

FLANNERY O'CONNOR'S "HABIT OF ART":
MARKED PASSAGES IN HER PERSONAL LIBRARY

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
Carolyn T. Young

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Thesis Director



Second Reader



Director of Graduate Studies

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Flannery O'Connor was a Southern author who is well worth knowing. Nonetheless, over thirty years after her death there is still no detailed account of her life. Scholars who interview her relatives are told there is one rule they must respect: "Never speak about O'Connor's writing or personal life" (Pearson 151). Up until recently her admirers were informed only through her works, letters, and lectures. In her lectures O'Connor stated that she believed that the "ability to create life with words is essentially a gift" (Mystery 88), but that the gift must be developed not only "in the head; it has to be learned in habits" (Mystery 92). In fact, she said that the key to effective fiction writing lies in behavior that Jacques Maritain called "the habit of art" (Mystery 101).

One of O'Connor's habits was that of reading. And one way to get to know a person is to know what he reads. In recent years, reconstructing, cataloguing, and analyzing an author's working library have become recognized as important tools to understanding the writer's work. For instance, the libraries of such eminent American authors as Melville, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Emerson, Dickinson, Hemingway, Steinbeck, and Twain have been painstakingly reconstructed and analyzed for this purpose. Alan Gribben writes that this method of literary research is one of the "surest approaches to that person's intellectual life, aesthetic tastes, and artistic development" (301). As a matter of fact,

Arthur F. Kinney has compiled and published a catalog of the personal library that O'Connor owned at the time of her death. This collection is now housed in the O'Connor Memorial Room at the Ina Dillard Russell Library of Georgia College in Milledgeville, her alma mater. Kinney's catalog, Flannery O'Connor's Personal Library: Resources of Being, lists all her books held at Georgia College and transcribes certain marked passages that seem clearly relevant to her writings.

O'Connor's personal books provide insight into the dimensions of her interests and inner life. Indeed, serious illness required that most of her activities take place in an inner life of the imagination. Because she developed lupus at the beginning of her writing career, she was forced to retire to Milledgeville, Georgia, to the family-owned farmhouse called Andalusia, where her mother cared for her. Thereafter, O'Connor virtually spent her days within a one-mile radius, like the peacocks and other local animals that she often used in metaphors. Confronted with such a limited physical environment, how was she able to create stories exhibiting a universal sense of the humorous while still maintaining a respect for the common man's ultimate dignity and worth? The answer lies in her refusal to allow her mind to be restricted as her body was. She realized she was endowed with a talent, but she habitually sought to improve that talent by turning to good teachers; she acquired books by authoritative authors, and she studied the techniques of writers she admired. In addition, she was forever seeking to understand the needs of the human spirit. Although O'Connor held a strong Christian faith, she felt compelled to read psychology and to weigh its relationship to religion. Throughout the remaining thirteen years of her life spent at Andalusia, she followed a routine of

dedicated habits of study and creativity, constantly honing and developing her skills as a writer and thinker.

Since O'Connor's physical life was confining, a knowledge of her working library is an especially rewarding tool in understanding how her reading enriched her observations and imagination as well as how such reading is reflected in her fiction. Her books illustrate an intense interest in philosophy, theology, literature, and literary criticism. This thesis expands on Kinney's work on O'Connor's library by more fully examining O'Connor's markings and marginalia in certain of her books. Because O'Connor was such a lavish marker and annotator, her markings provide unique insights into her own mental processes. Especially interesting are her markings in works she studied to improve her writing. Also fascinating are her annotations in selected books on psychology and theology. (An explanation of my method of examining and paraphrasing the marked passages in these books is presented separately, along with a list of the abbreviations used to symbolize O'Connor's markings.)

My purposes in preparing this thesis are twofold. First, I am interested in learning how O'Connor turned her restrictive illness to her advantage as a writer, not only by habitually and closely observing those around her, but also by closely studying various writers and theories and using them to help create a fictional world of her own. Also, I would like to try to understand her determination that the world she created would be crafted to the maximum of her capabilities. To be aware of her persistent pursuit of excellence one only has to learn that her last short story, written in May 1964, just three months prior to her death, is actually a rewrite of "The Geranium," one of the stories

in her thesis dated June 1947, for which she was awarded the degree of Master of Fine Arts by the State University of Iowa. O'Connor wrote her editor on 27 June 1964, requesting that she review the revised story: "It's a rewrite of a story that I have had around since 1946 and never been satisfied with (Habit 588).

The title of that short story, "Judgement Day," exemplifies O'Connor's spiritual orientation. Partly because of this inclination, she frequently studied books on theology and on psychology. Moreover, her writing reflects that she absorbed (and was shaped by) the works she studied. She wrote Cecil Dawkins on 6 September 1962, for example, that "You probably hear a lot about Freud at Yaddo. To religion he is much less dangerous than Jung" (Habit 491). This opinion echoes her study of Gregory Zilboorg's 1958 work, Freud and Religion, A Restatement of an Old Controversy. In a passage that O'Connor marked, Zilboorg writes that "Freud's teaching, despite all his passion for atheism, is less dangerous to true religion than Jung's attitude of a sort of utilitarian, pragmatic exploitation, in the service of psychotherapy, of man's belief in God" (5). This parallel typifies the kinds of connections that often exist between O'Connor's reading and her own writing.

Indeed, the traces of O'Connor's "long looks" run like threads throughout her works and words and provide real insight into her dedication to her talent and to its development. Those traces should therefore be of interest to other students of Flannery O'Connor. For this reason, a second goal of this thesis is to perform ground-work for further research into her "habit of art."

An examination of the books O'Connor studied shows that early in

her career she strove to improve her writing technique and structure. In 1954, after the publication of Wise Blood, she replied to Ben Griffith's question concerning her influences by reporting that she had recently "read Henry James, thinking this may affect my writing for the better without my knowing how" (Habit 68). She also wrote that "I've read almost all of Henry James" (Habit 99). It comes as no surprise, then, that her markings can be found in such works as James' Future of the Novel. O'Connor used a vertical line, for example, to mark one passage in that book where James advised that "the best rule certainly is the tact of the individual writer, which will adapt itself to the material as the material comes to him" (204). Interestingly enough, she also underlined a similar passage in Stephen C. Pepper's 1946 book on criticism: "The aesthetic materials seek their own satisfying structure and equilibrium through the artist, who does not dictate but follows their guidance" (83). Although O'Connor may later have forgotten marking these passages, their echoes can be heard in a talk she gave on writing short stories at a Southern Writers' Conference (neither the location nor the date are shown on the manuscript; Mystery 236). There, for example, she described how she created "Good Country People" (in 1955):

I doubt myself if many writers know what they are going to do when they start out. . . . I merely found myself one morning writing a description of two women that I knew something about, and before I realized it, I had equipped one of them with a daughter with a wooden leg. As the story progressed, I brought in the Bible salesman, but I had no idea what I was going to do with him. . . . This is a story

that produces a shock for the reader, and I think one reason for this is that it produced a shock for the writer.

(Mystery 100)

Clearly these comments indicate the kind of "tact" and responsive equilibrium recommended by both James and Pepper. On the other hand, although she understood that a writer must be open to creative impulses, O'Connor also realized that a writer must maintain control if her finished creation were to be satisfying. Thus she underlined the following passage in a 1941 publication (by Norman Foerster et al.) titled

Literary Scholarship:

No available psychology seems of much assistance to the literary critic; but the lack of a scientific instrument at once precise and relevant must not prevent the contemporary critic from seeing, as Aristotle saw, that the formal organization of literature aims at the production of a calculated response. (162)

O'Connor herself later acknowledged this very same need for precision and organization in a talk on "The Nature and Aim of Fiction" when she said, "The novelist makes his statement by selection, and if he is any good, he selects every word for a reason, and arranges them in a certain time-sequence for a reason" (Mystery 75). Once again, O'Connor's own comments help us better understand her markings (and vice versa). To illustrate more specifically O'Connor's careful planning of her fiction, let us consider one of her earliest short stories, "A Good Man Is Hard To Find," written in 1953. This work brought her national recognition and is still one of her most anthologized tales. The narrative begins as a humorous account of a family's automobile trip to

Florida, but the car soon turns down a road that leads to violence. The violence, however, is by no means accidental, as O'Connor explained in a reading of the work at Hollins College on October 14, 1963 (Mystery 107). There she explained her frequent focus on violence by claiming that the

man in the violent situation reveals those qualities least dispensable in his personality, those qualities which are all he will have to take into eternity with him; and since the characters in this story are all on the verge of eternity, it is appropriate to think of what they take with them. (Mystery 114)

Furthermore, she reveals that "in this story you should be on the lookout for such things as the action of grace in the Grandmother's soul, and not for the dead bodies" (Mystery 113). To exemplify such an "action of grace," for example, O'Connor made the grandmother speak these final words to the Misfit: "'Why you're one of my babies. You're one of my own children!'" (Stories 132). O'Connor thus arranged for grace to enter the grandmother's soul with her last words. However, she gave the final words of the story as a whole to the Misfit. Whereas he had earlier declared, "'No pleasure but meanness,'" after killing the grandmother he now confesses, "'It's no real pleasure in life!'" (Stories 132-33). The author selected this seemingly ambiguous ending to make an important point. As she disclosed in the same talk:

I don't want to equate the Misfit with the devil. I prefer to think that, however unlikely this may seem, the old lady's gesture, like the mustard-seed, will grow to be a great crow-filled tree in the Misfit's heart, and will be

enough pain to him there to turn him into the prophet he was meant to become. (Mystery 112,113)

In other words, the closing passage of "A Good Man Is Hard to Find" exemplifies the kind of careful planning recommended in the marked passage from Literary Scholarship.

Despite her artful selection of words and careful arrangement of sequences in this short story, however, there was one aspect of technique -- point of view -- that she claimed to have neglected in creating "A Good Man." In 1961, for instance, she wrote, "I don't see how I could write what Miss R. wants because point of view never entered my head when I wrote that story. I just wrote it. It's all seen from the eye of the omniscient narrator and that's that" (Habit 426). Nevertheless, at some point she obviously studied Percy Lubbock's book on technique and structure, The Craft of Fiction, and marked it profusely. In fact, in 1956 she even recommended the book to a friend as "a very profound study of point of view" (Habit 192). Lubbock discusses, for example, how skillfully Flaubert handles shifts in point of view in Madame Bovary. Thus in a passage which O'Connor marked with a vertical line, Lubbock illustrates how smoothly Flaubert handles the change in point of view (at Emma's death) from Emma to her husband. Lubbock claims that Flaubert needs the shift in order to achieve the climactic moment that completes the story (91). Perhaps coincidentally (or perhaps not), O'Connor used the same technique to shift from the protagonist's point of view in her 1960 story "The Comforts of Home." Throughout this narrative, the plot progresses by focusing on Thomas's observations, up to the final moment when he shoots a "slut." At that instant, when "nothing is left to disturb the peace of perfect order," a

door opens and a sheriff enters. "The sheriff's brain worked instantly like a calculating machine. He saw the facts as if they were already in print: the fellow had intended all along to kill his mother and pin it on the girl" (Stories 404). This seamless shift in point of view, therefore, demonstrates O'Connor's progress in the use of this technique between 1953 and 1960.

For that matter, O'Connor habitually studied to improve her literary craft. She studied Lubbock, in particular, as if she were at the feet of a master, admiring him in part because he was a "Jamesian" (Habit 192). Not surprisingly, therefore, in listing traits necessary for the fiction writer, O'Connor often quoted James. She listed one such trait, for instance, as the artist's judgment to give the "details he sees and how he sees them. Fiction writers who are not concerned with these concrete details are guilty of what Henry James called 'weak specification'" (Mystery 92). Certainly Lubbock agreed with James that details were necessary to flesh out the novelist's descriptions. In a passage in Lubbock's book which O'Connor marked with a vertical line, he therefore instructs that a novelist, unlike a playwright, must not only provide the words his characters speak but must also describe how the characters look, where they are, and what actions they are performing (111).

Similarly, it is also interesting to trace O'Connor's development in the area of character description from her graduate school days to her years as a mature writer. Consider her introduction of the two main characters in "The Geranium," one of her first short stories, written in 1946. The narrative begins by noting that "Old Dudley folded into the chair he was gradually molding to his own shape" and then reports that

"His daughter came in" (Stories 3). O'Connor provides no further physical descriptions of these two throughout the story. On the other hand, one can contrast her detailed introduction of the Turpins and their fellow patients in the doctor's waiting room in the November, 1963 story entitled "Revelation":

The doctor's waiting room, which was very small, was almost full when the Turpins entered and Mrs. Turpin, who was very large, made it look even smaller by her presence. . . . Her little black eyes took in all the patients. . . . Claude [her husband] was florid and bald and sturdy, somewhat shorter than Mrs. Turpin. . . . The only man in the room besides Claude was a lean stringy old fellow with a rusty hand spread on each knee. (Stories 488)

Such details continue as O'Connor introduces a "blond child in a dirty blue romper," a "well-dressed gray-haired lady," and a "fat girl of eighteen or nineteen," with a face "blue with acne" (Stories 488-90). By the time the reader has completed the first few pages in the narrative, he can actually see the characters in his mind's eye. Partly as a result of her reading, O'Connor's writing had overcome any tendency toward "weak specification."

However, another requirement for well-made fiction, according to Lubbock, is the creation of a convincing environment for the protagonist. Again using Flaubert as an example, he illustrates this point by discussing Madame Bovary. In a passage O'Connor marked with a vertical line, Lubbock demonstrates how Flaubert creates a universe for Emma. The small town, a mundane husband, and provincial, gossipy villagers are parts of the decoration of Emma's setting (80-82).

O'Connor not only marked Lubbock's instruction concerning painting a proper environment, but she also read and studied Madame Bovary itself. In a talk on "The Nature and Aim of Fiction," she used this technique of Flaubert's as an example of good writing:

All the sentences in Madame Bovary could be examined with wonder, but there is one in particular that always stops me in admiration. Flaubert has just shown us Emma at the piano with Charles watching her. He says, "She struck the notes with aplomb and ran from top to bottom of the keyboard without a break. Thus, shaken up, the old instrument, whose strings buzzed, could be heard at the other end of the village when the window was open, and often the bailiff's clerk, passing along the highroad, bareheaded and in list slippers, stopped to listen, his sheet of paper in his hand."

. . . .

Flaubert had to create a believable village to put Emma in. It's always necessary to remember that the fiction writer is much less immediately concerned with grand ideas and bristling emotions than he is with putting list slippers on clerks. (Mystery 69-70)

Characteristically, O'Connor used her study of Lubbock's book and her admiration of Flaubert's technique as foundations, but in her own fiction she reshaped their ideas by using her own unique imagery. Compare, for instance, Flaubert's introduction of Emma into Charles's village through the bailiff's clerk to Flannery O'Connor's introduction of the Displaced Person to the world of Mrs. McIntyre's dairy farm in

the 1954 story "The Displaced Person." O'Connor uses Mrs. Shortley, the wife of the hired dairyman, as the representative eyes of the farm community:

The peacock was following Mrs. Shortley up the road to the hill where she meant to stand. Moving one behind the other, they looked like a complete procession. Her arms were folded and as she mounted the prominence, she might have been the giant wife of the countryside, come out at some sign of danger to see what the trouble was.

. . .

Mrs. Shortley was watching a black car turn through the gate from the highway. Over by the toolshed, about fifteen feet away, the two negroes, Astor and Sulk, had stopped work to watch.

. . .

The car stopped at the walk . . . and the priest was the first to get out. . . . He opened the back door of the car and out jumped two children, a boy and a girl, and then, stepping more slowly, a woman in brown, shaped like a peanut. Then the front door opened and out stepped the man, the Displaced Person.

. . .

. . . . watching from her vantage point, Mrs. Shortley had the sudden intuition that the Gobblehooks, like rats and typhoid fleas, could have carried all those murderous ways over the water with them directly to this place. (Stories 194-96)

With this last chilling sentence O'Connor sets the tone for the tragic events to follow. However, she admitted to Ben Griffith in 1954 that maintaining the tone in a work was a considerable strain for her (Habit 68-9).

This problem of maintaining tone is not surprising, for O'Connor's vision, though comic on the surface, always had a dark underside. Naturally, then, she would be drawn not only to Flaubert but also to Dostoevski. She had a copy of his Crime and Punishment in her personal library, and she studied a book by Joseph Warren Beach which discusses Dostoevski's technique. For example, Beach discusses Dostoevski's scheme of inventing a real character, the protagonist, to embody an abstract principle, then providing an evil double to present a picture to the protagonist and the reader to help them understand the moral ugliness implied in the protagonist's religious position (98). Beach cites Raskolnikov and his obscene double Svidrigailov, in Crime and Punishment, as illustrations of this structural device. O'Connor herself used this same technique in her 1959 novel The Violent Bear It Away. Notice Rayber's reaction to young Tarwater at their first meeting:

When Rayber had first opened the door in the middle of the night and had seen Tarwater's face—white, drawn by some unfathomable hunger and pride—he had remained for an instant frozen before what might have been a mirror thrust toward him in a nightmare. The face before him was his own
 (99)

Moreover, the two are spiritual counterparts as well. Indeed, Rayber even acknowledges this fact to himself:

The affliction was in the family. It lay hidden in the line of blood that touched them, flowing from some ancient source, some desert prophet or polesitter, until, its power unabated, it appeared in the old man and him and, he surmised, in the boy. (114)

Tarwater realizes that he is called to be a prophet and finally turns away from Rayber's example. He accepts the call and moves steadily on to accept his fate (243). But Rayber, the shadow, who refuses to move, eventually feels nothing (203). O'Connor explained this meaning of doubles in a letter to Alfred Corn in 1962. She said that Rayber made the "Satanic choice, and the inability to feel the pain of his loss is the immediate result. . . . Rayber and Tarwater are really fighting the same current in themselves. Rayber wins out against it and Tarwater loses; Rayber achieves his own will, and Tarwater submits to his vocation" (Habit 484-85). O'Connor, with her strong Christian faith, saw the devil as a concrete being, yet she felt that humans need an abstract sense of evil to guarantee their sense of mystery. Her interest in evil helped lead her to read Dostoevski, and her reading of both Dostoevski and Beach seems to have had some influence on her own habits as a writer.

By the time she had completed The Violent Bear It Away, O'Connor had shifted the emphasis of her literary study from structure to theme. She was particularly concerned, for instance, with the proper way to express abstract ideas in fiction. She began studying Henry James' theoretical works, such as his criticism of Hawthorne's writing. Naturally she felt an affinity for Hawthorne because of their mutual religious backgrounds. Also, she, like Hawthorne, added a dimension of

abstract meanings to her concrete character portrayals. Nevertheless, in James's work entitled Hawthorne, she underlined a passage stating that "allegory, to my sense, is quite one of the lighter exercises of the imagination" (57). This view appeared to be reflected in her talk on "The Nature and Aim of Fiction," in which she discussed and contrasted three kinds of abstract meanings that medieval commentators on scripture found in texts. These three types were the allegorical, the tropological (or moral), and the anagogical, which had to do with the Divine Life and man's participation in it. O'Connor argued that the fiction writer needs to develop the anagogical view (rather than the allegorical) in order to increase the meaning of his story (Mystery 72). Likewise, in Raymond Hostie's Religion and the Psychology of Jung, where Hostie discusses Carl Jung's views concerning the abstract, O'Connor marked a passage where Hostie wrote that Jung summed up his theories by claiming that "'No symbol is simple. . . . Only signs and allegories are simple. For a symbol always covers a complex reality which is so far beyond any verbal equivalent that it can never be expressed all at once'" (41). In her responses to James, Hawthorne, Hostie, and Jung, therefore, O'Connor revealed a distrust of allegory but a strong interest in theories justifying symbolism.

O'Connor's mind was open to such theories. In a talk about how abstractions scare a "good many people off," she said that "for the fiction writer himself, symbols are something he uses simply as a matter of course. You might say that these are details that while having their essential place in the literal level of the story, operate in depth as well as on the surface, increasing the story in every direction" (Mystery 71). She illustrated the way a symbol works both literally and

in depth, for example, by describing Hazel Motes's rat-colored Essex in Wise Blood. The minute Haze saw the "high rat-colored machine with large thin wheels and bulging headlights," he knew that "this was the car he was going to buy" (69). He tells the salesman, "'I wanted this car mostly to be a house for me'" (73). As the story progresses, Haze climbs on the nose of the car and uses it as a pulpit (104). After that, the car becomes his weapon to destroy the false Prophet (204). Next, the car becomes his means of escape from an old place to a new location (207). Finally, "the patrolman got behind the Essex and pushed it over the embankment. . . . 'Them that don't have a car, don't need a license,' the patrolman said, dusting his hands on his pants" (209). O'Connor told one audience that

the hero's rat-colored automobile is his pulpit and his coffin as well as something he thinks of as a means of escape. He is mistaken in thinking that it is a means of escape, of course, and does not really escape his predicament until the car is destroyed by the patrolman.

The car is a kind of death-in-life symbol. (Mystery 72)

Often, O'Connor's explanations of the symbols in her stories, both in her letters and in her lectures, provide nearly as much entertainment as does her fiction itself, and her ideas about symbolism seem clearly to have been influenced by her reading.

