whatsoever, both as a report on Arcesilaus and on the position of Socrates.<sup>234</sup>

Similarly, Harald Thorsrud recognizes the problems of inconsistency within Cicero's account and questions how much the doctrines of ἀκαταληψία and ἐποχή factor in to the doctrines of the Academy.<sup>235</sup> Thorsrud argues that Arcesilaus' arguments for ἀκαταληψία and ἐποχή were part of his dialectical strategy against the Stoics.<sup>236</sup> Indeed, Cicero's depiction of Arcesilaus in the *Luc.* is consistent with the account

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<sup>231</sup> J. Cooper, "Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic," in *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy*, J. Cooper (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004) 81-103.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, 91, n.17.

<sup>235</sup> Harald Thorsrud, "Arcesilaus and Carneades," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 58-80.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

presented in Sextus, as being motivated by the discovery of truth and, thus, offering a practical counter-criterion in response to the logical outcomes of ἀκαταληψία and ἐποχή. Seeking to reconcile the contradictory accounts within Cicero with that of Sextus, Thorsrud argues that Arcesilaus presented ἀκαταληψία and ἐποχή as part of his dialectical strategy with the Stoics, while adding the practical criterion of το εὔλογον in response to Stoic objections, which claimed that ἐποχή made life unlivable by eliminating activity and making virtue and happiness impossible.<sup>237</sup> I shall address Cicero's apparent inconsistency in his interpretation further in Chapter 5; however, for now I shall redirect to the next advancement in the debate on the criterion of truth.

The objection of inactivity (ἀπραξία) from the Stoics forms the basis of the following development in the debate between the Academy and the Stoa. In the next section, I shall examine the ἀπραξία objection raised by the Stoics in response to the Academy and the advancements made by Carneades in the debate regarding the criterion of truth.

#### 4.4 INACTIVITY AND PROBABILITY

Cicero presents the Stoic's response to ἐποχή at *Luc.* 31-39 and 62, noting that ἐποχή makes life unlivable. The Stoics objected that removing assent not only removed the cognitive component to the criterion of truth, but it also resulted in a life robbed of the ability to act.<sup>238</sup> Cicero's interlocutor, Lucullus, complains at *Luc.* 31 that:

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<sup>237</sup> Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism*, 50-53.

<sup>238</sup> *Luc.* 37-39.

Ergo ii qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae...<sup>239</sup>

Therefore those who assert that nothing can be grasped deprive us of these things that are the very tools or equipment of life... (trans. Rackham)

Lucullus' complaint may seem a little dramatic; however, recall that the Stoics claimed that assent (*συγκατάθεσις* - *adsensio*) provided, not only, the foundation for perception, but also the cognitive ability to form the basis of our actions. Lucullus continues:

Diende cum inter inanimatum et animal hoc maxime intersit quod animal agit aliquid (nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit), aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea quae est in nostra potestate sita reddenda adsensio. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis quos neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt; ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere...<sup>240</sup>

Again, as the greatest difference between an inanimate and an animate object is that an animate object performs action (for an entirely inactive animal is an utterly inconceivable thing), either it must be assigned a faculty of assenting as a voluntary act. But on the other hand persons who refuse to exercise either sensation or assent are in a manner robbed of the mind itself; for as the scale of a balance must necessarily sink when weights are put in it, so the mind must necessarily yield to clear presentations... (trans. Rackham)

According to Cicero's account, assent is a cognitive function in which the mind voluntarily assents to a true presentation that demonstrates clear and distinct features (*ἐνάργεια* and *ιδιώματα*). Likewise, the exercise of assent facilitates action (e.g., the decision to act morally or immorally). Thus, to remove the activity of assent is akin to removing all of an individual's cognitive abilities. Therefore, the Stoics argue, denying assent also denies action – leaving only inactivity (*ἀπραξία*). Lucullus' continues:

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<sup>239</sup> *Luc.* 31.

<sup>240</sup> *Luc.* 37-38. cf. *Plut. Adv. Col.* 1122 b-d.

Omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est eique quod visum sit adsentiat. Quare qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e vita.<sup>241</sup>

And speaking generally, before we act it is essential for us to experience some presentation, and for our assent to be given to the presentation; therefore one who abolishes either presentation or assent abolishes all action out of life. (trans. Rackham)

Cicero's report of the ἀπραξία objection depicts the Stoic's agenda to move the focus of the debate on the criterion of truth away from the definition of the καταληπτική φαντασία, and become fully engaged in the dialectical give-and-take with the Academy. Instead of offering yet another revision of the καταληπτική φαντασία and a reiteration of the criterion of truth, the Stoa opted to criticize the objectionable and contradictory outcomes of ἐποχή (just as the Academy had criticized the objectionable outcomes of the Stoic καταληπτική φαντασία in the first place).<sup>242</sup> Thus, the ἀπραξία objection advanced the Stoics' intention to turn the dialectical tables against the Academy by using their own strategy against them.<sup>243</sup> Similarly, Katja Maria Vogt argues that the ἀπραξία objection is a uniquely Stoic invention against the Academy and is, arguably, the best-known anti-skeptical argument from Antiquity.<sup>244</sup> Indeed, Augustine's reply to

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<sup>241</sup> *Luc.* 39.

<sup>242</sup> See: Plut. *Stoic. rep.* 1056 e – 1057 c.

<sup>243</sup> See: Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1122 a-b.

<sup>244</sup> Katja Maria Vogt, "Scepticism and Action," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*, ed. Richard Bett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)165-180.

Academic philosophy in his *Contra academicos* employs a version of the ἀπραξία objection to demonstrate that withholding assent renders life unlivable.<sup>245</sup>

In fact, the Stoic ἀπραξία objection was such a successful dialectical strategy against the ἐποχή of the Academy, that it affected the following course of development of the debate on the criterion of truth between the schools. For example, instead of redirecting the debate back to the definition of the Stoic criterion of truth (the καταληπτική φαντασία) or denying the Stoics objection as a misinterpretation of the Academic position on ἐποχή, the Academy chose to reply to the arguments, like those of Lucullus, which claim that “by doing away with assent they have done away with all movement of the mind and also all physical activity.”<sup>246</sup> In fact, considering Arcesilaus’ το εὔλογον as a proposed response to the ἀπραξία objection offers a reasonable explanation for the inconsistency within Cicero’s accounts and with that of Sextus. For example, in an attempt to reconcile the inconsistent accounts of Arcesilaus views, Thorsrud considers both the dialectical interpretation of Arcesilaus’ position of ἐποχή along with the positive endorsement of το εὔλογον as representing different phases of

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<sup>245</sup> *C. acad.* 2.11-28, 3.33-36. Also see: Christopher Kirwan, “Augustine against the Skeptics,” in *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983) 205-223; Augustine J. Curley, *Augustine’s Critique of Skepticism: A Study of Contra Academicos*. Studies in the Humanities; Literature-Politics-Society, ed. Guy Mermier, vol. 14. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1996) 80-91, 120-121; Gareth B. Matthews, “Knowledge and Illumination,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 171-185; and Gerard O’Daly, “The Response to Skepticism and the Mechanisms of Cognition,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 159-170.

<sup>246</sup> *Luc.* 62, *sublata enim adsensione omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt* (trans. Rackham).



Arcesilaus' debate with the Stoics.<sup>247</sup> Thorsrud argues that Arcesilaus' position of *ἐποχή* was a dialectical strategy against the Stoic criterion of truth, while proposing *το εὔλογον* as an attempt to respond to the *ἀπραξία* objection, thus, implying that action is still possible even without assent.<sup>248</sup> Likewise, in a similar attempt to account for Arcesilaus' inconsistent claims, Perin conjectures that Arcesilaus proposed *το εὔλογον* as a version of weak assent in response to the *ἀπραξία* objection.<sup>249</sup> Whichever interpretation of Arcesilaus' views is correct, one thing is clear; when evaluating the replies of the Academy after Arcesilaus, the position of the Academy was developed in direct opposition to the Stoic *ἀπραξία* objection.<sup>250</sup>

Similarly, Cicero records Carneades' response to the *ἀπραξία* objection at *Luc.* 32-36, 59, 67, 78, and 112. Cicero reports at *Acad.* 1.46 and *Luc.* 59 that Carneades advanced the same arguments against the Stoic criterion of truth as had Arcesilaus. Briefly stated, this means that Carneades objected to the Stoic's claims of *ἐνάργεια* and *ιδιώματα*, and presented the position of *ἐποχή* as the dialectical outcome of the Stoic

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<sup>247</sup> Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism*, 52-58.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, 56-58.

<sup>249</sup> Perin, *Scepticism and Belief*, 145-150.