Although O'Connor enjoyed clarifying her symbolism, she was sometimes defensive about the classification of her writing as "grotesque." For instance, she wrote a friend in July 1959 that her current novel, The Violent Bear It Away, is "less grotesque than Wise Blood" (Habit 343). However, in response to a reply from the friend

describing Tarwater as a monster, O'Connor answered in November of that year by writing, "I don't feel Tarwater is such a monster. . . . I don't think he's a caricature. I find him entirely believable, plausible, given his circumstances" (Habit 358). Nevertheless, she was fascinated by the out-of-the ordinary. She drew vertical lines, for example, on both margins of this passage in Mircea Eliade's 1958 work, Patterns in Comparative Religion: "This setting-apart sometimes has positive effects; it does not merely isolate, it elevates. Thus ugliness and deformities, while marking out those who possess them, at the same time make them sacred" (18). Likewise, O'Connor wrote this marginal note beside a similar statement on a nearby page: "The grotesque is naturally the bearer of mystery, is dangerous" (14). The character of Bishop in The Violent Bear It Away may reflect her study of such ideas. Bishop, a retarded child, is featured in the middle section of the novel. A relationship between Eliade's lines and O'Connor's introduction of Tarwater and Bishop to the woman attendant can be glimpsed in one passage set at the Cherokee Lodge and written from the woman's point of view:

The instant the child [Bishop] touched him, the country boy's [Tarwater's] shoulder leapt. He snatched his touched hand up and jammed it in his pocket. "Leave off!" he said in a high voice. "Git away and quit bothering me!"

"Mind how you talk to one of them there, you boy!" the woman hissed.

He looked at her as if it were the first time she had spoken to him. "Them there what?" he murmured.

"That there kind," she said, looking at him fiercely as

if he had profaned the holy. (155)

O'Connor's portrayal of significant incidents in Tarwater's moment of crisis in the same novel offers possible traces of her study of Eliade's work. For instance, in a passage that O'Connor marked with a vertical line, Eliade wrote:

But it is quite certain that anything man has ever handled, felt, come in contact with or loved can become a hierophany. We know, for instance, that all the gestures, dances and games children have and many of their toys, have a religious origin -- they were once the gestures and objects of worship. (11)

In The Violent Bear It Away, for example, O'Connor describes a corkscrew-bottleopener that Rayber gives Tarwater: "The little instrument glittered in the center of his palm as if it promised to open great things for him. . . . He returned the corkscrew-bottleopener to his pocket and held it there in his hand as if henceforth it would be his talisman" (224). Later, to underscore how Tarwater is raped both physically and spiritually by a familiar-looking stranger, O'Connor writes that "In about an hour, the stranger emerged alone and looked furtively about him. He was carrying the boy's hat for a souvenir and also the corkscrew-bottleopener" (231). The child's tool thus illustrates Eliade's claim that even the most common objects can acquire special or even sacred significance. O'Connor's study of Eliade suggests how her reading may have affected her writing.

The desire to be a writer struck Flannery O'Connor nearly like a religious conversion. It was truly a vocation to her. She accepted the authors who wrote about the craft of fiction as mentors, and she

ruminated over the philosophers she read to expand her own horizons. Pepper and Foerster influenced certain aspects of her structure and style, but they also had an impact on goals for her writing. For instance, when Pepper quoted Santayana, O'Connor underlined the passage: "Nothing has less to do with the real merit of a work of imagination than the capacity of all men to appreciate it; the true test is the degree and kind of satisfaction it can give him who appreciates it most" (52). Similarly, she also cryptically wrote "Titian V. Girl" in the margin of this passage in a volume by Norman Foerster and others, entitled Literary Scholarship: "Undoubtedly the majority of men make less distinction between life and art than do men of letters, who go to the arts not primarily for a vicarious life, the escape from one life to another, but for a special experience which life does not offer" (148). To understand O'Connor's marginal note, "Titian, V. Girl," one must return to Pepper's book. Expanding on the just-cited words of Santayana, Pepper continues, in a passage which O'Connor also marked:

If now it is asked, "How on this basis can a Titian be superior to a Varga girl?" the answer would be something like this: In the first place, any man who cannot appreciate a Titian is missing something. The second man, moreover, assuming that he also appreciates a Varga, perceives that a Varga girl is little more than a poor substitute for a real girl who is much more worth appreciating than the picture of her, whereas there is no substitute for a Titian. (52)

In order to understand how O'Connor took such comments by Pepper and Foerster to heart, one must note how their words are reflected in her own remarks. For example, she told one audience:

I have a very high opinion of the art of fiction and a very low opinion of what is called the "average" reader. I tell myself that I can't escape him, that this is the personality I am supposed to keep awake, but that at the same time, I am also supposed to provide the intelligent reader with the deeper experience that he looks for in fiction. (Mystery 95)

Similarly, in a composite of very late material (passages in a paper read at the College of St. Teresa, Winona, Minnesota, and published in 1964, the year of O'Connor's death), she declared that the writer

has to write at his own intellectual level. . . . This doesn't mean that, within his limitations, he shouldn't try to reach as many people as possible, but it does mean that he must not lower his standards to do so. Arthur Koestler has said that he would swap a hundred readers now for ten readers in ten years and that he would swap those ten for one in a hundred years. This is the way every serious writer feels about it. (Mystery 186-7)

Clearly, Flannery O'Connor devoted her adult life and professional career to cultivating her "habit of art." Although the number of volumes examined here is a small portion of her total library, the information the volumes provide can serve as an impetus for continuing the inquiry. The passages analyzed provide evidence that further research in her library will yield additional insights into the structure of her fiction and the substance of her meanings.

CHAPTER II
METHOD OF EXAMINING MARKED PASSAGES
AND INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bibliographic information is provided on each volume from O'Connor's personal library that was examined. Publication dates are shown unless O'Connor's book bore no date. The number Arthur F. Kinney assigned the book in Flannery O'Connor's Library: Resources of Being is retained. Below the title, in sequential numbers, are listed the pages where O'Connor marked a passage; then, in bold-face type, the description cites the beginning and ending words or word fragments along the outside margin closest to the marks; then follows, also in bold-face type, an abbreviation of the marks themselves. Contextual comments are provided in square brackets; finally there follows a close paraphrase (not exact quotation) of the passage. If O'Connor made an additional mark or comment within the passage, it is cited in boldface preceding the words thus marked. Every passage that O'Connor marked in a book is presented in this manner.

Since O'Connor considered her books to be her friends, she not only marked them prolifically but also talked to them in her marginalia, sometimes referring a passage in one book to a passage in another, sometimes writing a humorous agreement or disagreement with an author's statement. Where she made such comments, the comment is recorded word for word. However, since she also made many markings that were customary for her, I have compiled an index of the abbreviations used to designate her usual markings.

Abbreviations:

A	- Arrow
BR	- Bracket
CK	- Check mark
DVL	- Double vertical line
DVL,BM	- Double vertical line, both margins
HL	- Horizontal line
HVL	- Hooked vertical line
L	- Loop
MN	- Marginal note
NOW	- Note written over word
P	- Parenthesis
PUL	- Partially underlined
SL	- Sideways loop
SQ	- Squiggle
UL	- Underlined
VD	- Vertical dots
VL	- Vertical line
X	- X mark

CHAPTER III

Beach, Joseph Warren. The Twentieth Century Novel: Studies in Technique. New York: D. Appleton Century, Inc., 1932. Kinney 332.

4: "Henry James. What Fielding / Meredith"; UL. [Henry James was virtually the single past writer in English who commented extensively on novelistic technique.] Fielding usually was concerned with "truth to nature" in the short critical compositions placed before each book of Tom Jones, and for all practical purposes that was the entire matter of interest of Thackeray, of George Eliot, of Meredith [in the repeated analytical explanations they inserted in their novels.]

4: "most frequently / unique word"; UL. [Although the French naturalists were masters of technique and sometimes made interesting technical comments, they mostly discussed analyzed either the] "human document" (Zola, the Goncourt brothers) or the exact, the singular word (Flaubert, Maupassant) [i.e., either "scientific truth" or style].

6: "And, having / ing it"; UL. [Percy Lubbock, in The Craft of Fiction, shows the manner in which Henry] James in The Ambassadors converts exposition or description into drama by filtering it through the awareness of the main character. . . .

20: "in the twentieth / us illustrates"; UL. [George Eliot's novels exemplify three important traits of Victorian fiction which are now

unfashionable in the twentieth century.] There is a usual tendency to instruct in a manner that teaches standards of right and wrong. There is an affection for discussing and analyzing the characters with the reader, supporting a particular position, and telling the reader what position he should adopt. And there is an intense scientific desire to interpret the character in order to cause the reader to realize how the specific episode being described exemplifies the principles of human nature on the whole.

26: "The disposition / the middle"; UL. The tendency to focus attention on the inner self's interpretation of events has become increasingly prominent in fiction, at any rate in English fiction, since around the mid-eighteen fifties.

98: "One feature / phy. He has"; HVL. [In discussing Dostoevski's technique], I will refer only briefly to a single distinguishing quality, the character of Svidrigailov [in Crime and Punishment]. It exemplifies so effectively Dostoevski's infallible natural talent, anytime he has a universal theoretical truth to reveal, for creating an actual character to be its personification. He desires that Raskolnikov, his main character, be generally appealing to the reader. His sensitivity itself makes him even more susceptible to a loss of belief which shows the extent of his compassion for wretched humanity. This is also correct of Ivan Karamazov [in The Brothers Karamazov]. But in both instances, Dostoevski wants us to be aware of the very deep moral repulsiveness suggested in the character's stance toward religion; he wants the man to realize it himself. And in each instance where he

has portrayed this type of character, he has created a loathsome duplicate or shadow. For Ivan Karamazov there is Smerdyakov; for Raskolnikov there is Svidrigailov.

Raskolnikov is a lofty spirit debased by a deceptive philosophy.

409: "we are made"; UL. [Just as slow-motion close-ups can be effective in film, so similar techniques can be used in fiction. In such cases] there is an extreme extension of a particular point in time.

409: "Ulysses. The / imaginary."; UL. [In a work such as Joyce's Ulysses], the union of three parts into one, sensation-motive-conduct, no longer functions. Activity is so negligible and disjointed that it scarcely has any importance, and we cannot have an appropriate sense of how action relates to feeling and thought. Intention, which is so greatly weighed in relation to conduct, seems to be in a feeble and ailing state of health. Sensation is the salient feature of the scenery -- real and fancied sensation.

447: "failures, so / in Dos"; UL. [Some recent novels exemplify a tendency to focus not so much on individuals] as on the human community as a living thing with interdependent functioning parts, where the separate human beings are significant mainly as they relate to each other and the total organism. [Beach mentions John Dos Passos as an example of such a novelist.]

CHAPTER IV

Eliade, Mircea. Patterns in Comparative Religion. Trans. Rosemary Sheed. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Kinney 241.

7: "in fact complex, / are nullified."; VL. [If one can demonstrate] that the religious experiences of peoples of the very earliest anthropological cultures are actually complicated, that they cannot be diminished merely to "'animism'", "'totemism'", or just "ancestor-worship," that they contain revelations of "Supreme Beings" with the entire force of an all-powerful "Creator-God," then at that time these assumptions based on theories of man's development in slow stages (assumptions which refuse early man any nearness to "'superior hierophanies'") are brought to nothing.

11: "man has / objects of"; VL. It is completely indisputable that any object that man has ever manipulated with his hands, touched, come together with or felt devotion for can become a "hierophany," that is, a sacred object. We are aware from previous study that all the expressive bodily movements, the rhythmic steps to music, the recreations by which children amuse themselves, and a great number of their playthings have a religious source -- at one time they were movements and articles of sacred devotion.

13: "singling-out. A / concerned"; UL [from "A" to "itself"]. An inanimate object becomes holy to the extent that it manifests (that is,

it discloses) something distinct from the object itself.

14: "throughout Central Celebes. Perfection / to be venerated,"; VL, MN. Next to second paragraph: "the grotesque is naturally the bearer of mystery, is dangerous." Flawlessness in any field is alarming, and this holy or mystical trait of flawlessness can help explain the fear that all societies, including the most enlightened, appear to experience when confronted with a genius or a saint. Perfection does not come from this earth. It is a distinct thing, it derives from another place.

This identical dread, this identical careful keeping of one's distance, pertains to all things foreign, unfamiliar, recently discovered -- the fact that such amazing things should appear is a manifestation of a power that, no matter how much it should be revered, can possibly be perilous.

18: "This setting-apart / the art,"; VL [both margins]. At times, being segregated or separated has an affirmative consequence; it not only sets apart, it exalts. In this manner unsightliness and grotesqueness, although drawing attention to those who exhibit them, simultaneously make them hallowed. Therefore, within the tribes of the Ojibwa Indians, "many receive the name of witches without making any pretension to the art, merely because they are deformed or ill-looking." [G. Landtmann, quoted by N. Söderblom, The Living God, Oxford, 1933, p. 15.]

19: "disturbing epi- / something.,"; UL. The unfamiliar and the remarkable are troubling manifestations: they signify the nearness of an element apart from the normal; the nearness, or, at the minimum, the

summons of that element.

29: "the dialectic / God and man."; VL, partial UL. The fact that the logic of sacred manifestations, of the revelation of the holy in objects consisting of matter, was a focus of study even for such a complicated philosophy as that produced by medieval theologians, helps confirm that it continues to be the central issue of any religion. One might say that all manifestations of the sacred merely prefigure the mystery of the Incarnation, that every such manifestation is a failed effort to disclose the union of God with humanity.

29: "It does / even that of"; VL. For that reason it does not appear at all irrational to examine the character of primitive hierophanies from the perspective of Christian theology: God is at liberty to reveal himself in any manner or substance -- even in such forms as stone and wood.

31: "life of the / Australia for"; VL. [One has simply to note, first,] that the religious existence of the "'primitive'" extends past the scope one usually apportions to religious experience and theory, and, second, that this religious existence is always complicated -- the uncomplex and flat-surfaced accounts repeatedly offered in attempts to synthesize and to appeal to the general public are determined wholly by the writer's, to some degree, subjective choice. Without doubt some styles will be discovered to control the religious situation (totemism in Australia, to illustrate

31: "people of / confirmation of"; VL [inside margin]. In fact the inability of modern people to conduct their bodily lives (specifically as those lives relate to sex and nutrition) as religious rites is one of the primary characteristics that sets them apart from the people of early cultures.

31: "they are / expressions"; VL. For the person of today they [sex and nutrition] are merely organic functions, but for primitive man they were in fact sacraments, rituals whereby he was connected with the power which symbolized Life itself. As will later become apparent, this power and vitality are mere expressions [of ultimate reality]

38: "This does not / miracles of"; VL [inside margin; short VL before second sentence]. Primitive man's religious response to the sky is not mere nature-worship. To the primitive mind, nature is never totally "natural." The expression, "contemplating the vault of heaven" actually has a particular significance when used in connection with primitive man, who is open to the supernatural wonders of each day to a degree that we moderns find difficult to conceive.

39: "we repeat: / symbolizes trans-"; UL. [Religious responses to the sky are neither wholly logical nor wholly irrational.] Let me say it again: prior to any religious worth being attributed to the sky, it still discloses its transcendental quality.

CHAPTER V

Foerster, Norman, John C. McGalliard, Rene Wellek, Austin Warren,
and Wilbur L. Schramm. Literary Scholarship, Its Aims and Methods.
Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1941. Kinney 287.

96: "Modern / ards. Thus"; VL. Modern literary history came into being almost simultaneously with the Romantic movement, which could overthrow the Neo-classical critical rules only by arguing that standards are relative and that changing times require changing rules.

97: "one common. / those devised"; UL. [From "All" to "integrity."] All these new approaches to literature have one mutual trait: they attempt to span the perilous chasm between meaning and form and to refrain from segregating single elements like meter and diction. They make an effort to examine critically the aesthetic work without disregarding its coherence and integration.

98: "the role / qualities"; UL. [From "Roman" to "implied."] Roman Ingarden's intriguing book Das literarische Kunstwerk (Halle, 1931) has mapped the escape: a painstaking distinction between the various layers of a work leads from a focus on designs of sound and groups of meaning to the tangible things symbolized and even to the transcendental elements suggested.

98-99: "interpretation of / not with--"; UL. [From "the 'world-view'"]

to "refers.]" [An explanation of the] "'world-view'" will be implied within the work of art as well as the entire design of realities and relationships to which it alludes. [The "'idea'" is not separate from the form of the work.]

100: "possibly be defended. Literary / specific"; UL. [From "Literary history" to "specific question."] Literary history is completely unimaginable without some decisions about value. These decisions are implicit in the simple selection of works, in the very basic issue of distinguishing between mere books and writing of enduring importance, in the simple allotment of space to this or that particular subject of inquiry.

104: "Even Coleridge's / of two"; UL. Even Coleridge's well-known explanation of the difference between "fancy" and "imagination" seems less significant as a difference in "psychology" than as a perception of two kinds of imagery which could be distinguished without assuming two separate mental capabilities.

107: "Mr. Bateson ig- / linguistics, it is"; UL. [From "Mr. Bateson" to "forces."] [In his 1934 book English Poetry and the English Language, F.W. Bateson argues that literature is totally dependent on external changes in language.] Mr. Bateson overlooks the reality that language is also influenced by literary works and that both language and literary works are shaped by other societal influences.

107: "But the / overemphasis on lin-"; UL. [Through "evolution."] But

the very reality that we can imagine a comprehensive record of enduring literary works, which would also be a record of literary structures and kinds, cutting across all language barriers, shows that literature cannot be reduced to a plain involuntary reaction to changes in language.

111: "extent independent"; CK. [Literature may be either ahead of or behind its "times." To achieve accurate results we must study the precise connections between literature and society in each era and we must understand that writing of enduring importance is often produced by a particular] group of intellectuals who are to a large degree free from [the influence of social classes].

112: "intellectual background / as a document"; UL. [From "it seems"] [The sociological approach to literature is therefore as fraught with possible error as the focus on intellectual background. The sociological method] appears either to enforce unrelated standards on literature or to use literature simply as written evidence relevant to other areas of knowledge.

113: "general time-."; UL. "Time-spirit" [is an English translation of the German word "Geistesgeschichte," which means the general psychology of a period and which is not limited to one sphere of human action. In this approach, literature is studied as an expression of the overall intellectual development of humanity.]

117: "One diffi- / signs. We"; UL. [Why has there been no

comprehensive effort to outline the development of literature as art?] One problem is clearly the reality that the preliminary study of aesthetic works has not been conducted consistently or systematically. Literary criticism has not yet worked out adequate procedures which would permit us to describe an aesthetic work only as a coherent arrangement of symbols.

117: "signs / of lang-"; UL. [Approaches to literature that emphasize either the author or the reader lead either to conjecture or to relativism. The best solution for finding the essence of a work of art would be to forget concepts based on individual psychology and search out the central core of an aesthetic creation] in coherent arrangement of symbols and understood conventions that occur as social realities in the shared beliefs of a culture just as, for example, the accepted sounds that constitute spoken communication exist.

118: "Literary history / individual works"; UL. [Histories of the visual arts and music often emphasize changes in general forms or styles.] Literary history is faced with a similar challenge of outlining the aesthetic evolution of literature in relative detachment from the events of its culture's past, the lives of its creators, or the random assessment of particular creations.

120: "literature was produced / history."; UL. [From "Even an"] [There is a difference between that which really happened but is now past and that which happened but somehow remains still with us. The Battle of Waterloo is clearly over, although it can be known and its influence can

still be perceived. However, great poems, buildings, or pieces of music, although created in the past, are somehow still part of the here and now. Nevertheless, this fact does not imply that genuine history is impossible.] Actually, a particular literary creation does not stay the same over the passage of time. [In fact, The Iliad has undergone a lengthy process of being interpreted and analyzed.]

120: "depend. In Homer / part of"; UL, VL, MN. ["?" at "In Homer"] In Homer and in all other poets we are unable to grasp all the the many conflicting nuances which are a vital part of what he intends to express.

120: "part of his meaning. There / through the minds."; UL. [From "There is,"] [In Homer's poetry] there is, certainly, a large sameness of structure which has not changed over time. But the structure evolves: it changes during the course of history as it is mentally experienced by audiences, critics, and fellow-poets.

120: "To speak / complete interruption"; DVL. To discuss "'eternity'" is simply to recognize the reality that the routine procedure of interpreting, criticizing, and appreciating has never been entirely broken and will likely go on endlessly, or at least as long as there is no total break of a culture's heritage.

120-121: "complete interruption / of universal literature."; UL. [From "One of"] One of the necessary duties of the literary historian is to illustrate the evolution of procedures for interpretation, criticism,

and appreciation. Another is to outline the evolution of creative works ranked in smaller and bigger groups, including those written by the same author, those which are members of the same aesthetic categories, those which share similar styles, those which are part of the same linguistic heritage, and lastly within a system of literature common to all humanity.

121: "objection that there / isolation of"; UL [from "One" to "anarchy"], BR, BR, MN. "fallacious analogy?" A person may encounter the argument that there is no account of literature as such, but merely of individuals creating with words. If we accepted this premise, we should also have to agree that there is no point in compiling a record of language because language consists only of individuals speaking words, [BR, BR, MN,. "fallacious analogy?"] or abandon a record of the development of philosophy because there are only individuals thinking. Such severe subjectivism would necessarily lead to general confusion.

124: "evolution. It / postulated."; UL. [The concept of evolution as the idea of historical evolution] acknowledges that a simple sequence of changes is not enough but that a purpose, a goal must be taken for granted for this sequence.

124: "collection of / gle event unimpaired"; UL. [From "The solution"] [If we are to understand historical evolution (as opposed to biological evolution) we must save the uniqueness of the historical event, but also retain a sense of the historical process as more than a series of unconnected events.] The answer to the problem is found in the effort

to connect the process of history to a value or common standard. Only then can the seemingly random sequence of happenings be divided into its fundamental and non-fundamental parts. Only then can we discuss historical development while still saving the distinctive character of the separate happenings.

129: "in its emphasis / only plead"; UL. [From "seems unduly" to "art"]

[We are only beginning to learn how to analyze a literary work in terms of its coherence. We are clumsy and our underlying theory is constantly changing. Therefore much remains to be done. Nor should we regret that the study of literature is unfinished and that new discoveries will require new methods. But we must search to define a new ideal of literary history and new methods for realizing that ideal. If this general plan sketched here for attaining this goal] appears excessively "purist" in its stress on the history of literature as aesthetics, [I can only argue that no alternative approach has been ruled out, and that such a focus seems needed in order to negate the expansionist tendency that has taken hold of literary history in the last decades.]

139: "the uncondi- / When it"; UL, "contingent," "unconditioned."

[Written above "contingent" is the word "possible"] [History] focuses on contingent occurrences [over "contingent" is written "possible"], the possible; philosophy with the unconditioned. [Literature reconciles the difference between these two.]

139: "When it / implied a typ-"; UL. When literature partially fails, it is because it explains a common rule by pointing to a specific

example, or explains a specific example by offering a general proverb; when it truly succeeds, its specific and general are so entwined that only by emphasis or tone can one determine if the general type embodied itself or the specific example suggested a norm.

142: "certain respects / as a separable."; UL [From "Aristotle" to "aspect is false"]; MN: "formism?" [The new formalism is somewhat different from its geneology.] Aristotle was interested in deriving, from a close study of Greek tragedies, broad pronouncements regarding diction, characterization, and plot. The neoclassicists continued this focus on the overall type. Current criticism, affected by Croce's battle against genres and other generalities, has typically employed itself with analyzing specific works, considering each work as one of a kind, a category containing only one example; the norm for evaluation is derived from the specific work, and is applied by judging the power of the different parts to produce the effectiveness of the whole: the procedure is completely concerned with analysis. A second significant deviation concerns the attitude toward "form." Following Croce in his battle against the idea that artistic form is an addition, an ornament, to a "substance" susceptible of declaration in different terms, some modern critics would assert that the "meaning" of a work of literature is exactly synonymous with its precise language, so that the entire idea of "form" as a separate feature is inaccurate.

143: "allows of / imagism"; UL [from "But formal" to "surfaces"] [The aesthetic or formalist method of criticizing poetry can become bogged down in an analysis of a poem's devices (stanza forms, rhyme schemes,

meters and images, etc.) and lose sight of the appropriateness of each feature to the poet's intent.] But when formal criticism is performed with sufficient ability, it does not deal with such isolated minutiae, nor does it restrict itself to the scrutiny of superficialities.

143: "richness of / Beauty is truth"; UL [through "in the poem"]

[Formalist criticism does not require a "pure" poetry of mere imagery and sound effects.] It permits, in fact, it highly values, the abundance or complexity of "ideas" in poetry, but it demands that they be scrutinized only as they perform within the context of the poem.

143: "to be / organism."; UL, MN: "contextualism? organicism?" The true meaning of a poem cannot be extracted in a prose restatement of what the poem says. It consists not only of its thought or concepts but of the cadences, the images, and the metaphors working together. These basic parts must be suitably scrutinized as they interact within the vital structure they constitute.

145: "ideological crit- / philosophical attitude."; UL. Ideological criticism that is discriminating and advanced will always be interested in examining the ethical or political inclination presented in the coherent literary organism, the unified work. It will note the mood or implication as well as what is stated; it will decide whether the author is seriously sincere or gently thoughtful, or teasing, or capricious, or sarcastic, or saying one thing and meaning its opposite. It will refrain from employing its examination of a novelist to do nothing more than find an excuse to promote morality or revolution. But it will take

the liberty to judge the correctness or incorrectness of the presentation of a particular social class, the presentation of the character of the protagonist or the antagonist, the narrowness or broadness of the author's philosophical attitude.

146: "The 'greatness' / literary"; UL. [Quoting T.S. Eliot]: "The 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards, though we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be determined only by literary standards."

147: "the Aristotle. / interprets the."; UL. [From "Formal critics" to "religious."] Formal critics, who are disciples of Aristotle's Poetics, believe that experiencing the artistry of a work of art gives art its value. Ideological critics, who follow Plato, believe that the worth of an aesthetic work derives from its usefulness as a tool to serve other purposes, involving economics, politics, ethics, religion.

147: "art as / which are"; UL. [Art critics and philosophers usually follow formal criticism, believing that an aesthetic experience is the goal of literature. Kant, Schopenhauer and Croce are noteworthy among this group.] Kant's view of art as having an artistic goal without a practical purpose, Schopenhauer's view of art as meditative, thus releasing us from the reckless force of direct action, and Croce's refusal to consider art either in terms of ideas it expresses or in terms of any practical purposes [are still used as critical approaches to art]

148: "public power / statesman's fear"; UL. [From "If art" to "'immoral' books?"] [Ideological critics, who regard the goal of art to be a goad to action, either economic, political, ethical, or religious, are often politicians, religious or secular people who, like Plato, believe that the arts should be censored. Efforts to destroy books and expel authors testify to the social potency of literature.] If art is cathartic rather than stimulating to strong feelings, if it draws humans back from acting instead of inciting them to rebel, why does the pragmatic politician fear "immoral" literature?

148: "than do / but for a"; MN: "Titian, V. girl." [Beyond question, fewer common people carefully distinguish between reality and art] than do highly educated people. Persons who write or read for a living look to art not chiefly as a substitute experience, a flight from one existence to another, but for a unique experience which practical reality cannot provide.

150: "the response / action"; UL. [through "behavior"] [For the reader with mature judgement] the reaction to literature is neither a lasting drawing back from action nor an artistic flight from everyday reality but an instant meditation which aids the reader toward reflective conduct rather than reflexive response to situations.

150: "humanly admirable failures. We / uninterrupted"; UL. [From "We" to "irrelevance."] [In the greatest literary works, the writer's imagination, both ethical and artistic, organizes and presents alternatives to the reader, of moral options, of political adjustments,

of disreputable successes and estimable defeats.] We have the chance, withheld from us in our daily existence, to be aware of others' internal thoughts and dreams and of the forces that drive other human beings; and we have the chance to observe ordered successions of cause and effect shape themselves unobstructed by unrelated events.

151: "embodiment. We / structure and its."; UL. [From "We" through "tone"] [We must not take either the aesthetic (formal) method or the ideological method of criticism as completely separate, assuming that one is concerned with form and the other with content.] We must instead regard these two approaches as procedures which balance one another. Formal criticism will scrutinize the entire structure of a work of literature, including its inherent themes; ideological criticism will involve itself with the interpretation and critical evaluation of a work's philosophical stance, both plainly expressed and understood but unstated, including the qualities its related parts communicate when combined in a whole and the prevailing impression that whole transmits.

154-155: "Who is / sires."; OM: "intensity, duration, varied values"

Is the common person, the aristocrat, the saint, or the literary expert to determine the merit of a work? The question is usually side-stepped -- and answered -- by responding that the broader the appeal, the more valuable the work. T. S. Eliot states that the writer "naturally prefers to write for as large and miscellaneous an audience as possible"; and the literary expert recognizes the multiple layers of meaning in a play by Shakespeare. "For the simplest auditors there is the plot, for the more thoughtful the character and conflict of

character, for the more literary the words and phrasing, for the more musically sensitive the rhythm, and for auditors of greater understanding and sensitiveness a meaning which reveals itself gradually." This quotation inherently suggests a standard by which we judge a masterpiece: the masterpiece manifests valuable traits which are so full and satisfying and so different from one another that each level of reader, though disregarding much of what is presented, will gain the kind of gratification he seeks.

158: "Categories / may be"; MN: "organicism" [beside "categories of form"] [Since the end of the eighteenth century, a focus on form has been one means by which aesthetic philosophers have tried to achieve objectivity. It has been accepted as true that certain forms (simple, such as tones, colors, shapes, and lines; and complex, such as certain structural arrangements) are satisfying to all mankind; that, in literary works, some words are gratifying simply because of their distinctive sounds. Fechner and other German experts in the study of responses to art have tried to offer a formal declaration of the utmost] classifications of form, of which Fechner's trio — "unity, consistency, and clarity" — may be regarded as typical.

159: "purity, / qualities. Schools of criticism,"; UL. [From "Rich-ness" to "qualities."] [The ultimate artistic criteria, it seems, are richness and purity.] Richness and purity are mutually related, because richness is always enclosed within some certain limitations, leaves some things out, and because purity is on all occasions judged in relation to the purity of some other aesthetic composition, real or imagined.

Therefore, as Prall has informed us, the criteria of excellence are the relative extent, not the characteristics themselves, or, more exactly, perhaps, the ratios of opposite characteristics.

162: "No available / of a calculated"; UL. [through "response."]

[Corneille, Racine, Moliere, Boileau, and La Fontaine repeatedly assert that the greatest rule of all artistic rules involves pleasing.] Even though none of the psychological knowledge presently at hand seems of much aid to the modern literary critic, he must not let the lack of a scientific tool that is both exact and applicable preclude him from understanding, just as Aristotle understood, that the purpose of the formal organization of a literary work is to cause a predetermined reaction.

165: "belief, or / interposes no ob-"; UL. [From "When" through

"experience,"] [There are provisional estimates in judging literature philosophically just as there are in critically judging philosophy.

T. S. Eliot stated that there was no hindrance to the reader's satisfaction with a work] if he could agree that the "doctrine, theory, belief, or 'view of life' presented in a poem is coherent, mature, and founded on the facts of experience"

173-174: "The exactness / of moral."; UL. [Criticism is not a precisely objective science, although it aims to be as precise and objective as possible: it will more and more reject imprecision and subjectivity. However, it will never attempt to be so supposedly scientific that it will sacrifice its focus on the values typical of the literary

experience.] The accuracy to be wished for is a precise separation of the whole of a literary work into its various parts, describing the distinctive characteristics perceived in consistent technical terms, and thoroughly discerning the impression it makes upon its reader. In formal criticism, the wished for tentative objectivity is obtained by concentrating on the particular literary work, so that the explanation furnished can be confirmed by the reader's close examination of the text; in ideological criticism such limited objectivity is obtained by referring the evaluation to some coherent group of concepts of moral or political philosophy.

CHAPTER VI

Hostie, Raymond, S.J. Religion and the Psychology of Jung. Trans.
G. R. Lamb. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1957. Kinney 53.

17: "in the early / Tibetanische Toten-"; VL. [Throughout all his research, Jung managed to hold on to the special character of psychic phenomena. This caused him to fight against the scientific materialism of his time and led him to try to prove that the concept of God is a psychic reality. This attempt offended believers (especially some Protestants) who concluded that what Jung was saying was equal to declaring that God was not an actual reality, just a mental reality.] In fact, it does appear as if in the beginning phases of his career Jung was satisfied to be an agnostic in order to permit himself some independence of thought, and thus he exposed himself to the accusation of psychologism [that is, of using psychological concepts to interpret historical events and logical thoughts.] This accusation has been made against him ever since that time. Nevertheless, as he grew older, he fought this explanation of his position as being conspicuously in error.

18: "Jung therefore / ontological reality"; VL. [Jung felt that the people of the Western world consider "psychological" to really mean "only psychological."] For this reason, Jung wants to reveal the unique, particular character of mental facts, but at the same time he

asserts that this testifies neither for nor against the final, objective reality of the matters studied.

18-19: "acted independently / This collective"; VL. [Freud considered the unconscious to be made up of separate suppressed psychic elements, and claimed that, since they were suppressed, they acted on their own and not as a part of the ego.] In contrast, Jung's opinion was that in addition to this unconscious (which he believed in without reluctance as the "personal unconscious"), there was present a more basic level yet, shared by all human beings and therefore rightfully called the "collective unconscious."

40: "easily have / expressive face."; VL. [Freud believed that the symbolism of dreams functions to bring up acceptable screen images which are disguises for desires that are otherwise unacceptable. This idea of symbolism suggests that the dreamer could have spoken his wish] without difficulty or disguise if he had not believed it essential to deceive the power that suppressed whatever seemed morally objectionable. In Freud's opinion the dream, as a sign, was a deluding mask. Conversely, Jung saw the dream as a symbol, and thus as more like a face full of expression.

41: "passage: No / at once."; DVL. [Over the period from 1906 to 1940, Jung's respect for the symbol evolved. He went from believing that the precision of the sign and the allegory made them more important than the complex symbol to a different belief, which he summarized in 1940 in this passage:] "No symbol is simple. Only signs and allegories

are simple. For a symbol always covers a complex reality which is so far beyond any verbal equivalent that it can never be expressed all at once."

44: "the question of / it. This"; DVL, BM. [Jung's view of dreams was more flexible than Freud's. In addition, Jung was capable of explaining something even more significant: the nature of symbolism.] Since consciousness always works from something that actually exists or has occurred and whose basic meaning is extremely obvious, at no time can it in itself constitute a real symbol. [Jung wrote,] "An expression that stands for a known thing always remains merely a sign and is never a symbol. It is therefore quite impossible to make a living symbol, i.e., one that is pregnant with meaning, from known associations. For what is thus manufactured never contains more than was put into it."

103: "individual sub- / of dis-"; VL. [In 1927, Jung wrote that his concept of the soul was more comparable to the primitive conception than to the Christian. The Christian idea seeks to be an inclusive philosophical concept of a transcendental individual element, whereas, according to Jung,] "My conception of the soul has nothing to do with this, since I use it in a merely phenomenological sense." Moreover, in his introduction to a French edition of his writings he repeated, in 1938: "Psychology cannot -- and does not wish to -- establish any metaphysical truths: all it is concerned with is psychological phenomenology."

Consequently, phenomenology should be considered as a system of uncovering the true sense of the phenomenon as it seems to [the

individual examining it without any effort to assess its ultimate reality.]

114: "I think belief / psycho-analytic cure"; HVL. [Jung believed that Western culture still clings to religiousness even though the education of Western feeling has made religion superfluous to modern man. Jung also felt that man's belief in religious symbols is only a positive creed which keeps man infantile and thus morally inferior. Although religion has been of great cultural importance and retains an undying beauty, it is delusive and can no longer morally satisfy mankind, which seeks to achieve ethical independence. The immaturity and ethical hazard consists in believing in the symbol because we thereby direct desire to a reality that exists only in the mind. Merely negating the symbol alters nothing, since the whole frame of mind remains unchanged; we simply eliminate the hazardous focus of thought. But the focus itself is not hazardous; rather, the hazard is in our own childlike habits of mind] "I think belief should be replaced by understanding; then we would keep the beauty of the symbol, but still remain free from the depressing results of submission to belief. This would be the psychoanalytic cure for belief and disbelief."

116: "Are we then / at the very root"; MN. "Teilverd?" Therefore, should we accept Jung's ambiguous praise with joy: "The Christian religion seems to have fulfilled its great biological purpose, in so far as we are able to judge"? On the contrary, it appears essential to call attention to the fact that there is a shocking dilemma at the actual base of this concept; because is it not in reality absurd to assert

[that a religious mistake constitutes the foundation of all Western teaching and that a religious delusion has shaped its high system of moral principles?]

123: "of mythological / themselves."; HVL. In Jung's view, studying the similarity of mythological counterparts offers much insight into the distinct entity of Christ, who is considered to symbolize the same sun-god as Mithras in a different aspect. Similar to Mithras, Christ represents the libido, which produces life after death. Since Christ made psychic energy physically visible in a distinctly impressive way, Christian believers see in him a personal model that they themselves can try to emulate. Unconsciously, they identify him as the supreme reflection of the psychic energy that is fermenting in the deepest part of their own nature. They surrender to him as a physical being -- accepting him as actually existing -- because he is really the most highly prized element of themselves.

124: "oriented towards / bring a certain"; VL. [Jung believed that biological instincts and spiritual archetypes form part of all human beings. These two basic parts of man's nature oppose and complement each other. Jung felt that religion, that is, surrender to God -- who is actually a projection of archetypes in the unconscious -- is an essential function in man. It is spiritual, not biological, whether it is sublimated or not. Jung accepted the existence of this essential religious function which] faces in the direction of an ultimate whose manifestation has always been recognized as God. Indeed, Jung says, this actuality is the psychic reality of the archetypes, on which

humankind perceives itself as relying for support. Consequently, religion is in error concerning the reality that it conceives to be its focus; another consequence, however, is that religion is psychologically valid, because it reveals mankind's most basic nature. Religious symbols are a support to individuals who from a deficiency in suitable moral growth and personal spirituality are left restricted by their own projected ideas. "They make it possible for many people to bring a certain amount of useful activity into their lives."

125: "projection of"; CK. [Studying primitive psychology has affected only two matters in helping solve the religious problems of analytical psychology. First, Jung believes that the different pre-animistic ideas of primitive man verify the existence of a universal permeation of the energetic or dynamic concept of the psyche] and he believes that the concept of God is really a projection of psychic energy working in the unconscious.

136: "symbol protects"; A. [When a religious genius finds a particularly appealing symbol that is rich with significance, he finds followers at once. For he is offering them an advanced concept of God, complete with suitable rituals and a designed system of doctrine. He assists them in channelling their psychic energy in a pre-determined direction. He is offering them an opportunity to re-direct, without effort or risk, their own unique ideas of the parent. The followers can simply adopt his rituals and doctrines and escape the danger of clearly facing the activity of the archetypes. Jung says,] "The dogmatic symbol protects a person from a direct experience of God."

154: "case is very / professions"; VL. [Jung says that psychology in no way excludes the existence of God.] The set of facts is actually opposite, he appears to state: "When I say as a psychologist that God is an archetype, I mean by that the 'type' in the psyche. The word 'type' is, as we know, derived from *τύπος*, 'blow' or 'imprint'; thus an archetype presupposes an imprinter. Psychology as the science of the soul has to confine itself to its subject. . . . Should it set up a God, even as a hypothetical cause, it would have implicitly claimed the possibility of proving God, thus exceeding its competence in an absolutely illegitimate way. Science can only be science; there are no 'scientific' professions of faith."

154: "Why then / has its"; VL. For what reason, therefore, does Jung retain the word "God" in his lexicon to any extent? The cause is comparatively uncomplicated: if after the application of psychological analysis we discover an archetype at hand, revealing itself in a type of symbolism with the same characteristics as the most generally accepted descriptions of God, we name it "God." Therefore, psychology has its own special meaning for the word.

154: "these, and the / symbolic expressions"; VL [inside margin]. [To Jung's readers who are religious believers, the word "God" means both the "real" God and the "absolute" God. Psychology, however, dispenses with both these senses of the word.] Consequently, the religious individual must be careful to remember whenever he is studying Jung that the God Jung is discussing is a theoretical concept which encompasses not only the "true" God but Allah, Purusha and the Tao equally. To put

it another way, the word "God" includes every one of the separate beliefs that have been embraced about him all through man's varied and changeable past. In addition, he must bear in mind that Jung does not intend to imply as much as the philosophical reality of the existence of this God he discusses, just its echoes and reflections in the human psyche -- which also show up when people participate in reverential awe and when they relate to the concept of God through symbolism.

157: "points out in / to defending"; VL. [inside margin] [In Jung's view the religious believer's faith is the same as a metaphysical assertion. Both are subjective. Jung states that a religious-minded person is free to believe whatever he wants about the origins of the images of God, but the scientist must rely on the principles of scientific interpretation. Therefore, since Jung believes that] metaphysics is a part of the province of faith, he mentions incidentally "the impossibility of ever proving or refuting the truth of a metaphysical assertion" -- on a scientific basis, certainly.

Such an opinion convinces me past any question that Jung is an incurable empiricist in his exploration for truth. Any belief that has no empirical scientific foundation must in his opinion be something accepted on faith, a sought-out subjective belief. Such a concept of metaphysics, theology, and faith is to some degree cheap and insubstantial and does not aid him a great deal when it comes to justifying his own opinions against critical assault.

157: "onwards Jung has / nothing. Is it surprising"; VL. [All the arguments in which Jung has been involved and all his published

correspondence show that it is very difficult for him to accept the importance of any method different from his own. We have already realized that his old agnosticism was not as much a metaphysical attitude as a reflexive means of protecting the validity of his scientific method.] If we recognize, therefore, that starting in 1944 and forward Jung never missed acknowledging the soundness of the religious believer's viewpoint, we still cannot disregard the reality that he truly lacks the resources to understand any difference between metaphysics, theology and faith. These three fields, with such fundamentally distinct qualities, are all categorized under the same label, "the religious point of view," and this contains all things whatsoever that exist outside the area of psychology and concerning it the scientist has positively no knowledge.