<sup>250</sup> See: Gisela Striker, "On the Difference Between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics," in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, ed. Gisela Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 135-149; and Gisela Striker "Academics versus Pyrrhonists, reconsidered," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 195-207. Striker argues in both papers that the Academy's positions on *ἀκαταληψία*, *ἐποχή*, and the respective replies to the *ἀπραξία* objection define their epistemological views.

criterion of truth in absence of assent (*συγκατάθεσις*).<sup>251</sup> In fact, Cicero claims that Carneades advanced the academic core argument against the Stoic criterion of truth and the position of *ἐποχή* even more aggressively than had Arcesilaus.<sup>252</sup> However, Cicero later states that Carneades presented the practical criterion of “the probable” (*πιθανόν* - *probabile*) in response to the *ἀπραξία* objection of the Stoics.<sup>253</sup> Cicero’s presents his interlocutor, Lucullus, criticism of Carneades’ *πιθανόν* as an unusable criterion when he states:

Quam ob rem sive tu probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequere, ad visum illud de quo agimus tibi erit revertendum.<sup>254</sup>

Therefore if you bring forward ‘probable presentation,’ or ‘probable and unhampered presentation,’ as Carneades held, or something else, as a guide for you to follow, you will have to come back to the sense-presentation that we are dealing with. (trans. Rackham)

According to Lucullus’ objection in *Luc.* 32-36, Carneades presented the *πιθανόν* as a response to the *ἀπραξία* objection as a regulatory practical criterion for the conduct of life. Lucullus reports:

Volunt enim (et hoc quidem vel maxime vos animadvertendam moveri) probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.7. = Numen. fr. 26.103-115, Des Places. cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.159-165.

<sup>252</sup> *Luc.* 28, 59.

<sup>253</sup> *Luc.* 32-36. cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.166-189.

<sup>254</sup> *Luc.* 33-34.

<sup>255</sup> *Luc.* 32. cf. Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.8. = Numen. fr. 27.19-37, Des Places.

For they hold (and this in fact, I noticed excites your school extremely) that something is ‘probable,’ or as it were, resembling the truth, and that this provides them with a canon of judgement both in the conduct of life and in philosophical investigation and discussion. (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, by applying *πιθανόν* as a practical criterion of truth, Carneades argued, that one is able to form opinions, therefore opening the possibility for assent.<sup>256</sup> However, Carneades’ account of *πιθανόν* as an alternate practical criterion for life raises additional interpretive concerns, similar to Arcesilaus’ endorsement of *το εὔλογον*. Specifically, while Carneades is depicted by Cicero, Sextus, and Eusebius as arguing aggressively against the Stoic criterion of truth, did he actually endorse *πιθανόν* as a view that he held himself, or did he merely present *πιθανόν* as a dialectical strategy?<sup>257</sup> Cicero addresses this controversy at *Luc.* 78, arguing that he is convinced that Carneades did not actually hold these views himself, but rather, advanced them as a dialectical strategy in his ongoing debate against the Stoics. In fact, Cicero explains that Carneades’ claim that assent is possible was actually used as another objectionable concession against the Stoic criterion of truth, for Cicero states:

Sed illud primum, sapientem si ad sensurus esset etiam opiniaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et eorum ad stipulator Antiochus; posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis quae possint distinguere.<sup>258</sup>

But the major premiss, that if the wise man did assent he would also hold an opinion, both the Stoics and their supporter Antiochus declare to be false, arguing

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<sup>256</sup> *Luc.* 59, 67, 78, 112.

<sup>257</sup> James Allen, “Carneadean Argument in Cicero’s Academic Books,” in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 217-256.

<sup>258</sup> *Luc.* 67-68.

that the wise man is able to distinguish the false from the true and the imperceptible from the perceptible. (trans. Rackham)

In other words, Carneades' *πιθανόν*, as an alternate criterion, was not a noble gesture of concession, but rather, another dialectical trap set for the Stoics. According to Cicero, Carneades was willing to admit that acting on the probable (*πιθανόν*) presentation can warrant assent. However, the assent which Carneades had offered was not assent to a mentally grasped presentation (*καταληπτική φαντασία*), but only assent to opinion.<sup>259</sup> This alternative to the criterion of truth would certainly not have been well-received by the Stoics, since the wise man (*sapiens*) was supposed to assent to truth, not to mere base opinions. Likewise, Cicero argues, the Academics maintained that in order to avoid error, one should avoid giving assent to anything which is either false or unknown (*adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum*).<sup>260</sup> Thus, if Cicero's dialectical interpretation of Carneades' *πιθανόν* is accurate, then Carneades' objective was to present the unpalatable alternative to the *καταληπτική φαντασία* and perpetuate the debate on the criterion of truth with the Stoics. For example, Gisela Striker argues for a dialectical interpretation of Carneades' view on *πιθανόν* and *ἐποχή*, maintaining that Carneades endorsed *neither* of these two views himself, but rather, presented them as dialectical strategies to deduce the logical conclusions which would have been unacceptable to the Stoics.<sup>261</sup> Similarly, Myles Burnyeat argues for a similar dialectical

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<sup>259</sup> See: Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1122 e-f.

<sup>260</sup> *Luc.* 68.

<sup>261</sup> Gisela Striker, "Sceptical Strategies," in *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology*, eds. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 54-83.

interpretation.<sup>262</sup> Burnyeat offers an explanation for the inconsistent account of Carneades' views by claiming that, in the process of debate, Carneades' arguments had all served a dialectical function. They were intended to demonstrate to the Stoics that action, moral choices, and truth could still be possible even if nothing could be perceived. However, confusion and inconsistency arose when Carneades' students and interpreters each vied to preserve his "real" doctrines.<sup>263</sup>

However, other historians of philosophy have considered *πιθανόν* as a view which Carneades actually endorsed as an Academic doctrine, and have justified that Carneades allowed for a distinction between two types of assent. For example, Michael Frede, who prefers a skeptical interpretation of Carneades' *πιθανόν* argues that "the difference between classical and dogmatic skepticism lies exactly in a different attitude toward belief or assent."<sup>264</sup> Frede claims that there is a distinction between "two kinds of assent such that *having a view* involves one kind of assent, whereas, *taking a position, or making a claim*, involves a different kind of assent, namely the kind of assent a sceptic will withhold."<sup>265</sup> Frede argues that Carneades was able to consistently maintain *πιθανόν* as a form of weak assent. Endorsing a similar distinction between two types of

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<sup>262</sup> Myles Burnyeat, "Antipater and Self-Refutation: Elusive Arguments in Cicero's *Academica*," in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 277-310.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, 308.

<sup>264</sup> Michael Frede, "The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge," in *The Original Sceptics: A Controversy*, eds. Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998) 149.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, 128. The emphases in this passage are mine.

assent, Thorsrud proposes a fallibilist interpretation of Carneades' role of *πιθανόν*, restricting the scope of *ἐποχή*, and allowing for a skeptically acceptable version of assent and a practical criterion of following convincing or plausible (*πιθανόν*) presentations.<sup>266</sup> Thorsrud argues that skeptical assent preserved Carneades' consistency by "allowing him to say that it appears convincing, but not certain, that knowledge is possible."<sup>267</sup>

The final episode in the debate on the criterion of truth emerged out of the disagreement of interpretations regarding the "real views" of Carneades. While some students of Carneades were willing to accept his arguments as dialectical strategies against the Stoics, other later interpreters were willing to adjust the Academic position on the criterion of truth by arguing for a variety of assent. Thus, the debate on the criterion of truth shifted from a focus as a dialectical exchange against the Stoics, to an internal debate amongst the Academy itself. In the final section of this chapter, I shall briefly state the position of the Academy regarding the criterion of truth after Carneades and the interpretative disagreements between the successive *scholarchs* which affected Cicero's endorsement of Academic philosophy.

#### 4.5 INTERPRETING THE LEGACY OF CARNEADES

Thus far, I have presented two iterations of the debate of the criterion of truth advanced between the Academy and the Stoa. The first iteration of the debate had focused on articulating the definition of the Stoic *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth and the following dialectical exchange which ensued between the

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<sup>266</sup> Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism*, 78-83, and Thorsrud, *Arcesilaus and Carneades*, 72-78.

<sup>267</sup> Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism*, 83.