159: "its grievous / its scope?"; VL. [Jung's basic position is one of a tireless researcher. At first, he repudiated all religious beliefs completely. As his research progressed, he became more and more impressed at religion's role in Western civilization and the psychic evolution of the human being. Because of his earlier rejection of religion, he had no contact with anything religious for years; therefore his knowledge of religious faith and doctrine is self-acquired. The practice of] religion, with its psychological implications, and its distressing twists, had come to him solely from his patients. In light of this, is it unusual that he should have remained loyal to his scientific psychological way of seeing things longer than he would have found desirable in other circumstances? Should we not instead be even more pleased that his empirical observations have so many times aided him in

surmounting the obstacles set up by the type of mentality that to begin with was, admittedly, somewhat limited in its range?

160: "Jung is not / to his subject."; VL. [Jung has been accused of "psychologism," an accusation that he angrily rejects. Jung himself defines psychologism as "any theory that regards religion as being simply the transformation or sublimation of an instinct." According to this definition religion would be non-genuine and Jung declares that his own attitude is different from this, that he believes the religious function does not derive from some other instinct but that it is itself a kind of instinct and therefore is incapable of being diminished. Yet persons who criticize his alleged "psychologism" can cite the words of his disciples to buttress their charges. In fact, he told me that, "It is quite clear that God exists but why are people always asking me to prove this psychologically?" Concerning Jung himself, one must admit that he has made great efforts to abandon "psychologism," at least in recent times. However, his lack of metaphysical knowledge and his inadequate understanding of religion have undermined his worthy goal. Thus it is all too possible to misread his thinking to make it support a limited private perspective. Some of his followers have not been reluctant to use his ambivalences to endorse an explicit psychologism. For such persons, God is merely a fact within the mind, even when they claim that this fact cannot be dissolved. Personally, I am very certain that Jung himself would never endorse this particular view, although his own language is not sufficiently precise to end the debate.] Jung is neither an atheist nor an agnostic. He is fundamentally a researcher relying on direct experience and observation, who has remained

conscientiously loyal to his discipline.

163: "the 'sick' / to antagonism." ; VL. [Most religious counsellors know from experience that they are helpless when they run into psychic troubles, and therefore they have tried to discover a means of neatly separating the roles of the therapist and the priest. This eliminates duplication and makes any effort at collaborative work superfluous. They send the "sick" to the doctor and keep the healthy people to themselves. They try for a definite demarcation between the natural and the supernatural; the doctor handles the natural and the priest counsels concerning the supernatural, This method is neat, but not very effective.] It intentionally disregards the reality that the "sick" and the "well" do not make up two totally distinct classifications, and that the categories of the natural and the supernatural are layered, one above the other, and act on each other. A certain amount of give-and-take between psychotherapy and spiritual counselling is inescapable, and declining to cooperate with one another will unavoidably lead to hostility.

164: "contrition for deliberate"; UL [through "patient"], parentheses around "patient" with a line to the encircled marginal note "penitent." [A typical example of misunderstanding between psychological and religious matters happens when psychological analysis and confession are seen to be the same occurrence. There are only external, structural similarities. The necessary basic part in confession is a genuine feeling] of repentance for intentional conscious sins which the patient [is required to name one by one as well as he is able. The priest's

granting absolution completes the sacramental act and brings forgiveness. It causes no psychological change in the patient's mind.

In psychotherapy, the doctor is not concerned with conscious sins. He is interested in unconscious inclinations that are causing conflict and that the patient does not understand.]

176: "personal act / would be"; VL. [The psychotherapist's patients are ill because they cannot feel secure in the objective and subjective worlds. Jung stresses that the therapist must help shoulder the patient's burden temporarily but act only as an interested spectator. As the patient regains his bearings he will discover a personal meaning to his individual life. So long as the psychotherapist limits himself to his own field, and draws conclusions as to that field only, there is no basis for any religious disagreement with Jung in principle. For it is true that faith must be an act of free will, and the individual arrives at it through personal submission, not because he feels alienated from himself or the world. In this regard a missionary is only helpful when he leads his converts to a] subjective action of belief, in other words aids them to convert themselves, not at the time he converts them. It is still more a fact that the psychotherapist -- who, if he is a religious believer will be individually certain of the total objective worth of his faith -- does not have the right to force his personal faith onto his patients. He cannot morally even disturb their minds. The patients who come to his office are seeking a psychic restoration of fitness, and it would be a serious error from his side if he should selfishly use his special situation and attempt to press into their minds truths which their personal state of health makes them

incapable of absorbing.

We do not permit a physician to offer the last sacraments for a patient who is a non-believer: similarly, is it not necessary that we say that any psychotherapist who attempted to bring about a religious reformation in his patient unless it is called for by his inner development would be a most inferior psychologist?

176,77: "sound like / the cases"; VL. [Jung believed that a psychotherapist, to be effective, should neither condemn nor endorse a patient's views. He wrote in his 1932 book Modern Man in Search of a Soul, "We can get in touch with another person only by an attitude of unprejudiced objectivity."] This may seem like a scientific rule, and could possibly be mistaken as a completely logical and distanced mental position. But what I intend to communicate is a very different thing. It is a human trait -- a sort of intense consideration for facts and events and for the individual who feels pain because of them -- a consideration for the hidden things of this kind of a human experience. The genuinely religious person has this outlook. He realizes that God has caused all kinds of unusual and unimaginable things to happen, and tries in quite peculiar ways to get into a person's heart. For this reason, the doctor is aware of the invisible hand of God's purpose in all things. This is what I intend by "unprejudiced objectivity." It is an ethical accomplishment of the physician, who should not permit himself to feel distaste for sickness and depravity. "We cannot change anything unless we accept it." Censure crushes, it does not set free. I crush the individual whom I censure instead of sharing his pain in fellowship. I do not in any way intend to state that we must never make

a decision in the state of affairs of people whom we wish to aid and make better. [But if the physician wants to help a person he must learn to accept him as he is. And the physician can in fact behave this way only when he has first perceived and accepted his own true condition.]

177: "the fruit of / we have first"; VL. [inner margin] Jung's rules for the psychotherapist resulted from prolonged attention and practice. I cannot say whether or not the Protestant ministers to whom Jung delivered the discourse entitled "Psychotherapists or the Clergy" can attain them. But I can vouch with certainty that every Catholic counsellor who has responsibility for souls strives to act in accordance with Jung's high standard as closely as he can. "Unprejudiced objectivity that enables us to accept a man as he is because we have first [of all accepted ourselves as we are" is a guiding law basic to all clerical theology.]

180: "quite true / religion."; VL. [Moreover, the therapist must be mindful that his function, likewise, in dealing with the patient is limited. Even if he always passes his patients' spiritual problems along to the spiritual counsellor -- that is, if they have requested him to do this -- he must resist the temptation to dominate those who are too weak to resist his power over them. It is] totally accurate that he is not permitted to send unbelieving patients to a priest, and the reality that Jung attempts to get the patients involved to understand the psychological worth of religion is admirable. Unhappily, he fails to realize that by doing this he actually hinders them from comprehending the real, unbiased worth of religion. However, that is the true

reason that both Protestants and Catholics have censured his psychologism. His psychological reassessment of religion is not for the most part a turn to the path to faith but an impediment to any greater comprehension of the true significance of faith. For this reason, although I deferentially recognize Jung's lack of prejudice in the care of his patients, I am not able to concur with his totally psychological reassessment of religion.

181: "has to guide / fitted to deal with.;" VL. [The psychotherapist is irreplaceable if he limits himself to bringing sick people back to mental health. In effecting this healing, he is not stepping over the boundary of the priest's domain, which is dealing with conscience and spiritual matters. Indeed, he thereby frees the priest from many seemingly hopeless cases in which the priest's committed faith would inevitably be ineffectual because he has no means for dealing with them. I refer especially to cases that consume endless time in the priest's counselling office and in confession – unless the persons in question finally reject their priest – persons whom the priest cannot charitably cause himself to reject without risking killing their last hint of hope, even though he cannot help them. From a therapist such persons would receive, if not a definite cure, at least appropriate medical attention.]

If the psychotherapist is to accomplish what he intends with his efforts he must lead the people who seek him and request his counsel in the direction that will encourage the complete growth of their natural psychic inclinations. Such growth, as Jung would willingly concur, contains religious values. Such values, of course, are only completely

available in their full totality in the Church, but it is another situation when we approach the problem of their specific expression in each particular person. At this point we discover ourselves faced with a mystery that causes one of the largest puzzles in theology. Past custom, loyally holding to the course of the Gospels, says that in any particular situation personal genuineness is more important than objective truth: there is salvation for those who genuinely, even in error, have faith that they are in the truth and try the best they can to shape their lives to it. Because of this, the psychotherapist must have respect for his patient's personality, and especially his religious beliefs, on the psychic plane.

Regretfully, if psychotherapists on occasion misuse their authority to sway their patients' religious beliefs, it is likewise a fact that priests occasionally decline to recommend psychic help to individuals who require it. They appear to detest the idea of taking a subordinate position, and so they attempt to take on problems which as priests they are not competent to handle.

184: "which are essentially / light shed"; VL. [In dealing with the problems of many patients, Jung has studied a great number of problems that are philosophical and theological in nature. He has shown great energy in struggling with the writings of the Fathers, but his study has been random and unorganized. Therefore, he must be careful not to eschew statements on metaphysics and theology simply because they do not coincide with the findings acquired through his scientific investigations. The psychologist in such a situation must first determine that there is no misunderstanding on either side. If the dis-

agreement continues, he must verify that both the psychological and the theological statements are accurate. The psychological statements] which are fundamentally logical assumptions, in the specialized meaning of the word, may require to be explained to an even greater degree or to be stated somewhat differently. In addition, certainly, the theological statements may have nonobjective parts taken away, parts that have been only the result of environmental influences or historical conditions and therefore have become better clarified because of the light shed on them by psychology.

184: "There is no doubt / coveries made"; VL. It is certain that the Galileo debate promoted a more lucid comprehension of the Bible's influence. A great number of theologians had held much too restricted an understanding of the matter and were inclined to believe that it assured the scientific correctness of the sacred writers' judgements on astronomy. The reality that we do not presently believe this is not because of a change in the substance of faith but because of advancement in our comprehension of the exact character of the sacred writers' purposes. This has been the outcome of the debate brought up by discoveries made in the field of astronomy.

184: "coveries made / statement of."; VL. (inner margin) Likewise, psychology, in its own distinct manner, can aid us in a roundabout way to arrive at a better statement of particular theological questions.

192: "postulating that good."; A. [Jung searched avidly for writings that stressed the reality of evil. He particularly likes the apocryphal

books that concentrate on the conflict between Satan and Christ, where Satan is presented as God's oldest son. Jung took this to mean that Satan was the "shadow" part of God's nature and that evil is therefore complementary to good.] By taking for granted as a fundamental principle that good and evil are found in union with each other in God Jung [assumes that he manages to avoid the doctrine that they are two eternal and opposing principles. That doctrine appears to be unavoidable when one emphasizes the actual, powerful quality of evil as firmly as he does.]

194: "same thing / do. And if"; BR. [The real nature of evil is not that it is a being, but that it is a lack in a being; it is a deformity from the normal. Consequently, to state that evil is the absence of a good is not] equal to stating that evil is an inferior good. Evil is the lack of a good that should be present: it is a privation in the exact meaning of the word. There is no evil in the reality that an animal "lives like a beast"; conversely, it is a good and natural way for an animal to live.

197: "idea about / of the psyche,"; DVL. [Does this not mean that psychic evil is a lack of something, a lack of a necessary good that should be present? If this interpretation of evil is correct --] and I am convinced that it is -- we are able to understand immediately that Jung's concept that there is evil in God will not hold. Jung places good and evil in God as a rational explanation for both being a part of humans and also still at the same moment escape any kind of dualism. However, this kind of explanation is not needed. Psychic evil means a

dysfunction in the balance of the self, [and it is an incorrectable flaw because man, since he is a created being, cannot be perfect.]

203-4: make the / gations into the "quaternity"; VL. [Jung explained the doctrine of the Trinity by describing the Trinity as an archetype of the three stages in a human being's development to maturity. Therefore, to Jung the Trinity is a change from a subjective reality to a transcendental reality. In fact, Jung said that his Trinity theory was an analogy similar to St. Patrick's explanation of the concept to the Irish, using a shamrock with its three separate leaves attached to each other at the base to form one leaf. However, in contrast to St. Patrick, who truly used an] analogy -- and a somewhat insufficient one! -- to help his listeners to accept the Trinity, Jung employed his in an attempt to do away with the doctrine entirely. Jung's comparative studies have not indebted theology to him; just the opposite, they have done nothing but make greater the risk that not just the ultimate transcendence of the mystery will be hidden, but, even worse, that individuals will con-gratulate themselves for having obtained such a broad grasp and perception of the doctrine that faith alone is now not required.

Jung's research has brought forth an overflowing amount of information, every bit of it exhibited with an extremely impressive analytical format. Unhappily, it is useless zeal; it carries neither believers nor nonbelievers the least bit closer to an understanding of the dogma. By the time he comes to the end of his research he is further from the dogma of the Trinity than he was when he began, in spite of having started with the very words used by the Church Councils.

Jung's efforts to make the dogma of the Trinity palatable are corrupt at the source. Perhaps he had better fortune with his research into the "quaternity" of Christianity?

207: "implicit at / Answer to Job"; VL [inner margin]. [Since Jung's research had convinced him that ternary symbols usually express an incomplete perfection and that four is the true symbol of perfection, he questioned whether Western man had left out an essential element in his representation of God as the Trinity. Consequently, as the Christian God is seen as the Supreme Good, Jung began to toy with the concept that the missing element is evil. For Jung, this tracing of evil back into God would create a quaternity, reflecting the ideal that rules full human development. To the argument that the actual Christian dogma does not concern itself with man's idea of God, but with God's revealed being, Jung would reply that his ideas are concerned only with psychic utterances, not with dogma. However, by restricting himself in this way, Jung cannot avoid the blind alley to which his logic has taken him.] Actually, in the event that Jung desires to preserve his argument he is required, implicitly if nothing else, to reduce the dogma itself to "an utterance made by the psyche." However, dogma -- regardless if it is the dogma of the Trinity or another one -- can no more be considered as equal to some kind of "psychic utterance" than it can be equal to any symbol of space or to a colored icon. Not even the lyric dreams of a Dante or the heavenly paintings of Fra Angelico should be considered the same as the dogmatic truths they dress in literary or molded structure.

Jung was not satisfied with only one effort to discover "quaternary

symbolism" in Catholic doctrine. In his most recent monograph, Answer to Job, [he postulates that the missing element in the Trinity is the feminine element, since in medieval mandalas the Blessed Virgin often appeared along with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.]

209: "this matter? / much confusion"; VL. [inner margin] [Jung has hailed the Church's proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin as a gradual development of an unconscious archetype into consciousness and a development from an incomplete ternary symbol into the complete quaternity.] What, then, is my last opinion concerning this subject? Jung has stated many times that he does not occupy his mind with the philosophical reality of revealed truths, and I do not intend to disregard this statement of principle. At the same time, it is distressful that particular significant passages are unspecific [and that such unclear language brings about so much perplexity -- about which he then expresses indignation.]

209: "us to practice / revealed truths."; VL. [I agree with Jung when he states that no psychological explanation of any dogma can prove or disprove the dogma. In addition, I accept the value of a psychological study "of the religious person" and "of religion proper, i.e., of religious contents." However, by itself an examination of this kind cannot increase our] intellectual comprehension of dogma, nor can it assist us in adhering in our behavior to a high religious standard; nevertheless, in an oblique way it can aid us towards a keener sensitivity to anything inauthentic in religious positions and to the after-effects that psychic inclinations can have in symbolic expressions

of revealed truths.

210: "he is discussing / the field of"; VL. [Nonetheless Jung is forever permitting himself to cross beyond the limits of his own liberties and abilities. If the case is that] he is examining the meaning of mandala centres, or investigating carefully the question of evil, or decoding the meaning of quaternary and ternary symbols, he proposes his observations and psychological interpretations counter to dogmatic truths, and yet he simultaneously praises the extraordinary power of the truths to produce a desired psychological result. By going forward in this manner he without a doubt passes outside the scope of the field of psychology.

212: "he speaks / self -- is symptomatic"; CK. [Jung's fundamental hypothesis was the libido or psychic energy. But his tireless research broadened that hypothesis, first in his study of different possibilities of psychic structure that he named archetypes, and then into the whole that unifies all the parts of the structures, going out from it and returning to it, which he named the self. The meaningful evolution of his technical terms -- at first] he mentions the "libido" exclusively and as time goes on he speaks nearly exclusively of the "self" -- is an indication of the progressive deepening of his thinking. [Jung finally came to realize that the specific object of analytic psychology is man as a psychic being.]

213: "is false, or even / itself forms a whole"; VL. [Jung does not claim to speak about the "real" focus of mental forces, or the external

realities that influence archetypes, or the supernatural entities that may control the human self.] This does not mean that Jung's hypothesis is erroneous, or even not fully developed or deficient. However, it does mean that it is limiting in the same manner that every methodological explanation that sets up the specific purpose of any science is limiting. The limited nature of its purpose furnishes the science of psychology with its worth and its entire reason for existing: if it were taken away, this would signify taking away all of analytical psychology as a separate division of learning inside the component parts of psychology, which itself constitutes an entire subdivision of scientific thought.

214: "has been able / theological"; VL. [I willingly concede to Jung that depth psychology can provide much interesting instruction concerning philosophy and theology, because both of these fields are "also productions of the psyche" (i.e., both have psychic dimensions). This assumption has helped Jung to find traits of introversion in idealistic thinking and traits of extroversion in realistic thinking. It has also permitted him to analyze the psychological reverberations that manifest themselves in dogmatic symbols, just as he] has been able to differentiate between the authentic and non-authentic in religious attitudes. I am pleased to corroborate these conclusions, which interpret or call to our consideration phenomena that possibly have erroneously been looked at as entirely metaphysical, theological, or religious.

214: "his science / but it does not"; VL. [Jung's contribution to

philosophy, theology, and religion have been indirect, nevertheless. Although he has a right to enter the field, for his part he ought to be ready to yield to the restrictions which] his science forces onto him. He should understand that he is discussing homo psychicus or the psyche, and not anything else. In actuality, this psyche stretches out through every part of human reality; but it does not contain the totality of human reality, [and psychology must remain silent concerning metaphysics or theology per se or concerning their particular subject matter.]

220: "practice which ignores / behind Jung's"; MN, Loop. [How can we explain the difference between Jung's theoretical stance and the way he applies it in his practice? The real reason for the difference lies in the dual nature of his scientific work. The fact is, Jung is not just a scientist seeking a psychological theory; he is also a psychotherapist seeking to help his patients. The interaction of the psychotherapeutic practice with psychological theory is very different from the reconciliation between an hypothesis and a specific object. The psychologist can keep the theory within its proper limits, but the psychotherapist is required to meet with every aspect of the human condition. This combination of theory and] practice, which intentionally disregards the well-outlined boundaries of the psychic, is inherent in the obvious inconsistency in Jung's positions.

221: "will agree / his deficiencies.>"; VL. [Because Jung realized that his patients' psychic health was affected by their religious needs, he got caught up in problems that were philosophical and theological in nature, problems he had tried to sidestep. Therefore, he has been

unable to remain entirely within an unobjectionable theoretical stance.] Persons who consider Jung according to his theoretical position will concur with him. Persons who focus on his actual use of it or his openly expressed or suggested deductions will diverge from him or dive into forcible criticism of him. These dissimilar manners of looking at him provide reasons why so many conflicting opinions have been repeatedly asserted about him, opinions which have all been established from his own expressed views or his actions as a psychotherapist. But if we adopt an extended overview of his efforts and attempt to arrive at our own decisions from this, we will have to concede the great insights Jung has provided in addition to his shortcomings.

222: "field of religion proper / two realities"; VL. [Jung himself acknowledged that his insights about religious function necessarily ignore everything to do with the actual focus of the function. His empirical method deals only with the feeling for religion rooted in man; it is limited to human representations. But when anyone tries to lift Jung's conclusions to the level of the standard of God-revealed truths, that person becomes guilty of an unforgivable violation of Jung's method. In addition he threatens the real gains that have been achieved, by illegitimately and arbitrarily generalizing from basic ideas that are completely true when considered in isolation. For at this time that person has left the realm of the religious function and has gone into the dangerous] area of religion itself, an entity which does not come into existence from human inclinations and which in reality can raise them to elevations which in other circumstances would be unimaginable. The feeling for religion is firmly fixed in man, but

revealed truths originate in God, and anytime that these two actualities meet, any mixing of the two is lethal.

CHAPTER VII

James, Henry. Hawthorne. 1887. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, [n.d.]
Kinney 386.

10: "flower of / a great"; CK. [The fact that Hawthorne was perhaps the only significant American writer of his time illustrates a lesson.] This lesson is that the blossom of art thrives only in deep earth, that it takes a long record of past human events to bear a small harvest of literature, that it requires a varied human community to awaken an author to movement, to creativity.

16: "almost have / most importunate"; CK. [The Puritan element ran unsullied in Hawthorne's veins -- in the journals he maintained when he lived in Europe, there are entries which might possibly have been composed by the most forbidding of the worthiest citizens of old Salem.] To him just as to them, the awareness of sin was the most unavoidable and troublesome reality of life; [and if the Puritans had written fiction, the awareness of sin would have been as much a presence in their works as it is in Hawthorne's].

18: "secrets of the world / ity. A large"; CK. [The new world of North America seems largely untouched by History; nature itself seems in its infancy here. Even the air appears to be just created and immature; the rays from the sun appear pure and untainted, as if they had little knowledge of] the hidden things of the world and as yet felt no boredom

from shining; the plant life has the look of not yet being full-grown.

57: "belong to the province / symbols and"; UL, VL. [Hawthorne's short stories] seem to me to be characterized in this fashion by their function as allegories. Hawthorne, in his philosophical states of mind, is clearly allegorical, and allegory, to my understanding, is truly one of the least weighty uses of the imagination.

58: "produced assuredly / forcible-feeble"; VL. [Certainly, allegory has] yielded literature of genuinely high quality; and, in his more youthful days, Hawthorne had been an ardent reader and enthusiast of Bunyan and Spenser, eminent artists of allegory. But allegory is likely to impair the value of two worthwhile things -- a story and a moral, a meaning and a form; and the fashion for allegory accounts for a great portion of the forced and ineffective literary works that have been imposed upon the world.

58: "allegory in his tales / very, very imperfectly"; DVL, MN: "Poe." [Poe generally spoke well of Hawthorne, but he disapproved of the great proportion of] allegory in his Hawthorne's stories -- but he justified this opinion by noting that for "whatever object employed, there is scarcely one respectable word to be said [for allegory]. . . . The deepest emotion," he continues, "'aroused within us by the happiest allegory as allegory, is a very, very imperfectly satisfied sense of the writer's ingenuity [in overcoming a difficulty we should have preferred his not having attempted to overcome.]"

102: "and of course / ister by appointment"; VL. [Hawthorne is incessantly searching for imagery that will represent the spiritual truths that occupy him,] and certainly, the quest is the absolutely fundamental nature of poetry. But prudence is the essential thing in this type of procedure, and when the image becomes persistent it risks the appearance of representing nothing more significant than itself. When Hester, by agreement, encounters the preacher in the woods, and lingers in conversation with him

CHAPTER VIII

James, Henry. The Future of the Novel: Essays on the Art of Fiction.
Ed. Leon Edel. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. Kinney 334.

193: "the concrete / less inspired"; VL, UL. [The first artists are often the least likely to explain their art, engaging instead in energetic creation.] Nevertheless, many times a powerful artist expresses his unrevealed truth, illuminates the insight that guides his creation, displays to us the standard by which his work can fairly be judged. This chance is most fortunate, in my opinion, when it is most speedily finished; the most concise explications of the creations of genius are the most desirable, and there is many a writer of fiction whose intimates, no matter how much they believe in the writer's capacities, will befittingly pray for him when he saunters forward into the shadowy jungle of theory.

195: "readers must be / of life (and that surely constitutes its"; VL, UL. Ultimately, his [Maupassant's] public must appreciate him for a statement such as the one in which he comments that while the general public quite rightfully remarks to a writer, "'Console me, amuse me, terrify me, make me cry, make me dream or make me think,'" the genuine critic says, "Make me something fine in the form that shall suit you best, according to your temperament." This appears to me to sum up the entire debate on the various kinds of fiction, which recently has been so continuously discussed. There are really as many different types as

there are producing writers, for if a painting, a story, or a novel is a direct impression of life (and that truly comprises its benefit and worth), [the impression will differ in accordance with the photographic negative that captures it, the specific structure and make-up of the recipient.]

196-97: "the artist resides / any other"; VL. [Maupassant has excellently argued, more effectively than has recently been done, that] the worth of the artist exists in how lucidly he expresses his [subjective, inevitably personal] version of reality. As a particular being he also constitutes a particular point of view, and the critic is perceptive to the degree that he understands and imaginatively enters into that point of view. To disagree with it because it is not something else, which it could never have been unless the artist were completely differently constituted, seems to M. de Maupassant a lamentable waste of time. If this entreaty to our objectivity may intimidate some readers [(through their lack of the power to imagine any other perspective except the one they favor -- a restriction that is fine in a reader but unfortunate in a critic) this seems an inappropriate time to say so, for M. de Maupassant himself exactly offers all the typical features of a particular perspective in the most compelling fashion, and demonstrates how far the consideration of such features can lead us.]

198: "English and American / so constantly"; VL. English and American writers, more than the French, are liable to be enticed by some conventional expectation of how we ought to perceive things, neglecting

to realize that the best form of perception will be the one with which nature has happened to endow us. Undoubtedly we frequently have the courage of our convictions (when we happen to have convictions) but we lack [the courage of our perceptions.]

202: "he must leave out / is most remarkable"; VL [inner margin].

[Maupassant might be criticized because his cynicism and materialism cause him to omit more fine and noble matters from his writing.] The matters that he [Maupassant] omits have no right to be taken into account until after we have fittingly appreciated the matters he includes. It is this positive aspect of M. de Maupassant that is most extraordinary -- the fact that his literary nature [is so wholly finished and enlightening.]

203: "The novel / consequence."; VL. [Maupassant argues that] "The novel conceived in this manner [i.e., emphasizing human actions rather than focusing explicitly on psychology] gains interest, movement, color, the bustle of life." When it is a matter of an aesthetic method we should always be skeptical of rigidly defined differences, for certainly in every method there is a bit of all other methods. It is as hard to narrate an action without touching briefly on its intention, its ethical background, as it is to depict an intention without touching on its actual effect.

204: "that our author / comes to him"; VL, internal margin. [Maupassant argues that a writer should sometimes not be explicit in making his meaning clear.] The principle leads in the wrong direction, and the

most desirable principle surely is the intuitive skill of the particular writer, which will fit itself to the story as the story reveals itself to him.

205: "is fortunate / such precision"; VL, HL, HL, HL, HL. A writer is lucky or well favored when his principles for creating literary works and the limits of his ability agree so precisely, when his desire for knowledge may be satisfied with such accuracy and alacrity.

207: "enough for / footprint."; VL. [Maupassant is conscious of writing in a language in which everything already seems to have been said before because the French literary tradition has existed for so long and because so many of its works have been so widely read.] And he goes on that the case is sufficiently uncomplicated for the author who only strives to entertain people by familiar methods; such a writer does not seek much, and he brings forth "'with confidence, in the candor of his mediocrity,'" books which solve no problem and make no mark. It is the author who desires to create more than this who has a lesser degree of freedom from anxiety. To that author, it appears that whatever exists has been written about, every impression already shown, every concoction already invented. If he has an extraordinary gift, his burden is less heavy, for hidden or magical methods reveal themselves to him, new compounds leap up for him even when newness seems deceased. It is only to the plain man of discrimination and aptitude, who has only an inward knowledge of right and wrong and a conscious desire to act, that these circumstances seem almost hopeless; he evaluates himself as he goes along, and he can only go along one step at a time over a landscape

where each step is marked by a prior footprint.

212: "and insupportable / interfused"; the passage is outlined.

Without exception a story of excellent quality certainly consists both of a verbal description of concrete objects and of an abstract concept [both a picture and an idea], and the more thoroughly they are intermixed the more thoroughly the writer's goal is achieved.

240: "between novels / which we can get at"; VL. [Trollope, faced with the alternative of] novels of character or of plot, probably would have stated (although he never spoke epigrammatically) that he favored the former, since character in essence is plot, although plot is hardly character. It seems safer to imagine that his very sensible mind would have stopped him from seriously considering a pointless dispute. Character, in any sense in which it can be grasped, is action, and action is plot

240: "references / proportion"; UL. [Further comment on the distinction between character and plot:] We show concern for the events people experience only insofar as we understand what people are.

249: "we can believe in / jocose productions"; VL. [In Trollope's novel Barchester Towers, the notion that Mr. Quiverful has fourteen children is not credible.] We can accept the name and we can accept the offspring, but we cannot accept the two together. It is perhaps fair to contend that if Trollope took half his inspiration from reality, he took the other half from Thackeray; his early fictions, especially, imply an

honorable imitation of the writer of The Newcomes. Thackeray named his characters perfectly; the names were always significant (except in his completely humorous writings, although even there the names compel admiration)

CHAPTER IX

Jung, C. G. The Undiscovered Self. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. A Mentor Book. New York: The New American Library, 1959. Kinney 17.

69: "instead / individual"; CK. [It seems a fallacy for churches to pressure an individual to become a member of a group and thus weaken] the sense of personal accountability rather than lifting him out from the sluggish, senseless body of ordinary people and convincing him that he is the single significant element and that the salvation of the universe depends on the salvation of the individual soul.

72: "State, it is / disadvantage"; CK. [Because a tyrannical government is by its very nature unethical and pitiless, it can choose its methods more freely than an institution which shows respect for the individual. If such an institution should turn out to clash with the ordered] State, it is quickly made conscious of the exceedingly genuine handicap of its conformity to standards of right conduct and consequently feels [driven to use means similar to those of its adversary].

92: "Nothing estranges / modes of"; MN: "Teilhard?" Man's ability to acquire knowledge alienates him more than anything else from the basic outline of his innate tendencies. This ability proves to be a real force promoting step-by-step changes in human forms of conduct.

103: "reality, how- / have been more to"; MN: "Teilhard?" [Some people dismiss the unconscious as a kind of psychological trash heap or as a

residue of man's animality.] In actuality, though, and according to exact denotation, it [the unconscious] is of inexact size and make-up, so that either to overrate it or to underrate it can be rejected as prejudicial. In any case, opinions like this seem extremely odd on the tongues of Christians, whose Lord was himself born on the hay of a manger, with the domestic animals.

107: "light in man and / The case is far graver"; VL. The evil that rises to the surface of man and that, without a doubt, lives inside him is a tremendous share of the whole, so that for the Church to speak of "original sin" and follow it back to Adam's comparatively guiltless mistake with Eve is nearly a euphemism. The actual state of affairs is a great deal more serious [and is greatly under-assessed.]

123: "is certainly / technology and science."; DVL. MN: "Teilh." [Every aspect of life and thought in the modern period suggests a breakdown and potential transformation of basic beliefs and symbols.] This exclusive characteristic of our age, which surely we did not select deliberately, is a manifestation of the unconscious man inside us who is metamorphosing. Later generations will need to consider this important change if humanity is not to demolish itself through the power of its own technology and science.

CHAPTER X

Levin, Harry. The Power of Blackness. Hawthorne, Poe, Melville. New York: Vintage Books, 1958. Kinney 385.

7: "wrote to / Whitman con-"; VL. [While the voice of the American majority is optimistic, the voice of thoughtful, independent American thinkers is likely to be ironic, introspective, and dissenting and to display itself] by declaring no in a loud, booming clap -- as Melville wrote to Hawthorne -- even though Satan himself commands you to say yes. The language of the Eternal Yea, the extravagant utterances of the eagle-screaming public speaker, and the tone of self-glorification have discordantly been in control, influencing the attitude of efforts to explain the meaning of our culture and worsening the doubts of our foreign critics.

8: "Therefore / with its"; VL. For that reason, our most independent souls have expressed their refusal to accept [optimistic platitudes] by emphasizing the opposing point of view, communicating their thoughts in paradoxical fashion, and bringing each commonly accepted supposition face-to-face with its logical opposite.

17: "more specu- / with dreams."; SL. [American and Russian writing tends to deal with morals, while much European writing tends to focus on manners. The difference between American and most European writing, which is typified by the contrast between Hawthorne's emphasis on

speculation and the stable substantiality of English] realism, was graciously conceded by Anthony Trollope. "On our side of the water," Trollope firmly declared, "we deal more with beef and ale, and less with dreams."

27: "is much / le roman noir."; BR. [This connection between imagery of blackness and moral darkness is much too common to be a unique trait of American fiction]; in fact the novel that we describe as Gothic, the French designate, more generally, as le roman noir [the novel of blackness].

78: "malevolence / fall, perhaps"; MN: "devil doing the work for grace before." Still it is [Chillingworth's] focused maliciousness, above all else, that causes Dimmesdale [in Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter] to conceive the thought of acknowledging his sin. Whether Chillingworth is his mirror image or an evil spirit, the voice for Dimmesdale's conscience or a devil's representative -- these prospects are brought up for consideration but are barely examined. He [Chillingworth] himself admits that he is carrying out a devilish duty, but he regards it as "a dark necessity," the unavoidable effect of Hester's ruin, perhaps a result of the kind of predetermined fate emphasized in Calvinism.

CHAPTER XI

Lubbock, Percy. The Craft of Fiction. 1921. New York: Peter Smith, 1945. Kinney 331.

9: "faculties / fiction. The"; CK. These natural abilities [that permit us as readers to imagine and finish in our minds the characters and settings that the novelist creates] certainly, when blended with an acquired discrimination, a capacity to perceive excellence, appear to represent all that is required for the criticism of fiction.

9: "gift, and / fiction. A novel is a picture of life, and"; CK. [The modern novel asks for nothing from its readers but] this natural aptitude [for shaping flat, written descriptions into dimensional forms] added to the rarer ability by which we distinguish between that which is worthy of its kind and that which is worthless. This is approximately the theory of our criticism concerning the matter of the craft of fiction.

10: "to matter. May / design,"; CK. [We are aware of novels that everyone acknowledges are poorly constructed, but they are so full of life that it does not seem] to make a difference. May we not decide that form, design, composition have different supporting [roles in the art of fiction than they have in other arts?]

11: "A book / the reader,"; CK. A novel sets off a succession of thoughts in the mind of the reader, [thoughts assembled and ordered in a rational manner of some sort;]

11: "help of / mass as a"; CK. . . . but it is only when aided by imaginative similes and metaphors that we can look upon the assembled thoughts as a [clearly defined whole. This imagery gives subtle clues and indirect indications of the creator's techniques; it is all too hazy a matter for anything further.]

12: "work gives / hand the"; CK. [I will focus on the element of the craft of a few selected novels. A large number of highly gifted novelists may be excluded, for it is not always the one who has the most unusual ability whose manner of] creating gives the aptest illustration; however, the best illustration is always found [among those with unusual abilities, and it is vital to associate with that group.]

13: "to read / touch with the"; CK. The first step in criticism involves reading properly, that is, to make as close contact [with the novel as possible. Granted, it is an impossible task; but there are different levels of failure.]

14: "A book / the form"; CK. We all accept that a novel has a definite structure. We find that whether the structure of a specific novel [is good or bad or even whether it is important is a matter for argument.]

14: "Not as a / stream of"; CK. [There is agreement that a novel is an

object which has a shape that is definable, either good or bad.] Not consisting of one form, but as a continuous flow of mental images and sensations, emanating from the bound text like [a thin cord as we turn the leaves -- that is how the book's shape is revealed to us.]

15 "which must / another, as"; CK. [It is difficult to conceive of this flowing current,] this stream of characters and actions, which must be perceived in a structured form, one following another, as [an immovable shape, like a heap of sculpture. Although we discuss the novel as a physical aesthetic creation, our descriptions also create the contrary feeling that it is rather a series of actions, passages of actual events, instead of a tangible object with dimensions and contours.]

15: "its formal / obscures it."; CK. [A critic appears to move between viewing books as complete objects and seeing them as passages of time, and primarily, it is the second view that] dominates; the first, the work of fiction with its designed outline, is seen briefly, then the vitality inherent in it reveals itself and overshadows the static form.

16: "prodigious hands? / instinctively"; CK. [But how can one systematically build a novel from the various impressions that Tolstoy profusely issues from his] remarkable hands? This is a type of "creative reading" (Emerson's phrase) possible through a natural aptitude that few of us have.

17: "It is an / distance; and yet"; CK. [Imaginatively recreating the

full world Tolstoy depicts -- as in Anna Karenina -- is difficult and demands the reader's deliberate thought.] It requires an attempt, in the first place, to view Anna's domain from a detached point of view; and yet [the perspective must be kept removed if it is to exist as an aesthetic creation.]

17: "no artist (and the / above it.;" CK. No creative person (and the expert, discriminating reader is a creative person) can permit himself to be overly influenced or controlled by the subject matter he is working with; he must remain apart from and superior to it.

17: "the novel in / the material,;" CK. [And it takes additional, extended effort, requiring] practice and knowledge, to reconstruct in the reader's mind the novel in its correct form, the best shape that is possible for the material [chosen and dealt with by the author].

18: "guidance. and Tolstoy / hesitate for;" CK. [The creation of a novel is a joint effort between the novelist and the critical reader. To understand the difference between the two, imagine the writer, say Tolstoy, side by side with the critic, looking over the free and shapless landscape of life. The critic, not knowing where to start, looks to Tolstoy for] direction. Tolstoy, following the lead of his own unknown and unexplainable extraordinary gift, does not falter for a moment. He thrusts his hand into [the middle of things, holds up huge isolated pieces, shabby clumps of life torn from their natural places; he chooses.]

18: "sets to / intensely living"; VL. He begins to work upon these selections using the total power of his creative mind; he perceives their importance, he loosens and discards whatever is irrelevant and without purpose; he reshapes the remainder into states of existence that are never found in real life, environments where a thing has the liberty to develop according to its own rules, communicating its significance without restraint; he frees and perfects. Then upon the newly created forms -- so similar to the old but yet so dissimilar, so heightened, perfected, with the dross eliminated -- upon all this living experience that is far more vibrant than before, Tolstoy now focuses [his artistic ability.]

19: "in which / harmon-"; 12 VD. [After Tolstoy has formed and finalized his creation, the critic thereby receives his guidance and his own task begins. He must make no choices, perform no shaping; his world is the one prepared for him, the world of art. It is a world freed from the chaos of contradictions, rescued from meaningless confusion.] In place of an uninterrupted, incessant action where the attention is pulled toward many objects all at the same time, with nothing to focus it on a central point of interest, the scene the critic is presented is complete and coherent; it has been sifted through a creative mentality, it has discarded anything that is not pertinent, and there remains a scene that is condensed into and brimming with its own purpose. This is the quality of the universe of the reshaped novel -- I do not claim it is the universe of Tolstoy's novel; but it is the potential universe of the ideal novel, in the work where creative thought and the ability to materialize it are in complete harmony.

20: "bility in / less. He"; VL. [We cannot consider that a sculptor or painter is so absorbed with feeling for the meaning of his creation that he disregards the beauty of form and color. Although there is a great space for feelings and] emotions in the aesthetics of creative writing, yet the creative writer who shapes thoughts and feelings is a skilled technician too, and the critic cannot be lower in this respect than he is.

20: "stone. Many / them aright,"; VL. [No one can work in materials that are unfamiliar to him. A reader who attempts to grasp a book while understanding only its life and ideas and story is like a person attempting to build a wall with no understanding of the capabilities of wood and clay and stone.] Many dissimilar materials, as unmistakable to the trained and experienced eye as stone and wood, go into the creation of a work of fiction, and it is essential to be able to recognize the essential qualities of the different materials. That is the only way that one is capable of using them correctly, [and of discovering when the book is finished that a complete, understandable, evaluable creation remains with the critical reader.]

20: "They are / well and"; VL. [What are the different materials that go into the creation of a novel, and how can a reader learn their proper use?] They are the several methods for telling a story, the structures a narrative may exhibit. Although there are many structures, there is not an excessive amount, even though the possible alterations and blends of them are unlimited. They are not mysterious; we are intimately acquainted with them and use them at will, [although to employ them is

simpler than to comprehend their requirement and traits.]

21: "presented. The / vivid - we at"; VL. [We will carefully examine the methods of the novelists whose good results cannot be questioned, noticing precisely the way they present the scenes and characters in their works.] We mentally shape and separate the scenes and characters without the least problem; and if we linger over them long enough to understand by what skill and techniques the author has provided us with the ability to imagine them so forcibly -- to understand exactly how this event was given dimension and that character was made understandable and full of life -- we [chance upon many insights into the creation of fiction.]

23: "small beside the / open to"; CK. [Every reader, with novel in hand,] has the enjoyment of creating it himself, which brings a larger enjoyment than the illusion [of not knowing how the novel was made].

23: "a novelist / is beyond"; CK. It is outside our scope to understand how a novelist finds his theme, in a human being or in a combination of circumstances or in a frame of mind. [We could look a long time at the very place where Tolstoy lived, but never discover the unwritten story he chanced upon there.]

24: "only it / lasted if"; CK. [After a reader has read a book critically, and he looks back on its overall design, he may find its form imperfect. He realizes the book will fade away eventually,] but it will remain in existence for a longer time than it would have if it had been

read uncritically, if he had [not intentionally tried to recreate it.]

27: "really be as / his great"; CK. If any writer could create a novel as large as life, Tolstoy is the one who could easily do it. His immense [powerful reach seems to be able to grasp everything, without boundaries.]