Academy and the Stoa. The second iteration of the debate emerged as the Stoa shifted the focus of the debate on the criterion of truth away from the definition of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* and redirected the Academy's own dialectical strategies against it by raising the *ἀπραξία* objection; thus, positioning the Academy into arguing for an alternative practical criterion (Arcesilaus' *το εὔλογον* and Carneades' *πιθανόν*). The third, and final, iteration of the debate on the criterion of truth involved yet another paradigm shift in the way in which the Academy interpreted and evaluated its own positions in the debate on the criterion of truth. Indeed, one of Cicero's primary goals for composing the *Academica* was to defend the position of the New Academy (Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo) against the interpretations of the Old Academy (Antiochus).<sup>268</sup> Cicero devoted the entirety of Lucullus' speech in *Acad.* 1.15-42 to a full outline of the position of Antiochus and the Old Academy regarding the *philosophandi ratio triplex*. Unfortunately, since the *Acad.* only survives in a fragmentary form (preserving most of book one and nothing else) Cicero's reply for the New Academy has not been preserved. On the other hand, several passages in the *Academica* shed light on the controversy and disagreement of interpretation between Philo and Antiochus.<sup>269</sup>

According to Cicero's account in *Luc.* 17, Philo was a pupil of Clitomachus, Carneades' successor, and he initially endorsed the dialectical interpretation of Carneades' position on the criterion of truth.<sup>270</sup> Charles Brittain argues that during this

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<sup>268</sup> Cicero explains in the dedicatory letter to book one of the *Academici Libri* (i.e. book one of the *Academica-liber primus editio secundus*) that he has scripted Varro as defending the views of Antiochus, while he himself will defend the position of Philo.

<sup>269</sup> *Acad.* 1.13-14, *Luc.* 11-12, 17-18, 69-71.

<sup>270</sup> Philodemus, "Academicorum Historia," in *Filodemo: Storia dei Filosofi [.] Platone e l'Academia (PHerc. 1021 e 164)*. Edizione, traduzione e commento a cura de Tiziando Dorandi. Istituto

phase of his intellectual development, Philo endorsed the Clitomachian interpretation of Carneades' argument on the criterion of truth, upholding the objections of both ἀκαταληψία and ἐποχή.<sup>271</sup> However, Brittain argues, Philo eventually changed his position on the criterion of truth and adopted a literal interpretation of Carneades' πιθανόν alternative, thus rejecting both ἀκαταληψία and ἐποχή. Cicero reports this shift in interpretation at *Luc.* 17-18, noting that Philo chose to change his position on the criterion of truth and endorse revolutionary doctrines “because he was scarcely able to withstand the usual arguments against the obstinacy of the Academics”.<sup>272</sup> Eusebius also reports Philo's change from the Clitomachian interpretation of Carneades; quoting his source Numenius:

Ὅς δὲ προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξιτήλου δ' ὑπὸ συνηθείας οὔσης αὐτῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς, οὐδὲν, μὲν κατὰ ταῦτ' ἑαυτῷ ἐνόει, ἢ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων αὐτὸν ἀνέστρεφεν ἐνάργειά τε καὶ ὁμολογία. Πολλὴν δὴτ' ἔχων ἤδη τὴν διαίσθησιν ὑπερεπεθύμει εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι τῶν ἐλεγχόντων τυχεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐδόκει ἑμετὰ νῶτα βαλῶν αὐτὸς ἐκὼν φεύγειν.<sup>273</sup>

But as time went on, and their doctrine of “suspense” was going out of fashion from familiarity, he was not at all consistent in thought with himself, but began to be converted by the clear evidence and acknowledgement of his misfortunes. Having therefore already much clearness of perception, he was very desirous, you may be sure, to find some who would refute him, that he might not appear to be turning his back and running away of his accord. (trans. Gifford)

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Italiano per Gli Studi Filosofici. La Scuola di Epicuro, Collezione di testi ercolanesi diretta da Marcello Gigante, volume dodicesimo. (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1991), col. 33. cf. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 14.9.1 = Numen. fr. 28.1-5 Des Places.

<sup>271</sup> Charles Brittain, *Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 73-128.

<sup>272</sup> *Luc.* 18, *quod ea sustinere vix poterat quae Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur* (trans. Rackham).

<sup>273</sup> Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.9.2 = Numen. fr. 28.6-11, Des Places.



In other words, Philo had become too familiar with the *status quo* of arguments and objections to the Academic position, and chose to reevaluate the Academic position altogether. Cicero reports that Philo drafted two volumes which outlined his new doctrine on the criterion of truth (referred to as the *Roman Books*).<sup>274</sup> Brittain argues that in order to neutralize concerns of logical inconsistency in the Academic position, Philo rejected the Stoic definition of the criterion of truth (the *καταληπτική φαντασία*) and replaced it with a definition allowing for a fallible form of comprehension (*κατάληψις*).<sup>275</sup> Cicero alludes to this change at *Luc.* 18 when he states that Philo had abolished “the criterion between the unknowable and the knowable”.<sup>276</sup> Similarly, in his evaluation of Philo’s position, Harold Tarrant argues that by mitigating the extent of *ἀκαταληψία*, that Philo opened a door for promotion of a positive dogma, which eventually influenced the development of Middle Platonism.<sup>277</sup> However, Philo’s change in position was strongly objected by his pupil Antiochus.

Cicero reports at *Luc.* 11 that Antiochus angrily rejected the contention of Philo’s argument in the *Roman Books*, in which Philo presented his thesis that knowledge of some sort was possible in rejection of the Stoic criterion of truth of the *καταληπτική*

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<sup>274</sup> *Luc.* 11-12. See: Brittain, *Philo of Larissa*, 3-37.

<sup>275</sup> Brittain, *Philo of Larissa*, 129-168.

<sup>276</sup> *Luc.* 18, *iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti* (trans. Rackham). cf. Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.9.2 = Numen. fr. 28.6-9, Des Places.

<sup>277</sup> Harold Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy*. Cambridge Classical Studies, eds. J.A. Crook, E.J. Kenney, and A.M. Snodgrass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 22-33. Also see: Carlos Lévy, “The skeptical Academy: decline and afterlife,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 81-104, who argues that although the Academy ceased to exist as an institution after the death of Philo of Larissa, the intellectual tradition of the Academy contributed to the autonomous development of Middle Platonism and NeoPyrrhonism.

φαντασία.<sup>278</sup> In response to Philo's argument in the *Roman Books*, Antiochus drafted his own response, the *Sosus*, in which he argued in support of retaining the Stoic criterion of truth (the *καταληπτική φαντασία*).<sup>279</sup> Cicero emphasizes the dispute between Philo and Antiochus as primarily a disagreement between their respective interpretations of the criterion of truth.<sup>280</sup> Specifically, Philo was determined to reject the Stoic criterion of truth altogether, while Antiochus argued in favor of retaining the definition and features of the *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth. Depicting the position of Antiochus, Cicero's interlocutor, Lucullus, reports at *Luc.* 18 that:

Quare omnis oratio contra Academiam ita suscipitur a nobis ut retineamus eam definitionem quam Philo voluit evertere; quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.<sup>281</sup>

Therefore, the whole defense of the case against the Academy is undertaken by us on the line of preserving the process of definition which Philo wished to overthrow; and unless we succeed in upholding it, we admit that nothing can be perceived. (trans. Rackham)

Specifically, Antiochus and his followers were committed to defending the Stoic criterion of truth against the interpretation of Philo. Similarly, John Dillon argues that Antiochus accepted the qualified Stoic criterion of truth of *καταληπτική φαντασία* with the

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<sup>278</sup> *Luc.* 11. See also: James R. Hankinson, "Natural Criteria and the Transparency of Judgement: Antiochus, Philo and Galen on Epistemological Justification," in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 183-187.

<sup>279</sup> *Luc.* 12. See also: Jonathan Barnes, "Antiochus of Ascalon," in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 70-78.

<sup>280</sup> *Luc.* 69-71.

<sup>281</sup> *Luc.* 18.

added no *ἔνσθημα* clause as the basis for his theory of knowledge.<sup>282</sup> By retaining the Stoic criterion of truth and rejecting Philo's interpretation, Antiochus shifted the debate on the criterion of truth to an internal dispute within the Academy which, Cicero reports, was left unresolved.<sup>283</sup>

While Cicero does not indicate whether Philo issued a formal response to Antiochus' *Sosus*, Cicero presents himself as the intellectual inheritor of the debate on the criterion of truth and uses the *Academica* as his platform to present the debate to a Roman audience. In fact, Cicero intends the *Academica* to preserve and advance the debate between the New Academy and the Old Academy of Antiochus regarding the issue of the criterion of truth. Having studied under both Philo and Antiochus, Cicero's interpretation and depiction of the debate on the criterion of truth presents a sophisticated and well-informed account of the special features of the controversy between the Academy and the Stoa. The consistency of Cicero's account with that of other Greek sources demonstrates an honest rendering of the complexities of the nature of the debate itself, and also of the inconsistencies of interpretation which ultimately led to the collapse of the Academy's involvement in the debate with the Stoa. In the final iteration of the debate on the criterion of truth, Cicero depicted the debate as an internally divisive dispute which

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<sup>282</sup> John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977. Revised edition with a new afterword (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996) 52-113. See also: Gisela Striker, "Academics Fighting Academics," in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 261-265. Striker argues that Antiochus presented two arguments in favor of retaining the Stoic *καταληπτική φαντασία* as the criterion of truth.