27: "command of / power. He"; CK. Yet, this powerful control of expansive spaces and groups of people is only half [Tolstoy's] strength. Although he [spreads further than everyone else, he also hones scenes, episodes, and characters with consummate grace and accuracy into the particulars of the action, the separate event, the minute nuance of distinguishing traits.]

27: "sunshine in a / of it an"; CK. [In some ways no one comes near the relaxed power with which Tolstoy manages the demanding situation at hand, "a roomful of people,] the brilliance of youth, spring sunshine in a forest, a boy on a horse"; whatever his comprehensive view focuses on, he creates of it [a mental picture of beauty and truth that is ultimate, wholly finished, absolute.]

31: "Youth and / book."; X. Youth and age, the rise and the fall of the regularly returning waters -- is the theme of Tolstoy's novel [War and Peace.]

38: "of our own. / the whole"; CK. [In War and Peace, Tolstoy leads the reader into the conflict. From a strong feeling that touches us through

the young people placed in its way, the war is transformed into a strong feeling] of our own. It is presented by the narrator as an action where he is present, as an episode that he confronts directly.

38: "instead of / an onlooker,"; VD,VD,VD,VD,VD,VD. The action [of Tolstoy's War and Peace] is not mirrored in the participation of the growing generation but is instead presented as an experience confronted by the narrator himself. It is a fact that Tolstoy's natural talent always leads him away from simply narrating the story from the omniscient author's point of view; at crucial turning points he is too wise to be the narrator himself. He approaches the narrative through the thoughts of a third party, a spectator, Napoleon or Kutusov [choosing the strength of obliqueness].

38: "of the independent / being consistent"; VL. [But Tolstoy selects his onlooker at random; he is not consistent. Therefore, the controlling perspective on the situation belongs to Tolstoy,] the objective narrator; so that the overall impression of these observations is made on a completely different principle from that which rules the narrative of the young characters. In that tale too, though, Tolstoy's system is far from conforming to a single design.

39: "any rate one / manner, but"; VL. [So, at times Tolstoy describes the war as an experience confronted by himself, while at others the point of view is that of Peter and Andrew, Nicholas and Natasha, and Tolstoy is erased.] Here then is the explanation, or in any case one explanation, of why the overall form of War and Peace fails to gratify

the attentive reader -- as I assume we concede that it does fail. It lacks orderly arrangement because of its two conflicting designs, the deficiency more or less concealed by Tolstoy's unruffled naturalness of style, but [disclosed by the appearance of the novel when viewed as a whole.]

40: "The business / ficent novel"; VL. The proper concern of a fiction writer is to imagine and people a world, and [in War and Peace,] without a doubt, Tolstoy does just that; it lacks the sense of completeness of a clear, consistent structure, and it would be proper to have it, but this lack is its only fault. We have a superb work of fiction just as it is.

40: "be a finer, / tion"; DVL. [War and Peace is a magnificent novel, but with the addition of a stronger form, we possibly would have a novel that would] be a more subtle, more honest, clearer, and more vigorous portrayal of life. The most desirable structure is that which best realizes the work's content -- that is the only explanation of the purpose of structure and style in fiction.

40: "the two, / idea."; VL. [The well-made book is the one in which the subject and the form coalesce and meld until they are indistinguishable. When there is discrepancy and discord between] the two, there is either unnecessary material or material that is lacking; the structure of the completed novel has fallen short of what the conception deserved.

41: "in fact, it / and dis-"; VL. [Tolstoy's War and Peace has such a loose, unstructured form that it presents an inadequate grasp of a great

theme. The reader hardly notices this deficiency after a first reading, but with each return it becomes more obvious.] With each re-reading, it is more difficult to make a complete story of it. Rather than binding with each other, its large quantity of elements seem more essentially different and confused; [they will not blend into one].

41: "subject, one / in his"; VL. A novel cannot begin to reveal its form without a [theme, single] and complete and coherent, to sustain its weight. This appears obvious; still there is nothing more well-known to the current reader of fiction than the difficulty of unearthing what the book he is [reading is about].

44: "away to / must plainly"; VL. [The essential theme of War and Peace is the march of life. It requires a large and various cast of characters, but a few selected ones must stand out and carry the thread of the story. Their places in the general drama of life must be clearly seen. The impression of a wide world must be presented,] expanding to remote distances circling the action at the center. The entire purpose of the events of the plot is the typicality of their qualities, their universality; this must be clear.

48: "tion, that it"; VL. [Tolstoy's characters appear to have lives of their own, because he understands and knows them so well. Yet, even though Tolstoy was gifted with such a high poetic genius, he seems to look straight at the same world as ordinary people do. It is because he sees and feels so much more of that world and because all his experience moves into his enormous moldable creative] mind, that it appears to be

so original. [His characters, then, are basically familiar and understandable; we easily expand their lives in any direction.]

53-4: "an elderly / to them"; VL. [In War and Peace Tolstoy portrays a certain stretch of time, but he does not show his definite purpose for this, the moral of it all. He starts the story with promise and ends it with finality; but between the beginning and the ending, his purpose is doubtful. For instance, in the opening chapters at one social gathering] two characters, an old cosmopolitan male and a conniving hostess, are in conversation as the guests arrive, then a young man comes in; or at another genial gathering there is a cry and a surge, and the young ones of the house plunge into the circle. That is all Tolstoy needs, his story of human conflict centered on youth and age begins immediately with a convincing impression. The narrative stirs at once; there are a few fleeting looks of this sort, and then the setting is prepared, the events are able to progress; all that is needed is prepared for the impression it is to create.

And at the close of the novel, after many hundreds of pages, the tale reaches its denouement in an incident that brings together all the loose ends and entwines them. The young men and ladies are now the parents of the next uproarious group of young people. Life has not turned out as a single one of them anticipated, but the events of each life have molded it, and it is clear that the present form is the last one. Without difficulty a spectator can predict their future.

54: "But shyly / and speculating"; VL. [The once young characters have settled into their lives and no longer own the future shining with

possibilities of just a few years ago.] But bashfully, furtively, sitting unobserved but observing, studying the older people as they exchange pleasantries and disagreements toward the close of the festivity -- comes around again that same tentative, unpredictable future full of romantic possibilities. The final scene belongs to the new generation, the dawning new day, grown enough to be pondering and conjecturing over its own dreams. [That is the natural conclusion of the story.]

62: "I speak / made to"; VL. [To contrast with Tolstoy's War and Peace, we will examine a novel in which the subject is definitely fixed and determined. There is no better novel for this purpose than Flaubert's Madame Bovary. Its subject stands firm and clear, with no ambiguity to distract the reader. Flaubert's only thought is how to tell his story.] I refer to his narrating the tale, but naturally he has no thought of doing only that; the art of fiction does not even start until its creator realizes that his work is a particular matter that must be revealed or made visible, to be put on view so that it almost narrates itself. Just to present the reader with the actual events of the story simply as so many plain, unadorned facts -- this is like telling only the theme of the novel, the skeleton which the novelist then sets about to flesh out. The novel is not a sequence of events, it is a unique image; the actual events are not significant in themselves, they have no reality until they have been employed for the author's purpose. I am discussing the complex skill of creating fiction, not the trifling craft of telling a story; and in fiction one can turn to no authority beyond the novel itself. Narrative -- for instance, such as the stories of

Defoe -- must have outside substantiation; Defoe provided it by declaring that the events in his tales actually happened in the past. But in a novel, strictly speaking, confirmation like this is indeed unimportant; the account only has to appear real and nothing more. It is not made to look real by a simple declaration.

63: "His book / statements."; VL. [Still the novelist must narrate.] His novel is a sequence of declarations with no proof, that is all. That is easy to see, and the dissimilarity between the craftsmanship of Defoe and that of Flaubert is only in the variation in their manners of positioning their declarations.

63: "in criticizing / region; we"; VL. [Flaubert takes a more roundabout way to place his statements than Defoe takes, but in any case, he must choose a path and follow it to relate his sequence of facts. This common requirement of statement is taken for granted and] in criticizing fiction we may go forward as though a writer could truly be concerned at once with appearances. We may discuss the image or the drama that he originates, we may clearly state that he completely shuns phrasing that is only simple declaration, because at the level of fiction the total concern is in another province; [we are only interested in the method he uses to choose the information he presents.]

63,4: "writer like / of it."; VL. A writer such as Flaubert -- or such as any writer whose fiction sustains criticism at all -- is so removed from relating an event as it might be reported in an official document, that we stop considering him as reporting in any way. He is creating an

effect and a psychological response, by some procedure demonstrating skill to one degree or another. If we study his completed creation we can discern his procedure, maybe describe its nature, observe how it changes now and then, find a rational explanation for the novelist's selection of it.

64-67: "But the method / greater tact"; VL. [The story of Madame Bovary is a simple one, and there are many ways, many points of view that Flaubert can use to present it. Until we see the particular subject that Flaubert sees in the facts, we cannot criticize his method.] But when the method is carefully observed, it is realized at once that Flaubert changes the way he manages his material in different sections of the novel. At times he appears to be giving an account of places and people he has known, talks between them that he has overheard. I do not imply that he is actually relating an event from his own life, but that he writes as if this were the case. In such circumstances, he relates only what we ourselves would have become aware of if we had been there. His goal is to set the scene before us, so that we watch it like a picture slowly revealed or a play being performed. Then, he immediately uses a different system. There comes a turning point in the story where, for an unspecified reason, the reader must know more than he could have learned by looking and listening only. Flaubert, the creator, the omniscient author, must interfere to clarify the narrative. Maybe it is to relate something in the background of the characters in the episode; you cannot understand this behavior or this conversation, the writer suggests, unless I give you the information I now offer. And so, to illuminate the action in a new way, the author

tells of specific incidents that we would not have known in any other way. Or possibly, he who knows all, even the inner, unspoken personal thoughts of his characters, wants us to experience the mind of Bovary or of Emma, not to rely simply on what they do or say. So he delves into their inner feelings and tells of the train of emotion that goes by.

These are the well-known tools of storytellers, tools which they all use routinely. It is so normal to use them that unless we intentionally focus on the writer's devices we are hardly aware when he shifts from one to another. These appear to be the usual, spontaneous ways to narrate a tale, but really, these changes serve as examples of variations in style that are quite basic. If the action is to be portrayed to us, then from the opening word the problem comes up of how we are to be positioned in regard to the action. Are we present at a certain place, an event, at a chosen time in the lives of these characters whose destinies we will learn of? Or are we watching their fates from above, sharing in the advantage of the novelist -- scanning their progressing stories with a panoramic view and taking in a general reaction? Here immediately is an essential choice between two approaches. Actually, Flaubert first presents us with a setting -- he depicts the morning of the small Bovary's arrival at school, then moves backward from that episode and condenses the boy's earlier life, gives a mental picture of his parents, what his home was like, then moves forward to tell of his progress as a pupil. It is the usual way that novels begin -- an initial scene, a backward look, and a concise account of the substantive facts. It is so usual that the reader is not aware of a forcible shift in the point of view; yet he has been moved from a spectator's place in front of the scene to an overview level, from which

he scans a broad expanse of time. Here, therefore, is one recognized manner of narration; and it is revealing that even in this basic matter our terminology is unsure and equivocal. How do we usually distinguish between these completely different ways of offering what happens in a story? I hardly know -- it is as though we had no accepted words to differentiate blue from red. But let us take for granted that "scenic" and "panoramic" presentations of a story describe understandable opposites, by the rules and technically.

There is our connection, once more -- ours, the reader's -- in respect to the author. Flaubert is commonly thought of as an extremely "impersonal" writer, one who stays back and wants us not to realize he is there; he displays the events for us to see and hides his own opinion. But I contend that this salient feature has been overworked; it just means that Flaubert does not broadcast his opinion, and thus it has been maintained that a true artist should not be seen in his story anywhere. But naturally with every contact that he makes with his theme he reveals what he thinks of it; his theme, in truth, the novel that he creates from his chosen fragment of existence, is actually the portrayal of his vision, his assessment, his thoughts concerning it. The celebrated "impersonality" of Flaubert and others like him rests in the superior finesse [with which they portray their feelings instead of stating them.]

68: "It is a / he describes"; VL. [I am not concerned with Flaubert's opinion of Emma Bovary when I speak of our relation to him.] I am concerned with his method. At times the writer is speaking himself, at other times he speaks from the consciousness of one of the characters in

the novel -- in this novel usually from Emma herself. In this way he paints a picture of the country side [where Emma's fate is cast]

68: "And then / and Leon,"; VL. Then, following this he is observing through the eyes and consciousness and standards of someone else; the scenery now has the shades that Emma sees, the episode is captured in the shape it has taken in her imagination. Flaubert himself has withdrawn, and we are now occupied with Emma. Consider, for instance, the two images of her lovers, Rodolphe and Leon; [they are very insignificant to anyone except a foolish and shallow little woman like Emma.]

69: "of Emma's / lover."; VL. Another time, look at the episode of Emma's only entry into cultured society, the dance at the mansion which sets off so many of her sentimental fantasies; it is all portrayed in her words, it is painted as she sees it. And once in a while the perspective is changed from her to another character, and we catch a quick glance at how she looks to her husband, her mother-in-law, or her lover.

69: "of the / is chiefly" ; VL. In addition, whether the speaker is the author or one of his characters, there is a pictorial method of handling the episode and there is also a dramatic method. It may be that the effect of the occasion -- as in the instance of the marquis's ball -- is mainly [presented as a portrait, an image of how the event appears in someone's consciousness.]

71: "advantage of / turn from"; VL. [A critic's thought is constantly engaged in determining what method a novelist is using at a given place in the story. Is he concerned with the dramatic incident, or is he describing the shape and color the incident takes in a character's thought? Possibly he will be concerned with both, maybe in the same sentence;] nothing forces him to give up the benefit of either approach, if his narration can gain from [both, one after another.]

71: "generally a / that binds"; DVL. Ordinarily a novelist holds onto his freedom to use any method or skill he wants, first this one then that, using drama where drama serves his purpose, using pictorial description where the twist of the story requires it.

72: "is the need / course it"; VL. [The only law that restricts a novelist] is the necessity to conform to some design, to continue with the principle that he has taken up; and, naturally, one of the first prescriptions for his actions, as [with every artist, is that he must permit himself no more license than he needs.]

72: "scenic and panoramic / other;"; VL. [A critic looks for the principle which the author has adopted and notes how he uses it to develop the subject. And] so with the scenic and panoramic techniques -- one looks carefully all the time to see how he controls their rotation, how the tale is presently observed from above and then placed at once at the reader's eye level. Once more, the tale's requirements may occasionally appear to tug firmly toward one course or the other . . .

72: "prepares / fulfils"; VL. [Sometimes we get a book that is chiefly a panoramic overview, and sometimes we get one that is a series of scenes linked together like a chain. But usually we see an alternation that gives way to a summary that] prepares the direction and guides into the condition that accomplishes it.

72: "will thoroughly / really wanted,"; VL. [The positioning of this transforming event at just the right point in the narrative where it] will completely clarify a different aspect of the subject and move the action forward by a definite step is among the most important problems of the writer, I believe, in designing his novel. A scene that is not actually needed, and that accomplishes nothing special, [is a weakness in a story that a writer should always be guarding against.]

73: "readiest / con-"; VL. [Regardless, there is no doubt that the scene] is most important, that it is the scene that is the quickest method of creating an interest and of establishing a problem. We fall into an action on the first page and start to guess about the characters involved.

73: "climax of / began. In Madame"; VL. [There is no doubt] that the scene returns for a climax of any kind, the solving of the problem -- and so the scene concludes what it started.

73: "deathbed / in order each"; VL. [In Madame Bovary the scenes are placed and executed with unusual craft. Such scenes as] the extraordinary meeting of the priest and the apothecary at Emma's bedside when

she dies -- these shape the jointing together of the novel, the plan of its construction. [Each scene follows another in an order that steadily develops each stage of the story.]

73: "place is / up the"; VL. [By the time a scene is reached, nothing is lacking for its readiness;] the action is fully developed, the setting is vibrant

73: "method is no / with any"; VL. But the most significant matter of design, certainly, is the perplexing problem of point of view.

74: "entirely objective / thought."; VL. [I imagine the writer thinking through his unwritten story, its main plot determined, as a matter at first] completely objective, the entire story viewed from outside -- the connected series of episodes, the characters in their positions. And it is possible that the narrative can stay in this shape while it is put on paper, and the finished novel will be only a statement of actions seen from the creator's point of view, standing like a spectator of the events, never revealing any character's thought. [But such a totally external point of view is difficult and unusual, except perhaps in a very brief story.]

74: "than he / rectly divined"; VL. [At some point the writer must get inside his characters and reveal their thoughts to the reader. It is certainly the author's aim to change the point of view no more times] than he finds necessary; and if the theme can be totally depicted by presenting it as it seems to only one of the characters in the novel,

then there is no cause to explore any more. Random and nonessential thrusts into the minds of the people in the book blur the focus of the result, altering the concentration without counterbalancing benefit. But what is the focus point, what is the consciousness that truly controls the theme? The solution is not always clear immediately, nor does it always appear to be properly surmised in the books we read.

75: "And yet / some other"; VL. [In Madame Bovary there is no doubt that we must mainly see through Emma's eyes.] Still, Flaubert discovers that it is essential to look at [Emma] from time to time, profiting from another [point of view temporarily]

75: "elements of the / fusion and"; VL. Now we have the basic parts of the novelist's craft -- fundamentally a small number and not complicated, but limitless in their potential for blending together [and uniting as parts of a whole.]

75: "imposed / pictorial"; VL. [We see the basic elements arranged in a different pattern to suit every theme that a writer attempts;] we find them following one another by turns, combined, forced on one another, this point of view fused with another, dramatic action treated like a painting, pictorial exposition presented dramatically -- [and I use these words, dramatic and pictorial, with the special meaning I explained earlier.]

75: "In well- / method, so"; VL. In well-made fiction it is always intriguing to detect how method is inclined to be placed upon method, [so that we receive, so to speak, levels and strata in the presentation

of the narrative.]

75: "a man's / he is"; VL. [For although] it is natural that a writer's method is influenced by the specific tale he is occupied in relating, [the story that he thinks of, the subject he deals with, will ask for a method congenial to himself, and therefore will tell the reader about the nature of his imagination.]

80-82: "Flaubert wrote / be in it"; VL. Emma's cosmos, as Flaubert created it, would therefore have to be considered as a result of Emma, conceived to serve her, painted in words so that they may portray her. In other words, her universe is a part of the manner of handling the narrative; no part of it, including the husband, the life of the small town, would be a part of the writer's argument, the foundation of his fiction; we would be able to conceive another arena, possibly superior, than Flaubert's chosen setting. Every bit of this -- if the theme of the novel is only the portrait of this kind of woman.

But naturally that is not all; a single quick look at our memory of the novel is sufficient to reveal it. Emma's universe could not be different than it is, she could not be transferred into wealthier, more spacious circumstances without ruining the entire object and plan of Flaubert's novel. She alone is not the focus of the work. He intends to present for inspection a chronological account of a woman of this sort in a particular environment like hers, a shallow female in confining conditions; so that the rustic setting, exerting an effect on her, molding her into the shape she becomes, is as necessary to the book as she is herself. It is not a picture, not an examination of character

with no purpose beyond itself, but more like a story of human conflict and emotion between two characters, a woman on one side and her entire environment on the other, that is Madame Bovary. There is a tension, a test of force and counterforce, and a dramatic question. Emma is a weak power, certainly, her inclinations are reckless, her feelings are without depth and richness, she has no strength of desire with which to combat the world. She only has her impractical fancy and her simple, unrefined appetite; but these can be impressive weapons, nevertheless, and she may eventually manage to get what she wants on her own conditions. In contrast, however, the restrictions of her existence are very empty and quite rigid; they encage her, restraining her soarings, limiting her chances. The stage for action is set, regardless, however it may work out; Emma marries Bovary, is settled in Yonville and must confront the paucity of her circumstances. Something will come out of it, the consequence will declare itself. It is a characteristic of a dramatic situation that it includes a conflict of some sort, two firm resolves that clash, a movement that tugs between two interests, and in this respect Madame Bovary looks like a drama. Flaubert might develop the narrative from that perspective and emphasize the subject. The center of his theme would be the conflict between Emma and everything that makes up her existence, between her impractical illusions and her harassing reality. The problem is what will be the outcome.

On the other hand -- that is not precisely the problem in this novel. It is easy to see that the focus of the action is not on the ordinary trivial incidents of Emma's pursuits. Certainly, they could possibly be the stages in an dramatic story, but Flaubert treats them as nothing of the sort. He makes it completely apparent that his vision is

not focused on the outcome of Emma's plight, whether it will resolve this way or that; what she does or does not do is very unimportant. Her interludes with Rodolphe and with Leon are ephemeral pictures; they resolve nothing, they build to no culmination. For instance, Rodolphe's last refusal of her is no episode of conflict that resolves a doubtful problem; it is one of Emma's several misfortunes that has a visible influence on her, but it does not appear in the novel as a moment of transformation in the narrative. She continues her course and plays out her story; but Flaubert creates nothing of uncertainty or vivid conflict from it.