<sup>283</sup> *Luc.* 12.

threatened the survival of the institutional Academy itself.<sup>284</sup> The Academy had internalized the debate on the criterion of truth as a question of institutional interpretation, which left the future of the Academy unresolved. The *Academica* was Cicero's literary gesture to continue the dialogue between the New Academy and the Old Academy, while demonstrating his overall support of the New Academy and providing his justification for his endorsement of the method and outcomes of Academic philosophy. Also, while other political factors led to the dissolve of the institutional Academy after Philo (i.e., the conflict with the Mithridatic Wars), Cicero's preservation of the debate on the criterion of truth aided the transmission of Academic philosophy to a Roman audience and demonstrated his own endorsement of the method of Academic philosophy. In the final chapter, I shall examine Cicero's overall interpretation of the criterion of truth and how it influenced his endorsement of Academic philosophy.

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<sup>284</sup> *Acad.* 1.13-14, *Luc.* 11-12, 17-18, 69-71.

## CHAPTER 5: THE *ACADEMICA* AND CICERO'S APPROPRIATION OF ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY: SOURCES, INTERPRETATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Before advancing into the final presentation of Cicero's appropriation of Academic philosophy, it will be helpful to review, briefly, Cicero's interpretation of the criterion of truth within his conception of philosophy presented thus far. First, Cicero conceived of the criterion of truth as a component of the third part of philosophy (*tertia philosophiae pars*) within the Hellenistic philosophical curriculum of the *philosophandi ratio triplex*. Specifically, Cicero conceived the debate on the criterion of truth as the central topic within the branch of *λογική* (*rationem disserendi*) as a logical/dialectical issue and as the primary means for the discovery of truth. Secondly, Cicero presented the three progressive phases of the debate on the criterion of truth between the Stoa and the Academy as including: first, a debate regarding the definition of the Stoic *καταληπτική φαντασία*, second, the Academic responses to the Stoic objection of *ἀπραξία* and, third, the internal discord generated within the Academy over the appropriate interpretation of the Academic position and how best to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies between advocating *ἐποχή* or adopting *πιθανόν* as a practical criterion. Thirdly, Cicero emphasized the practical outcome of the debate on the criterion of truth and the appropriation of the Academic method for dialectical studies and for the discovery of truth.

Cicero's complex interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth has been received with mixed reviews among contemporary scholars. While some historians of philosophy value Cicero's account of the debate on the criterion of truth as reliable, others have criticized Cicero's interpretation as incomplete, insufficient, and unsatisfying.<sup>285</sup> However, in examining Cicero's interpretation, it is important to place the *Academica* within the context of the debate on the criterion of truth. Not only was the *Academica* Cicero's manifesto on Academic philosophy, it was also the platform for his preferred interpretation of the Academic position regarding the debate on the criterion of truth. As the intellectual inheritor of the legacy of the New Academy, Cicero was in a position to justify his interpretation of the criterion of truth and to support his appropriation of Academic philosophy. This is not to say that Cicero presented his version of history as that written by the survivors, but that the *Academica* was his outlet to continue and moderate the discussion on the debate on the criterion of truth. In the *Academica*, Cicero highlighted the debate on the criterion of truth as part of his grand didactic mission to present the best of Hellenistic philosophy to a Latin-speaking audience.<sup>286</sup>

However, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, Cicero presented two inconsistent versions of the outcomes of Academic philosophy. Therefore, how does one reconcile the two contradictory accounts of Academic philosophy within Cicero's interpretation? According to one version, the Academic method of *in utramque partem disserendi* is

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<sup>285</sup> David Sedley, "The Motivation of Greek Scepticism," in *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983) 14.

<sup>286</sup> *Div.* 2.3-4, *Fin.* 1.1-12, *Nat. D.* 1.6-11.

intended to demonstrate the equally convincing reasons of a position to arrive at the conclusion that nothing can be perceived (*ἀκαταληψία*), and thus, to advance the outcome of *ἐποχή*.<sup>287</sup> However, according to the other version, the Academic method reveals a balanced evaluation of arguments intended to promote the discovery of truth (or the closest approximation to the truth – *veri simile*) that is based on reason and the convincing power of argument as opposed to authority, tradition, or custom.<sup>288</sup>

However, Cicero did not view these two approaches to Academic philosophy as mutually exclusive. As I shall argue in this final chapter, the outcome of the debate on the criterion of truth influenced Cicero's motives to adopt Academic philosophy as the preferred method for the discovery of truth. However, before examining Cicero's interpretation and appropriation of Academic philosophy, I shall consider the contextualization and reliability of his sources.

## 5.1 QUELLENFORSCHUNG AND CONTEXTUALIZATION

In order to understand the originality of Cicero's interpretation of Academic philosophy, it is necessary to decipher the extent and contextualization of his sources in the *Academica*. As presented in Chapter 1, Cicero's interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth and the outcomes of Academic philosophy relied upon, not one, but several sources. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that Cicero would have made use of all his resources (i.e., manuscripts, lecture notes, copies, papyri, memory, etc.) in his

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<sup>287</sup> *Acad.* 1.44-46, *Luc.* 28, 59, 67-68.

<sup>288</sup> *Luc.* 32-36, 60, 76, 77, *Nat. D.* 1.10, *Tusc.* 5.83.

presentation of the debate on the criterion of truth. However, since Cicero generally was indifferent and inconsistent about citing his sources, problems of reliability and textual transmission threaten the integrity of Cicero's account in the *Academica*. For example, who were Cicero's sources and how did his interpretation transmit the perspective of other philosophers? Furthermore, were Cicero's sources reliable? Similarly, was Cicero relying on an exclusively Academic or Stoic account of the debate on the criterion of truth? Given Cicero's commitment to fair and balanced analysis through his endorsement of the Academic method of *in utramque partem disserendi*, does he present an honest rendering of the debate on the criterion of truth, especially from the Stoic perspective? I shall address these questions in the following sections and rely upon Cicero's testimony to provide an answer. First, however, I shall examine Cicero's admission of using Stoic sources in his presentation on the debate between the Stoa and the Academy.

### 5.1.1 Stoic Sources

During his speech in favor of the New Academy at *Luc.* 64-147, Cicero reports a single Stoic source, Chrysippus, as presenting counterarguments to the Academic objections against the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>289</sup> Specifically, Cicero references counterarguments provided from the "volumes of Chrysippus" which examine purported incidents of false presentations.<sup>290</sup> Unfortunately, Cicero does not disclose which volumes of Chrysippus he transmits. However, given Cicero's concern to accurately

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<sup>289</sup> *Luc.* 75, 87, 93, 96, 140, 143.

<sup>290</sup> *Luc.* 87. = *SVF* 2.109.



transmit the details of the debate on the criterion of truth, it would seem appropriate for him to reference counterarguments from Stoic sources in defense of the position of the New Academy. Indeed, Chrysippus was by far the most industrious writer among the Hellenistic Stoics and it is conceivable that Cicero would have been familiar with several of his works. In particular Diogenes Laertius attributes a catalogue of over seven-hundred works to Chrysippus.<sup>291</sup>

According to Diogenes and Cicero, Chrysippus was methodical in his response to the Academic arguments, particularly against the *καταληπτική φαντασία*.<sup>292</sup> Cicero reports at *Luc.* 87 that Chrysippus,

studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem...<sup>293</sup>

carefully sought out all the facts that told against the senses and their clarity and against the whole of common experience and against reason... (trans. Rackham)

According to Cicero's account, Chrysippus inventoried all of the individual arguments used by the Academics against the reliability of the senses and drafted counterarguments in support of the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>294</sup> Similarly, Diogenes lists three works from

Chrysippus in particular that may have served as Cicero's source: (*Πρὸς τὸ*

*Ἀρκεσιλάου μεθόδιον πρὸς Σφαῖρον α'*). (Reply to the Method of Arcesilaus,

dedicated to Sphaerus, one book), (*Κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας πρὸς Μητρόδωρον ζ'*). (Attack

upon Common Sense, addressed to Metrodorus, six books) and, (*Ὑπὲρ τῆς συνηθείας*

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<sup>291</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.180.

<sup>292</sup> *Luc.* 93, 96.

<sup>293</sup> *Luc.* 87. = *SVF* 2.109.

<sup>294</sup> *Luc.* 75, *Diog. Laert.* 7.180.

πρὸς Γοργιππίδην ζ'. (Defense of Common Sense, addressed to Gorgippides, seven books).<sup>295</sup> Unfortunately, no extant fragments of Chrysippus identify which volumes Cicero may have used in the *Academica*. However, if Cicero had used Chrysippus as a source for the Stoic counterarguments against Academic objections to the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*, Chrysippus' account also may have transmitted Zeno's original definitions and redactions of the criterion of truth.

Similarly, the possibility that Cicero relied on Stoic sources other than Chrysippus seems likely given his philosophical education with Stoic instructors. While Cicero does not admit explicitly to relying on lecture notes to present the Stoic position in the *Academica*, Cicero had studied extensively with the Stoic instructors Posidonius and Diodotus as part of his philosophical education.<sup>296</sup> Cicero would have received exceptional instruction by both of these figures regarding the Stoic criterion of truth and the Stoic counterarguments in response to Academic objections. Therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that Cicero would have also relied on his philosophical education, his memory, and his lecture notes to appropriately present the Stoic position on the criterion of truth. If Cicero did go to such lengths to preserve and transmit the Stoic position by relying on Stoic sources, then he took great care to present an account that can be regarded, confidently, as accurate, honest, and reliable.

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<sup>295</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 7.198.

<sup>296</sup> *Nat. D.* 1.6, 123, *Fin.* 1.6, *Luc.* 115, *Brut.* 308-310.

### 5.1.2 Academic Sources

Interpreting the positions of Arcesilaus and Carneades is especially challenging since neither figure presented their philosophical views in writing.<sup>297</sup> Therefore all accounts of their philosophical views are, at best, testimonial reports. Similarly, since the views of Arcesilaus and Carneades were compiled and transmitted by their pupils, the concern to preserve the correct interpretation of their philosophical views became a matter of institutional priority to members of the Academy. However, Cicero reports that disagreements about the appropriate interpretation of their views often emerged between their pupils, especially among the pupils of Carneades.<sup>298</sup> Therefore, disputes over interpretation often appealed to the transcript that claimed to present the authorized account of their master's philosophical views. The pupil with the authorized account would therefore preserve the *gravitas* of the legitimate interpretation. Philodemus claims in the *Acad. hist.* that a student of Arcesilaus, named Pythodorus, compiled a written account of his lectures and discussions.<sup>299</sup> However, Malcolm Schofield argues that most of the philosophical arguments ascribed to Arcesilaus in the sources “derive from accounts which relate his views to Carneades’, and may well depend on an oral tradition transmitted through Carneades.”<sup>300</sup> Similarly, Cicero does not report his source for Arcesilaus in the *Academica*. However, if Schofield is correct and Cicero transmitted the

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<sup>297</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 1.16, 4.32, 4.65; cf. *Phld. Acad. hist.* col. 20.43-44.

<sup>298</sup> *Luc.* 78.

<sup>299</sup> *Acad. hist.* col. 20.43-44.

<sup>300</sup> Malcolm Schofield, *Academic Epistemology*, 324, n.5.

views of Arcesilaus through an oral tradition passed down through Carneades, then who was Cicero's source for Carneades?

As reviewed in Chapter 4, two prevailing interpretations emerged among Carneades' pupils regarding his philosophical views on the criterion of truth. According to one interpretation, Carneades advanced arguments against the Stoic criterion of truth as a dialectical dilemma between the alternatives of withholding assent (*ἐποχή*) or allowing assent to a probable presentation (*πιθανόν*).<sup>301</sup> That is, either the Stoics would agree to withhold assent (*ἐποχή*) to a mentally grasped presentation (*καταληπτική φαντασία*) since there is nothing that can be perceived, or the Stoics would allow assent to a probable presentation (*πιθανόν*) which could only qualify assent to an opinion, not truth.<sup>302</sup> However, neither of these two alternatives would have been acceptable to the Stoics. According to the other interpretation, Carneades advanced assent to the probable presentation (*πιθανόν*) as a position which he endorsed as a philosophical view of the Academy.<sup>303</sup> Cicero reports that the first interpretation was supported by Carneades' pupil Clitomachus, while the second interpretation was advanced by Metrodorus (a later student of Carneades) and Philo of Larissa.<sup>304</sup> Coincidentally, Cicero is very specific throughout the *Academica* about his preferred interpretation of Carneades' philosophical views. At *Luc.* 78 Cicero reports that,

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<sup>301</sup> *Luc.* 59, 78, 67, 148.

<sup>302</sup> *Luc.* 67.

<sup>303</sup> *Luc.* 16-17, 32-36, 78.

<sup>304</sup> *Luc.* 16-17, 78; cf. *Phld. Acad. hist.* col. 24.4-11.

...equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum puto.<sup>305</sup>

...for my own part, trusting Clitomachus more than Philo or Metrodorus, I believe that Carneades did not so much accept this view as advance it in argument. (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, Cicero makes explicit reference to Clitomachus more than any other individual Academic source throughout the *Academica*.<sup>306</sup> For example, at *Luc.* 16, Cicero praises

Clitomachus for his philosophical industry and for his large number of books.<sup>307</sup>

Likewise, Cicero admits that he has relied on Clitomachus' account of Carneades' views and is in agreement with his interpretation.<sup>308</sup> Specifically, Cicero notes that his source

for Carneades' account of the Academic objections to the criterion of truth comes from volume one of Clitomachus' four-volume work on withholding assent. Cicero explains,

Nec vero quicquam ita dicam ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus ut Poenus et valde studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis assensionibus, haec autem quae iam dicam sunt sumpta de primo.<sup>309</sup>

However, I will not assert anything in such a manner that anybody may suspect me of inventing; I shall take it from Clitomachus, who was a companion of Carneades quite until old age, a clever fellow as being a Carthaginian, and also extremely studious and industrious. There are four volumes of his that deal with the withholding of assent, but what I am now going to say has been taken from Volume One. (trans. Rackham)

Therefore, not only did Cicero have access to Clitomachus' extensive works, but also Clitomachus' account influenced Cicero's interpretation of Academic philosophy.

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<sup>305</sup> *Luc.* 78.

<sup>306</sup> *Luc.* 16, 78, 98-99, 102-103, 108, 137, 139.

<sup>307</sup> *Luc.* 16, *e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit (declarat multitudo librorum)* (trans. Rackham); cf. *Diog. Laert.* 2.92.

<sup>308</sup> *Luc.* 102-103, 108, 137.

<sup>309</sup> *Luc.* 98-99; cf. *Diog. Laert.* 4.67.

Specifically, Cicero agreed with Clitomachus' interpretation that Carneades presented *ἐποχή* and *πιθανόν* as dialectical strategies against the Stoic criterion of truth, and not that Carneades actually endorsed *ἐποχή* or *πιθανόν* as philosophical positions of the New Academy. Similarly, Gisela Striker agrees that Cicero "is perfectly right when he follows Clitomachus in thinking that Carneades advocated opinion for the sake of argument."<sup>310</sup> The dialectical interpretation of Carneades' view is also supported by Woldemar Görler who confirms that Cicero favored the Clitomachean interpretation.<sup>311</sup>

However, Cicero admits that Clitomachus' interpretation of Carneades' philosophical views could prove problematic. Specifically, at *Luc.* 139, Cicero reports that Clitomachus, at times, was confused about the philosophical views that Carneades was willing to accept.<sup>312</sup> Given the rigid dialectical interpretation of Carneades, it makes sense that Clitomachus would have found it difficult to discern those views that Carneades had advanced dialectically in argument from those that he was willing to adopt personally. Similarly, the dialectical interpretation of Carneades is susceptible to the problem of authenticity since it is likely to discount his views as simply having been advanced for the sake of argument. For example, it is dismissive to think that Carneades argued *ratio contra omnia* and *in utramque partem* because he held no personal views of his own. However, this does not mean that Carneades would have been incapable of

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<sup>310</sup> Striker, *Sceptical Strategies*, 110.

<sup>311</sup> Woldemar Görler, "Cicero's Philosophical Stance in the *Lucullus*," in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld, (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 56.

<sup>312</sup> *Luc.* 139, *quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur...* (trans. Rackham).

endorsing personal views. Indeed, while Carneades has often been portrayed as a devil's advocate figure within the history of philosophy; his reputation for quick wit and dialectical acumen has defined his enduring legacy.<sup>313</sup> For example, at *Acad.* 1.46, Cicero reports that he had been instructed by Zeno the Epicurean who had heard Carneades' lectures first-hand and, though disagreeing with him, nevertheless had a great deal of respect and admiration for his philosophical and dialectical abilities.<sup>314</sup> Indeed, central to the *modus operandi* of the Academic method was the dialectical practice of concealing one's personal beliefs in the course of argument.<sup>315</sup> The practice of concealment was not an outcome of being indecisive; but rather a method to allow *auditors* to discern the truth based on the merit of argument, not based on the authority of the speaker.