82: "would have / what he"; VL. [None of the events in Emma's career build to an important point. Leon and Rodolphe do not matter as lovers in themselves;] she would have chanced upon others if these two had not been readily available. The unusual episodes, then, Emma's short trip to Rouen, her rides in the woods, her few noteworthy exciting trips beyond her rustic environs, all of these are simply Flaubert's method of painting a picture of his basic ideas, of making it memorable. They do not comprise his theme, they merely explain it.

83: "chosen for / impression it"; VL. [Although Madame Bovary is a sort of drama,] it is a drama selected for the purpose of obtaining the picture in it, for the effect it [produces of the way that certain lives are lived.]

83: "misses / pictorial;"; VL. [Madame Bovary is not a drama like Jane Eyre, where another obscure woman is the focus, but] in which what is

important is what she accomplishes or fails. Flaubert created his book out of a circumstance that appeared differently to him. It was not so much a drama as a picture. [Emma does not have the makings to be the main character in a drama.]

84: "the theme. / as may"; VL. [The key to Flaubert's treatment of] his subject is that it is visual like a painting, and its purpose is to make Emma's life as understandable and observable as it can be.

84: "could see. Flaubert's / be known"; VL. [The reader is to be set inside Emma's world to get the flavor of it, and also to observe it from the outside. That way he will actually see more of it than she] can see. Flaubert's theme insists on nothing less, if the painting is to be whole. She must be understood through and through -- that is his primary concern

84: "more than / treats the"; VL. [But it is also essential that Flaubert portray the small town that traps her and closes her off as clearly and individually as he does Emma.] It is not just a frame for Emma and her secret scheme; it is an indispensable part of the novel, much more than the chance lovers who cross Emma's path. They are only events and enticements to catch her capricious imagination. The small town, the parish priest, the druggist, and the local gossips require a clear focus. Therefore, Flaubert looks at the locale of his book, [Yonville and its peculiar inhabitants, as closely as he looks at its heroine.]

85: "its right / nobody's"; VL. [If the town is to be in the forefront with Emma, not just be her background, what point of view is needed? If the book is to achieve the coherence necessary to bring about its proper impact there can be no doubt at this point, no pointless changing of the position from which the spectator looks at it. And in the story of Madame Bovary the problem of the correct perspective can be greatly puzzling. Where is Flaubert to locate his focal point? -- from what vantage ground, inside the novel or outside, will the progress of the plot be controlled most efficiently? The problem is that although one view of his theme can only be seen from an internal perspective, through the woman's eyes, a different view must unavoidably be seen from an external perspective, through [the creator's own eyes and no one else's.]

86: "her subjective / and to"; DVL. [Since it is necessary to show Emma's sense of her world, Flaubert must get the reader inside her consciousness,] let her speak for herself; and Flaubert is painstaking to do this and to make her inner life known, in a manner of speaking, the moment she appears in the novel.

86: "But it / for the"; VL. But the tale also commands, as we discovered, that her position and circumstances be seen realistically and understood as familiarly as she is herself. This revelation is beyond Emma's capability.

Her intellectual power is much too weak and capricious to render an adequate characterization of her world. If Flaubert had to stay within the limits of her insight of the town of Yonville, it would be very

meanly delineated; it would be scanty and empty, it would scarcely be more than a backdrop for the romantic vision of the lovers she wants.

86: "desires. What were / entirely inadequate"; VL. What did the local townfolk mean to her? They lived in her awareness only as tedious interruptions and hindrances, other than once in a while when she had opportunity to use them. But for us, the spectators, they are a part of her portrait, they symbolize the oppressive burden of rustic life which is the salient reality in her existence. Emma's primitive conception of them is completely insufficient.

86,87: "humour / away"; VL. [She does not have a visible trace] of the ability to understand what is funny or how to express one thing while meaning the opposite in order to flesh out [her neighbors]. Besides, they affect her far more strongly and in more ways than she could possibly imagine; a keener perception than hers, quite clearly, must come between, assisting the undeveloped workings of her mind. Her two eyes are not sufficient; the portrait perceived through them is a meager likeness on its own, for she can perceive no more than her mind can apprehend. It is not fair to her besides, because she herself is so much the product of her environment.

It is a hard choice that arises in any narrative, when the materials to be depicted are the events in the life of an unsophisticated spirit or a listless intellect. If it is the very flavor of particular occurrences that are to be portrayed, the tale must be looked at as the simple being saw it; and still a simple soul cannot relate the happenings sufficiently. A change in the point of view is essential.

Also in Madame Bovary, we must point out, there is no other character in the novel who has the opportunity to continue the thread of the story when Emma proves inadequate. There is no other person present at the events who observes and comprehends more than she does; insight and discernment are nowhere in Yonville to any degree -- this is an essential point. Then the author's omniscient powers and no one else's must provide what is lacking. This need, to a creator of Flaubert's keenly sensitive awareness of cause and result, requires a high degree of prudence. The transition must be accomplished smoothly, without attracting notice. Flaubert is not the type of story-teller who will openly acknowledge it; he will not "go behind" Emma, telling her version, and then directly, admittedly, return to his own persona and clarify matters, using his own greater knowledge. There is nothing more disappointing in a novel than to be aware of an author shifting his mask in this manner -- discarding the persona through whom he has been speaking and revealing himself as a spectator observing the action.

87-89: "the great / him perfect"; VL. Possibly Thackeray, among the highly gifted, is the only writer who appears to obtain a really headstrong satisfaction in harming his own fiction by abuse of this sort; there are instances when Thackeray will even brag of his autonomy, in effect asserting his privilege to write whatever suits him about his characters and to force them to act as he chooses. But without using Thackeray's unrestrained freedom a novelist may still mar his narrative by allowing too stark a difference between the internal description of Emma's thoughts -- Emma's or Becky's, whoever it is -- and the detached picture that he sees himself, between the actual

participation that is reflected in another imagination and that which is formed by his own. When a reader has been drawn into a character's experience in a story and absorbed the complete sensation it imparts, it is a blow for him to be torn from the scene and assigned a removed position; it is a blow that must be muted in some manner. If not, it may weaken whatever was honest and powerful in the experience; for now there is a different prospect of it, outside and objective, and a different intellect operating, the writer's -- and that sensation of having been a part of the experience of the character is suddenly destroyed.

Flaubert's method of concealing the appearance of such contradiction is not an exclusive skill of his, no doubt. Indeed, it is likely true that he was unaware of it, as much as he was conscious of most of the subtleties of his art; and possibly it is just a trick that might be innate to any good storyteller. But it piques curiosity to trace Flaubert's style to the absolute conclusion, for it endures to perfection; and I believe we are able to explain it now. I would claim, therefore, that he handles the problem I have discussed by always holding Emma a little apart, even when he seems to be ranging within her thoughts most freely. He relates her inner experience and emotions, positions us to look through her eyes -- that is true; but he accomplishes this with an appearance of distance that prohibits our ever associating completely with her. Here is the way she reasoned and experienced emotion, he seems to tell us; observe and you will comprehend; this is the nature of the spirit of this silly female. A suggestion of irony is always implied, and it is sufficient to keep us from becoming one with her awareness, engrossed in it past an easy

return to our own. The woman's experience is exceedingly genuine, wholly perceived; yet the reader is required to receive his share in it as an enjoyable experiment, the sort of experiment that is interesting to a refined inquisitiveness -- there is no possibility of its being more than this. The reality of Emma is accepted with total seriousness, certainly; she is there to be scrutinized and examined, and no way of comprehending her perspective will be overlooked. But her worth is a different question; on that matter Flaubert never has a moment's illusion, at all times he realizes she has no value.

He recognizes this without stating it, certainly; his appraisal of her is just suggested; it is in his style -- never in what he says, which constantly respects her own opinion of herself. His irony, just the same, is ever-present and essential; he has a specific use for this capacity and could not give it up.

90: "of disdain. From / out."; VL. [Emma's style was completely believable while she was expressing herself, but we were always aware that a deeper intellect was observing her exhibition with a little bit] of disdain. Occasionally it leaves her and starts to render the world of Homard and Binet and Lheureux and the others, in a manner that far surpasses any idea that she is capable of conceiving. Still there is no jarring movement in this, no clumsy replacement of one code of values for another; very tactfully the same quality of excellence has governed in every part.

91: "manages this / glance into"; VL. [We have seen Emma's relation to her husband through her eyes, but it would also be helpful to know how

her husband really sees her.] Flaubert handles this skillfully, shaping his method to accomplish an additional aim as he does it. For he must bear in mind that his tale is not completed with the death of Emma; the denouement comes, not when she dies, but when her husband unwittingly learns of her prolonged infidelity, when early in his period of grieving he chances upon the small parcel of letters that exposes her. The climactic moment that completes the story is in the final blow of irony which furnishes the man this extended glimpse [into the past, and through this glimpse shows his own confusion, because his only reaction is a kind of stunned bewilderment.]

92: "a critic / from one"; VL. [The groundwork for Charles's final reaction had been laid at the beginning of the book when the reader is told of Charles's youth, first marriage, and his past up until he meets Emma. Flaubert knew that a knowledge of Charles's background would be needed at the end. Madame Bovary is a well-made book, all the different methods that are needed to tell the story are used, but the different methods used are carefully limited to the story's bare needs. It is a book that is a good starting point for a study of the methods of fiction. That is why I have examined in detail a work of which otherwise] a critic might deduce another opinion. I recall how Flaubert maligned his topic while he was writing about it; his fondness for vivid hues and tastes was offended by the dull writing of this type of narrative -- so he believed and declared. But as time went by and he labored from one chapter to the next, [did he begin to sense that it was not much of a theme, even of its type?]

99: "that is / again, by so"; VL. [Thackeray's Vanity Fair is a panoramic presentation of a story, giving an impression of the well-to-do London society of a hundred years ago. To create an impression of Becky's career, an overall look and concise explanation of her accumulating problems,] is what Thackeray sets out to show us.

He goes about it with an easy confidence. From his eminence he scans about, absorbs the overall impression with his broad imagination, makes his own the variations of its tone; then, reaching closer he grasps the particular item that brings it to life. However, the feeling of the vast overview is his first concern. When he looks back on Becky's career in London and all the consequences of her efforts to win a place in that city, he is quickly overtaken by many different recollections, defining little episodes, fragments of conversation that reveal the direction of her affairs; but these appear to float up incidentally, they flash in his brain as he remembers the past. They illuminate the meaning he wants to disclose, and he uses them to good effect. He touches upon them lightly, though, without pausing or detailing much; a suggestion, an instant, a quick look, is enough for the share that some episode or piece of dialogue is to add to the overall picture. For example, notice how casually, over and over, and with how little planning of how to finish a deliberate scene, Thackeray floats into his narrative of a conversation or action of Becky's. She starts to talk, you discover there is another person present, you discover they are in a particular room at a particular time; meaning becomes apparent unexpectedly in a reminiscence. Fleeting, to all outward appearance quite by chance, the little scene appears and disappears; there is a pause to look and listen, and then the current flows on once more,

[adorned and supported by that incident.]

100: "That foreshortening / is so great"; VL. [Or even at a crisis time, it is as if Thackeray soars above the scene, giving quick and penetrating glimpses of it, but giving no sequential dramatic action.] That condensing and broadening, that blending of particulars, that subjection of the moment and the event to the general impression, are the essential parts of the pictorial craft in which Thackeray is so exceptionally skilled.

101: "the great / directly"; VL. [As long as Thackeray is sketching a panoramic view of life, his style is beyond mere compliments. But when he reaches the final, climatic scene, there is a strange loss of confidence in his skill. He can no longer show us Becky with his eyes; he must reveal her to our own. The big problem has become, does Becky finally fail? When we consider all that we have] heard of her efforts it has become the important question, and the power of its resolution will be damaged if it is not presented with the best possible justification. The best of which he is capable, better even than Thackeray's marvelous description of her, will be the straightforward and instant presentation of the answer, its visible form in a scene that shall pass directly before us.

101: "throughout, they / for what"; VL. [The form that was not required earlier in the story is now absolutely necessary.] Up to now, almost in every part, the characters have been the puppets of Thackeray's mind, they have been overtly and admittedly the creations of his imagination.

At this time they must step out, announce themselves, and be perceived for what they are.

102: "dramatic / climax"; VL. [Although Thackeray does have the characters come forward in the final passage, he achieves this needed climax with a definite change of method. This scene has an artificial appearance when compared with the reminiscent style of the earlier chapters. It appears to be theatrical, melodramatic.] The extravagant drama has no deadly fascination for Thackeray; therefore if he is histrionic in this scene, it is not because it would be natural for him, given his opportunity. It is precisely because he is required at any price to make the denouement of his novel speak, with no remaining doubt or question [that he is forced to use contrivances that are awkward for him.]

103: "of it. / party at"; VL. [I am not trying to criticize Vanity Fair. I am just pointing out that Thackeray's method of writing a novel did not prepare in advance for the final big dramatic scene. It is as though he never quite trusted his characters to speak for themselves. The high point of Becky's exciting experience presented an obvious opening for complete theatrical] effect, if he had decided to benefit from it. He had repeatedly heaped up his impression, he had cautiously garnered all the significance of the matter to come together at one point; all things were prepared for the momentous occasion of Becky's victory in the presence of society, one unforgettable evening at the Gaunt House party. [It is unbelievable that he missed the chance to show the action fairly and squarely and set up the approaching scene for

the disastrous climax.]

104: "closed after all. There / social career,"; VL. [Yet Thackeray does miss the chance; the evening ends in a triumph and leaves the narrative entirely unchanged.] There is no quality here but Thackeray's entertaining, unrestrained discussion concerning the action; he cannot decide to make room for it and provide the scene with the open space it demands. And if you ask what type of clearness I have in mind, I have only to call attention to another page, near by, which illustrates it exactly. Becky had gone to Gaunt House earlier; she had eaten there, near the start of her social ascent, and had discovered herself in trouble. [When she sits at the piano to play for the noble ladies, she meets their frigid hostility; but when the men return the moment is over. With that short passage, Thackeray moves the story forward and shows Becky and her fragile position.]

111: "relation / the bare"; VL. [I have described Thackeray's method of writing a novel as "panoramic." I have also used "pictorial" for the same method. The contrasting method that appears in a novel is "dramatic." I do not know that they are the best names, but they have been used technically in the criticism of fiction.] It is a problem, I said, of the reader's connection to the writer; in one instance the reader turns toward the narrator and pays attention to him, in the other instance he looks at the story and observes it. In the action on a stage in the produced play, a member of the audience apparently has no immediate involvement with the playwright in any way, while the drama is going forward. The playwright puts the actors' lines in their mouths,

withdraws from them so they create their own effects, permits us, the spectators, to form in our minds whatever we can from it. The movement of existence is in front of us, the perspective, observing intelligence of the creator is outside, ignored. That is drama; and when we consider a novelist as contrasted to a playwright, it is plain to see that in the complete meaning of the word there is no such thing as drama in a novel. The novelist may provide the actual words that his characters speak, their dialogue, but nevertheless he is himself required to intervene to describe how the characters looked, where they were, and what action was taking place. If he presents no more than unadorned [dialogue, he is creating a type of play; just so, when a dramatist enlarges his play with "stage-directions" and publishes the text to be read, he has actually created a type of novel.]

112: "so. Maupassant's / whom he"; VL. [I will now discuss the other method of fiction, which I will name drama. A definite line cannot be drawn between the pictorial and the dramatic methods, but Maupassant is a good example of the dramatic approach.] Maupassant's concept of a tale (and not exclusively Maupassant's, certainly, yet his name is appropriate) would propose a form that you shaped and surrendered to the reader, forsaking it and having it remain alone with him; Thackeray's concept would be more like a long and convivial conversation with the reader, a comrade with whom he must set up precise conditions.

113: "that was / drama."; VL. [Now, the contrast is understood. But how is the difference illustrated in Thackeray's Esmond and Maupassant's La Maison Tellier?] Each book portrays an image that was in the

author's mind; yet the tale proceeds into Thackeray's novel as a "picture," and proceeds into Maupassant's in a different form -- I term it "drama."

113: "can. Cer- / tell itself."; VL. [Maupassant's drama is told in a way that puts the reader in the midst of the action. The reader forgets Maupassant and follows the scene as if it were happening before his eyes.] Of course he is "telling" us something, but the action is so present, so easily understood, that the plot devices he uses, by which it comes to us, are not observed; the yarn seems to spin itself.

115: "not dramatic / is the"; VL. Therefore, a great part of a work of fiction that is not dialogue and action, that is not like a view into life, always leans toward the pictorial, to someone's mental image. Faced with an episode -- like Becky's important scene, again -- we are not aware that it is someone else's creation; but immediately when the tale returns to narrative form the problem comes up. Who is controlling the disclosure of random data, whose is this different point of view? It is the ["omniscient author."]

115: "convention / really self-"; VL. By accepted custom the author is permitted his universal understanding of the story and its characters. Yet it is a custom only, and a novelist who exercises care and foresight does not stretch it beyond its need. In Vanity Fair Thackeray does not exercise care and foresight; his style, so rarely exactly dramatic, is such that due to its basic traits it is likely to force this problem of the story-teller's right to decide, and he seems to try to stress the

problem even more. He brandishes the reality that it is his own point of view, not to be confused with that of any character in the novel. Because of this, his book, we might state, is not whole in itself, not actually held together on its own.

140: "some guise or"; CK. [In Meredith's Harry Richmond, written in the first-person narrative, the method of autobiography fails when Harry's consciousness should be dramatized. Although the first-person is very useful for heightening the pictorial effect, when the reader must rely on another narrator to come between the reader and the story] in some aspect or other, it is more desirable [to be familiar with the narrator and to know him as a proper part of the tale, than to be distracted from the novel by the author.]

147: "from himself. / man and"; VL. [A contrast with the limited use of the autobiographical method is the method whereby the author places the reader at a window, and the window opens not only onto action, but into the depths of a character's mind, his very life. Henry James's book The Ambassadors is an illustration of a book in which a character's mind is dramatized.] In this way the novelist forces his responsibility more and more apart from himself. The novel he authors is finally his; but it seems meager and weak if he publicly declares it as his, or anyway it becomes much stronger the minute he ascribes its origin to someone else. The writer vows, this is not my creation, you are not familiar with me. It is the tale of this man or woman who is telling it, and he or she is a human being with whom you can identify. You may understand for yourselves how the situation came up, these two [being the way they are

. . . .]

252: "done? It is managed"; CK. [I take the whole complex problem of method in the craft of fiction to be ruled by the question of point of view. One way to eliminate the author as the narrator is to introduce a narrator who is in the story himself. But if the narrator is himself the subject of the story, how can the writer tell it without resorting to the omniscient author point of view?] It is contrived by repeating [the same device, an additional change of the point of view. This time the onlooker, the eavesdropper, the reader himself is positioned at the point from which to look; he is not to be presented with an explanation or a statement, to some degree believable, but given a straight view of the subject itself, while it is happening.]

CHAPTER XII

Pepper, Stephen C. The Basis of Criticism In the Arts. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1946. Kinney 274.

4: "tion. The point / and, if"; UL. Skeptics, just like those searching for firm belief, must examine the evidence. Skeptics will hope it is lacking; non-skeptics will hope it is present.

6: "of corroboration / we are"; BR, PUL. Multiplicative corroboration, providing facts related to physics and the sciences, is obtained by repeated empirical testing until a verifiable conclusion is achieved.

7: "with / different"; BR. Structural corroboration involves creating an opinion by comparing many variable data until they gradually merge toward a single outcome or result.

23: "of the same / definition"; CK [this mark comes at the end of one paragraph and at the beginning of another]. Various students of art have appealed to common sense to provide examples and definitions of beauty. More elaborate theories have usually been tested against these common-sense standards. Two different descriptions of objects commonly considered beautiful are thus considered to be competing descriptions of the same thing. [CK] Describing certain manmade creations or works of nature as beautiful because they are commonly considered beautiful is a general principle yet to be proved. While it is a very useful tool, it

is only an hypothesis and cannot be considered valid; it can only be assumed. To use it as a standard is to use it dogmatically. Indeed, when an exact definition is given of the required qualities of art, the commonly accepted definitions of beauty are surpassed.

31: "fallacy of their / and have"; MN "Imp." [Important?] I believe that I have explained to you the error of new attempts to reach logical conclusions merely by relying on definitions of words and that I have reestablished your faith in definitions based on observing reality.

52: "ciple when / faction"; UL. Santayana wrote that the true value of a creative work has nothing to do with the ability of all people to enjoy it; the real proof of its worth is how much, and what depth of, fulfillment it provides to the one who is most aware of its value.

52: "If now it / who is much"; VL. One could ask, "How on this basis can a Titian be superior to a Varga girl?" The answer would be that any normal man could see the value of a Varga girl. However, a man who cannot understand the appeal of a Titian is deficient. A man who has developed the ability to see differences would see the value of the Varga girl but would understand that she does not replace a real girl, of whom the Varga girl is a mere copy. At the same time, he would realize that nothing could replace the Titian.