However, while Cicero admits to endorsing a Clitomachean interpretation of Academic philosophy, he also made extensive use of sources from his teachers Philo and Antiochus. In fact, as John Glucker reminds, the controversy of interpretation between Philo and Antiochus looms behind Cicero's sources and motivations in the *Academica*.<sup>316</sup> While it is clear that Cicero rejected Antiochus' interpretation on the criterion of truth, Cicero presented the disagreement between Philo and Antiochus from his own first-hand

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<sup>313</sup> Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.8.1-75 = Numen. fr. 27.4-7, Des Places. cf. *Diog. Laert.* 4.62-63.

<sup>314</sup> *Acad.* 1.46.

<sup>315</sup> *Nat. D.* 1.10, *Fin.* 2.1-2, *Tusc.* 5.83, *Luc.* 60. cf. August. *C. acad.* 2.29-30, 3.37-41, 3.43. While Cicero explains that the Academic practice of concealing one's beliefs was a dialectical strategy which appealed to the merits of argument and avoided appeals to authority, Augustine argued that the Academics concealed their beliefs in argument in order to hold esoteric Platonic beliefs that were only disclosed to trusted Academic philosophers later in life.

<sup>316</sup> John Glucker, "Socrates in the Academic Books and Other Ciceronian Works," in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld, (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 58-59.

account and from their writings. In *Acad.* 1.13-14, Cicero explains that his account of the views of Philo and Antiochus comes from a combination of their writings and from their lectures.<sup>317</sup> As discussed in previous chapters, Cicero had studied philosophy and dialectic with Philo and Antiochus as part of his formal philosophical education.<sup>318</sup> Therefore, Cicero was directly aware of the dispute between his two masters as well as the details which exacerbated their disagreement. Cicero explains that the two leading issues between Philo and Antiochus concerned: (1) Philo's interpretation of the history of the Academy, and (2) Philo's theory of knowledge that rejected the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>319</sup> Similarly, Cicero reports that the dispute between Philo and Antiochus had been documented in volumes written by each philosopher. Philo's account comes from two volumes, the *Roman Books*, while Antiochus' counterargument to Philo was titled the *Sosus*.<sup>320</sup> While Cicero wrote the *Academica* primarily to compare the system of the New Academy against the Old Academy and the Stoa, Cicero neglected to include explicit passages from the *Roman Books* or the *Sosus* in his account. Throughout the *Academica*, Cicero demonstrates his familiarity with both works and his masterful knowledge of the details of Philo and Antiochus' philosophical views. However, the absence of specific references to particular sections from the *Roman Books* and the *Sosus* also omits details regarding Cicero's transmission of the works in his presentation of Philo and Antiochus' philosophical views.

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<sup>317</sup> *Acad.* 1.13, *quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir ut tu existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus.*

<sup>318</sup> *Luc.* 98, 111-115, *Nat. D.* 1.6, *Brut.* 306, 315, *Fin.* 5.1.

<sup>319</sup> *Luc.* 10-13, 18, 40-44, 111. cf. Brittain, *Philo of Larissa*, 129-254.

<sup>320</sup> *Luc.* 11-12, 69.



John Glucker has also investigated the potential sources for Cicero's speech in *Luc.* 64-147.<sup>321</sup> In his evaluation, Glucker examines previous assumptions of an Antiochean source of Cicero's speech in the *Acad.* and the *Luc.* He notes that recent scholarship has mainly disproved an Antiochean source of Cicero's works in recognition that Cicero employed multiple sources in his interpretation of Academic philosophy. Specifically, Glucker examines the suggestion that Lucullus' speech is based on Antiochus' *Sosus* while Cicero's speech – although it is officially an answer to Lucullus – is in fact based on Philo's *Roman Books*. By examining the “Philonian innovations” present in Cicero's speech, Glucker takes note of the areas and subjects which Cicero defends as a response to Lucullus' speech. Glucker arrives at the conclusion, that, if Cicero's source for his speech in the *Luc.* is Philo, it could not be the Philo of the *Roman Books*.<sup>322</sup> Glucker notes that no part of the *Luc.* is derived from Philo's *Roman Books* except the few passages where Philo's innovations are referred to explicitly.<sup>323</sup>

Glucker argues that the major candidates as sources for Cicero's speech are Clitomachus, Philo's *Roman Books*, and (supposedly) Philo's response to the *Sosus*. Glucker proposes the theory that Cicero's speech is based on Philo's reply to the *Sosus* which, Glucker argues, was based entirely on the traditional Carneadean and Clitomachean arguments against Stoic epistemology.<sup>324</sup> Therefore, Glucker argues, Cicero's speech in the *Luc.* and in the *Acad.* demonstrate the more traditional views of Clitomachus.

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<sup>321</sup> John Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*. Hypomnemata: Untersuchungen Zur Antike und Zu Ihrem Nachleben, Heft 56 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978) 391-423.

<sup>322</sup> Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, 398-414.

<sup>323</sup> scil. *Acad.* 1.13, *Luc.* 11, 12, 18, 78.

<sup>324</sup> Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, 415-420.

While Glucker's theory has merit, Cicero provides no evidence in the *Academica* that Philo ever wrote a response to Antiochus' *Sosus*. However, I agree with Glucker that Cicero's presentation of Academic philosophy in the *Academica* is strongly influenced by Clitomachus, both in inspiration and by his own admission. Similarly, Cicero does not disclose the objections from Antiochus' *Sosus* that would have prompted a traditional Carneadean/Clitomachean response through Philo. In fact, it is just as likely that Cicero, in an attempt to depict a dialectical interpretation of Carneades, advanced the views of Clitomachus directly against Antiochus' objections. No doubt, Cicero would have proven to have been a very capable defendant of the New Academy in response to Antiochus' objections in the *Sosus*. Not only had Cicero counted Philo and Antiochus among his philosophical instructors, he was also acutely aware of the institutional history of the debate on the criterion of truth and the individual arguments from Philo and Antiochus as well. Indeed, it is very likely that Cicero took up the role as defender of the New Academy against the objections of Antiochus and the *Sosus* as a well-informed and philosophically sophisticated participant in the debate. In fact, as I shall argue in the following section, Cicero endorsed specific philosophical views personally that supported a traditional Clitomachean/Carneadean interpretation of Academic philosophy. Therefore, it was Cicero, and not Cicero's transmission of a source, that constituted the replies to the Antiochean objections in the *Academica*.

## 5.2 INFLUENCES, INTERPRETATION, AND IMPLICATIONS

Thus far, I have examined Cicero's transmission of his sources in the *Academica*; however it is still to be determined what philosophical views Cicero actually endorsed himself in the debate on the criterion of truth. While it is reasonable to assume that Cicero's philosophical interpretation of the debate on the criterion of truth was influenced by his sources, it is necessary to identify the specific views that he personally adopted.<sup>325</sup> Indeed, Cicero's claim to having endorsed the philosophical position of the New Academy requires clarification, since Cicero presented multiple outcomes from Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo. However, since Cicero followed a Clitomachean interpretation of Academic philosophy, does this mean that his personal philosophical views also were influenced by Clitomachus? In the following sections I shall analyze and evaluate the views that Cicero claimed to endorse as his personal appropriation of Academic philosophy; not what he simply transmitted from his sources.

### 5.2.1 Cicero's Philosophical Commitments

In the opening to his speech in *Luc.* 64-147, Cicero announces his authentic endorsement of Academic philosophy and the views that he personally adopts. While selections from Cicero's statement of authenticity in *Luc.* 65-66 have been examined

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<sup>325</sup> See, John Glucker, "Cicero's philosophical affiliations," in *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, eds. John A. Dillon and A.A. Long, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 34-69; and John Glucker, "Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations Again." *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 17 (1992): 134-138.

earlier in this thesis; it will be helpful to reexamine Cicero's statement in its entirety.

Cicero states:

...iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et ea sentire quae dicerem. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum gaudeam si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum qui nihil umquam falsi adprobem, qui numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero ipse et magnus quid sum opinator (non enim sum sapiens) et meas cogitationes sic derigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram qua "fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto," ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant quod eam tenent quae "cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe," sed Helicen et clarissimos Septentriones, id est rationes has latiore specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius; sed non de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem sensumve pepulerunt accipio, iisque interdum etiam adsentior (nec percipio tamen, nihil enim arbitror posse percipi) – non sum sapiens, itaque visis cedo neque possum resistere...<sup>326</sup>

...I should swear by Jove and the gods of my household that I am fired with zeal for the discovery of the truth, and that I really hold the opinions that I am stating. For how can I fail to be eager for the discovery of truth, when I rejoice if I have discovered something that resembles truth? But just as I deem it supremely honourable to hold true views, so it is supremely disgraceful to approve falsehoods as true. And nevertheless I myself am not the sort of person never to give approval to anything false, never give absolute assent, never hold an opinion; it is the wise man that we are investigating. For my part however, although I am a great opinion-holder (for I am not a wise man), at the same time the way in which I steer my thinking is not by that tiny star, the Cynosure, in which "Phoenicians place their trust by night to guide them on the deep," as Aratus puts it, and steer the straighter because they keep to her who "revolves upon an inner circle and an orbit brief," but by Helicē and the resplendent Septentriones, that is, by these theories of wider aspect, not fined down and over-subtilized. The result is that I roam and wander more widely; but it is not I, as I said, but the wise man that is the subject of our inquiry. For when the presentations you talk of have struck my mind or my sense sharply I accept them, and sometimes I actually give assent to them (though nevertheless I do not perceive them, for I hold that nothing can be perceived) – I am not a wise man, and so I yield to presentations and cannot stand out against them... (trans. Rackham)

In this passage, Cicero admits his personal application of Academic philosophy and his position regarding the outcomes of the debate on the criterion of truth. First, Cicero

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<sup>326</sup> *Luc.* 65-66.

opens the passage with his statement of authenticity, or as Gorman calls it the “say-what-you-believe-rule,” pledging his sincere endorsement of the views that he will be presenting.<sup>327</sup> Next, Cicero advocates the two-fold epistemological commitment of Academic philosophy: the discovery of truth and avoiding error.<sup>328</sup> The most important commitment for a philosopher, Cicero argues at *Nat. D.* 1.1-2 and *Luc.* 66-68, is to not hold false beliefs. Even if a philosopher is unable to identify the truth confidently, it is expected that he will not “give assent either to a falsehood or to something not certainly known.”<sup>329</sup> Cicero’s position reflects his principle of epistemic integrity to search for the truth. Likewise, in the absence of discovering the truth or something truth like (*veri simile*), one should not assent to a falsehood. However, Cicero continues, by his own limitations that he frequently engages in the practice of assenting to presentations. Since Cicero does not regard himself a wise man (*sapiens*), he is unable to maintain the level of discipline and diligence required to withhold from accepting presentations. Indeed, Cicero admits that his inability to practice *ἐποχή* consistently is due to his predilection for open-ended inquiry. Cicero explains in metaphor that his thinking is guided by Helicē and the Septentriones, not by the Cynosure. In other words, Cicero adopts a broad approach in his analysis and is not confined by a narrow set of philosophical doctrines or beliefs (scil. Stoicism, Epicureanism). However, Cicero admits, since he is not the paradigmatic “wise man,” he cannot resist the convincing power of some presentations.

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<sup>327</sup> Gorman, 16-33, 91-94.

<sup>328</sup> See section 1.2.1 in this thesis.

<sup>329</sup> *Acad.* 1.45, *quae tum esset insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur* (trans. Rackham).

Therefore, he accepts true presentations and even occasionally gives assent to a probable presentation (*πιθανόν*).

On one hand, Cicero maintained the consistency of his philosophical position, namely, the admission that nothing can be perceived (*nihil posse percipi*).<sup>330</sup> However, on the other hand, Cicero admitted that the practical limitations to his philosophical theory prevented him from consistently withholding assent to presentations. How can this be? At the core of Cicero's philosophical view was the epistemological commitment of Academic philosophy: the discovery of truth and avoiding error. Similarly, Cicero strongly rejected the Stoic criterion of truth.<sup>331</sup> At *Luc.* 141, Cicero endorses the traditional Academic objection against the Stoic *ἐνάργεια* or distinguishing mark.

Similarly, at *Nat. D.* 1.12 Cicero provides a clear depiction of his philosophical stance:

Non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentendi nota. Ex quo exstitit illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem iis sapientis vita regeretur.<sup>332</sup>

Our position is not that we hold that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgement and assent. From this followed the corollary, that many sensations are *probable*, that is, though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man. (trans. Rackham)

Therefore, by rejecting the Stoic *ἐνάργεια*, Cicero upheld the standard Academic argument that there is no distinction between true and false presentations. Similarly, since there is no distinct mark (*ἐνάργεια*) between true and false presentations, Cicero

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<sup>330</sup> *Luc.* 68.

<sup>331</sup> *Fin.* 5.76.

<sup>332</sup> *Nat. D.* 1.12.

maintained that truth is not a quality that can be perceived. Therefore, having rejected the Stoic criterion of truth and having rejected the notion of ἐνάργεια, Cicero argued that nothing can be perceived (*nihil posse percipi*).<sup>333</sup> However, Cicero was not willing to fall into the trap of the Stoic ἀπραξία objection, making life unlivable due to inaction from the lack of assent (συγκατάθεσις). Instead, Cicero was willing to admit that it is appropriate to accept probable presentations as guides for conduct in lieu of the Stoic καταληπτική φαντασία. However, how could Cicero consistently reject of the Stoic criterion of truth while also maintaining that it is appropriate to accept probable presentations? Similarly, is Cicero's position consistent with his endorsement of Clitomachus' dialectical interpretation of Academic philosophy?

Harald Thorsrud explains Cicero's position by arguing that he endorsed a version of fallibilism through Academic philosophy as a dialectical method to discern truth.<sup>334</sup> According to Thorsrud's fallibilism thesis, Cicero understood the limitations to his claims to knowledge and assent, since "even the most careful and responsible judgment of probable truth may always turn out to be wrong."<sup>335</sup> The endorsement of a fallibilist theory of assent to probable presentations allowed Cicero to adopt a traditional anti-Stoic position on the criterion of truth, while also allowing him to promote an appropriate course of action in the absence of matters on which one cannot be certain. Therefore, Thorsrud argues, Cicero's version of weak assent involved a conscious evaluation of the

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<sup>333</sup> *Luc.* 68.

<sup>334</sup> Harald Thorsrud, "Radical and Mitigated Skepticism in Cicero's *Academica*," in *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, ed. Walter J. Nicgorski, (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

rational merits of alternative views and a deliberately fallible judgment of truth.<sup>336</sup>

Thorsrud's analysis recognizes Cicero's ability to arrive at an appropriate solution for compatibility between the rejection of the Stoic criterion of truth while endorsing a practical criterion for the conduct of life and action which, he admits, may also turn out to be wrong. Indeed, the Academic method allowed for such an evaluation of alternative views and solutions to be evaluated and adopted in order to discover the truth or its approximate, verisimilitude. Cicero utilized the Academic method of arguing *in utramque partem* as a criterion of truth to advance verisimilitude as a dialectical outcome of discovering the most logically consistent propositions.<sup>337</sup> In the next section I shall examine Cicero's endorsement of Academic philosophy and the elements which he developed in support of a practical criterion.

### **5.2.2 Cicero's Criterion of Truth: *in utramque partem disserendi*, verisimilitude, and *probabilitas***

Having rejected the Stoic criterion of truth, Cicero appropriated the Academic dialectical method as his preferred application for the discovery of truth. Instead of defining truth by the *καταληπτική φαντασία*, Cicero defined the criterion of truth as the dialectical process of *in utramque partem disserendi*, in order to advance the position which most closely arrives at the probable truth, verisimilitude. Similarly, since Cicero preferred the dialectical interpretation of Academic philosophy in Clitomachus' account of Carneades, it comes as no surprise that Cicero also emphasized the dialectical method

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<sup>336</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>337</sup> Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism*, 84-101.



of Academic philosophy.<sup>338</sup> Indeed, Cicero conceived philosophy as a living method, not merely a set of rules for conduct or established dogmas of belief. Similarly, Cicero's admission of being guided by "Helicē and the resplendent Septentriones" allowed him the intellectual flexibility and freedom to explore the outcomes of arguments based on the merit of reason and not as a result of the authority or customs of any particular philosophical school.<sup>339</sup> While Cicero's interpretation of the Academic method has already been evaluated in Chapter 1, I shall review briefly Cicero's conception of each element within his appropriation of Academic philosophy: *in utramque partem disserendi*, *verisimilitudo*, and *probabilitas*.

Cicero describes the dialectical practice of at *in utramque partem disserendi* at *Luc.* 7-8, where he states:

...neque nostrae disputationes quidquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam expriment aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat.<sup>340</sup>

...and the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth. (trans. Rackham)

Similarly, at *Tusc.* 2.9 Cicero notes:

Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetude de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset inveniri, sed etiam quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitation.<sup>341</sup>

Accordingly these considerations always led me to prefer the rule of the Peripatetics and the Academy of discussing both sides of every question, not only

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<sup>338</sup> *Luc.* 66.