65: "best / analysis"; VL. The surest way to learn what elements (if present in an aesthetic work) will increase the intensity of emotional response in its observer is to examine the elements that produce an

opposite effect. There are mainly three reasons for a weakened response: (1) habit, custom, cultural mores; (2) practical pursuit of results; and (3) detailed examination.

65: "Quality / situation"; UL. A practical approach tends to weaken an intense response because such an approach is eager to achieve a result or to solve a problem. It thus diverts the mind from any intense response to the present in order to consider a possible future solution.

65: "the para- / greatest; UL. Paradoxically, however, both pragmatic methods and detailed examination, when skillfully handled, can be strong forces for increasing quality of response or experience.

68: "contextualistic view. He / quality"; UL. The critic must decide to what extent the artist has communicated his vision of experience -- the intensity and the breadth he has achieved. He will decide if the artist has fully exploited his emotional material, or has exceeded artistic boundaries and thereby destroyed aesthetic distance. He will consider the work in relation to the society for which it was created and consider the appropriateness of its construction. And to aid the spectator, he will examine the construction and explain its constituent parts so that the spectator will not overlook them and so that he will achieve a full vision of the work in its total complex unity.

69: "awareness of / factors"; UL. The mental image formed of an aesthetic work obviously involves the consciousness of the different characteristics of the circumstance.

71: "art is the / It is P₁+"; UL. This means that the aesthetic work of art is the sum of one's successively discrete mental impressions of it.

71: "therefore / untrust-"; UL. The only sufficient assessment of a work of art is thus based on the fullest possible awareness of it, which is derived from many previous impressions of it.

74: "the sphere of art"; UL. For organicism as a world hypothesis, intrinsic worth in the field of art involves the synthesis of emotions.

77: "'incarnate' [he] / 'body-and-mind.'"; CK. [Pepper quotes]

Bosanquet's organistic explanation of a work of art as emotion becoming "organized," "plastic," or "incarnate." According to Bosanquet, this organized trait of artistic emotion is essential, for emotion which has assumed the concrete form or shape of a work of art is no longer merely a temporary individual response to an external stimulus.

83: "object. The / observing."; UL. The intrinsic worth of a work of art as a synthesis of emotions is as free from the creator's personal conception of his goals or intentions when he was creating as the intellectual worth of a scientific explanation of fact is free of the scientist's hypothesis when he began his empirical tests.

83: "The aesthetic / guidance"; UL. The artistic elements seek their own fulfilling form and balance through the artist, who does not determine their finished shape but who instead follows the lead they provide.

87: "judg- / range"; MN: "Croce in the woodpile." The theory is that the critic, in the process of evaluating the work of art, reproduces or recreates the original work that the artist produces.

89: "artist / materials"; CK, CK. [Since an organistic critic can specify exactly when and where he thinks an artist has gone wrong in the creative process, he opens himself to criticism.] He, like the artist, has demonstrated the quality of his imagination to shape a work of art.

89: "spectator is / construction. The spectator"; UL. If the onlooker is displeased or unfulfilled by a work of art, then the problem is whether the creator or the spectator was wrong in constructing or perceiving the work.

98: "in aesthetic / it. Ruskin"; UL. It is noteworthy that the ["formistic"] theories of artistic criticism of both Ruskin and Taine were underpinned by the earlier views of Aristotle and Aquinas, although neither had any idea of this fact and would have been disturbed by the knowledge.

101: "value / If value"; UL. And the method of deciding intrinsic worth is of the utmost importance, since the method supplies the basic boundaries and rules for judging worth once the method has been decided upon.

102: "species be? What is a normal man? / It is not"; UL. Determining who is a normal man [i.e., one who provides a norm for the species] does

not involve an averaging of traits.

103: "always takes / the aesthetic"; UL. Formism takes into account that nature always finally determines what kind of adaptation is healthy. This realization is formism's great gift to knowledge, and this insight has ubiquitous (though frequently unnoted) implications for every part of human life, including the artistic.

105: "The imi- / imitation of the"; UL; MN: "not mutually exclusive with the mechanist distinction of art & non art." [In formistic theories of imitation], the likeness is not of a certain person, but of the universal human standard which the represented individual symbolizes.

112: "have been skillful / He is a supreme"; UL. Certain artists [such as Leonardo, Michelangelo, El Greco, Bocklin, Rousseau, and Picasso] know how to create works that release a person's unconscious and repressed feelings without overwhelming or scaring him, thereby leading him to gain an elevated feeling rather than a feeling of revulsion. Dali, on the other hand, is simply a realist who focuses on specifics (like Zola). He is an ultimate craftsman but cannot produce the emotion of catharsis.

146: "central / made up"; UL. The work of art [that can be appreciated and perhaps judged] is composed of the totality of a sequence of distinct perceptions.

148: "So far / intermittent"; UL. We have discovered that the focus of

critical artistic assessment consists of insights which are the isolated and intermittent outcomes of input from two ongoing forces ["continuants"].

149: "appreciation in a / in their"; UL. The focus of an assessment or appreciation of a work of art is not one or another successive random insights, but is instead the total series of insights, "P₁-P₂-P₃-P₄," which we will label the "perceptive series." This sum of perceptions is truly the created work of art.

156: "perceptible / all"; MN: "?." From this insight [that a work of art must inevitably pass through the medium of a human interpreter] we realize that a single artistic creation may have several acceptable explications or explanations, and that each response may be appropriate.

156-57: "all belonging / interpretations. In"; UL. The total assessment of the worth of the complete work of art would therefore have to take into account all the acceptable explications or responses. When this is comprehended, we then understand that to some extent any kind of artistic creation may have several interpretations.

157: "In / Fifth"; MN: "differing in kind as well as degree." In a painting, for example, the lines may be assumed to portray an image, or they may be considered as component parts of the whole abstract design. Therefore, the painting may be seen either as an imitative image or as a shaped, abstract composition. Or, the two understandings may be combined in one that includes both. However, the same kinds of lines

may form patterns that seem contrary to each other (suggesting, for instance, either depth or surface ornamentation). Yet contrary patterns like these cannot be combined into a single vivid perception, just as two different readings of a line of music cannot, even though each may recall or suggest the other.

Thus we realize that a work of art may contain various built-in ambiguities or suggest differing responses. Indeed, many critics believe that the more possible interpretations a work can sustain, the greater is its artistic worth. This is one way that a work of art is different from a scientific datum, since the latter is expected to be understandable in only one way. This difference warns us not to try to use scientific and pragmatic standards of evaluation when evaluating a work of art. The standards of validity differ in each case.

Thus a musical score illustrates how difficult it is to impose a single reading on a work of art, just as it illustrates the likelihood of equally valid interpretations of the same work. Yet a score also illustrates another trait of many works of art -- their multiple physical existences. While there may be only one painting named "Toledo" by El Greco, there may be thousands of scores of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, and each of them is as real as the others.

158: "While / that can"; CK. We should acknowledge the help that reproductions can give us in constructing our perception of an artistic creation. [For instance, there is a good copy of El Greco's "Toledo." The copy is a many-faceted work that has much worth on its own. But the worth all comes from its likeness to the original El Greco.]

164: "cultural / compulsion"; UL. Once we realize that other people influence any one person's perception, we see that a culture is an on-going influence on one's artistic understanding of any work of art. Language forces us to see this, since words would have no control over an individual's meanings if language were not a social phenomenon controlled by social usage.

166: "multiplicity / culture has"; UL. A culture derives its vitality and existence from the interactions and relations of its component individuals.

166: "to the perceived / the subjects that"; MN: "?" [If a hundred different persons study El Greco's "Toledo," will there not be a hundred different mental and emotional inputs into the understanding of the work], and therefore, a hundred different insights resulting in a hundred different artistic works? Is the painting really one work of art to so many distinct perceivers, or is it not as diverse as all the persons who perceive it?

166: "must have / not be"; UL. [This book has argued that] a high degree of artistic relativism [the theory that truths may vary according to the individual] cannot be asserted.

170: "perceptions with / sonances"; UL. According to a mechanist [a person who is interested in the technical composition of a work], one can clearly distinguish between hearing a combination of tones that clash and liking or disliking that clash. According to this view, a

piece of modern music, when listened to by a pair of equally capable critics, may sound nearly the same to both of them. They could therefore strongly agree about the arrangement and the functional union of parts of the piece, yet one might dislike the piece and the other like it, because of the clash of tones.

171: "judgment and the / each other"; UL. [However, for an organicist critic], perceiving a work and evaluating its intrinsic worth are activities that blend with and mutually affect one another.

CHAPTER XIII

Van Doren, Mark. Nathaniel Hawthorne. New York: Viking, Compass C23, 1957 (New York, 1949). Kinney 387.

62: "America. No author, / does not find"; HVL. [Quoting from Hawthorne's preface to The Marble Faun explaining his choice of Italy as the setting of the novel:] "No author, without a trial, can conceive of the difficulty of writing a romance about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a commonplace prosperity, in broad and simple daylight, as is happily the case with my dear native land."

Hawthorne never willingly conceded that when an artist does not discover his subjects he must create them; [or, even better, discover them after a long search.]

63: "'who . . . / to touch.'" VL. [Quoting Poe about Hawthorne's monotonous literary voice:] "The author who . . . is merely at all times quiet, is, of course," said Poe in his devastating way, "upon most occasions merely silly and stupid." Poe admitted that Hawthorne was not perpetually low-keyed, but he felt that Hawthorne lacked an "ever-present force of imagination, giving its own hue, its own character to everything it touches, and, especially, self-impelled to touch [everything]."

66: "knew Dante,"; CK. [One of the tasks that Hawthorne either could

not or would not undertake was the task of controlling his allegories so that their meanings were always sound and understandable. Dante never evaded this duty. Hawthorne was] familiar with Dante, but he was more familiar with Spenser and Bunyan, and [they are less skillful artists].

67: "is a good thing / to seem,"; VL. [Hawthorne] knew that allegory is a suitable style only when it includes "the history and experience of many souls." He was aware that a concept must be formed in a way that it appears true

67: "greater than / this art." VL. Although where there are halves they must be equal parts, Hawthorne understood plainly that one half of a tale must appear to be the total story. That half is the part that can be seen or visualized, the reality that has become a concept, the material that has flared up and become something visible. Unquestionably no poet has been flawless in this skill.

67: "energy / consistent, or in the"; VL. [Those who have approached closest to flawlessness] are the ones who most frequently have discovered symbols that would support their total power; and this has been the situation with those whose fundamental beliefs concerning life have been most coherent.

126: "was the vacuum / man in"; VL, UL. [For Hawthorne solitude] was the emptiness of boredom and hopelessness that no spiritual beliefs had ever assuaged -- in fact, to know and acknowledge the void was the purpose of religion. Hawthorne was aware of this and understood that

Emerson was not. That was the reason that Emerson could not obtain anything from him [Hawthorne]. Hawthorne's stories posed a challenge to every Transcendental principle and judged it mistaken. For Hawthorne, the philosophy that prided itself in having passed beyond the medieval times was like the present-day minister in "The Christmas Banquet" who had "gone astray" [quotation continues in next marked passage]

126: "from the firm / to go.;" SQ. ". . . from the firm foundation of an ancient faith and wondered into a cloud region where everything was misty and deceptive; looking forward, he beheld vapors piled on vapors, and behind him an impassable gulf between the man of yesterday and today." Hawthorne has survived that philosophy, no matter how out-of-date its disciples considered him in his day. It was a stillborn theory under the most favorable circumstances, with no possibility of growth. Henry James called it a sunrise without a noon.

127: "ideas to come.;" CK. [If the style of Hawthorne's existence at the Old Manse was lonely, it probably appeared to be a different kind of loneliness, for he was very productive there, and he wrote without difficulty -- according to Sophia, with] "reverent and patient" spaces of time spent in readiness for inspiration to arrive.

128: "by, not the thought / then created"; VL. [Hawthorne's satires were shallow because their themes were self-conscious and entertaining to him;] they were not the thought that controlled him despite himself, and that he turned from when he was able. In these works, with huge force but with something off-balance in his imagination, he speeds

through the world to arrange its pieces into patterns he considers reasonable. "The New Adam and Eve" fantasizes that Father Miller's Day of Doom has finally arrived and has destroyed all humanity; a single male and a single female are soon produced to stroll through the remains and judge what [was natural, and what was art, in the culture that existed.]

148: "in them. Hawthorne / not what"; VL. [Hawthorne's habit of having his characters use rhetoric in expressing emotion makes them appear cold. This coldness was added onto the coldness he habitually ascribed to them. Also he declined to explain the good and evil in the characters.] Hawthorne had nurtured in himself a liability toward abstraction. The abstract is indispensable to storytelling, but at a more profound plane than the one the poet shows us. Abstraction is the element that causes the characters to be ultimately significant and totally stimulating. But when abstraction is presented for our view in the deflecting form of chance and personal traits, of dialogue and action, it distracts us so that we can neither trust intellectually nor respond emotionally. In The Scarlet Letter Hawthorne has finally created characters who can contain all of his ideas, and so unconsciously that even he forgets what his ideas are. He can concentrate on the characters, not what they symbolize.

172: "all in one / that it will."; VL. [Hawthorne wrote in 1851 to Bridge concerning The House of The Seven Gables that] "I had only to get my pitch, and could then go on interminably. Many passages of this book ought to be finished with the minuteness of a Dutch picture, in order to

give them their proper effect. Sometimes, when tired of it, it strikes me that the whole is an absurdity from beginning to end; but the fact is, in writing a romance, a man is always, or always ought to be, careering on the utmost verge of a precipitous absurdity, and the skill lies in coming as close as possible, without actually tumbling over. My prevailing idea is, that the book ought to succeed better than The Scarlet Letter, though I have no idea that it will."

178: "man's. By usable / among the 'yes-gentry.'"; HVL. [Melville, writing of Hawthorne's ability to portray particular areas of human tragedy better than any other writer, stated that] "By usable truth, we mean the apprehension of the absolute condition of present things as they strike the eye of the man who fears them not, though they do their worst to him There is the grand truth about Nathaniel Hawthorne. He says NO! in thunder; but the Devil himself cannot make him say yes. For all men who say yes, lie." When Hawthorne read these final statements, with an amused expression as was his usual reaction to their writer's effusiveness, he possibly recalled Emerson in Concord and questioned if Melville numbered that local saint among the "yes-gentry."

179: "this intellect / He ex-."; VL. [Melville saw Hawthorne as a man whose capacity for affection and whose sense of the comic were rooted in a "great, deep intellect." But that affection and taste for the comic were only the eyes with which this brilliant mind rationally viewed the universe. Melville said that in back of those eyes was "a blackness ten-times black," a "great power of blackness" whose source was Hawthorne's unique "calvinistic sense of Innate Depravity and Original

Sin, from whose visitations, in some shape or other, no deeply thinking mind is always and wholly free Perhaps no writer has ever wielded this terrific thought with greater terror than this same harmless Hawthorne." Blackness "pervades him through and through Even his bright gildings but fringe and play upon the edges of thunderclouds." "A strong, positive illustration" is the tale of Goodman Brown, which is "as deep as Dante." Hawthorne, like Shakespeare, is a master of the "Great Art of Telling the Truth." "In one word, the world is mistaken in this Nathaniel Hawthorne." As for Melville, Hawthorne's blackness, which holds and intrigues him, had also influenced him as much as one intellect can influence another. "Already I feel that this Hawthorne has dropped germinous seeds into my soul. He ex[pands and deepens down, the more I contemplate him."]

CHAPTER XIV

Zilboorg, Gregory. Freud and Religion: A Restatement of an Old Controversy. Westminster, Md: The Newman Press, 1958. Kinney 58.

5: "created. Freud's / same trend."; VL. Freud's atheism is not essential to the pursuit of skillful psychoanalysis; Freud's instruction, in spite of all his intense feeling for atheism, is less of a peril to real belief in a higher Power than Jung's self-serving approach of a type of useful cause-and-effect that uses man's belief in God to assist in psychotherapy.

The articles furnished by Father Bruno Jesus-Marie, O.C.D. or Louis Beirnaert, S.J., are additional samples of the same general direction.

12: "views is brought / cessfully in"; VL. As soon as they take an anti-religious turn, intellects that have the greatest logical foundation unwittingly reveal that strongly sensitive state of mind which they appear to evade so desirably in their own scientific work.

25: "on a rather / subjectivity."; HVL. They [those who espouse a scientific faith] rely on a somewhat subtle personal interest which is presented as being detached. This detachment is scientific, but the entire system of current science is not only grounded, but demands to be grounded, in mankind's natural faculty of sense perception which, second to our emotions, is in all probability the truest servant of our

subjectivity.

31: "Freud mean / infantilism". How is that"; DVL. What did Freud intend to convey by religion? Freud responds: "'In my Future of an Illusion I was concerned much less with the deepest sources of religious feelings than with what the ordinary man understands by his religion.'" Jones comments on this that Freud later wrote in addition that this is the sole religion that should carry the distinction of religion. This meaning is plain at the present time. The religion that Freud was thinking of was not truly religion but the partially romantic, partially worrying posture toward God taken by the ordinary man one meets. It is the distressed, crouching faith of the little man who is affected by the weight of the condition that Freud describes as "'the forcible imposition of mental infantilism.'"

40: "lems of death, / tone of"; VL. . . . the questions of "death, immortality, and religious faith" (and each of these possibly owns its separate place in the human mind) are not bound by rules; in other words, each person must find the answer for himself, and Freud's beliefs on these matters are not binding for psychoanalysts. Psychoanalytic learning does not demand acceptance of Freud's judgments on religion and supplementary subjects. These are individual beliefs of Freud, possibly intensely personal, and tied to his own private emotional experience. And it is in view of this emotional experience, of which in the past we have been permitted only brief inklings and random illuminations, that it will finally become possible to understand the mental evolution in addition to the whole emotional quality of Freud's opinions.

49: "inspired with the / he reduced religion"; VL. He [Freud] appears to have been driven with the necessity to dispose of religion -- possibly it upset him and made him a bit uncomfortable. But Freud did not give himself the task of mastering the whole import of religion. In place of that, he to some degree altered it to a measure of his own preference. As stated before, he decreased religion to the mental image held by the ordinary man.

59: "psychoanalytic / and the unknown.>"; VL. If this is a fact, what of the pursuit of psychoanalytic therapy? The reply is identical. The atheistic veneer of Freudian psychoanalysis neither separates nor in any other way protects psychoanalysis from the undeniable force of the human view of psychotherapy. This view exposes the human psyche as a matter of more than a complicated maze of psychological machinery and directs to the conclusion of a relationship above and beyond sensory experience between man and the unknown.

CHAPTER XV
LISTING OF VOLUMES EXAMINED
CLASSIFIED BY SUBJECT

The following list classifies the books examined according to Arthur F. Kinney's catalog, Flannery O'Connor's Library: Resources of Being. In his "Notes on the Catalog," Kinney writes that the rough general divisions of his listing are O'Connor's own divisions (11).

Philosophy

Jung, C. G. The Undiscovered Self.

Religion

Eliade, Mircea. Patterns in Comparative Religion.

Hostie, Raymond, S.J. Religion and the Psychology of Jung.

Zilboorg, Gregory. Freud and Religion: A Restatement of an Old Controversy.

The Arts

Pepper, Stephen C. The Basis of Criticism in the Arts.

Literature

Beach, Joseph Warren. The Twentieth Century Novel: Studies in Technique.

Foerster, Norman, John C. McGalliard, Rene Wellek, Austin Warren, and William L. Schram. Literary Scholarship: Its Aims and Methods.

James, Henry. Hawthorne.

James, Henry. The Future of the Novel: Essays on the Art of Fiction.

Levin, Harry. The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne, Poe, Melville.

Lubbock, Percy. The Craft of Fiction.

Van Doren, Mark. Nathaniel Hawthorne.

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- James, Henry. Hawthorne. 1887. Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, [n.d.]
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Ed. with an introduction by Leon Edel. New York: Vintage Books, 1956.
- Jung, C. G. The Undiscovered Self. Trans. R. F. C. Hull.
New York: The New American Library, 1959.
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Athens: U of Georgia P, 1985.
- Levin, Harry. The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne, Poe, Melville.
New York: Vintage Books, 1960 (New York, 1958).

- Lubbock, Percy. The Craft of Fiction. 1921. New York: Peter Smith, 1945.
- O'Connor, Flannery. Mystery and Manners, Occasional Prose.
 Selected and edited by Sally and Robert Fitzgerald. 1961.
 New York: Noonday Press, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995.
- Flannery O'Connor, The Complete Stories. 1971. New York: The Noonday Press, 1994.
- The Habit of Being: Letters. Ed. Sally Fitzgerald. 1979.
 New York: Noonday Press, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993.
- Wise Blood. 1949. New York: The Noonday Press, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993.
- The Violent Bear it Away. 1960. New York: The Noonday Press, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991.
- Pearson, Michael. Imagined Places, Journeys into Literary America.
 Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1991.
- Pepper, Stephen C. The Basis of Criticism in the Arts.
 Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1946.
- Van Doren, Mark. Nathaniel Hawthorne. New York: Viking, Compass C23, 1957 [New York, 1949].
- Zilboorg, Gregory. Freud and Religion: A Restatement of an Old Controversy. Westminster, Md: The Newman Press, 1958.