<sup>339</sup> *Luc.* 66.

<sup>340</sup> *Luc.* 7-8.

<sup>341</sup> *Tusc.* 2.9.

for the reason that in no other way did I think it possible for the probable truth to be discovered in each particular problem, but also because I found it gave the best practice in oratory. (trans. King)

Cicero appropriated the method of *in utramque partem disserendi* not only in his conversational approach to philosophy, but also in the way in which he wrote his philosophical dialogues and treatises.<sup>342</sup> In the *Academica* and his other philosophical works, Cicero adapted the dialectical method of *in utramque partem disserendi* as a literary method to present the opposing views of each side in an argument and develop the arguments and counterarguments concerning a particular topic. For example, J.G.F. Powell explains that “the adversarial mode (suspended argumentative discourse) is fundamental to Cicero’s methods of composition, just as the Socratic Elenchus is to Plato’s.”<sup>343</sup> Similarly, Cicero’s employment of *in utramque partem disserendi* within his philosophical works “gave him the opportunity to expound the rival doctrines of the other schools side by side, and thus to show philosophy as above all an activity and not just a set of predigested doctrines. Cicero’s works represent a genuine attempt to invite the reader to judge which is the most plausible view.”<sup>344</sup>

Cicero appropriated the dialectical method of *in utramque partem disserendi* with the intention of demonstrating the position which most accurately arrives at the probable truth or verisimilitude.<sup>345</sup> While Arcesilaus and Carneades had advocated *το εὔλογον* and *πιθανόν* (respectively) as dialectical alternatives to the Stoic *ἀπραξία* objection;

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<sup>342</sup> *Fin.* 2.1-3.

<sup>343</sup> J.G.F. Powell, “Introduction: Cicero’s Philosophical Works and their Background,” in *Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers*, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 21-22.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>345</sup> *Luc.* 8, 99-101, 104-105, *Nat. D.* 1.12.

Cicero advanced verisimilitude and *probabilitas* as tentative outcomes of the Academic dialectical method of *in utramque partem disserendi*. In the *Academica*, Cicero does not present the application of verisimilitude and *probabilitas* as having been endorsed by previous members of the Academy. Therefore, verisimilitude and *probabilitas* appear to have been Cicero's own original interpretation of the outcomes of Academic philosophy. However, Cicero's endorsement of the probable presentation and verisimilitude may have been influenced according to his translation of the Greek terms *το εὔλογον* and *πιθανόν* into Latin. For example, Glucker argues that "by the time of Cicero and in the next few generations, *εἰκόζ*, *πιθανόν*, and *εὔλογον* seem to become more and more interchangeable."<sup>346</sup> However, while Cicero occasionally interchanged and conflated *εἰκόζ* and *πιθανόν* within his philosophical works, he more often maintained consistency in his translations of these terms. Glucker continues, "when Cicero ... had a Greek rhetorical definition which most probably included both *εἰκόζ* and *πιθανόν*, he translated the former as "*veri simile*" and the later as "*probabile*."<sup>347</sup> Similarly, in the *Academica*, Cicero translates *εἰκόζ* as *veri simile* while he translates *πιθανόν* as *probabile*.<sup>348</sup> Thus, Cicero was intentional with his translation and application of verisimilitude and *probabilitas* within his conception of Academic philosophy. While Cicero conceived verisimilitude and *probabilitas* as outcomes of the Academic dialectical

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<sup>346</sup> John Glucker, "*Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms*," in *Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers*, ed. J.G.F. Powell. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 127.

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*, 131; Schofield, *Academic Epistemology*, 350; Ilkka Niiniluoto, "Scepticism, Fallibilism, and Verisimilitude," in *Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition*. *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, no. 66, ed. Juha Sihvola. (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 2000) 158-159.

method, verisimilitude defined the quality and condition of truth while *probabilitas* identified the state of justification of truth. Since Cicero's appropriation of the Academic dialectical method did not seek to discover the truth, only what appears most like the truth, the certainty of truth was not emphasized as an outcome. Instead of advocating the Academic dialectical method as a criterion of truth, Cicero appropriated Academic philosophy as a criterion of verisimilitude.

### 5.3 CONCLUSION

The central argument of this thesis can be summarized best, perhaps, in one sentence: Cicero's appropriation and endorsement of Academic philosophy was directly influenced by his interpretation of the debate regarding the criterion of truth between the Hellenistic Stoa and Academy. Generally speaking, Cicero rejected the Stoic criterion of truth. Specifically, Cicero disagreed with the Stoic notion that presentations have a unique *ἐνάργεια* or *ιδιώματα* which warrant assent as an immediate inference. Similarly, Cicero's relied on a Clitomachean interpretation of Academic philosophy, which emphasized the dialectical role of the Academic method. Cicero viewed Academic philosophy as a dialectical method and adopted the practice of *in utramque partem disserendi* to arrive at a position which most closely represents the probable truth, verisimilitude.

## EXCURSUS: THE COMPOSITION AND REDACTION OF CICERO'S *ACADEMICA*

Cicero composed two editions of the *Academica* in 45 B.C., and the collations of the separate parts of the editions survive as the *Academica*. Cicero's letters to Atticus from May 13, 45 B.C. to July 21, 45 B.C., provide a detailed account of the composition, revision, publication and redaction of the two editions.<sup>349</sup> Cicero's first edition was composed of two books, the *Catulus* and the *Lucullus*.<sup>350</sup> However, upon reconsidering the philosophical credibility of Q. Lutatius Catulus and L. Licinius Lucullus as the primary interlocutors, and receiving criticism from his friend Atticus – reminding Cicero that he had promised to dedicate a work to M. Terentius Varro – Cicero acquiesced and decided to make editorial changes to the first edition.<sup>351</sup> In the revised second edition of the work, Cicero replaced Catulus and Lucullus with Varro as the single interlocutor in the dialogue.<sup>352</sup> In addition to the *dramatis personae* changes, Cicero expanded the two books of the first edition into four books, and supplied further substantive changes in the content and presentation of the dialogue.<sup>353</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> *Att.* 12.44 - 13.44; Miriam Griffin, "The Composition of the *Academica*: Motives and Versions," in *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> Symposium Hellenisticum, Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995. *Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy*, vol. LXXVI, eds. Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1997) 1-35.

<sup>350</sup> *Att.* 12.44, 13.32.

<sup>351</sup> *Att.* 13.12, 19.

<sup>352</sup> *Att.* 13.12, 16, 19.

<sup>353</sup> *Att.* 13.13, 16.

During the first six months of the year 45 B.C., Cicero was also working on at least two other philosophical texts, the *De finibus* and the *Hortensius*. Because of the rapid output of these works, Cicero was in frequent correspondence with Atticus regarding their publication. Upon completion of the first edition of the *Academica*, Cicero immediately had the *Catulus* and the *Lucullus* sent to Atticus for copying and publication.<sup>354</sup> However, during the copying process of the first edition, Cicero (at Atticus's prompting) began reconsidering the structure and content of the *Catulus* and *Lucullus*, and began working on the redacted second edition. Cicero then sent his redacted version (composed of four books) to Atticus for copying. In his letter *Att* 13.13, Cicero indicates that he wishes the *Catulus* and *Lucullus* not be published, but that the four books of the *Academici Libri* be published instead. However, by the time that Atticus received Cicero's letter along with the redaction, his publishing house had already finished copying the *Catulus* and *Lucullus*.<sup>355</sup>

Due to the redaction and publication of the *Academica*, it is not difficult to understand how the work survives in its current fragmentary form. Certainly, a possibility exists that unauthorized versions of the *Catulus* and *Lucullus* made their way out of Atticus's printing house, either in pirated versions during the copying phase or as later editions intentionally published by Atticus.<sup>356</sup> Regardless of the circumstances, by the time that these texts were rediscovered in the Renaissance, only the *Lucullus* survived

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<sup>354</sup> *Att.* 12.44.

<sup>355</sup> Terence J. Hunt, *A Textual History of Cicero's "Academici Libri."* Mnemosyne: Bibliotheca Classica Batava, Supplementum Centesimum Octogesimum Primum. (Leiden, Boston, and Köln: Brill, 1998) 10-13, 260-261.

<sup>356</sup> *Att.* 13.13, 21- 22. Cicero expresses his displeasure with Atticus for publishing and releasing unauthorized versions of his work.

of the first edition, while only book one (the *Academicus primus*) survived in a fragmentary form of the redacted second edition.

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